This article examines the domestic use of drones by law enforcement to gather information. Although the use of drones for surveillance will undoubtedly provide law enforcement agencies with new means of gathering intelligence, these unmanned aircrafts bring with them a host of legal and epistemic complications. Part I considers the Fourth Amendment and the different legal standards of proof that might apply to law enforcement drone use. Part II explores philosopher Wittgenstein’s notion of actional certainty as a means to interpret (...) citizens' expectations of privacy with regard to their patterns of movement over time. Part III discusses how the theory of actional certainty can apply to the epistemic challenge of determining what is a “reasonable” expectation of privacy under the law. This Part also investigates the Mosaic Theory as a possible reading of the Fourth Amendment. (shrink)

In his article, “Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty,” Nigel Pleasants argues that killing an innocent, non-threatening person is wrong. It is, he argues, “a basic moral certainty.” He believes our basic moral certainties play the “same kind of foundational role as [our] basic empirical certaint[ies] do.” I believe this is mistaken. There is not “simply one kind of foundational role” that certainty plays. While I think Pleasants is right to affiliate his proposition with a Wittgensteinian form of certainty, he exposes (...) himself to a tension that exists in On Certainty regarding how we acquire it: is certainty natural, is it social? In this paper, I present two ways in which we come to possess certainty: a bottom-up approach, where certainty is part of our instinctual predisposition, and a top-down approach, where certainty is acquired through positive reinforcement by family and culture. (shrink)

Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought considers how, where, and to what extent the thoughts and ideas found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can be applied to other areas of thought, including: ethics, aesthetics, religious belief, mathematics, cognitive science, and political theory. Robert Greenleaf Brice opens new avenues of thought for scholars and students of the Wittgensteinian tradition, while introducing original philosophies about human knowledge and cognition.

Bringing the views of Grayling, Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll together, I argue that in On Certainty, Wittgenstein explores the possibility of a new kind of foundationalism. Distinguishing propositional language-games from non-propositional, actional certainty, Wittgenstein investigates a foundationalism sui generis . Although he does not forthrightly state, defend, or endorse what I am characterizing as a "new kind of foundationalism," we must bear in mind that On Certainty was a collection of first draft notes written at the end of Wittgenstein's life. The (...) work was unprogrammatic, sometimes cryptic. Yet, his exploration into areas of knowledge, certitude and doubt suggest an identifiable direction to his thoughts. (shrink)

One of the more recent pedagogical debates confronting university instructors is whether liberal education should be replaced with multiculturalism. John Searle has labeled these positions as “traditionalists” and “challengers,” respectively. While not finding “much that is objectionable in the [traditionalists’] assumptions,” Searle argues that the challengers’ assumptions are “weak” and “fallacious.” This negative outcome for the challengers however, is due in large part to Searle’s misrepresentation of their position. Searle presents a flawed, straw-man argument; he unfairly and inaccurately presents the (...) challengers’ assumptions as inadequate. In this paper I shall address some of the assumptions Searle raises on the challengers’ side and offer further elucidation of their position where he fails to do so. (shrink)

In the penultimate chapter of his book, Art as Language, G. L. Hagberg presents an argument against Arthur Danto, George Dickie, and other advocates of the Institutional Theory (IT), arguing that a tension exists within the theory. Through conferral, a spokesperson declares what artifacts are accepted into the artworld. Hagberg finds this problematic because, while the criterion one uses is something that the later Wittgenstein would endorse, it points back to an essentialism that he clearly rejected. But Hagberg believes he (...) can avoid this problem by applying Wittgenstein’s notion of certainty to specific artifacts in aesthetics. By relying on Wittgenstein’s notion of certitude, however, he exposes himself to a tension that exists in On Certainty: is certainty natural, or is it social? Although the propositions Hagberg uses have the potential to become certain, he treats them as if they begin that way. In this paper I present two ways in which Wittgenstein classifies or understands certainty: a bottom-up approach, where certainty is part of our natural and instinctual predisposition, and a top-down approach, where certainty is acquired through positive reinforcement. I believe Hagberg fails to appreciate this distinction as well as the consequences for his claim. (shrink)

