In response to Germain argument that evolution by natural selection has a limited explanatory power in cancer, Lean and Plutynski have recently argued that many adaptations in cancer only make sense at the tumor level, and that cancer progression mirrors the major evolutionary transitions. While we agree that selection could potentially act at various levels of organization in cancers, we argue that tumor-level selection is unlikely to actually play a relevant role in our understanding of the somatic evolution of (...) human cancers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of somatic evolution by natural selection to our understanding of cancer development. I do so in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I ask to what extent cancer cells meet the formal requirements for evolution by natural selection, relying on Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) framework of Darwinian populations. I argue that although they meet the minimal requirements for natural selection, cancer cells are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations. In the second (...) part of the paper, I examine the most important examples of adaptation in cancer cells. I argue that they are not significant accumulations of evolutionary changes, and that as a consequence natural selection plays a lesser role in their explanation. Their explanation, I argue, is best sought in the previously existing wiring of the healthy cells. (shrink)

In its last round of publications in September 2012, the Encyclopedia Of DNA Elements (ENCODE) assigned a biochemical function to most of the human genome, which was taken up by the media as meaning the end of ‘Junk DNA’. This provoked a heated reaction from evolutionary biologists, who among other things claimed that ENCODE adopted a wrong and much too inclusive notion of function, making its dismissal of junk DNA merely rhetorical. We argue that this criticism rests on misunderstandings concerning (...) the nature of the ENCODE project, the relevant notion of function and the claim that most of our genome is junk. We argue that evolutionary accounts of function presuppose functions as ‘causal roles’, and that selection is but a useful proxy for relevant functions, which might well be unsuitable to biomedical research. Taking a closer look at the discovery process in which ENCODE participates, we argue that ENCODE’s strategy of biochemical signatures successfully identified activities of DNA elements with an eye towards causal roles of interest to biomedical research. We argue that ENCODE’s controversial claim of functionality should be interpreted as saying that 80 % of the genome is engaging in relevant biochemical activities and is very likely to have a causal role in phenomena deemed relevant to biomedical research. Finally, we discuss ambiguities in the meaning of junk DNA and in one of the main arguments raised for its prevalence, and we evaluate the impact of ENCODE’s results on the claim that most of our genome is junk. (shrink)

The ways in which other animal species can be informative about human biology are not exhausted by the traditional picture of the animal model. In this paper, I propose to distinguish two roles which laboratory organisms can have in biomedical research. In the more traditional case, organisms act as surrogates for human beings, and as such are expected to be more manageable replicas of humans. However, animal models can inform us about human biology in a much less straightforward way, by (...) being used as measuring devices—what I call their instrumental role. I first characterize this role and provide criteria for it, before illustrating it with some examples from biomedical research, especially cancer research. In such an instrumental role, phenotypes are not expected to phenocopy human phenomena, but instead have the purely instrumental value of detecting or measuring differences. I argue that the instrumental role is more prevalent than might first be suspected, and that some characteristics of contemporary biomedical research are increasingly shifting the use of laboratory organisms to the instrumental role. Finally, in light of the distinction proposed, I discuss the meaning of the expression “animal model”. (shrink)

The notion of biological function is fraught with difficulties—intrinsically and irremediably so, we argue. The physiological practice of functional ascription originates from a time when organisms were thought to be designed and remained largely unchanged since. In a secularized worldview, this creates a paradox which accounts of functions as selected effect attempt to resolve. This attempt, we argue, misses its target in physiology and it brings problems of its own. Instead, we propose that a better solution to the conundrum of (...) biological functions is to abandon the notion altogether, a prospect not only less daunting than it appears, but arguably the natural continuation of the naturalisation of biology. (shrink)

