: My essay incorporates Irigaray's notion of the sensible transcendental, a dynamic attempt to reconstitute the body/mind dualism which founds Western thought, into a reading of the practice of European concert dance. I contend that Irigaray's efforts toward articulating a language of the body as active agent have much to offer (feminist) analyses of dance practice, and develop this claim through a reading which reflects philosophically on the changing nature of my own dance activity.

My essay incorporates Irigaray's notion of the sensible transcendental, a dynamic attempt to reconstitute the body/mind dualism which founds Western thought, into a reading of the practice of European concert dance. I contend that Irigaray's efforts toward articulating a language of the body as active agent have much to offer analyses of dance practice, and develop this claim through a reading which reflects philosophically on the changing nature of my own dance activity.

Moral particularists and generalists alike have struggled over how to incorporate the role of moral salience in ethical reasoning. In this paper, I point to neglected resources in Kant to account for the role of moral salience in maxim formation: Kant's theory of reflective judgment. Kant tasks reflective judgment with picking out salient empirical particulars for formation into maxims, associating it with purposiveness, or intentional activity (action on ends). The unexpected resources in Kantian reflective judgment suggest the possibility of a (...) particularist universalism, where recalcitrant particulars directly inform, and in some cases revise, moral principles. Such an account improves on particularist accounts of moral salience and moral perception: rather than deriving moral sensitivity solely from an agent's upbringing or cultural resources, the reflective dimension is situated alongside the universalist dimension of moral principles typically identified with Kantian ethics, allowing for a critical approach both to moral universals and to the reception of moral particulars. (shrink)

This paper calls into question the view typically attributed to Kant that aesthetic judgements are particularist, resisting all conceptual determination. Instead, it claims that Kant conceives of aesthetic judgements, particularly of art, as playing an important role in therevisionof concepts: one sense in which aesthetic judgements, as Kant defines them, ‘find a universal’ for a given particular. To understand the relation between artistic judgements and concepts requires that we consider what I call Kant’s diachronic account of aesthetic ideas, or how (...) such judgements unfold in the course of communication and reflection. My reading draws Kant much closer to debates in the philosophy of art on the semantic dimension of artworks. Here, illuminating the way in which aesthetic judgements about art can play a role in conceptual revision allows us to make sense of the way in which modern artworks contest concepts rather than merely presenting or expressing them. (shrink)

This paper offers a reading of Beauvoir’s Second Sex as a genealogy of ‘morality’: the patriarchal system of values that maintains a moral distinction between men and women. This value system construes many of women’s experiences under oppression as evidence of women’s immorality, obscuring the agential role of those who provoke such experiences. Beauvoir’s examination of the origin for this value system provides an important counterexample to the prevailing debate over whether genealogical method functions to debunk or to vindicate: while (...) the currently dominant moral system may have been historically necessary at certain stages in human development, Beauvoir nevertheless debunks it; only the value system itself now remains, without its precipitating needs. Thus, Beauvoir’s critique reveals what I call the moral unintelligibility of women’s experiences of oppression: women encounter difficulty in making sense of the harms wrought against them because the operative value system obscures them as harms in the first place, instead construing women themselves as immoral. Against the prevailing construction of moral blame and responsibility, Beauvoir’s solution is the political virtue of moral invention, a virtue epistemic as well as moral, collective as well as individual. (shrink)

An interview with Michel Foucault in 1979 that was never published during his lifetime and was recently rediscovered in the archives. The interview, appearing for the first time in English and in its complete form, marks one of Foucault’s final public discussions of the contentious topic of the Iranian Revolution. In particular, Foucault clarifies what he means by “political spirituality” and addresses the respective relations between religion, revolution, and self-transformation.

Multicultural Counseling: Responding With Cultural Humility, Empathy, and Advocacy is divided up into three sections. The first section is comprised of four chapters and explores the counselors' worldview. The second section is made up of 19 chapters that encapsulate the clients' worldview. The third section includes four chapters that demonstrate the application of multicultural counseling by broaching race and culture; providing culturally responsive assessment, diagnosing, and treatment planning; finding a supervisor who prepares advocates; and designing a culturally sensitive workplace. Each (...) chapter opens with questions designed to have counselors consider their beliefs, attitudes, and judgments and how they might show up in their work with diverse clients. Chapters include clinical case scenarios where students can conceptualize cases using empathy, humility, and advocacy. A distinguishing feature of this book is that it includes cultures that may have been overlooked elsewhere. The authors also sought to include various faiths in this text-such as agnosticism, atheism, and indigenous spiritual practices-with hopes that counselors' first experience with such would be in this book rather than on their couches with clients. Another chapter is dedicated specifically to transgender people. The goal of this book is to give learners the framework to begin to understand who the people are that they will be serving. (shrink)

