Comparable worth is a controversial compensation strategy. In this paper, research issues that arise when employers perform point-based job evaluations, but deviate from them because of market factors, are discussed. Greater research attention to the actual operation of markets and to the consequences of conflicts in equity perceptions is encouraged.

Despite a large and multifaceted effort to understand the vast landscape of phenotypic data, their current form inhibits productive data analysis. The lack of a community-wide, consensus-based, human- and machine-interpretable language for describing phenotypes and their genomic and environmental contexts is perhaps the most pressing scientific bottleneck to integration across many key fields in biology, including genomics, systems biology, development, medicine, evolution, ecology, and systematics. Here we survey the current phenomics landscape, including data resources and handling, and the progress that (...) has been made to accurately capture relevant data descriptions for phenotypes. We present an example of the kind of integration across domains that computable phenotypes would enable, and we call upon the broader biology community, publishers, and relevant funding agencies to support efforts to surmount today's data barriers and facilitate analytical reproducibility. (shrink)

In their simplest form, hybrid languages are propositional modal languages which can refer to states. They were introduced by Arthur Prior, the inventor of tense logic, and played an important role in his work: because they make reference to specific times possible, they remove the most serious obstacle to developing modal approaches to temporal representation and reasoning. However very little is known about the computational complexity of hybrid temporal logics.In this paper we analyze the complexity of the satisfiability problem of (...) a number of hybrid temporal logics: the basic hybrid language over transitive trees; nominal Until logic; and referential interval logic. We discuss the effects of including nominals, the @ operator, the somewhere modality E, and the difference operator D. Adding nominals to tense logic leads for several frame-classes to an increase in complexity of the satisfiability problem from PSPACE to EXPTIME. On transitive trees, however, the satisfiability problem for this language can be decided in PSPACE. Along the way we make a detour through hybrid propositional dynamic logic: we establish upper bounds for a number of temporal logics by generalizing results due to Passy and Tinchev [29] and De Giacomo [16]. We conclude with some remarks on the relevance of our results to description logic, and draw attention to the utility of the spypoint technique for proving upper and lower bounds. (shrink)

This paper is about the good side of modal logic, the bad side of modal logic, and how hybrid logic takes the good and fixes the bad.In essence, modal logic is a simple formalism for working with relational structures . But modal logic has no mechanism for referring to or reasoning about the individual nodes in such structures, and this lessens its effectiveness as a representation formalism. In their simplest form, hybrid logics are upgraded modal logics in which reference to (...) individual nodes is possible.But hybrid logic is a rather unusual modal upgrade. It pushes one simple idea as far as it will go: represent all information as formulas. This turns out to be the key needed to draw together a surprisingly diverse range of work . Moreover, it displays a number of knowledge representation issues in a new light, notably the importance of sorting. (shrink)

Hybridization is a method invented by Arthur Prior for extending the expressive power of modal languages. Although developed in interesting ways by Robert Bull, and by the Sofia school , the method remains little known. In our view this has deprived temporal logic of a valuable tool.The aim of the paper is to explain why hybridization is useful in temporal logic. We make two major points, the first technical, the second conceptual. First, we show that hybridization gives rise to well-behaved (...) logics that exhibit an interesting synergy between modal and classical ideas. This synergy, obvious for hybrid languages with full first-order expressive strength, is demonstrated for a weaker local language capable of defining the Until operator; we provide a minimal axiomatization, and show that in a wide range of temporally interesting cases extended completeness results can be obtained automatically. Second, we argue that the idea of sorted atomic symbols which underpins the hybrid enterprise can be developed further. To illustrate this, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a simple hybrid language which can quantify over paths. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss two hybrid languages, ℒ and ℒ, and provide them with complete axiomatizations. Both languages combine features of modal and classical logic. Like modal languages, they contain modal operators and have a Kripke semantics. Unlike modal languages, in these systems it is possible to 'label' states by using A and ↓ to bind special state variables.This paper explores the consequences of hybridization for completeness. As we shall show, the challenge is to blend the modal idea of (...) canonical models with the classical idea of witnessed maximal consistent sets. The languages ℒ and ℒ provide us with two extreme examples of the issues involved. In the case of ℒ, we can combine these ideas relatively straightforwardly with the aid of analogs of the Barcan axioms coupled with a modal theory of labeling. In the case of ℒ, on the other hand, although we can still formulate a theory of labeling, the Barcan analogs are not valid. We show how to overcome this difficulty by using COV*, an infinite collection of additional rules of proof which has been used in a number of investigations of extended modal logic. (shrink)

