An energy condition, in the context of a wide class of spacetime theories, is, crudely speaking, a relation one demands the stress-energy tensor of matter satisfy in order to try to capture the idea that "energy should be positive". The remarkable fact I will discuss in this paper is that such simple, general, almost trivial seeming propositions have profound and far-reaching import for our understanding of the structure of relativistic spacetimes. It is therefore especially surprising when one also learns that (...) we have no clear understanding of the nature of these conditions, what theoretical status they have with respect to fundamental physics, what epistemic status they may have, when we should and should not expect them to be satisfied, and even in many cases how they and their consequences should be interpreted physically. Or so I shall argue, by a detailed analysis of the technical and conceptual character of all the standard conditions used in physics today, including examination of their consequences and the circumstances in which they are believed to be violated. (shrink)

One can (for the most part) formulate a model of a classical system in either the Lagrangian or the Hamiltonian framework. Though it is often thought that those two formulations are equivalent in all important ways, this is not true: the underlying geometrical structures one uses to formulate each theory are not isomorphic. This raises the question of whether one of the two is a more natural framework for the representation of classical systems. In the event, the answer is yes: (...) I state and sketch proofs of two technical results—inspired by simple physical arguments about the generic properties of classical systems—to the effect that, in a precise sense, classical systems evince exactly the geometric structure Lagrangian mechanics provides for the representation of systems, and none provided by Hamiltonian. The argument not only clarifies the conceptual structure of the two systems of mechanics, but also their relations to each other and their respective mechanisms for representing physical systems. It also shows why naïvely structural approaches to the representational content of physical theories cannot work. [Lagrange] grasped that he had gained a method of stating dynamical truths in a way, which is perfectly indifferent to the particular methods of measurement employed in fixing the positions of the various parts of the system. Accordingly, he went on to deduce equations of motion, which are equally applicable whatever quantitative measurements have been made, provided that they are adequate to fix positions. The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of all things. (Whitehead [1948], p. 63)1. Introduction2.Classical Systems3. The Possible Interactions of a Classical System and the Structure of Its Space of States4. Classical Systems Are Lagrangian5. Classical Systems Are Not Hamiltonian6. How Lagrangian and Hamiltonian Mechanics Represent Classical Systems7. The Conceptual Structure of Classical Mechanics. (shrink)

Every physical theory has two different forms of mathematical equations to represent its target systems: the dynamical and the kinematical. Kinematical constraints are differentiated from equations of motion by the fact that their particular form is fixed once and for all, irrespective of the interactions the system enters into. By contrast, the particular form of a system's equations of motion depends essentially on the particular interaction the system enters into. All contemporary accounts of the structure and semantics of physical theory (...) treat dynamics, i.e., the equations of motion, as the most important feature of a theory for the purposes of its philosophical analysis. I argue to the contrary that it is the kinematical constraints that determine the structure and empirical content of a physical theory in the most important ways: they function as necessary preconditions for the appropriate application of the theory; they differentiate types of physical systems; they are necessary for the equations of motion to be well posed or even just cogent; and they guide the experimentalist in the design of tools for measurement and observation. It is thus satisfaction of the kinematical constraints that renders meaning to those terms representing a system's physical quantities in the first place, even before one can ask whether or not the system satisfies the theory's equations of motion. (shrink)

Although black holes are objects of central importance across many fields of physics, there is no agreed upon definition for them, a fact that does not seem to be widely recognized. Physicists in different fields conceive of and reason about them in radi- cally different, and often conflicting, ways. All those ways, however, seem sound in the relevant contexts. After examining and comparing many of the definitions used in practice, I consider the problems that the lack of a universally accepted (...) definition leads to, and discuss whether one is in fact needed for progress in the physics of black holes. I conclude that, within reasonable bounds, the profusion of different definitions is in fact a virtue, making the investigation of black holes possible and fruitful in all the many different kinds of problems about them that physicists consider, although one must take care in trying to translate results between fields. (shrink)

Much controversy surrounds the question of what ought to be the proper definition of 'singularity' in general relativity, and the question of whether the prediction of such entities leads to a crisis for the theory. I argue that a definition in terms of curve incompleteness is adequate, and in particular that the idea that singularities correspond to 'missing points' has insurmountable problems. I conclude that singularities per se pose no serious problem for the theory, but their analysis does bring into (...) focus several problems of interpretation at the foundation of the theory often ignored in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the hole argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an (...) investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists. 1 Introduction2 The Hole Argument3 Limits of Spacetimes4 Pointless Constructions5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists6 Existence and Physicality: An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism, and the Structure of Our Knowledge of Physics. (shrink)