Cancers rely on multiple, heterogeneous processes at different scales, pertaining to many biomedical fields. Therefore, understanding cancer is necessarily an interdisciplinary task that requires placing specialised experimental and clinical research into a broader conceptual, theoretical, and methodological framework. Without such a framework, oncology will collect piecemeal results, with scant dialogue between the different scientific communities studying cancer. We argue that one important way forward in service of a more successful dialogue is through greater integration of applied sciences (experimental and clinical) (...) with conceptual and theoretical approaches, informed by philosophical methods. By way of illustration, we explore six central themes: (i) the role of mutations in cancer; (ii) the clonal evolution of cancer cells; (iii) the relationship between cancer and multicellularity; (iv) the tumour microenvironment; (v) the immune system; and (vi) stem cells. In each case, we examine open questions in the scientific literature through a philosophical methodology and show the benefit of such a synergy for the scientific and medical understanding of cancer. (shrink)

What has been called the new mechanistic philosophy conceives of mechanisms as the main providers of biological explanation. We draw on the characterization of the p53 gene in molecular oncology, to show that explaining a biological phenomenon implies instead a dynamic interaction between the mechanistic level—rendered at the appropriate degree of ontological resolution—and far more general explanatory tools that perform a fundamental epistemic role in the provision of biological explanations. We call such tools “explanatory frameworks”. They are called frameworks to (...) stress their higher level of generality with respect to bare mechanisms; on the other hand, they are called explanatory because, as we show in this paper, their importance in explaining biological phenomena is not secondary with respect to mechanisms. We illustrate how explanatory frameworks establish selective and local criteria of causal relevance that drive the search for, characterisation and usage of biological mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that explanatory frameworks allow for changes of scientific perspective on the causal relevance of mechanisms going beyond the account provided by the new mechanistic philosophy. (shrink)

Cet article propose une approche de la pensée du franciscain Gonzalve d’Espagne qui vise, d’une part, à renouveler l’intérêt des études médiévales pour ce penseur longtemps oublié et, d’autre part, à permettre la compréhension de sa doctrine de la foi et des rapports qu’elle entretient avec sa compréhension de la scientificité de la théologie. Nous cherchons ici à comprendre de quelle manière la réponse de Gonzalve à la question de la compossibilité des habitus de foi, opinion et science se présente (...) comme l’extension d’une psychologie de l’habitus et d’une épistémologie de la foi conceptualisant la scientificité pratique de la théologie. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the innovative character of the approach to metaethics underlying John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey's theory of evaluation is contrasted with one of the most dominant contemporary metaethical theses: constructivism. I show that the insistence placed by metaethical constructivists on the actor’s practical point of view, on the rejection of the subjective preferences model, and on a specific form of ethical antirealism and naturalism echoes some of the most crucial claims made by Dewey. This argumentation leads to my main (...) hypothesis: an analysis of Dewey's conception of evaluation allows us to highlight the groundbreaking character of its metaethical approach—an approach that will be characterized as fairly constructivist. (shrink)

Michael Brodrick’s book, The Ethics of Detachment in Santayana’s Philosophy, constitutes a much-needed contribution to the field of American philosophy. Although it is common for contemporary authors to claim that their preferred philosopher has been misunderstood, few can do so with as much conviction as Broderick has done for George Santayana, “a great and unjustly neglected philosopher”.The overarching goal of Brodrick’s investigation is the presentation of a conceptual framework for an “ethics of detachment” fundamentally mediated by human finitude. Setting his (...) work in opposition to the contemporary ethical conceit of an “attachment” to life, progress, and perfection, Brodrick seeks to demonstrate “how... (shrink)

Etant donné l'universalité de la médiation linguistique conditionnant notre rapport au monde, à quoi fait-on référence lorsque l'on a recours au concept de " vérité " en épistémologie contemporaine? Doit-on nécessairement supposer que nos énoncés correspondent à une réalité extérieure pour faire sens du concept de vérité? Un réalisme sans la représentation est-il possible? Le présent ouvrage tente de faire la lumière sur ces interrogations en exposant deux des plus importantes conceptions contemporaines de la vérité : celle de Jürgen Habermas (...) et celle de Richard Rorty. Un traitement successif de ces auteurs permettra de relever les points de tension de ce débat épistémologique. Le tournant linguistique a-t-il épuisé la validité conceptuelle du dualisme croyance-vérité comme le croit Rorty? Pouvons-nous préserver un concept transculturel de vérité après le tournant linguistique comme le suggère Habermas? Cet ouvrage traite de ces interrogations fondamentales de façon à dévoiler l'une des jonctions méthodologiques les plus importantes à laquelle est arrivée l'épistémologie contemporaine. (shrink)