Morality after Calvin' examines the development of ethical thought in the Reformed tradition immediately following the death of Calvin. The book explores a previously unstudied work of Theodore Beza, the Cato Censorius Christianus (1591). When read in conjunction with the works and correspondence of Beza and his colleagues (Simon Goulart, Lambert Daneau, Peter Martyr Vermigli, among others), the poems of the Cato reveal the theoretical underpinnings of the disciplinary activity during the period. Kirk M. Summers shows how the moral (...) fervor of the latter half of the sixteenth century had its genesis in a well-formulated theology that viewed a Christian's sanctification as a process of restoration to an original order created by God. 00. (shrink)

While increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the relation between Foucault’s conception of critique and Kant’s, much controversy remains over whether Foucault’s most sustained early engagement with Kant, his dissertation on Kant’s Anthropology, should be read as a wholesale rejection of Kant’s views or as the source of Foucault’s late return to ethics and critique. In this paper, I propose a new reading of the dissertation, considering it alongside 1950s-era archival materials of which I advance the first (...) scholarly appraisal. I argue that Foucault manifests a fundamental ambivalence to Kantian anthropology, rejecting it in theoretical terms while embracing its practical (‘pragmatic’) conception of the subject. Furthermore, I take these texts to collectively evidence Foucault’s attempt to situate himself within the anthropological-critical tradition rather than extricating himself from it. If we interpret Foucault to reject this tradition’s appeal to an essentialized, theoretical conception of subjectivity, what remains of anthropology is its inherent practical reflexivity in structure. Thus, I situate Foucault’s conception of ethics as one’s relation to oneself in continuity with this tradition. (shrink)

This paper claims that Kant’s conception of culture provides a new means of understanding how the two parts of the Critique of Judgment fit together. Kant claims that culture is both the ‘ultimate purpose’ of nature and to be defined in terms of ‘art in general’ (of which the fine arts are a subtype). In the Critique of Teleological Judgment, culture, as the last empirically cognizable telos of nature, serves as the mediating link between nature and freedom, while in the (...) Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, the connection between art and morality passes through culture. In either case, Kant offers distinct, yet interdependent, arguments for how culture demonstrates the amenability of nature to its supersensible ground: the central question Kant claims in the Introduction that the work seeks to answer. Thus, not only does this account advance a concept essential to both parts of the work; it also demonstrates how the two parts can be conceived as complementary, with each supplementing the other to solve Kant’s central question. As such, understanding the Critique of Judgment in terms of culture enables us to see how the two parts of the work do not merely share points of similarity or common themes, but presuppose one another in order to understand how nature is amenable to freedom. (shrink)

An influential strand in philosophy of science claims that scientific paradigms can be understood as relativized a priori frameworks. Here, Kant’s constitutive a priori principles are no longer held to establish conditions of possibility for knowledge which are unchanging and universally true, but are restricted only to a given scientific domain. Yet it is unclear how exactly a relativized a priori can be construed as both stable and dynamical, establishing foundations for current scientific claims while simultaneously making intelligible the transition (...) to a subsequent framework. In this article, I show that important resources for this problem have been overlooked in Kant’s theory of reflective judgement in the third Critique. I argue that Kant accorded the task of formulating new scientific laws to reflective judgement, which is charged with forming new ‘universals’ that guide the experience of nature. I show that this is the very task attributed to the relativized a priori: the constitution of a given conceptual framework, not of the conditions for object-reference as such. I conclude that Kant’s considered conception of science encompasses the operations of both reflective and determining judgement. Relativizations of the a priori should follow Kant’s lead. (shrink)

The New World reveals a warning of the great change coming to our world and a prophetic vision of a future world for which we must prepare. It is a warning from God about humanity's rapid depletion and degradation of the Earth and the urgent action we must take, individually and collectively, to both restore our planet and prepare for the future.