I explain the difficulty of making various concepts of and relating to probability precise, rigorous and physically significant when attempting to apply them in reasoning about objects living in infinite-dimensional spaces, working through many examples from cosmology. I focus on the relation of topological to measure-theoretic notions of and relating to probability, how they diverge in unpleasant ways in the infinite-dimensional case, and are even difficult to work with on their own. Even in cases where an appropriate family of spacetimes (...) is finite-dimensional, and so admits a measure of the relevant sort, however, it is always the case that the family is not a compact topological space, and so does not admit a physically significant, well behaved probability measure. Problems of a different but still deeply troubling sort plague arguments about likelihood in that context, which I also discuss. I conclude that most standard forms of argument used in cosmology to estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of various properties or behaviors of spacetimes have serious mathematical, physical and conceptual problems. (shrink)

All accounts of causality that presuppose the propagation or transfer or some physical stuff to be an essential part of the causal relation rely for the force of their causal claims on a principle of conservation for that stuff. General Relativity does not permit the rigorous formulation of appropriate conservation principles. Consequently, in so far as General Relativity is considered and fundamental physical theory, such accounts of causality cannot be considered fundamental. The continued use of such accounts of causality ought (...) not be proscribed, but justification is due from those who would use them. (shrink)

The question of the existence of gravitational stress-energy in general relativity has exercised investigators in the field since the inception of the theory. Folklore has it that no adequate definition of a localized gravitational stress-energetic quantity can be given. Most arguments to that effect invoke one version or another of the Principle of Equivalence. I argue that not only are such arguments of necessity vague and hand-waving but, worse, are beside the point and do not address the heart of the (...) issue. Based on a novel analysis of what it may mean for one tensor to depend in the proper way on another, which, en passant, provides a precise characterization of the idea of a "geometric object", I prove that, under certain natural conditions, there can be no tensor whose interpretation could be that it represents gravitational stress-energy in general relativity. It follows that gravitational energy, such as it is in general relativity, is necessarily non-local. Along the way, I prove a result of some interest in own right about the structure of the associated jet bundles of the bundle of Lorentz metrics over spacetime. I conclude by showing that my results also imply that, under a few natural conditions, the Einstein field equation is the unique equation relating gravitational phenomena to spatiotemporal structure, and discuss how this relates to the non-localizability of gravitational stress-energy. (shrink)

I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the hole argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an (...) investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists. 1 Introduction2 The Hole Argument3 Limits of Spacetimes4 Pointless Constructions5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists6 Existence and Physicality: An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism, and the Structure of Our Knowledge of Physics. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to the recent claims of physicists and philosophers of physics, general relativity requires no interpretation in any substantive sense of the term. I canvass the common reasons given in favor of the alleged need for an interpretation, including the difficulty in coming to grips with the physical significance of diffeomorphism invariance and of singular structure, and the problems faced in the search for a theory of quantum gravity. I find that none of them shows any defect (...) in our comprehension of general relativity as a physical theory. I conclude by comparing general relativity with quantum mechanics, a theory that manifestly does stand in need of an interpretation in an important sense. Although many aspects of the conceptual structure of general relativity remain poorly understood, it suffers no incoherence in its formulation as a physical theory that only an ‘interpretation’ could resolve. *Received November 2007; revised February 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 817 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: erik@strangebeautiful.com . When science starts to be interpretive it is more unscientific even than mysticism. (D. H. Lawrence, “Self‐Protection”). (shrink)

General relativity poses serious problems for counterfactual propositions peculiar to it as a physical theory. Because these problems arise solely from the dynamical nature of spacetime geometry, they are shared by all schools of thought on how counterfactuals should be interpreted and understood. Given the role of counterfactuals in the characterization of, inter alia, many accounts of scientific laws, theory confirmation and causation, general relativity once again presents us with idiosyncratic puzzles any attempt to analyze and understand the nature of (...) scientific knowledge must face. (shrink)