L’objectif de ce court texte est de réfléchir, de manière quelque peu exploratoire, à l’idée selon laquelle certains des outils conceptuels développés en droit à la protection de la vie privée peuvent éclairer la réflexion sur l’utilisation responsable de renseignements personnels par des outils actuariels d’évaluation des risques de récidive. Nous tentons de démontrer que les principes de l’exactitude des renseignements utilisés, de la rectification et de l’effacement des traces numériques pourraient contribuer de manière intéressante au développement responsable de l’utilisation (...) de ces outils. (shrink)

Pierre-Luc Desjardins Le présent article se donne pour fin d’étudier le sens que revêt, chez Maître Eckhart de Hochheim (1260-1328), l’emploi du couple formé par les notions de pouvoir « politique » et de pouvoir « despotique ». Plus précisément, il y est question de replacer cet usage dans le contexte de la conception eckhartienne de la nature et d’y trouver un dédoublement de la notion de sujétion. De fait, pouvoir politique et pouvoir despotique se présentent comme deux manières, (...) pour un agent, d’interagir avec le principe passif qui se soumet naturellement à lui — le pouvoir despotique demeurant extérieur à ce qu’il gouverne, là où le pouvoir politique oeuvre au sein même de ce qu’il gouverne pour se l’assimiler. Une telle contextualisation de la conceptualité « politique » eckhartienne doit faire ressortir la manière dont elle s’inscrit dans une conception plus globale des rapports entre Dieu et la création, entre l’agent suprême et l’être imparfait qui lui est soumis. (shrink)

Le présent article se donne pour fin d’explorer la question des rapports entre foi, croyance et connaissance à la lumière de leur théorisation médiévale. En posant la question de la compossibilité de la connaissance et de la foi, il interroge le rôle que jouent croyance et foi dans notre acceptation quotidienne de vérités plus ou moins évidentes. Il s’agit donc ici en définitive de voir comment certains outils conceptuels empruntés à Thomas d’Aquin et Augustin d’Hippone peuvent nous aider à penser (...) la confusion et l’effritement contemporains de l’idée de vérité en comprenant comment notre rapport affectif aux institutions contribue à ce phénomène. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, we argued that theories of cultural evolution can gain explanatory power by being more pluralistic. In his reply to it, Dennett agreed that more pluralism is needed. Our paper’s main point was to urge cultural evolutionists to get their hands dirty by describing the fine details of cultural products and by striving to offer detailed and, when explanatory, varied algorithms or mechanisms to account for them. While Dennett’s latest work on cultural evolution does marvelously well (...) on the first point, it has only whet our appetite on the second. Accordingly, the present paper aims to show what an evolutionary explanation of culture that takes the variety of cultural evolution mechanisms seriously would look like. We will focus on the cultural evolution of social epistemic mechanisms and we will propose that Darwinian algorithms should be complemented with a cultural analogue of the error reduction mechanism proposed to account for human cognition, with a particular emphasis on the necessity to build independencies between different sub-systems in charge of tracking states of the world. To illustrate our point, we will present how the evolution of the legal system as epistemic systems can be understood as a process of building increasingly better independencies and how various criticisms of the actual legal system calls for building even more of them. (shrink)