We propose an account of the subject’s cognition that allows for a full articulation of the phenomenon of ideology. We argue that ideology operates at the level of the a priori: it transcendentally conditions the intelligibility of thought and practice. But we draw from strands of post-Kantian philosophy of science and social philosophy in repudiating Kant’s view that the a priori is necessary and fixed. Instead, we argue, it is contingent, and therefore revisable. More precisely, it is conditioned materially: it (...) must be understood as an activity, continuous with and shaped by material social practice. We conclude with some remarks about the possibility of agency over one’s relativized, materially conditioned a priori; that is, over the possibility of critique. (shrink)

Researchers have raised concerns about teachers’ ability to embed nature of science in their science instruction, a complicated situation that is certainly impacted by the availability of adequate resources to assist K-12 science teachers. In light of the implementation of the ideas from the Framework for K-12 Science Education and the Next Generation Science Standards in the USA, this study sought to identify and evaluate resources aimed at guiding NOS instruction. A search of the National Science Teachers Association database for (...) Next Generation Science Standards -aligned instructional resources resulted in an analytical sample of eight lessons. All materials accompanying these lessons were analyzed for their representations of 10 NOS aspects. The evaluation of these materials revealed a prevalence of implicit, naïve representations in the sample lessons. Examination of the connections to NOS in these lessons leads to a set of recommendations to improve the quantity and quality of NOS representations in future NGSS-aligned instructional resources. The analytical approach used and the issues raised about the presentation and treatment of NOS in precollege lessons are of interest to the broader science education community. (shrink)

An introduction to an interview with Michel Foucault in 1979, which contextualizes his general stance on the Iranian uprising, as well as his conception of philosophical journalism and political spirituality, his rejection of the teleology of history, and his willingness to let historically silenced subjects speak for themselves.

A critical discussion of three recent monographs on Kantian ethics: Jens Timmermann's Kant's Will at the Crossroads, Barbara Herman's The Moral Habitat, and Mark Timmons' Kant's Doctrine of Virtue. I start by laying out some of the main claims of all three works, and then examine some of the main points of contention between them: principally, the issue of moral complexity, the derivation of duties, and the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. I conclude with some remarks on how the (...) insights of all three works might be fruitfully combined to advance the current state of thought on the structure and composition of the Kantian moral system, as well as on the sense in which it might be taken to parallel, or otherwise be related to, Kant's theoretical system. (shrink)

In ‘Other Minds’, J.L. Austin advances a parallel between saying ‘I know’ and saying ‘I promise’: much as you are ‘prohibited’, he says, from saying ‘I promise I will, but I may fail’, you are also ‘prohibited’ from saying ‘I know it is so, but I may be wrong’. This treatment of ‘I know’ has been derided for nearly sixty years: while saying ‘I promise’ amounts to performing the act of promising, Austin seems to miss the fact that saying ‘I (...) know’ fails to constitute a performance of the act of knowing. In this paper, I advance a defense of Austin’s position. I diagnose the principal objections to Austin’s account as stemming from detractors’ failure to acknowledge: (1) that Austin never characterizes ‘I know’ as a pure performative; (2) that saying ‘I know p’, unlike simply knowing p, occurs in specific interpersonal contexts in which others rely on our knowledge claims; (3) Austin’s considered account of the felicity conditions of performative utterance; (4) Austin’s ultimate repudiation of the performative/constative distinction. I conclude that Austin’s treatment of ‘I know’ rests on a more general commitment to the intrinsically normative nature of ordinary language. (shrink)

This volume provides an authoritative, up-to-date survey of theories of infant development.

This study discovers a pattern to Diderot's thinking, a fundamental dualism attributable largely to the attitudes and assumptions of the time and giving a common structure to his ideas and writing. Geoffrey Bremner draws widely on Diderot's works in studying his ideas on perception and action, aesthetics, ethics and politics, as well as his plays and fiction. The subtlety of the textual analysis and the analogies Dr Bremner draws provide a convincing and illuminating argument for his interpretation. He (...) supports this but emphasising the intellectual circumstances in which Diderot wrote and demonstrating his links to other eighteenth- and seventeenth-century writers. His study will therefore make a valuable contribution to the reassessment of the period that is currently underway, as well as to the central, elusive problem presented by Diderot's thought itself. (shrink)

This study discovers a pattern to Diderot's thinking, a fundamental dualism attributable largely to the attitudes and assumptions of the time and giving a common structure to his ideas and writing. Geoffrey Bremner draws widely on Diderot's works in studying his ideas on perception and action, aesthetics, ethics and politics, as well as his plays and fiction. The subtlety of the textual analysis and the analogies Dr Bremner draws provide a convincing and illuminating argument for his interpretation. He (...) supports this but emphasising the intellectual circumstances in which Diderot wrote and demonstrating his links to other eighteenth- and seventeenth-century writers. His study will therefore make a valuable contribution to the reassessment of the period that is currently underway, as well as to the central, elusive problem presented by Diderot's thought itself. (shrink)