I argue that all current research programs in quantum gravity conform to the 17th century hypothetico-deductive model of scientific inquiry, perhaps of necessity given the current state of technology. In so far as they do not recognize and advertise the shortcomings of the research method they use, they do a disservice to the integrity of science, for the method admits of far less certainty accruing to its products than one would be led to believe by the pronouncements of researchers in (...) the area. (shrink)

In the early 1970s it is was realized that there is a striking formal analogy between the Laws of black-hole mechanics and the Laws of classical thermodynamics. Before the discovery of Hawking radiation, however, it was generally thought that the analogy was only formal, and did not reflect a deep connection between gravitational and thermodynamical phenomena. It is still commonly held that the surface gravity of a stationary black hole can be construed as a true physical temperature and its area (...) as a true entropy only when quantum effects are taken into account; in the context of classical general relativity alone, one cannot cogently construe them so. Does the use of quantum field theory in curved spacetime offer the only hope for taking the analogy seriously? I think the answer is `no'. To attempt to justify that answer, I shall begin by arguing that the standard argument to the contrary is not physically well founded, and in any event begs the question. Looking at the various ways that the ideas of ``temperature'' and ``entropy'' enter classical thermodynamics then will suggest arguments that, I claim, show the analogy between classical black-hole mechanics and classical thermodynamics should be taken more seriously, without the need to rely on or invoke quantum mechanics. In particular, I construct an analogue of a Carnot cycle in which a black hole ``couples'' with an ordinary thermodynamical system in such a way that its surface gravity plays the role of temperature and its area that of entropy. Thus, the connection between classical general relativity and classical thermodynamics on their own is already deep and physically significant, independent of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

I argue that an adequate semantics for physical theories must be grounded on an account of the way that a theory provides formal and conceptual resources appropriate for---that have propriety in---the construction of representations of the physical systems the theory purports to treat. I sketch a precise, rigorous definition of the required forms of propriety, and argue that semantic content accrues to scientific representations of physical systems primarily in virtue of the propriety of its resources. In particular, neither the adequacy (...) of those representations nor any referential relations their terms may enter into play any fundamental role in the determination of the representation's semantic content. One consequence is that anything like traditional Tarskian semantics is inadequate for the task. (shrink)

I state and prove, in the context of a space having only the metrical structure imposed by the geometrized version of Newtonian gravitational theory, a theorem analagous to that of Weyl's in a Lorentzian space. The theorem, loosely speaking, says that a projective structure and a suitably defined compatible conformal structure on such a space jointly suffice for fixing the metrical structure of a Newtonian spacetime model up to constant factors. It allows one to give a natural, physically compelling interpretation (...) of the spatiotemporal geometry of a geometrized Newtonian gravity spacetime manifold, in close analogy with the way Weyl's Theorem allows one to do in general relativity. (shrink)

In the early 1970s it is was realized that there is a striking formal analogy between the Laws of black-hole mechanics and the Laws of classical thermodynamics. Before the discovery of Hawking radiation, however, it was generally thought that the analogy was only formal, and did not reflect a deep connection between gravitational and thermodynamical phenomena. It is still commonly held that the surface gravity of a stationary black hole can be construed as a true physical temperature and its area (...) as a true entropy only when quantum effects are taken into account; in the context of classical general relativity alone, one cannot cogently construe them so. Does the use of quantum field theory in curved spacetime offer the only hope for taking the analogy seriously? I think the answer is 'no'. To attempt to justify that answer, I shall begin by arguing that the standard argument to the contrary is not physically well founded, and in any event begs the question. Looking at the various ways that the ideas of "temperature" and "entropy" enter classical thermodynamics then will suggest arguments that, I claim, show the analogy between classical black-hole mechanics and classical thermodynamics should be taken more seriously, without the need to rely on or invoke quantum mechanics. In particular, I construct an analogue of a Carnot cycle in which a black hole "couples" with an ordinary thermodynamical system in such a way that its surface gravity plays the role of temperature and its area that of entropy. Thus, the connection between classical general relativity and classical thermodynamics on their own is already deep and physically significant, independent of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The analysis of theory-confirmation generally takes the deductive form: show that a theory in conjunction with physical data and auxiliary hypotheses yield a prediction about phenomena; verify the prediction; provide a quantitative measure of the degree of theory-confirmation this yields. The issue of confirmation for an entire framework either does not arise, or is dismissed in so far as frameworks are thought not to be the kind of thing that admits scientific confirmation. I argue that there is another form of (...) scientific reasoning that has not received philosophical attention, what I call Newtonian abduction, that does provide confirmation for frameworks as a whole, and does so in two novel ways. I further argue that Newtonian abduction is at least as important a form of reasoning in science as standard deductive and inductive forms. The form is beautifully summed up by Maxwell : “The true method of physical reasoning is to begin with the phenomena and to deduce the forces from them by a direct application of the equations of motion.”. (shrink)