How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds, that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentialist, understanding of HCA variability. To set our case against essentialist theories of HCA variability, we (...) detail the general notion of an ICM and the specific ICM at the heart of evolutionary psychology. We briefly illustrate the type of essentialism fostered by evolutionary psychology’s ICM by showing how it grounds essentialist theories of cognitive gender. We shall not criticize these theories here since the literature is replete with compelling objections to them, but shall instead focus on motivating a replacement ICM to destabilize evolutionary psychology’s ICM wholesale. ICMs usually span larger than the models they support, hence larger than arguments against these models, and one reason the essentialist theories addressed here have the kind of staying power they do is that they are partly supported by the ICM in which they are grounded. In short, we offer “A New Hope” against the essentialist empire. True to the Hollywood trope, this new hope rests on an alliance between a young theory, cognitive network neuroscience, and two older, but still quite young, epistemic rebels: enactive cognitive science and developmental systems theory. Accordingly, we detail and discuss the proposed emerging ICM and test-drive it by sketching the multimorphic view of gender it grounds. (shrink)

According to a popular version of the current evolutionary attitude in cognitive science, the mind is a massive aggregate of autonomous innate computational devices, each addressing specific adaptive problems. Our aim in this paper is to show that although this version of the attitude, which we call GOFEP , does not suffer from fatal flaws that would make it incoherent or otherwise conceptually inadequate, it will nevertheless prove unacceptable to most cognitive scientists today. To show this, we raise a common (...) objection to the concept of innateness, not to mount an attack on GOFEP but to study how its proponents have attempted to meet that challenge. The aim of this move is to show that GOFEP cannot face the challenge without, as it were, losing its soul. There is, or so we will argue, something deep at the heart of GOFEP that prevents its proponents from meeting the challenge. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the core insights of the (...) constructivist and biological approaches of mental illness. In order to do so, we will use some recent propositions by philosophers of biology, specifically ideas put forth by «developmental system theory» and the notion of «generative entrenchment». (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology presupposes relations between theories of different domains that the two traditional models, reduction and autonomy, cannot properly account for. We aim to construct a model of relations between theories that succeeds where traditional models fail. We show that the multiple realizability argument, on which the autonomist model is thought to rest, is compatible with reductionism and, following Kim, that an autonomist reading of the argument deprives psychology of its scientific status. We therefore opt for a reductionist model compatible (...) with functionalism and multiple realizability, but show that, within evolutionary psychology at least, the very application of the conditions of reduction requires strong interactions between psychology and various other adjacent disciplines. We also show that reduction must be preceded in evolutionary psychology by an of the reduction base, which brings still other disciplines into play. Finally, we present a model of the interaction between disciplines we believe accounts best for these relations and discuss the problems facing this kind of enterprise. (shrink)

Les travaux du Comité public de suivi Le comité a été créé le 12 avril 2016. À cette occasion, il a annoncé le dépôt d’un rapport de suivi à l’occasion du premier anniversaire du dépôt du rapport de la Commission Charbonneau. Dans les derniers mois, le comité s’est penché sur les initiatives répondant aux recommandations de la Commission, en étudiant les informations rendues publiques sur ce sujet. Aidé d’une équipe...

The contrast between third- and first-personal accounts of the experiences of autistic persons has much to teach us about epistemic injustice and epistemic agency. This paper argues that bringing about greater epistemic justice for autistic people requires developing a relational account of epistemic agency. We begin by systematically identifying the many types of epistemic injustice autistic people face, specifically with regard to general assumptions regarding autistic people’s sociability or lack thereof, and by locating the source of these epistemic injustices in (...) neuronormativity and neurotypical ignorance. We then argue that this systematic identification pushes us to construe epistemic agency as resulting from a fundamentally relational and dynamic process between an individual, others around them, and their social, cultural, or institutional environment, rather than as a fixed and inherent property of individuals. Finally, we show how our relational account of epistemic agency allows us to introduce the novel concepts of epistemic disablement and epistemic enablement. We argue that these two concepts allow us to more accurately track the mechanisms that undermine or facilitate epistemic agency, and thereby to better understand how epistemic injustice arises and to design more effective interventions to foster greater epistemic justice for autistic people. (shrink)