In On Certainty, the important, but to many readers obscure, twentieth century Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, provides not only a brilliant solution to a previously intractable philosophical problem, but also the elements of an entirely new way of approaching this and similar longstanding, apparently un-resolvable, problems. In these notes he re-conceives the problem of radical skepticism–the claim that we can never really be certain of anything except the contents of our own minds–as a kind of philosophical “disease” of thought. His (...) approach to the problem, which I will emphasize is similar to the treatment of disease, has two main goals: -/- (1) bring about an awareness in the philosopher that this kind of extreme skepticism is not a methodological approach to be taken seriously, and, with this awareness, -/- (2) an attempt to replace this radical skepticism with a practical, Common Sense framework. -/- Implicit in Wittgenstein’s approach are a number of strategies found in a contemporary approach to psychotherapy known as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). These strategies, along with philosophical methods and scientific practices rooted in the Scottish School of Common Sense, seek to diagnose and treat irrational thoughts and beliefs that often emerge (and re-emerge) in the discipline of philosophy. The aim is to provide the philosopher with tools necessary to adjust and reshape these irrational, self-defeating thoughts and beliefs into something new, something healthy. (shrink)

The philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Maurice Merleau-Ponty may seem at first glance to be mutually exclusive. On further examination, however, they can be seen to share some fundamental points of view. For instance, they both share a common rejection of a modern mechanistic explanation of nature, and both endorse what we might call a pre-linguistic level of meaning. In this paper, we show that these thinkers not only share some fundamental philosophical views, but also had, for many years, contemplated (...) what cognitive scientists today call “embodied cognition.”. (shrink)

La pregunta si Wittgenstein fue un filósofo liberal ha recibido menos atención que la de si fue un filósofo conservador, pero, como Robert Greenleaf Brice ha defendido recientemente, hay muchos indicios de liberalismo en algumas de sus observaciones, y algunos filósofos, como Richard Eldridge, han sostenido que hay un cierto tipo de liberalismo que se sigue de la filosofía de su última etapa. Richard Rorty ha sacado también conclusiones liberales a partir de la perspectiva filosófica que se (...) basa en la obra de Wittgenstein y Alice Crary ha sugerido que las lecciones aprendidas de su propria interpretación de Wittgenstein "reflejan en formas de vida social que incorporan los ideales de la democracia liberal". (shrink)

ABSTRACT The question of whether Wittgenstein was a liberal philosopher has received less attention than the question of whether he was a conservative philosopher but, as Robert Greenleaf Brice has recently argued, there are hints of liberalism in some of his remarks, and some philosophers, like Richard Eldridge, have argued that a kind of liberalism follows from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Richard Rorty has also drawn liberal conclusions from a philosophical viewpoint which draws on Wittgenstein’s work and Alice (...) Crary has suggested that the lessons learned from her own interpretation of Wittgenstein are “reflected in forms of social life that embody the ideals of liberal democracy”. Here I will argue both that Wittgenstein was not a liberal and that his philosophy does not imply a liberal viewpoint. The authors discussed here do not demonstrate that any broad ideological conclusions fol-low from Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks. -/- RESUMEN La pregunta si Wittgenstein fue un filósofo liberal ha recibido menos atención que la de si fue un filósofo conservador, pero, como Robert Greenleaf Brice ha defendido recientemente, hay muchos indicios de liberalismo en algunas de sus observaciones, y algunos filó-sofos, como Richard Eldridge, han sostenido que hay un cierto tipo de liberalismo que se sigue de la filosofía de su última etapa. Richard Rorty ha sacado también conclusiones libera-les a partir de la perspectiva filosófica que se basa en la obra de Wittgenstein y Alice Crary ha sugerido que las lecciones aprendidas de su propia interpretación de Wittgenstein se “reflejan en formas de vida social que incorporan los ideales de la democracia liberal”. En este artículo, voy a defender tanto que Wittgenstein no era un liberal como que su filosofía no implica una perspectiva liberal. Los autores de que se discuten aquí no prueban que de las observaciones filosóficas de Wittgenstein se desprendan amplias conclusiones ideológicas de ningún tipo. (shrink)

While naturalism is used in positive senses by the tradition of analytical philosophy, with Ludwig Wittgenstein its best example, and by the tradition of phenomenology, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty its best exemplar, it also has an extremely negative sense on both of these fronts. Hence, both Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in their basic thrusts adamantly reject reductionistic naturalism. Although Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology rejects the naturalism Husserl rejects, he early on found a place for the “truth of naturalism.” In a parallel way, Wittgenstein accepts (...) a certain positive sense of naturalism, while rejecting Quine’s kind of naturalism. It is the aim of this paper to investigate the common ground in the views of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty regarding the naturalism that they each espouse and that which they each reject. (shrink)

While typically ignored by the cognitive sciences, Wittgenstein’s later work provides those defending embodied cognition (EC) with essential philosophical tools that serve to strengthen the argument against cognitivism. Cognition, as Wittgenstein’s work demonstrates, is not simply a matter of disembodied intellect, but is actional, time-pressured, body-based, and dependent on the larger environment.