The analysis of theory-confirmation generally takes the deductive form: show that a theory in conjunction with physical data and auxiliary hypotheses yield a prediction about phenomena; verify the prediction; provide a quantitative measure of the degree of theory-confirmation this yields. The issue of confirmation for an entire framework (e.g., Newtonian mechanics en bloc, as opposed, say, to Newton’s theory of gravitation) either does not arise, or is dismissed in so far as frameworks are thought not to be the kind of (...) thing that admits scientific confirmation. I argue that there is another form of scientific reasoning that has not received philosophical attention, what I call Newtonian abduction, that does provide confirmation for frameworks as a whole, and does so in two novel ways. (In particular, Newtonian abduction is not inference to the best explanation, but rather is closer to Peirce’s original idea of abduction.) I further argue that Newtonian abduction is at least as important a form of reasoning in science as standard deductive and inductive forms. The form is beautifully summed up by Maxwell (Proc Camb Philos Soc II:292–294, 1876): “The true method of physical reasoning is to begin with the phenomena and to deduce the forces from them by a direct application of the equations of motion.”. (shrink)

I do not think the notion of rigidity in designation can be correct, at least not in any way that can serve to ground a semantics purports both to be fundamental in a semiotical sense and to the best science of the day. A careful examination of both content and the character of our best scientific knowledge not cannot support anything like what the notion of rigidity requires, but actually shows the notion to be, at bottom, incoherent. In particular, the (...) scientific meaning of natural kind terms can be determined only within the context of a fixed scientific framework and not sub specie aeternitatis. Along the way, I provide grounds for the rejection of essentialist views of the ontology of natural kinds. (shrink)

Although black holes are objects of central importance across many fields of physics, there is no agreed upon definition for them, a fact that does not seem to be widely recognized. Physicists in different fields conceive of and reason about them in radically different, and often conflicting, ways. All those ways, however, seem sound in the relevant contexts. After examining and comparing many of the definitions used in practice, I consider the problems that the lack of a universally accepted definition (...) leads to, and discuss whether one is in fact needed for progress in the physics of black holes. I conclude that, within reasonable bounds, the profusion of different definitions is in fact a virtue, making the investigation of black holes possible and fruitful in all the many different kinds of problems about them that physicists consider, although one must take care in trying to translate results between fields. (shrink)

The standard argument for the uniqueness of the Einstein field equation is based on Lovelock's Theorem, the relevant statement of which is restricted to four dimensions. I prove a theorem similar to Lovelock's, with a physically modified assumption: that the geometric object representing curvature in the Einstein field equation ought to have the physical dimension of stress-energy. The theorem is stronger than Lovelock's in two ways: it holds in all dimensions, and so supports a generalized argument for uniqueness; it does (...) not assume that the desired tensor depends on the metric only up second-order partial-derivatives, that condition being a consequence of the proof. This has consequences for understanding the nature of the cosmological constant and theories of higher-dimensional gravity. Another consequence of the theorem is that it makes precise the sense in which there can be no gravitational stress-energy tensor in general relativity. Along the way, I prove a result of some interest about the second jet-bundle of the bundle of metrics over a manifold. (shrink)

One can (for the most part) formulate a model of a classical system in either the Lagrangian or the Hamiltonian framework. Though it is often thought that those two formulations are equivalent in all important ways, this is not true: the underlying geometrical structures one uses to formulate each theory are not isomorphic. This raises the question whether one of the two is a more natural framework for the representation of classical systems. In the event, the answer is yes: I (...) state and prove two technical results, inspired by simple physical arguments about the generic properties of classical systems, to the effect that, in a precise sense, classical systems evince exactly the geometric structure Lagrangian mechanics provides for the representation of systems, and none that Hamiltonian mechanics does. The argument not only clarifies the conceptual structure of the two systems of mechanics, their relations to each other, and their respective mechanisms for representing physical systems. It also provides a decisive counter-example to the semantical view of physical theories, and one, moreover, that shows its crucial deficiency: a theory must be, or at least be founded on, more than its collection of models (in the sense of Tarski), for a complete semantics requires that one take account of global structures defined by relations among the individual models. The example also shows why naively structural accounts of theory cannot work: simple isomorphism of theoretical and empirical structures is not rich enough a relation to ground a semantics. (shrink)

