F. A. Hayek's realistic economic theory has been replaced by the formalistic use of equlibrium models that bear little resemblance to reality. These models are as serviceable to the right as to the left: they allow the economist either to condemn capitalism for failing to measure up to the model of perfect competition, or to praise capitalism as a utopia of perfect knowledge and rational expectations. Hayek, by contrast, used equilibrium to show that while capitalism is not perfect, it contains (...) error‐correcting institutions that bring it closer to perfection than is intuitively apparent. (shrink)

F. A. Hayek's realistic economic theory has been replaced by the formalistic use of equlibrium models that bear little resemblance to reality. These models are as serviceable to the right as to the left: they allow the economist either to condemn capitalism for failing to measure up to the model of perfect competition, or to praise capitalism as a utopia of perfect knowledge and rational expectations. Hayek, by contrast, used equilibrium to show that while capitalism is not perfect, it contains (...) error‐correcting institutions that bring it closer to perfection than is intuitively apparent. (shrink)

Following the October Revolution of 1917 the Bolsheviks embarked upon a series of initiatives in order to bring about a socialist economic order. Traditional accounts of these events?"War Communism?; and the New Economic Policy?are deficient in two respects. First, they do not consider the policy implications of early twentieth?century Marxism. Second, they do not appreciate the economic coordination problems such policies would, and did, encounter. As a result, the standard account of early Soviet socialism is distorted. This paper attempts to (...) rectify these deficiencies by discussing the Bolshevisks? own assessments of their purposes and exploring the consequences of their policies in the period 1918?1921. (shrink)

Hayek argued that the central question of economics is the coordination problem: How does the spontaneous interaction of many purposeful individuals, each having dispersed bits of subjective knowledge, generate an order in which the actors' subjective data are coordinated in a way that enables them to dovetail their plans and activities successfully? In attempting to solve this problem, Hayek outlined an approach to economic theorizing that takes seriously the limited, subjective nature of human knowledge. Despite purporting to have appropriated Hayek's (...) thought by acknowledging the information-transmitting role of prices, mainstream economists have missed Hayek's point. The predominant tool of formal economics—equilibrium analysis—begins by assuming the data held by actors to have been pre-reconciled, and so evades the problem to be solved. Even the more advanced tools for modeling knowledge in economic analysis, such as the economics of information, assume away either the subjectivism of knowledge and expectations (rendering the coordination of beliefs and plans a trivial matter) or the frictions and “imperfections” of reality (rendering the coordination problem indeterminate). (shrink)

Socialism is strictly “impossible.” Its impracticability is not, as Bryan Caplan has suggested, a “quantitative” matter, nor does he show that real‐world socialism's incentive problems outweighed its informational ones. Caplan's criticism of Ludwig von Mises's critique of the “possibility” of socialism fails to appreciate what he meant by “socialism” and misunderstands Mises's argument about economic calculation. History, too, suggests that socialism's informational deficiency was the most significant problem facing those who tried to implement socialism.

This volume critically explore and extend Hayek's Nobel Prize-winning work on knowledge and social interconnectedness from the disciplines of law, economics, philosophy, anthropology, political science, and history. Hayek's insights about knowledge become even more important once it is recognized that nothing in the social world occurs in isolation. There is no such thing as a distinct economic, political, or social sphere--they are inextricably intertwined. Given the range of both Hayek's work and the contributing authors' perspectives, the range of topics covered (...) in this volume is extraordinarily wide, running the gamut from immigration, to white supremacy, to ancient agricultural practices, to the nature of what it means to be free. (shrink)

Do markets generate a “just” wage? The answer to this question will depend upon the particular theory of the market that the political economist employs. When comparing actual labor markets with the neoclassical theory of competitive equilibrium as its normative benchmark, Joseph Heath argues that factor pricing is orthogonal to normative issues such as distributive justice. We argue that Heath’s conclusion, though not invalid, follows from a similar normative benchmark of equilibrium, one that evaluates factor pricing without taking into account (...) the institutional conditions within which factor prices emerge. Though indeed classical political economists and early neoclassical economists failed to deliver an explicit theory of distributive justice, what Heath overlooks is that implicit to their understanding of the market process was an institutional theory of distributive justice. (shrink)

Socialism is strictly “impossible.” Its impracticability is not, as Bryan Caplan has suggested, a “quantitative” matter, nor does he show that real‐world socialism's incentive problems outweighed its informational ones. Caplan's criticism of Ludwig von Mises's critique of the “possibility” of socialism fails to appreciate what he meant by “socialism” and misunderstands Mises's argument about economic calculation. History, too, suggests that socialism's informational deficiency was the most significant problem facing those who tried to implement socialism.