In On Certainty Wittgenstein presents an argument against both G. E. Moore and the Cartesian skeptic, exposing both positions as flawed. His main contention is that what "stands fast" for us-certainty-is not subject to doubt, truth, or falsehood. Whatever is subject to these ascriptions is propositional in form and belongs to our language-games. But certitude is not so subject; certitude is principally non-propositional and therefore stands outside the language-game. Action is the locus of certainty, the things about which we are (...) certain constitute the "foundation" upon which all our knowledge turn. What Moore had once called our "obvious truisms" are, under Wittgenstein's direction, recognized first as inherent in our human natural history, and second, as grounded or based in human societies, cultures, forms of life. It is this human-centered kind of foundationalism that distinguishes Wittgenstein from what Moyal-Sharrock characterizes as the super-human kind of traditional, Cartesian foundationalism. Due to the human emphasis, Wittgenstein's new kind of foundationalism is quite different than the traditional Cartesian variety; it makes no guarantees of absoluteness or universality. Instead, Wittgenstein identifies a common groundwork, a "footing" on which our language-games rest. This new kind of foundationalism shows the way our language-games are anchored to the world. Therefore, in On Certainty, I argue that Wittgenstein presents a new kind of foundationalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between John XXIII and Robert K. Greenleaf’s understanding of leadership. By taking into consideration Greenleaf’s theory of servant-leadership – from conceptualization to model development – and Larry Spears’ influential rubric of ten servant-leadership characteristics, we will show how servant-leadership theory goes in line with that of John XXIII when both are based on a notion of the common good and human dignity.

Anthropology is a significant matter within the church. A person's doctrine of humanity will inevitably shape the way a person thinks about the church, salvation, and in part, God. This dissertation is written out of concern for the potential harm that a faulty anthropology may do to the church. This study is concerned with exposing an approach to leadership within the church that is based on a faulty anthropology. Servant leadership has been hailed as the answer to the leadership crisis (...) that has plagued businesses, political offices, and churches. It is said that the authoritarian, monarchical style of leadership in the twentieth century no longer meets the needs of the current setting. In 1970 Robert K. Greenleaf---the chief advocate of servant leadership---proposed servant leadership as the emerging style that was prepared to address the social unrest of the 1960's and 1970's. He argued that the current leadership style must change---adapt to the emerging needs of the people. Greenleaf developed his ideas on servant leadership in the context of his reading of Hermann Hesse and Albert Camus. The repercussions of Robert K. Greenleaf's anthropology are evident in his view of human transformation. ;This study exposes the philosophical and theological underpinnings of Greenleaf's work on servant leadership as a distortion of the nature of humanity to the point that it leaves the doctrines of sin and salvation bereft of Christian significance. Since many within the church have used Greenleaf in their search for a biblical leadership paradigm, a Christian theological response to Greenleaf's assessment of humanity and human transformation will conclude this study. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In recent years, debates on same-sex marriage and the recognition of transwomen as women have been raging. These debates often seem to revolve around the meaning of, respectively, the word ‘marriage’ and ‘woman’. That such debates should take place might be puzzling. It seems that if debates on gay and transgender rights revolve around the meaning of these words, then those in favor of same-sex marriage and of the recognition of transwomen as women have no room left to maneuver. (...) However, prima facie, the pro – and anti-, in both cases, have genuine disagreements over the meaning of these words: though the analyses of revisionary theorists are revisionary, they are analyses. Sally Haslanger and other philosophers in her wake have appealed to an anti-descriptivist externalist view of meaning to provide the conceptual foundations of this practice of revisionary theorizing: revisionary analyses bring to light what, unbeknownst to us, these words mean. In this paper, I argue that a descriptivist externalist view should be preferred instead. My argument rests on the thesis that what is contested in these debates is the meaning of the words ‘marriage’ and ‘women’ as used in the law. (shrink)