Simon Blackburn has claimed that on a theory of revealed preference it is tautological that any eligible player - one whose preferences are consistent - plays hawk, chooses a strategy of non-cooperation with the other prisoner. This claim is examined and rejected. A prisoner in the appropriate sense is defined not by preferences over actions (playing hawk or playing dove) but by preferences over the four possible outcomes which result from the players' actions jointly (both playing hawk, both playing (...) dove, the first playing hawk and the second dove, and vice versa). It is not inconsistent to suppose that a prisoner has the appropriate preferences over outcomes but nevertheless chooses to play dove. This can happen either if the prisoner believes for some reason that the full range of outcomes is not available, or if the prisoner is simply a bad strategic thinker. It is perhaps tautological that a player with the appropriate preferences over outcome and with suitable beliefs will if rational choose to play hawk. However, rationality would then involve an appeal to a further principle, the sure-thing principle: if a prisoner would choose hawk knowing that the other will choose hawk, and would also choose hawk knowing that the other will choose dove, then hawk should be chosen when it is uncertain what the other will choose. (shrink)

This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't. I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn of his dilemma can be (...) resisted. I then move on to clarify the nature of the propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of. I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been. I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology. I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use modal language. (shrink)

Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si (...) ricostruisce l’antecedente come «E’ necessario adottare il fine X» e infine si ricostruisce il condizionale come «Se è necessario adottare il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y». Il non-strumentalista è così portato a credere che la stessa normatività che è contenuta nel principio strumentalista deve essere derivata dalla normatività dei fini (p. 242). (shrink)

Blackburn’s dilemma (as commonly understood) is that in explaining truths of the form ‘Necessarily-P’ we have to appeal either to a necessary truth, in which case we don’t seem to make the right kind of progress, or to a contingent truth, in which case we seem to undermine the necessity we were meant to be explaining. This paper advances two claims. First, it is argued that the dilemma is wider in scope than usually supposed. The standard assumption (evident also (...) in Black-burn’s original paper (1993)) is that the dilemma applies to explanations of truths of the form ‘Necessarily-P’. I argue that the real problem identified by Blackburn doesn’t just apply to explanations of truths of this form, but to explanations of necessary truths in general (e.g. truths of logic, mathematics, etc.). In the course of this argument it also transpires that the real problem on the necessity horn is rather different—and rather less susceptible to obvious objections—than it is usually taken to be. It concerns the antinaturalistic core of necessity. Second, it is argued that there is an escape from the antinaturalistic core on the contingency horn. In the footsteps of Wright (1985), the claim is that the contingency horn is tenable for those who believe that the necessary truth in question is analytic, i.e. follows from its meaning. (shrink)

This bestselling dictionary is written by one of the leading philosophers of our time, and it is widely recognized as the best dictionary of its kind. Comprehensive and authoritative, it covers every aspect of philosophy from Aristotle to Zen. With clear and concise definitions, it provides lively and accessible coverage of not only Western philosophical traditions, but also themes from Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and Jewish philosophy. New entries on philosophy of economics, social theory, neuroscience, philosophy of the mind, and moral (...) conceptions, bring this authoritative third edition up to date. It is the ideal introduction to philosophy for anyone with an interest in the subject, and it is an indispensable work of reference for students and teachers. (shrink)

We present an axiom system for basic hybrid logic extended with propositional quantifiers (a second-order extension of basic hybrid logic) and prove its (basic and pure) strong completeness with respect to general models.