Economic formalism crowds out the analysis of change and adjustments to change under capitalism. The style of analytical narrative that was practiced by the first generation of neoclassical economists, in contrast, is more productive of genuine economic understanding. Despite Daniel Haus‐man's challenging argument to the contrary, I maintain that Joseph Stiglitz's work is formalist at its core. While I agree with Robert Heilbroner's critique of contemporary economics, there is a limited sense in which nonformalist economics can rely on universalistic assumptions. (...) And Thomas Mayer has provided useful guidelines for focusing nonformalist analysis on real‐world economic problems. (shrink)

This book review of How Bad Writing Destroyed the World: Ayn Rand and the Literary Origins of the Financial Crisis by Adam Weiner finds that the author's indictment of Rand and the alleged effects that her ideas had on generating the 2008 financial crisis exhibits no knowledge of the relevant scientific or historical literature on economic policy.

ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS: A MANIFESTO FOR MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS by Geoffrey Hodgson Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988. 365pp., $39.95 Traditional institutional economics argued that the methodological individualism of both classical and neoclassical economics was grounded in a false conception of human nature and a pre?scientific understanding of economic life. Geoffrey Hodgson has provided a restatement of this position and extended the institutionalist critique to modern developments within economics at both a positive and normative level. In the course of doing (...) so, Hodgson both draws on and differs from developments within modem Austrian economics. It is argued that Hodgson misunderstands key aspects of the Austrian project and as a result his indiscriminate criticisms of methodological individualism and classical liberalism are not convincing. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes two types of entrepreneurial activity in terms of their institutionally relevant contexts. Type 1 entrepreneurship refers to catallactic activity in which coordinating mechanisms, operating via the exchange of property rights, generates market prices. We identify Type 2 entrepreneurship with noncatallactic processes.The paper argues that scientific activity, despite exhibiting characteristics congenial to the economic way of thinking, cannot be generally studied as a catallactic process under prevailing institutional arrangements. Recent changes in the institutional context of science, however, suggest (...) a widening scope for treating science as a market activity.Cet article fait la distinction entre deux types d’activité entrepreneuriale suivant les contextes institutionnels où ils apparaissent. Le premier type d’activité entrepreneuriale s’inscrit dans un cadre catallactique où les mécanismes de coordination opérant à travers l’échange des droits de propriété génèrent les prix marchands. Le second type d’activité entrepreneuriale que nous identifions relève de processus non catallactiques. L’article soutient que, même si elle présente des caractéristiques qui pourraient relever de la pensée économique, l’activité scientifique telle qu’elle est pratiquée dans les conditions institutionnelles actuelles, ne peut en général pas être étudiée comme un processus catallactique.Cependant, les changements récents dans le contexte institutionnel de la science suggèrent la possibilité grandissante d’envisager la science comme une activité marchande. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSchumpeter’s theory of socialism pivots on his response to Ludwig von Mises’s claim that rational economic calculation is “impossible” in a socialist economy. Mises held that because socialism eliminates market prices for the means of production, it is impossible under socialism to know the relative scarcities of productive inputs, and thus to determine rationally which of any number of technologically feasible production projects to pursue. Schumpeter appears to assume away Mises’s epistemic concerns about socialism by contending that it is theoretically (...) possible to determine which goods should be produced in a socialist economy if all the relevant data are known—which begs the question Mises had asked. Did Schumpeter really commit such an elementary error of interpretation? Or was the appearance of doing so part of his attempt to communicate to the reader of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy a host of reservations about the likely consequences of socialism in practice, even as he ostentatiously praised its feasibility in principle? (shrink)

Abstract:This essay argues that liberty generates progress via the generalized increasing returns to commercial activity. These increasing returns to expanding commercial activity follow from the gradual, cumulative process of institutionalizing particular liberties. As a society adopts an institutional framework from accumulated liberties, there is greater scope for productive specialization and social cooperation under the division of labor. Greater scope for market exchange also delivers social norms and commercial values that tolerate experimentation and innovation. Taken together, the accumulation and institutionalization of (...) liberties gives rise to generalized increasing returns to commercial activity. It is through this cumulative process that the creative powers of a free civilization are unleashed, delivering societies from poverty and subjugation. (shrink)