The absence of a fully-fledged theory of evolution in the eighteenth century can be accounted for by the unquestioned assumption of a hierarchy of values whose effect was to allot an inferior status to all potentially evolutionary concepts. The dominant values in the hierarchy were absolute form and plenitude, whereas concepts such as the movement of matter, change, diversity, etc., were seen simply as the means by which nature produced purely contingent effects. Only man's intervention, through art or animal breeding (...) for example, could create controlled order, that is, form and value. The change in attitudes which will make evolutionary thought possible is first seen on Lamarck's theory of heredity and his theory of the structure of the universe. (shrink)

"Stains" can serve as a metaphor for the role allotted to meaninglessness not only by partisans of the deterritorializing force of "brute matter", but also by diagnosers of symbolic incompleteness. For both, the blindspot that will lead to the disturbance of a given regime of meaning must be determined through a smear or glitch which that regime cannot sublate: the mark of a Real stripped of systematising mediation. However, we argue that it is all too easy to allow the stringency (...) of this Real to be undermined by the inflation in its name of merely contingent empirical instances. Such blockages to theoretical and artistic practice can be removed with the aid of the articulation of incompleteness and inconsistency implied by François Laruelle's conception of the Real as non-consistent but hypercomplete "radical immanence". À rebours of Laruelle himself, different types of meaninglessness can then be distinguished, de-metaphorized, and conceptualized as "noise". (shrink)

Nous avons voulu procéder à une reformulation de la célèbre énigme de Cedric Price qui remettait en question les promesses de la technologie. Nous avons donc formulé la provocation suivante : « Le design est la réponse, mais quelle était la question? ». Dans ce cas, quelle pourrait être la promesse du design? Nous posons une autre question : « Si le design n’est pas la réponse, qu’est-ce qu’il pourrait être? » Quelle que soit la réponse, nous disons clairement que (...) ce que le design peut faire est de répondre aux échos de notre relation avec tous et tout ce qui se trouve sur la planète que nous partageons – notre maison commune – et de se demander ce qui pourrait ne pas advenir dans un monde-sans-nous – un monde impensable. (shrink)

Mareschal and his colleagues argue that cognition consists of partial representations emerging from organismic constraints placed on information processing through development. However, any notion of constraints must consider multiple sensory modalities, and their gradual integration across development. Multisensory integration constitutes one important way in which developmental constraints may lead to enriched representations that serve more than immediate behavioural goals.

Recently, concern has been raised regarding the politicization of public bioethics. Party politics has increasingly influenced public debate on ethical issues like stem cell research, human cloning, and end-of-life care. These debates have put bioethics “smack in the middle” of the culture wars. These recent events confirm Daniel Callahan’s prescient claim made in 1996 that “bioethical debates are beginning to reflect those culture wars … the larger moral struggles of our society.”.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 12, Page 1, December 2011.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 2-5, August 2011.

Can one explain both the resilience of the status quo and the possibility for resistance from a subordinate position? This paper aims to resolve these seemingly incompatible perspectives. By extending Randall Collins's interaction ritual theory, and synthesizing it with Norbert Wiley's model of the self, this paper suggests how the emotional dynamics between people and within the self can explain social inertia as well as the possibility for resistance and change. Diverging from literature on the sociology of emotions that has (...) been concerned with individual emotional processes, this paper considers the collective level in order to explore how movement action is motivated. The emotional dynamics of subordinate positioning that limit women's options in face-to-face interactions are examined, as are the social processes of developing feminist consciousness and a willingness to participate in resistance work. Pointing toward empirical applications, I conclude by suggesting conditions where resistance is likely. (shrink)

: National bioethics commissions have been critiqued for a variety of structural, procedural, and political aspects of their work. A more recent critique published by Dzur and Levin uses political philosophy to constructively critique the work of national bioethics commissions as public deliberative forums. However, this public forum critique of bioethics commissions ignores empirical research in political science and normative claims that suggest that advisory commissions can and should have diverse of functions beyond that of being public forums. The present (...) paper argues that the public forum critique too narrowly considers the roles that bioethics commissions can play in public bioethics and ignores the moral obligation of commissions to fulfill their mandates. Evaluations of commissions must consider that these institutions can serve in capacities other than those of a public deliberative forum and use additional measures to evaluate the multiple roles and successes of bioethics commissions in public policy. (shrink)