Ceux qui sont nés, comme l'auteur de ce livre, dans les dernières années du siècle précédent, qui ont eu leurs vingt ans au front, avaient encore grandi non seulement sans autos ni avions, ni radios, mais même, s'ils n'étaient pas riches, sans l'électricité chez eux. Lorsqu'ils sont tombés, à peine sortis de l'enfance, dans la machinerie de l'autre guerre, ils n'avaient eu pour formation que les humanités classiques, la morale de Kant, le symbolisme et les marches à pied. Depuis, en (...) une quarantaine d'années, à un rythme presque infernal, ils ont dû avaler, venant d'ailleurs un peu pêle-mêle, la révolution russe, les guerres civiles en Europe, la psychanalyse, la dialectique hégélienne, le marxisme, la phénoménologie, l'existentialisme, le national-socialisme, l'invasion de la France, la dislocation des empires coloniaux, la physique nucléaire, les bombes atomiques, le retournement contre l'Europe occidentale des idées et des connaissances qu'elle avait produites et qu'elle continuait à produire, la fin de son hégémonie. C'était peut-être beaucoup. C'était peut-être trop? Le résultat en a peut-être été la rupture définitive avec le passé? C'est ce que se demande Brice Parain. Il a eu souvent le sentiment qu'il risquait de se perdre, que courir les routes, se déplacer en avion, téléphoner un peu partout, savoir qu'il existe des camps de concentration en Europe, regarder de la peinture dite abstraite, faire tout dépendre de l'avenir, ne pouvait rien avoir de commun avec la vie qu'il avait menée au temps des gendarmes à cheval et des lampes à pétrole. Ce sentiment lui a fait peur. Il a voulu y réfléchir. L'Occident s'était peut-être trompé, à un moment ou à un autre? La liberté, telle qu'il l'a définie, a engendré la solitude et la solitude engendre le suicide. L'Occident a peut-être sacrifié la vie à ses ambitions? Faudra-t-il qu'il rapprenne à vivre pour éviter de périr? Brice Parain ne se résout pas à s'en tenir à la dialectique comme méthode de raisonnement pour comprendre l'histoire et la vie. Il croit que la dialectique est pareille à une ligne tortueuse qui a pourtant un axe. La connaissance de cet axe rétablirait une logique, qui permettrait de refaire une morale. Ajoutons qu'il sait le russe, s'étant mis à l'apprendre très vite après son retour de la Grande Guerre, en 1920. Depuis, sa réflexion s'est largement alimentée à la confrontation entre l'Occident et la Russie, qui lui était toujours présente. On n'aura pas de peine à en suivre les démarches. Elles nous sont exposées à travers le récit des simples événements d'une enfance et d'une adolescence aussi passionnées de sentiments que de pensée. (shrink)

In the context of Multiple criteria decision analysis, we present the necessary and sufficient conditions allowing to represent an ordinal preferential information provided by the decision maker by a Choquet integral w.r.t a 2-additive capacity. We provide also a characterization of this type of preferential information by a belief function which can be viewed as a capacity. These characterizations are based on three axioms, namely strict cycle-free preferences and some monotonicity conditions called MOPI and 2-MOPI.

For years, phenomenological psychiatry has proposed that distortions of the temporal structure of consciousness contribute to the abnormal experiences described before schizophrenia emerges, and may relate to basic disturbances in consciousness of the self. However, considering that temporality refers mainly to an implicit aspect of our relationship with the world, disturbances in the temporal structure of consciousness remain difficult to access. Nonetheless, previous studies have shown a correlation between self disorders and the automatic ability to expect an event in time, (...) suggesting timing is a key issue for the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Timing disorders may represent a target for cognitive remediation, but this requires that disorders can be demonstrated at an individual level. Since cognitive impairments in patients with schizophrenia are discrete, and there is no standardized timing exploration, we focused on timing impairments suggested to be related to self disorders. We present the case report of AF, a 22 year old man suffering from schizophrenia, with no antipsychotic intake. Although AF shows few positive and negative symptoms and has a normal neurocognitive assessment, he shows a high level of disturbance of Minimal Self Disorders (SDs) (assessed with the EASE scale). Moreover, AF has a rare ability to describe his self and time difficulties. An objective assessment of timing ability (variable foreperiod task) confirmed that AF had temporal impairments similar to those previously described in patients, i.e., a preserved ability to distinguish time intervals, but a difficulty to benefit from the passage of time to expect a visual stimulus. He presents additional difficulties in benefitting from temporal cues and adapting to changes in time delays. The impairments were ample enough to yield significant effects with analyses at the individual level. Although causal relationships between subjective and objective impairments cannot be established, the results show that exploring timing deficits at the individual level is possible in patients with schizophrenia. Besides, the results are consistent with hypotheses relating minimal self disorders (SDs) to timing difficulties. They suggest that both subjective and objective timing investigations should be developed further so that their use at an individual level can be generalized in clinical practice. (shrink)