The Austrian School of Economics is an intellectual tradition in economics and political economy dating back to Carl Menger in the late-19th century. Menger stressed the subjective nature of value in the individual decision calculus. Individual choices are indeed made on the margin, but the evaluations of rank ordering of ends sought in the act of choice are subjective to individual chooser. For Menger, the economic calculus was about scarce means being deployed to pursue an individual's highest valued ends. The (...) act of choice is guided by subjective assessments of the individual, and is open ended as the individual is constantly discovering what ends to pursue, and learning the most effective way to use the means available to satisfy those ends. This school of economic thinking spread outside of Austria to the rest of Europe and the United States in the early-20th century and continued to develop and gain followers, establishing itself as a major stream of heterodox economics. The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics provides an overview of this school and its theories. The various contributions discussed in this book all reflect a tension between the Austrian School's orthodox argumentative structure and its addressing of a heterodox problem situations. The Austrian economists from the founders to today seek to derive the invisible hand theorem from the rational choice postulate via institutional analysis in a persistent and consistent manner. Scholars and students working in the field of History of Economic Thought, those following heterodox approaches, and those both familiar with the Austrian School or looking to learn more will find much to learn in this comprehensive volume. (shrink)

Boettke and Butkevich argue that a vibrant society is an entrepreneurial society. Entrepreneur- ial effectiveness is a function of the free movement of economic actions – their alertness to opportunities for mutual gain, and their sense of when and where to enter and exit a market. Boettke and Butkevich focus not so much on the behavior of entrepreneurship, but the institutional conditions within which entrepreneurship takes place. They argue that policies which hinder the above ground legitimate expression of (...) entrepreneurial discovery must be eliminated for the further development of the Russian economy towards a market system and away from the current “virtual economy”. Institutions of governance must be established which reduce political uncertainty and encourage individuals to be willing to bet on their ideas and find the financing to bring those bets to life.Boettke et Butkevich suggèrent que l’activité entrepreneuriale est la force motrice d’une société. L’efficacité de l’activité entrepreneuriale dépend de la libre circulation des acteurs économiques – leur vigilance à l’égard des opportunités de gains mutuels, et leur jugement concernant les moment et lieu opportuns pour entrer sur un marché ou en sortir. Les auteurs mettent l’accent, pas tant sur le comportement des entrepreneurs, que sur les aménagements institutionnels à l’intérieur desquels l’activité entrepreneuriale a lieu. Ils considèrent que les politiques qui font obstacle aux manifestations légitimes de découverte entrepreneuriale doivent être éliminées pour accompagner le développement de l’économie russe vers une économie de marché, distincte de l’actuelle “économie virtuelle”. Des institutions de gouvernance qui réduisent l’incertitude politique doivent être établies. Ces institutions devraient aussi encourager les individus à parier sur leurs idées et à trouver des sources de financement pour instaurer ces idées. (shrink)

While markets are all around us, not all markets are the same. Markets come in a variety of colors based on the legality of activities in the specific market. As such, there is no market economy per se, but instead various shades of markets. The different shades of markets that are evidenced in practice directly depend on the institutional environment that makes certain activities legal or illegal. Shifts in the institutional environment are a result of entrepreneurial activity over the rules (...) of the game. The rules of the game and resulting shade of the market in turn impact entrepreneurs acting within those rules and hence economic development or the lack thereof.L’économie de marché est en réalité une économie des marchés. La variété des marchés s’explique par la légalité des activités sur chacun d’entre eux. Ainsi il n’existe pas une économie de marché en soi, mais plutôt plusieurs formes de marché. Ces formes manifestes de marché sont fonction de l’environnement institutionnel qui rend certaines activités légales ou illégales. Les changements de l’environnement institutionnel sont le résultat de l’activité entrepreneuriale en dehors des règles du jeu. Les règles du jeu ainsi que la forme du marché qui leur est associée influencent à leur tour les actions entrepreneuriales et donc le développement économique. (shrink)

Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s (...) evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way. (shrink)

Introduction -- What is political judgment? -- Foundations: Plato and Aristotle -- The Kantian Problematic -- The Arendtian Theory of Judgment -- Hermeneutics, tacit knowledge and neo-rationalism.