哲學作家朱家安、哲學研究者邱振訓、哲學系副教授許漢愛智推薦！ 英國劍橋大學著名哲學教授賽門‧布雷克本 教你這樣探索人生的20個大問題！ 他在一連串彼此相關的問題與論證中推敲、從前人的思路中借鏡 縱橫解析偉大思想家們思考的來龍去脈 主題深刻，內容精闢，是了解自己、了解世界的經典之作 「你幹嘛要想這些奇怪的問題呢？」 「它們看起來根本就沒有答案啊！」 當代知名哲學家賽門‧布雷克本教授在《這一切究竟是為什麼：20個哲學大哉問》這本書裡，幫助你迅速釐清每個主題的「哲學戰況」： 目前最重要的問題是什麼？ 有哪些當紅的立場？ 主要是誰跟誰對上？ 各自有哪些難解的任務？ 不但可以讓你少走冤枉路， 也可以誘引你跟隨、批判，並發展自己的獨到見解。 作者賽門‧布雷克本所列舉的20個題目，是無論男女老幼都會經常感到困惑的問題。就算不依靠反省能力，這些問題似乎也會自然迸生出來，而我們都想找到這些問題的解答。 《這一切究竟是為什麼》一書所羅列的20個問題沒有按一定順序編排，只有最後一個問題例外，因為那是我們所有人最終都會面臨的問題。每個問題的相關討論都是各自獨立的，所以讀者可以挑自己感興趣的主題來看。不過， 有時候不同的問題討論難免會涉及彼此，因此讀者可能會需要前後對照。 所有題目都沒有「標準」答案，但是大家都能從作者的思路、思考的角度來省思我們實際上如何思考、如何感受，以及我們應該如何思考與感受。 ※ 愛智推薦 或許你會忽然覺得「我幹嘛想這些奇怪的問題？」於是轉頭就走不再回來；或許你會覺得這些問題有點有趣，甚至找到志同道合的人一起討論。不管你是哪種人，這本書都能提供一些有趣的幫助。 ──哲學作家 朱家安 哲學思考實在不是為了什麼額外好處才要進行的活動，就像是「美」、「健康」、「正義」一樣，本身就是具有獨立內在價值的事。亞里斯多德說哲學起源於驚嘆，想來約是此意。 ──哲學研究者 邱振訓 這本書並不容易閱讀，讀者多少會感覺到布雷克本的思考或行文脈絡不容易完全掌握，有時引述討論某個哲學家或科學家或文學家的說法，有時是對流行意見的觀察，有時是他自己的看法，這些不同說法交雜在他的思考與討論中 ……哲學問題是反思性的，讀者需要夠努力去思考才能掌握或品味其中的趣味。 ──國立中正大學哲學系副教授 許漢.

This book disseminates practical solutions to the automation of open and distance learning. It discusses computational methods, algorithms, implemented prototype systems, and applications of open and distance learning. It also provides state-of-the-art research on the impact and general principles of ethical computer use in academics, while also emphasizing the cyber philosophical aspect of human-computer interaction.

The classic approaches -- Correspondence -- Coherence -- Pragmatism -- Deflationism -- Tarski and the semantic theory of truth -- Summary of part I -- Varieties of enquiry -- Truths of taste; truth in art -- Truth in ethics -- Reason -- Religion and truth -- Interpretations.

Introduced with a stunning portrait of each featured philosopher, the biographies trace the ideas, friendships, loves, and rivalries that inspired the great thinkers and influenced their work, providing revealing insights into what drove them to question the meaning of life and come up with new ways of understanding the world and the history of ideas.

Abstract In this piece I take issue with Bernard Williams's interpretation of Herodotus as lacking something of our conception of time. I claim that there is nothing so unusual in the interleaving of myth or fiction and history that Williams finds in Herodotus. I also reflect on the difficulty of separating acceptance of truth from acceptance of myth, metaphor, and model, not only in history but also in science.

In this paper I contemplate two phenomena that have impressed theorists concerned with the domain of reasons and of what is now called ‘normativity’. One is the much-discussed ‘externality’ of reasons. According to this, reasons are just there, anyway. They exist whether or not agents take any notice of them. They do not only exist in the light of contingent desires or mere inclinations. They are ‘external’ not ‘internal’. They bear on us, even when through ignorance or wickedness we take (...) no notice of them. They thus very conspicuously shine the lights of objectivity, and independence, and even necessity. By basking in this light, ethics is rescued from the slough of sentiment and preference, and regains the dignity denied to it by theorists such as Hobbes or Hume, Williams, Gibbard or myself. Hence, many contemporary philosophers compete to stress and to extol the external nature of reasons, their shining objectivity. The other phenomenon is that of the inescapable ‘normativity’ of means-ends reasoning. Here the irrationality of intending an end but failing to intend the means is a different shining beacon. It is that of pure practical reason in operation: an indisputable norm, again showing a sublime indifference to whatever weaknesses people actually have, and ideally fitted to provide a Trojan horse for inserting rationality into practical life. If the means-end principle is both unmistakably practical and yet the darling child of rationality itself, then other principles of consistency or of humanity, or of universalizing the maxims of our action, can perhaps follow through the breach in the Humean citadel that it has spearheaded. And so we get the dazzling prospect that if people who choose badly are choosing against reason, then this can be seen to be a special and grave defect. It would locate the kind of fault they are indulging. It would give us, the people of reason, a special lever with which to dislodge their vices. Being able to herd knaves and villains in a compound reserved for those who trespass against reason and rationality therefore represents definite progress. (shrink)