Introduction: the grey goose -- The origins of civil society and the function of law -- Justice, ownership, and law -- Natural justice and conventional justice -- Justice and the trading order -- Adjudication and interpretation -- Morality, law, and legislation -- Natural law -- Rights -- The force of law -- The authority and legitimacy of law -- Conclusion.

This is a coherent set of essays regarding the study of justice and it takes into consideration the needs and obligations of the individual as a member of society.

Throughout her work Mrs Langer has consistently opposed the idea that art is the symptomatic expression of currently felt emotion with her theory, which she has progressively expanded and clarified, of art as the ‘symbolic expression of the artist’s knowledge of feeling’. In Mind, Vol. I she explores the problem of ‘living form’: why must art, to be expressive of feeling, be living form?. Her suggested answer, developed and illustrated magnificently in the second part of this volume, is a significant (...) advance on her general thesis on the nature of art, and since she is one of the few significant contemporary contributors in this field the advance is welcome. It is not, however, her central concern in this work which, as the title indicates, is of broader scope than aesthetics. Her study of mind will be in six parts, three of which are contained in Vol. I; its overall purpose is to work out and present ‘a biological theory of feeling that should logically lead to an adequate concept of mind, with all that the possession of mind implies’. The work of art expresses the forms of feeling; the artist’s ‘entire work is the making of forms which express the nature of feeling’ ; for these reasons, according to Mrs Langer, it is likely that art could provide the scientist with the data on feeling which at present he lacks: ‘since art is the objectification of feeling, whereby men have perceived and recognized its rhythms and complexities and scope since time immemorial, it is not unreasonable to expect some formulation of psychological basic facts to come from art’. (shrink)

CONSCIOUSNESS is the basic context governing the emergence of both meaning and expression. Modes of expression are developed to cope with developing modalities of consciousness and meaning but, because meaning and its expression are not identical, not only may expression be inadequate but its examination does not yield a proper understanding of the modalities of consciousness and meaning. This latter understanding is to be sought by attending to one’s own conscious acts of meaning, to the modalities in which one operates. (...) Accordingly, although frequent reference will be made throughout this paper to expression, attention is constantly directed to consciousness in an effort to work out the nature of the basic context and so go some way towards providing a general field within which instances of meaning could be related to each other. (shrink)

This paper deals with the contention, coming from two main sources in scientific theory (theory of evolution and string theory), that the conclusions of these theories demonstrate the nonexistence of God. In response to this, the author seeks to show that neither of these arguments is sound; he is not particularly concerned here with proving the existence of God. In the course of the paper, a certain amount of confusion concerning the requirements which these two scientific theories would make of (...) believers is cleared up. The cosmological positions of Aquinas, Hume, Leibniz, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Lonergan are mentioned, culminating in the ultimate question: ’why should there be any thing at all?’ Like all questions, it arises upon presuppositions. The author does not attempt to answer it here; but tries rather to elucidate its presuppositions. He points out that from natural science there neither is, nor can there be, evidence either to support or to undermine such presupposition. (shrink)

This essay focusses on two questions: What is intellectual conversion? Why is naive realism attractive?

The subtitle indicates the scope of the study: the theory of interpretation in modern philosophy. As a history of hermeneutics concentrating on some major thinkers whose theories are genetically related and whose influence has been and is considerable this book.