The case of very young children is a test case for the plausibility of reductionism about testimonial warrant. Reductionism requires reductive reasons, reductively justified and actively deployed for testimonial justification. Though nascent language-users enjoy warranted testimony based beliefs, they do not meet these three reductionist demands. This paper clearly formulates reductionism and the infant/child objection. Two rejoinders are discussed: an influential conceptual argument from Jennifer Lackey’s paper “Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection” and the growing empirical evidence from developmental psychology on (...) selective trust in children. Neither Lackey’s argument nor the empirical evidence vindicate reductionism. (shrink)

Historically, the hypothesis driving emotion research has been that emotion’s data-base—in language, physiology, and behavior— is organized around specific mental states, as reflected in evaluative language. It is suggested that this approach has not greatly advanced a natural science of emotion and that the developing motivational model of emotion defines a better path: emotion is an evolved trait founded on motivational neural circuitry shared by mammalian species, primitively prompting heightened perceptual processing and reflex mobilization for action to appetitive or threatening (...) survival cues. As the field moves forward with increasingly sophisticated measurement technology and assessing more complex affective functioning, scientific understanding of human emotion will proceed best within the framework of this mammalian brain model. (shrink)

Social knowledge, for the most part, is knowledge through testimony. This essay is an overview of the epistemology of testimony. The essay separates knowledge from justification, characterizes testimony as a source of belief, explains why testimony is a source of knowledge, canvasses arguments for anti-reductionism and for reductionism in the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate, addresses counterexamples to knowledge transmission, defends a safe basis account of testimonial knowledge, and turns to social norms as a partial explanation for the reliability of testimony.

The norm of assertion, to be in force, is a social norm. What is the content of our social norm of assertion? Various linguistic arguments purport to show that to assert is to represent oneself as knowing. But to represent oneself as knowing does not entail that assertion is governed by a knowledge norm. At best these linguistic arguments provide indirect support for a knowledge norm. Furthermore, there are alternative, non-normative explanations for the linguistic data (as in recent work from (...) Van Elswyk). Direct arguments would rely on normative judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of assertions with and without the speaker knowing the content asserted. John Turri's work experimental results purport to show that our norm of assertion is factive, and probably knowledge. But as a number of recent experimentalists (Kneer, Reuter and Broessel, Marsili and Wiegmann) have shown, Turri's results rely on the problemmatic use of 'should' as in 'Maria should assert that she owns a 1990 watch.' Correcting for this, these experimentalists provide strong evidence that our norm of assertion is not factive. The standard reply to evidence like this from the assertion of unlucky falsehoods is the excuse maneuver. But Marsili and Wiegmann, following Turri's protocol for testing for excuse validation, show that participants who judge that assertions unlucky falsehoods are permissible are not guilty of excuse validation. Given our current understanding of the experimental evidence, knowledge is not our norm of assertion. (shrink)

This book is an anthology of commentary and criticism written within the transitional period between Alan Watts' 1973 death and the twenty-first century intellectual horizon. Comprised of 16 essays written and published between 1974 and 1994, with up-to-date introductions from the essayists and other contemporary thinkers, this volume opens a window onto unexplored grounds of Alan Watts' impact within late-twentieth-century discourse - an intermediate space where scholars reoriented their bearings through changing times and emerging academic trends. Offering varied explanations and (...) assessments of Alan Watts, including his influence on the Beat and Hippie generations, and his popularization of Zen Buddhism in America, it tackles unaddressed questions within the milieu of late-twentieth century America from the Reagan Revolution and religious conservatism, to paradigm shifts in Buddhist studies and the rise of post-colonial theory. Contributors' post-mortem analyses and critiques of Watts allow for a thematic rendering of their consonance or dissonance with noted Beat, Hippie, and Zen Buddhism themes of his lifetime. This volume will appeal to scholars and students of humanistic psychology, transpersonal psychology, the psychology of religion, comparative religion, and American studies. (shrink)

Politics is, at its core, a kind of activity, a particular type of doing. It comprises a distinctive and varied repertoire of human practices that we regularly characterize as political and that we think of as somehow defining the essence of public life. One might say that specific forms of political engagement are to politics as batting, throwing, catching and running are to baseball. They constitute, in effect, the sum and substance of the enterprise.

Bishop Elliott's book is a great tool for defending Catholic sexual ethics as humane and reasonable. His experience representing the Holy See at the United Nations has given him a ring-side seat in the battles showing just how radical the sexual revolutionaries really are. He offers a rare combination of sound theology and practical experience." -- Jennifer Roback Morse [taken from back cover].