Svätopluk Štúr is a strong critic of strands of German thought that emphasize the will to power as an organizing principle of human society. Štúr is particularly critical of Nietzsche’s vitalism, which Štúr believes culminated in national socialism and the destruction of the Second World War. This paper describes and examines Štúr’s criticism of a number of German thinkers and focuses especially on Štúr’s criticism of Nietzsche. Štúr criticizes Nietzsche’s emphasis on life over knowledge. Štúr offers a different philosophy of (...) life grounded in the dignity of human beings and the social consequences of ideas and actions. This paper concludes by examining what Štúr means by dignity in terms of a moral agent and as opposed to Nietzsche’s emphasis on vitalism. (shrink)

Technologies of democracy are instruments based on material apparatus, social practices and expert knowledge that organize the participation of various publics in the definition and treatment of public problems. Using three examples related to the engagement of publics in nanotechnology in France (a citizen conference, a series of public meetings, and an industrial design process), the paper argues that Science and Technology Studies provide useful tools and methods for the analysis of technologies of democracy. Operations of experiments and public demonstrations (...) can be described, as well as controversies about technologies of democracy giving rise to counter-experiments and counter-demonstrations. The political value of the analysis of public engagement lies in the description of processes of stabilization of democratic orders and in the display of potential alternative political arrangements. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver have argued that psychology is not distinct from neuroscience. Many have argued that Piccinini and Craver’s argument is unsuccessful. However, none of these authors have questioned the appropriateness of Piccinini and Craver’s argument for their key premise—that functional analyses are mechanism sketches. My first and main goal in this paper is to show that Piccinini and Craver offer normative considerations in support of what is a descriptive premise and to provide some (...) guidelines on how to argue for this premise. My second goal is to show that the distinctness question should be of great significance for philosophy of cognitive science. (shrink)

Les Espagnols et le sexe est une contribution à l’histoire de la sexualité dans l’Espagne du xixe et du premier tiers du xxe siècle : le projet de Jean-Louis Guereña constitue un apport important à la compréhension de la construction du sujet libéral espagnol, puisqu’on lui reconnaît ici des pratiques intimes, ou privées, au moment où s’affermit la notion d’« ordre public ». La question principale qui se pose à la lecture de l’ouvrage tient précisément à ce qu’il est postulé (...) que la sexualité... (shrink)

Ce livre est composé de trois textes ayant pour sujet commun la dialectique : 1°) un essai sur Pascal, contenant une analyse de ses méthodes de raisonnement en mathématique. Pascal est le premier, dans l'ère moderne, qui ait opposé la dialectique à l'ancienne logique, qu'on appelait alors la scolastique ; 2°) un court traité dont l'objet est le développement d'une critique formelle de la dialectique, c'est-à-dire d'une critique portant sur le mode de raisonnement qu'on appelle de ce nom, quel que (...) soit le contenu des propositions qui le composent ; 3°) enfin une pièce de théâtre, dont l'auteur justifie l'introduction dans le volume en disant qu'elle n'est pas une illustration des thèses sur la dialectique exposées dans les essais, mais le récit d'un moment même de la dialectique, et sans doute le plus important, celui où la dialectique, se sentant enfermée dans sa propre incertitude, s'avoue impuissante à assurer la conduite de la vie. L'ensemble est un examen sévère de la dialectique comme méthode de pensée, et un effort pour proposer à la place un mode de communication plus sûr, plus simple également, donc plus universel. Pourquoi donc la dialectique ne devrait-elle pas, elle aussi, selon sa propre loi, céder la place à une autre solution, qui s'opposerait à elle comme elle s'est opposée à l'ancienne logique? (shrink)

The abstract structure of inquiry - the process of acquiring and changing beliefs about the world - is the focus of this book which takes the position that the "pragmatic" rather than the "linguistic" approach better solves the philosophical problems about the nature of mental representation, and better accounts for the phenomena of thought and speech. It discusses propositions and propositional attitudes (the cluster of activities that constitute inquiry) in general and takes up the way beliefs change in response to (...) potential new information, suggesting that conditional propositions should be understood as projections of epistemic policies onto the world.Robert C. Stalnaker is a professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.