As its title suggests, Mondin’s book is encyclopedic. It treats of theological language from the Greeks—in fact, Plato and Aristotle with very brief mention of others—to the present time. The entries are necessarily short but Karl Barth, Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann among the moderns and Augustine and Aquinas among the classics get complete chapters to themselves. Heidegger does not, perhaps surprisingly, receive separate treatment although he is referred to as the source of both Gadamer and Ricoeur and specifically as (...) the source of the overcoming of the subject-object schema and so of the new hermeneutics. One might have expected more discussion of Bultmann’s relation to Heidegger. The section on linguistic analysis in general and Wittgenstein in particular is quite short but, granted that the book is taken as an encyclopedic reference work, is quite useful for anyone unfamiliar with analysis who wanted to begin a study of the theory of theological language within this school. Indeed, the usefulness of the book as a reference work on the problem is its major merit. The essays or entries do not pretend to achieve more than a swift survey of the author or school treated. As an aid to work the book is worth having. No price is given; there is an index of authors mentioned which in most cases is accurate; the entry on Freud is wrongly noted at 435 instead of 434. The bibliographies are restricted to the footnotes which is perhaps slightly awkward and sometimes only the Italian translation of a book is given e.g. on page 460 footnote 66 there is a reference to MacQuarrie, Ha senso parlare di Dio? which, I presume, is a translation of God-Talk. The book would be a better instrument if the original titles were given as well. (shrink)

The unity of this study rests on the notion that both statistics and emergence are intimately connected with randomness. A statistical law discovers an ideal frequency from which the actual frequency diverges only randomly i.e. the divergence is not contained in a law. Statistics and randomness, thus, mutually define each other. Emergence is related on the one hand, to regularly recurring events and, on the other hand, to the non-ordered events on one level which may be contained in a higher (...) order law. A discussion of the three linked notions naturally turns to the relations between the sciences and to the relations between the events which are their objects; thus the apparent oddness of a considered subtitle—‘Towards an adequate Weltanschauung’ —is eliminated, for an adequate Weltanschauung for the contemporary philosopher will have to include a position on the interconnexions between sciences. Perhaps the philosopher of science will readily grant this but recent thrusts in the philosophy of art, as well as the clear tendencies of the human sciences indicate that an understanding of these questions is increasingly important. It must be clear, for instance, that no serious comprehensive study of artistic meaning after Langer can afford to neglect utterly the nature of the shift from biological regularity to artistic pattern. I have passed from the unity on the side of the object to a corresponding unity on the side of the subject. For how is one to go about the discovery of the relevant interconnexions. So an earlier title refers to the concrete logic of discovery which itself is discovered not merely—perhaps not at all—by the verbal objectification of a theory but by the actual operations of the discoverer who is reflecting critically on himself. This view on the nature of philosophic enquiry, from which belief as present within the scientific community and essential to the proper development of science, is excluded, guides the form of the expression which continually points away from itself to the crucial experiments which the reader must himself perform. Indicative of this elusiveness is a reference to Goedel which is little more than an indication that at this point in the argument it would be valuable to do some work on the theorem. One may be inclined to cavil at this mode of expression; nevertheless it may be suggested that if philosophy does differ significantly from science it is possible that its proper mode of expression will likewise differ from that of science, and that this mode requires more investigation than it has yet received. Perhaps Wittgenstein is not aphorism at all. (shrink)

Expression is at once content and structure. Of late attention has shifted from the meaning of expression as content to its meaning as structure. This shift has occurred in various fields: in philosophy notably with the Heidegger of Holzwege and with the later Wittgenstein; in linguistics there is the well known work of Sapir and men like Bernstein who acknowledge a debt to Sapir; in social anthropology the investigations of Lévi-Strauss are associated with this movement; and the French structuralist school (...) in literary criticism also approaches some problems from this angle. It is not a wholly new approach and doubtless historians will reveal its antecedents; what is new, perhaps, is the shift in emphasis. Marshall McLuhan has brought this shift in emphasis to the public notice in works that are both lively and at times provocative. But McLuhan is suggestive above all and he rarely carries his suggestions through. One would hope that those following him might take up some of the suggestions and work them out more fully. The telephone, for instance, has connected distant parts of the world so that decisions made in one hemisphere can be, in a few moments, communicated to another. Conversely, since the decision of the man on the spot can be communicated to the remote chief at once, the practice of delegation of authority changes. But how much, how often, to what extent does the technology run before its reasonable implementation? Such are the precise questions that now emerge. Unfortunately, The Presence of The Word does not take us much farther towards an answer. However, besides these investigations, there is another aspect to the whole field: the very notion of content and structure. In much of the writing in this area there seems to be some confusion, and some authors, when professedly talking of structure, allow content in by the back door. This criticism has been made by Durand of Lévi-Strauss. The confusion stems from a prior failure to distinguish between expression and meaning and a consequent failure to differentiate modalities of meaning. Prior to a discussion of a distinction between structure and content on the level of expression, there is needed a clarification of the structure of meaning. No matter what science one may be referring to, one will discover that it is theory verified in instances. When this has been clarified one can go on to discuss the relation of expression to theory e.g. the structure of scientific expression. Besides scientific meaning, there is aesthetic, symbolic and interpersonal meaning and here again their structure must be analysed. One question in the analysis will be, as before, the relation of expression to meaning. The relation of expression to meaning will differ in the several modalities and the significance of a shift in the way of expression will likewise differ from mode to mode. Fr Ong does not very clearly advert to this aspect of the problem and nowhere does he treat it adequately. (shrink)

