I argue that sentences ascribing beliefs to non-human animals have the same logical form as sentences of the "perceives that" variety. Pace D.M. Armstrong, I argue that animal belief sentences can be referentially opaque, just as perception sentences containing a propositional clause are. In both cases, referential opacity requires our assuming that the animal believer and the human perceiver has each identified the object of the belief or perception.

I argue that the time-gap argument poses no objection to Direct Realism. In the case of exploded stars many light years from us, what we see is no longer the star, but its light. I argue that in all cases of seeing we see light, but only when physical objects exist at the time of our seeing do we see them.

I defend the view that propositional knowledge can be defined as follows: A knows that p if and only if A believes that p because p. Spelling out the meaning of 'because' in this formula results in a causal-explanatory view of knowledge.

If skepticism is once again fashionable, then much of the credit must go to Peter Unger who gives a sustained defense of an ultra-pyrrhonian position in his book, Ignorance: A case for Skepticism. Starting with a version of the traditional argument that we know nothing about the external world, Unger plunges deeper into skeptical waters by next arguing that there is at most hardly anything which we know to be so; and he scarcely pauses before proceeding to defend the stronger (...) conclusion of ‘universal ignorance,’ the thesis that nobody ever knows anything to be the case. I view Unger's thesis and the arguments that led him to it as a challenge to be overcome, not by an appeal to dogmatism - which Unger sees as the only alternative to skepticism - but by recourse to hard-biting arguments of the sort in which Unger himself puts his faith. In what follows I shall attempt to restate Unger's three main skeptical arguments with a view to showing that their bite is not nearly so hard as he imagines. (shrink)

I argue that there are perverse actions, in the sense that they are acts performed in the belief that they are wrong. They are also, however, acts done in the belief that they are right. What makes them perverse is, not only that they have conflicting motivations, but that the motivation that wins out is not in accord with reason. That is, a perverse act is one resulting from one's strongest motivation but not based on all one's available reasons.

I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a (...) functionalist. His functionalism should instead be given a materialistic interpretation, since he holds that only the appropriate sort of matter can realize the human psyche. Aristotle’s functionalism is therefore best viewed as a “causal functionalism,” in which functional descriptions enable us to find the right sort of material embodiment. By sidestepping dualistic assumptions, Aristotle also avoids having to deal with any further notion of consciousness. (shrink)

I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.

Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle : If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation might be dismissed simply on the (...) grounds that A suffers from some physical or psychological disability that prevents him from drawing inferences from what he knows.Properly interpreted, remains acceptable as long as the propositions substituted for p and q are such that it is at least logically possible for A to get evidence enough to make them known. Agreement on this point is itself enough to render Johnsen's own examples irrelevant. For instance, even though it may be physically impossible for A to get adequate evidence that in the constellation Andromeda there is a planet intermediate in size between Venus and Earth, the foregoing is still a fit substitution instance for q; but since such a q does not suffice to falsify the consequent of, it does nothing to generate any skeptical argument, either. (shrink)

In this article it is argued that it is impossible to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, given that knowledge is an "epistemic" concept with these marks: (1) like necessity, it is only partially truth-functional; and, (2) unlike necessity, it includes an "intentional" component (belief) which is completely non-truth-functional. a reductive analysis would have to contain at least one extensional component, one intentional component, and none that is itself epistemic. but any plausible analysis then turns out either to be non-reductive, (...) e.g., causal, or else falls prey to "gettier" counterexamples. my positive suggestion is that we eschew reductive analyses of epistemic concepts in favor of non-reductive analyses. (shrink)

I argue that Davidson's anti-skeptical thesis can survive objections made against it by treating skepticism as logically possible, but not epistemically possible. That is, the skeptical hypothesis of massive error conflicts with what we must take ourselves to know if we are to have coherent thought and speech.

I answer objections to my article, "The Time-Gap Argument," made by C. Daniels in his "Seeing Through a Time Gap.".

I argue that Robert Almeder's "Blind Realism," although instructive, fails to show that recourse to completely justified belief defuses Gettier counterexamples. This is because Almeder's notion of complete justification involves conflating truth with "warranted assertibility," thus making truth relative to what was scientifically fashionable at the time.