Similar to “parasitism” and “mutualism”, the concept of commensualism defines a kind of biological association, i.e. the neutral interaction between two different species. This paper shows that “commensualism” was initially defined by the Belgian zoologist and parasitologist Pierre-Joseph van Beneden (1809–1894) as referring to biological associations between organic individuals from different species. According to van Beneden, one individual derives biological advantages from this kind of association, whereas the other one remains neutral, i.e. does not receive any biological loss or gain. (...) Tracing the further history of the concept, the paper demonstrates that, while “commensalism” was initially created and used in zoology, it was taken up in other biological disciplines shortly afterward, such as botany and the emerging field of ecology. However, the experimental demonstration of the phenomenon of commensualism remained difficult. This, in turn, contributed to the nomadic existence of this concept in the life sciences of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Similar to “parasitism” and “mutualism”, the concept of commensualism defines a kind of biological association, i.e. the neutral interaction between two different species. This paper shows that “commensualism” was initially defined by the Belgian zoologist and parasitologist Pierre-Joseph van Beneden (1809–1894) as referring to biological associations between organic individuals from different species. According to van Beneden, one individual derives biological advantages from this kind of association, whereas the other one remains neutral, i.e. does not receive any biological loss or gain. (...) Tracing the further history of the concept, the paper demonstrates that, while “commensalism” was initially created and used in zoology, it was taken up in other biological disciplines shortly afterward, such as botany and the emerging field of ecology. However, the experimental demonstration of the phenomenon of commensualism remained difficult. This, in turn, contributed to the nomadic existence of this concept in the life sciences of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Robert B. Brandom is one of the most original philosophers of our day, whose book Making It Explicit covered and extended a vast range of topics in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language--the very core of analytic philosophy. This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out. A tour of the earlier book's large ideas and relevant details, Articulating Reasons offers an easy entry into two of the main themes of Brandom's (...) work: the idea that the semantic content of a sentence is determined by the norms governing inferences to and from it, and the idea that the distinctive function of logical vocabulary is to let us make our tacit inferential commitments explicit. Brandom's work, making the move from representationalism to inferentialism, constitutes a near-Copernican shift in the philosophy of language--and the most important single development in the field in recent decades. Articulating Reasons puts this accomplishment within reach of nonphilosophers who want to understand the state of the foundations of semantics. Table of Contents: Introduction 1. Semantic Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism 2. Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning 3. Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism 4. What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any? 5. A Social Route from Reasoning to Representing 6. Objectivity and the Normative Fine Structure of Rationality Notes Index Displaying a sovereign command of the intricate discussion in the analytic philosophy of language, Brandom manages successfully to carry out a program within the philosophy of language that has already been sketched by others, without losing sight of the vision inspiring the enterprise in the important details of his investigation ' Using the tools of a complex theory of language, Brandom succeeds in describing convincingly the practices in which the reason and autonomy of subjects capable of speech and action are expressed. --J'rgen Habermas. (shrink)

L’utilisation de l’intelligence artificielle dans le domaine de la santé pose la question des limites de celle-ci : jusqu’où devons-nous employer l’intelligence artificielle, la médecine pourrait-elle être déshumanisée et perdre son sens \textit{princeps}? Le philosophe Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) propose durant la seconde moitié du vingtième siècle une philosophie de la technique. Il s’agit de repenser la technique, non pas comme aliénation, mais comme possibilité d’évolution, avec le développement de la technique. Cet article présente ainsi l’intelligence artificielle comme une technique que (...) l’humain doit s’approprier afin de limiter les risques de déshumanisation et d’optimisation du potentiel de l’intelligence artificielle. La pensée de Gilbert Simondon est alors un outil philosophique et éthique permettant d’intégrer l’intelligence artificielle dans le domaine de la médecine, en conservant tout son sens éthique. (shrink)