Expression is at once content and structure. Of late attention has shifted from the meaning of expression as content to its meaning as structure. This shift has occurred in various fields: in philosophy notably with the Heidegger of Holzwege and with the later Wittgenstein; in linguistics there is the well known work of Sapir and men like Bernstein who acknowledge a debt to Sapir; in social anthropology the investigations of Lévi-Strauss are associated with this movement; and the French structuralist school (...) in literary criticism also approaches some problems from this angle. It is not a wholly new approach and doubtless historians will reveal its antecedents; what is new, perhaps, is the shift in emphasis. Marshall McLuhan has brought this shift in emphasis to the public notice in works that are both lively and at times provocative. But McLuhan is suggestive above all and he rarely carries his suggestions through. One would hope that those following him might take up some of the suggestions and work them out more fully. The telephone, for instance, has connected distant parts of the world so that decisions made in one hemisphere can be, in a few moments, communicated to another. Conversely, since the decision of the man on the spot can be communicated to the remote chief at once, the practice of delegation of authority changes. But how much, how often, to what extent does the technology run before its reasonable implementation? Such are the precise questions that now emerge. Unfortunately, The Presence of The Word does not take us much farther towards an answer. However, besides these investigations, there is another aspect to the whole field: the very notion of content and structure. In much of the writing in this area there seems to be some confusion, and some authors, when professedly talking of structure, allow content in by the back door. This criticism has been made by Durand of Lévi-Strauss. The confusion stems from a prior failure to distinguish between expression and meaning and a consequent failure to differentiate modalities of meaning. Prior to a discussion of a distinction between structure and content on the level of expression, there is needed a clarification of the structure of meaning. No matter what science one may be referring to, one will discover that it is theory verified in instances. When this has been clarified one can go on to discuss the relation of expression to theory e.g. the structure of scientific expression. Besides scientific meaning, there is aesthetic, symbolic and interpersonal meaning and here again their structure must be analysed. One question in the analysis will be, as before, the relation of expression to meaning. The relation of expression to meaning will differ in the several modalities and the significance of a shift in the way of expression will likewise differ from mode to mode. Fr Ong does not very clearly advert to this aspect of the problem and nowhere does he treat it adequately. (shrink)

‘For performance must precede reflection on performance and method is the fruit of that reflection’. This statement taken from the new introduction to Verbum, where it refers to Aquinas’ performance in the investigation of human understanding, may, perhaps, be taken as a key to Fr Lonergan’s work. It is worthy of some reflection.

‘For performance must precede reflection on performance and method is the fruit of that reflection’. This statement taken from the new introduction to Verbum, where it refers to Aquinas’ performance in the investigation of human understanding, may, perhaps, be taken as a key to Fr Lonergan’s work. It is worthy of some reflection.

The Introduction to Why Believe? Approaches to Religion opens with the statement: “Our language carries our traditions. We learn them as we learn our languages. As we live in our language so we liv...

The Introduction to Why Believe? Approaches to Religion opens with the statement: “Our language carries our traditions. We learn them as we learn our languages. As we live in our language so we liv...