Yugoslavia was the site of unorthodox thinking on multiple fronts during the postwar period. In addition to the geopolitical innovation of the “non-aligned movement” and its domestic attempt at “self-management socialism,” the intellectual environment in the country after Tito’s 1948 break with Stalin also allowed for the development of theoretical work that departed from the Marxism-Leninism of the rest of the communist bloc. One of the most important attempts to blend Marxism with decidedly non-Leninist elements comes from the Slovenian politician (...) and intellectual, France Bučar. In the postwar period, Bučar sought to link his political activity to his intellectual work by developing his own critical systems theory. Unlike the thinkers within the Soviet Union, he was able to explore theoretical resources beyond Karl Marx, focusing in particular the groundbreaking work of Max Weber. This resulted in an agent-centric approach to systems theory that highlights the importance of the individual and geopolitical ethics. This paper aims to situate Bučar’s work in the context of postwar Yugoslavia. In so doing, I bring Bučar into conversation with the most important movement that sought to bring Marx together with Weber from the Western side of the Iron Curtain, i.e. the Frankfurt School of critical theory. I argue that certain aspects of Bučar’s critical systems theory bear a striking resemblance to Habermas’s own attempts to integrate Weberian insights into his own version of critical theory. I conclude by reflecting on how Bučar’s work can be understood as a combination of Eastern praxis with Western critique. (shrink)

Through case studies on biodiversity, deforestation, pollution, and war, among others, Stoett analyzes the ability of international policy to provide environmental protection and discusses the ever-present factors of equality, sovereignty, and human rights integral to these issues. While providing a panoramic view of the actors and structures producing these policies. Stoett reminds readers that the topic is personal, that effective governance is not solely the responsibility of governments but of individuals and communities as well. Environmental diplomacy may not always meet (...) its intended goals, but positive steps are being achieved, and change can only happen when angst is replaced with an educated determination to work toward environmental justice. The Second Edition will explore new events, issues, and agreements since 2011; notably the Paris Agreement. The UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be a new theme added throughout and highlighted in each case study. (shrink)

This study examines the Verbum speculation of Nicholas of Cusa. The investigation concentrates equally on the concept of language that he inherited from medieval and Quattrocento sources and on the Christian theology of the Word that he wove together using his own resources and distinctive approaches. It includes a consideration of the resonances between Gadamer's hermeneutical theory and Cusanus's unfolding of a productive and rhetorically-oriented concept of the Word. The next section offers a detailed examination of the medieval and humanistic (...) sources for his theology of the Word, paying special attention to Albertism, Ramon Llull, and the role played by Heymeric of Camp. This study highlights a development in Cusanus's thought that takes place after 1450 towards a speculative synthesis of human ars through the semiotic appearance of the power and intentionality of the word. It is also argued that even in the late works Cusanus does not submit to the nominalist tendencies of the via moderna. A penultimate section offers a detailed study of the role of faith in the acceptance of the divine Word. Cusanus fuses the unformed discursive knowledge that is known by analogy with the formal certainty received through intellectual vision. Faith and speculative knowledge unite to lead the believer beyond the images that words convey to the unifying image of the divine Word. The last section reviews recent literature on language and theology in Nicholas of Cusa and indicates a path as to how research on the speculative thought of Cusanus and on intercultural theology could move forward together in the future. (shrink)

Acknowledgments 1. Culture Is Essential 2. Culture Exists 3. Culture Evolves 4. Culture Is an Adaptation 5. Culture Is Maladaptive 6. Culture and Genes Coevolve 7. Nothing about Culture Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution.

The Management of Scientific Integrity within Academic Medical Centers discusses the impact scientific misconduct has in eight complex case studies. Authors look at multifaceted mixtures of improper behavior, poor communication, cultural issues, adverse medical/health issues, interpersonal problems and misunderstandings to illustrate the challenge of identifying and managing what went wrong and how current policies have led to the establishment of quasi legal processes within academic institutions. The book reviews the current global regulations and concludes with a section authored by a (...) US federal court judge who provides his perspective on the adequacy of current regulations and policies. (shrink)

Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics. Why? Not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions-the theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate (...) understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical world-view in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small-and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way. This book will appeal to researchers, students, and anybody else interested in how science informs our world-view. (shrink)