Edmund Gettier has cited familiar cases in which it seems plausible to conclude that a person has a true and justified belief, yet lacks knowledge. Robert Almeder denies that Gettier’s cases falsify the traditional account. What they show is that Gettier’s subjects lack knowledge because they are not completely justified in their beliefs, where being completely justified in believing that p entails the truth of the proposition that p. This move blocks Gettier’s counterexamples, which rely on the possibility that one (...) might be justified in believing something false. (shrink)

Résumé Sans négliger les autres documents pertinents dans un tour d’horizon final et comparatif, cette étude s’efforce de dépeindre l’enseignement universitaire de la philosophie tel qu’il se reflète dans le miroir des textes didascaliques artiens de Paris jusqu’au mitan du xiiie siècle, tout en fournissant en annexe un premier répertoire, encore partiel, de ce corpus, avec ses éditions et ses traductions. Malgré son caractère généralement pratique et institutionnel, certains de ses éléments théoriques — comme la mise en relief de la (...) liaison intime, trame sapientielle de ces écrits de maîtres ès arts, entre théologie cosmique et éthique philosophique — permettent d’espérer que cet article apporte une véritable contribution à l’Histoire de la philosophie.Without neglecting the other relevant documents in a final comparative survey, this study tries to depict the university teaching of philosophy as reflected in the mirror of the Parisian didascalical texts of the Arts Faculty during the first half of the thirteenth century, while giving in appendix a first repertory, still partial, of this corpus, with its editions and translations. Notwithstanding its generally practical and institutional character, some of its theoretical elements — such as the highlighting of the close relationship between cosmical theology and ethical philosophy, a sapiential thread in those arts masters writings — it is hoped that this article may prove a genuine contribution to the History of philosophy. (shrink)

Claude Lafleur et Joanne Carrier En tant qu’introduction générale aux commentaires d’Ockham sur la logique, celle de Porphyre et d’Aristote, l’Expositionis in libros artis logice Prohemium traite la nature de cette discipline, de son sujet, de son utilité, de sa spécificité et de son statut épistémologique. La nouvelle traduction française ici offerte est accompagnée d’une édition annotée qui restitue l’orthographe médiévale du latin d’Ockham. Il en va de même pour la nouvelle traduction du début du premier commentaire logique d’Ockham, (...) l’Expositio in librum Porphirii De predicabilibus, dont le moment fort est l’interprétation des questions de Porphyre sur les universaux. (shrink)

Résumé Cette première traduction française d’une portion significative de l’In « Isagogen » Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda, en regard d’un texte latin reponctué en conséquence et accompagné d’annotations critiques, est précédée d’une présentation historico-doctrinale mettant en relief le rôle — à la fois central et problématique — de l’abstraction dans la solution boécienne, ouvertement rattachée à Alexandre d’Aphrodise, du statut des genres et des espèces dans ce texte qui, à travers l’exégèse du célèbre questionnaire porphyrien, a fait connaître le problème (...) des universaux à l’Occident latin et en est demeuré l’expression la plus achevée jusqu’au xiie siècle, où Abélard en a donné un méta-commentaire particulièrement brillant dans sa Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium, éditée, traduite et étudiée ci-après dans ce numéro thématique.This first French translation of a relevant portion of the In “Isagogen” Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda, in parallel with a consequently reponctuated and critically annotated latin text, is preceded by a historico-doctrinal presentation highlighting the role — both central and problematic — of abstraction in the Boethian solution, openly linked to Alexander of Aphrodisias, of the status of genera and species in this text which, through the exegesis of the well-known porphyrian questionary, has revealed the problem of universals to the Latin West and remained its most achieved expression until the 12th century, where Abelard wrote on those pages a particularly brilliant meta-commentary in his Logica “Ingredientibus” : Super Porphyrium, edited, translated and studied hereafter in this thematic issue. (shrink)

