In this paper I will argue that medical specialists interpret and diagnose through technological mediations like X-ray and fMRI images, and by actualizing embodied skills tacitly they are determining the identity of objects in the perceptual field. The initial phase of human interpretation of visual objects takes place during the moments of visual perception before we are consciously aware of the perceived. What facilitate this innate ability to interpret are experiences, learning and training that become humanly embodied skills. These embodied (...) skills are actualized during the moments of visual perception. My argument is that biology, society and instruments constitute unique individual ontologies influencing specialist readings of the technological output, in other words, putting limits on the ‘‘truth-to-nature’’ relation, which is so much sought for in science. (shrink)

The essays both represent a variety of epistemological approaches, including those of the humanities, social studies, natural science, sociology, psychology, ...

This chapter contains sections titled: History of Technology Technology and Science Technology and Philosophy Technology and Environment Technology and Politics Technology and Ethics Technology and the Future.

Embodied cognition is an interpretative—or hermeneutical—cognition inherent in motor-sensory perception intrinsically informed by biological and sociocultural memory, a cognition embedded in the organism as well as the socio-cultural environment interacting with it (Ward et al. TOPOI 36:365–375, 2017), of which technologies are a part. Yet, smart machines are advancing on human abilities to perceive and interpret concerning the accuracy, quantity, and quality of the data processed. Machines process and categorize images, perform classification tasks, they calculate and perform pattern analysis, all (...) machine learning processes are task-specific. Machine learning processes resemble human interpretative processes; however, these are two very different ways of “dealing with something,” although both can be said to be hermeneutical, one enactive, the other material; the first is a meaning-generating interpretative process, the second a statistics-based information output. The information extracted from all the data fed into the computer is the end-product of machine learning, whereas human interpretative enactments are continuous and necessary for any application of the information output. (shrink)

The volume advances research in the philosophy of technology by introducing contributors who have an acute sense of how to get beyond or reframe the epistemic, ontological and normative limitations that currently limit the fields of philosophy of technology and science and technology studies.

Book Symposium on Don Ihde’s Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science Content Type Journal Article Category Book Symposium Pages 1-22 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0060-5 Authors Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis, University of Copenhagen, Nørre Farimagsgade 5 A, Room 10.0.27, 1014 Copenhagen, Denmark Larry A. Hickman, The Center for Dewey Studies, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA Robert Rosenberger, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, DM Smith Building, 685 Cherry Street, Atlanta, GA 30332-0345, USA Robert C. (...) Scharff, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824-3574, USA Don Ihde, Stony Brook University, Harriman Hall 221, Stony Brook, NY 11794-3750, USA Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433. (shrink)

In this commentary on Don Ihde’s paper “Stretching the in-between: embodiment and beyond” I argue that perceptions and observations are based on tacit frames and these frames are expressed through pre-reflexive intuitions thus giving meaning to the perceived content of observations. However, if the objective or given information in perception is incomplete or missing our brain and nervous system will intuitively and unconsciously fill in the missing information in order to act—these particular pieces of added information may not be relevant (...) to the decoding of the given content of perception at all. (shrink)

Friis and Crease illustrate the diversity of content and styles in postphenomenology, a burgeoning field that has attracted attention among scholars engaged in technology studies. Contributors to this edited collection seek to analyze, clarify, and develop postphenomenological language and concepts, expand the work of Don Ihde, the field's founder, and delve into areas that Ihde never tackled.

The essays both represent a variety of epistemological approaches, including those of the humanities, social studies, natural science, sociology, psychology, and engineering sciences and reflect a diversity of philosophical traditions such ...

The volume advances research in the philosophy of technology by introducing contributors who have an acute sense of how to get beyond or reframe the epistemic, ontological and normative limitations that currently limit the fields of philosophy of technology and science and technology studies.

Experienced time is real time, the only time we know anything about and how we can go about to make it a scientific measure of natural processes.

The leap from primitive to scientific time represented as the "time" in "relativity physics", or in "thermodynamics" or perhaps in "quantum physics" or even within "statistical mechanics" is large. Large also is the conceptual dif­ference between these various understandings of the nature of time. How are we really to understand these physical perspectives on time: As knowledge about the real nature of time represented by the objective concepts: Or as epistemological-operational abstractions that cannot avoid elevating their results to the level (...) of full-fledged reality, to ontology. (shrink)

The leap from primitive to scientific time represented as the “time” in “relativity physics,” or in “thermodynamics” or perhaps in “quantum physics” or even within “statistical mechanics” is large. Large also is the conceptual difference between these various understandings of the nature of time. How are we really to understand these physical perspectives on time: As knowledge about the real nature of time represented by the objective concepts: Or as epistemological-operational abstractions that cannot avoid elevating their results to the level (...) of full-fledged reality, to ontology? (shrink)

Generally speaking, the most essential and characteristic feature of realism is the notion of a mind-independent existence, which means that individual or a species of things have an existence that is “in-itself”. Realism is a metaphysical position; it is a stance taken of individual mind-endowed human beings towards the world in perception. On the other hand, to deny that something is mind-independent is yet another, however different, metaphysical stance that is called anti-realism or idealism. However, philosophical discourse discloses the fact (...) that we, as philosophers and scientists, tend to choose different specifications for what is to count as “independent of mind” and also in which way this “mind-independent” entity is supposed to exist. There are many metaphysical issues over which realism and idealism have been argued. For example, we have the question about the existence of moral values. Or we have the problem of the existence of souls and minds. More interestingly is whether the past can be said to have been real, or, on the other hand, if the future is real. We tend, nevertheless, to take different specifications for granted and therefore we have a tremendously large variety of senses in which the word “realism” is being used. In order to get a general feeling of the modern sense of philosophical realism, we have to briefly take a look at the “before” and “after” of Kant. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to postphenomenology, an emerging school of thought in the philosophy of technology and science and technology studies, which addresses the relationships users develop with the devices they use.

Introduction to special issue of Synthese.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this note, we show that the first-order logic IKω is sound with regard to the models obtained from continuum-valued Łukasiewicz-models for first-order languages by treating the quantifiers as infinitary strong disjunction/conjunction rather than infinitary weak disjunction/conjunction. Moreover, we show that these models cannot be used to provide a new consistency proof for the theory of truth IKTω obtained by expanding IKω with transparent truth, because the models are inconsistent with transparent truth. Finally, we show that whether or not this (...) inconsistency can be reproduced in the sequent calculus for IKTω depends on how vacuous quantification is treated. (shrink)

_Airy Nothings_ contains eleven contributions on the scholarly and literary representations of the Otherworld of Faerie from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment.

The application of semantical concepts such as synonymy and interpretation to actual situations of usage gives rise to perplexing problems. One of the few attempts to tackle these problems has been carried out by Arne Naess. Further advances along this line may become possible after a clarification of the basic concepts employed. The discussion centers around empirical synonymy and certain other notions built on this concept by Naess. Possible ways of making the system coherent are indicated.