Cet article propose un nouvel examen de l'image d'Alexis Ier Comnène dans l'Historia Ierosolimitana d'Albert d'Aix, afin d'en apprécier les nuances et les subtilités. Bien qu'Albert d'Aix soit reconnu pour son impression généralement positive d'Alexis Ier, une relecture attentive de son œuvre démontre plutôt une image ambivalente de l'empereur et des Byzantins. En scrutant les motifs d'Albert d'Aix, il est possible de constater une disposition favorable du chroniqueur lorsqu'il s'agit de souligner les relations privilégiées entre Alexis Ier et les souverains (...) lotharingiens de Jérusalem. En contrepartie, lorsque les Byzantins ne répondent plus à ce besoin, l'opinion de l'auteur se veut généralement moins clémente en reflétant davantage les accusations dirigées contre les Grecs au début du XIIe siècle. Un examen du vocabulaire employé par Albert d'Aix révèle également une évolution des impressions du chroniqueur à travers les différentes phases d'écriture de son récit et témoigne de l'évolution des desseins politiques de l'auteur dans le temps. Bien que l'Historia Ierosolimitana se distingue à bien des égards de la tradition des Gesta Francorum et des autres récits de la première croisade, l'étude conclut que les intentions de son auteur n'étaient pas moins tendancieuses. (shrink)

Let us suppose that the idea of art can be expanded to embrace the whole range of man-made things, including all tools and writing in addition to the useless, beautiful, and poetic things of the world. By this view the universe of man-made things simply coincides with the history of art.George Kubler I filosofi, tradizionalmente, hanno creduto che le loro argomentazioni abbiano una validità assolutamente generale. Quando descrivono azioni, storia o conoscenza, pensano che la loro analisi si a...

Major theme in the history of philosophy, the problem of universals has been transmitted to the Latin West mainly through the exegesis that, in his Second commentary on the Isagoge, Boethius gave of the famous Porphyrian questionnaire on the genera and species. Our study focuses on the series of philosophical key concepts, sometimes difficult to define, which, in this seminal commentary, form the redactional framework, often misunderstood, of the Boethian Solution of an Aporia that claims to have demonstrated the impossibility (...) of the existence of the genera and species (among others by the argument of the regressus ad infinitum), as well as the redhibitory defects of their (consonant or not consonant) intellections. For Boethius, all this is basically about the relation between thought and reality. (shrink)

Résumé Comme théologie pratique de libération, la prédication romérienne oppose le péché à l’oeuvre dans toute société, à l’importance d’avoir une idée claire du Salut-Libération. L’Ancien Testament lui sert de canevas pour exposer l’intention de Dieu qui est de former un peuple afin qu’il participe à l’édification d’un Règne de justice et de paix. Il insiste sur l’importance d’avoir une vision déterminée de la personne et de la mission du Jésus historique et du Christ ressuscité. Cela implique une restauration du (...) vécu ecclésial conçu désormais comme une présence organique et mystique du Christ dans l’histoire. C’est alors que les chrétiens et le peuple conscients de cette mission peuvent devenir les hérauts de Dieu par leurs attitudes et leur parole prophétique.As a practical liberation theology, Romero’s preaching opposes sin at work in the whole of society, in order to have a clear idea of salvation-liberation. The Old Testament served as the background against which he depicted the intention of God, that is, to create a people that can participate in the construction of a kingdom of justice and peace. He insists on the importance of having a clear vision of the person and mission of the historical Jesus and of the resurrected Christ. This implies a real ecclesial restoration conceived from now on as an organic and mystical presence of Christ in history. It is then that Christians and people conscious of this mission can become heralds of God as a result of their attitudes and their prophetic word. (shrink)

Claude Lafleur et Joanne Carrier Suivant l’ordre traditionnel à son époque d’un cours sur la « Vieille Logique », ou Ars Vetus, Ockham, après avoir commenté l’Isagoge de Porphyre et les Catégories d’Aristote, en vient à son Expositio in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis, dont on offre ici une traduction française et une édition orthographique de la partie considérée alors comme le Proême, une partie divisée elle-même en trois parties — l’exégèse du Vénérable incepteur insistant très fortement sur le début de (...) la deuxième partie et, de façon notable, encore plus spécialement sur ce que signifie une « passion de l’âme », autrement dit, pour Ockham lui-même et surtout pour nous, un « concept ». (shrink)