The dispute over the viability of various theories of relativistic, dissipative fluids is analyzed. The focus of the dispute is identified as the question of determining what it means for a theory to be applicable to a given type of physical system under given conditions. The idea of a physical theory's regime of propriety is introduced, in an attempt to clarify the issue, along with the construction of a formal model trying to make the idea precise. This construction involves a (...) novel generalization of the idea of a field on spacetime, as well as a novel method of approximating the solutions to partial-differential equations on relativistic spacetimes in a way that tries to account for the peculiar needs of the interface between the exact structures of mathematical physics and the inexact data of experimental physics in a relativistically invariant way. It is argued, on the basis of these constructions, that the idea of a regime of propriety plays a central role in attempts to understand the semantical relations between theoretical and experimental knowledge of the physical world in general, and in particular in attempts to explain what it may mean to claim that a physical theory models or represents a kind of physical system. This discussion necessitates an examination of the initial-value formulation of the partial-differential equations of mathematical physics, which suggests a natural set of conditions---by no means meant to be canonical or exhaustive---one may require a mathematical structure, in conjunction with a set of physical postulates, satisfy in order to count as a physical theory. Based on the novel approximating methods developed for solving partial-differential equations on a relativistic spacetime by finite-difference methods, a technical result concerning a peculiar form of theoretical under-determination is proved, along with a technical result purporting to demonstrate a necessary condition for the self-consistency of a physical theory. (shrink)

General relativity poses serious problems for counterfactual propositions peculiar to it as a physical theory, problems that have gone unremarked on in the physics and in the philosophy literature. Because these problems arise from the dynamical nature of spacetime geometry, they are shared by all schools of thought on how counterfactuals should be interpreted and understood. Given the role of counterfactuals in the characterization of, inter alia, many accounts of scientific laws, theory-confirmation and causation, general relativity once again presents us (...) with idiosyncratic puzzles any attempt to analyze and understand the nature of scientific knowledge and of science itself must face. (shrink)

Systems of differential equations are used to describe, model, explain, and predict states of physical systems. Experimental and theoretical branches of physics including general relativity, climate science, and particle physics have differential equations at their center. Direct solutions to differential equations are not available in many domains, which spurs on the use of creative mathematics and simulated solutions.

Beyond Human is an informative and accessible guide for all those interested in the developing sciences of genetic engineering, bioprinting, and human cloning. Illustrating the ideas with reference to well-known science fiction films and novels, the author provides a unique insight into and understanding of how genetic manipulation, cloning, and other novel bio-technologies will one day allow us to redesign our species. It also addresses the legitimate concerns about "playing God", while at the same time embracing the positive aspects of (...) the scientific trajectory that will lead to our transhuman future. (shrink)

Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.

Posterior a Hiroshima y Nagasaki se hizo visible hacia dónde conducirían la obtención y uso de conocimientos y creación de artefactos que no se correspondieran a las metas de subsistencia y mejoramiento humanos, emergieron movimientos y estudios relacionados con los impactos sociales de la ciencia y la tecnología. Surgió en ese contexto el campo denominado Ciencia- Tecnología- Sociedad (CTS), centrado en las complejas interrelaciones que la ciencia y la tecnología y la sociedad. El presente texto tiene el objetivo de profundizar (...) en el trabajo de fundamentación teórica a partir del reconocimiento de algunas ideas como: la relación de los seres humanos con sus entornos es socio- tecno- cognitiva, la interacción conocimiento- sociedad es contradictoria, y es preciso reconocer la complejidad del conocimiento CTS. Por último, una nueva propuesta, en las circunstancias actuales un acrónimo más abarcador que el de CTS puede ser SOCITEI (So: sociedad, CI: conocimiento, Te: tecnología, In: innovación). After Hiroshima and Nagasaki the destiny of the obtaining and use of knowledge as well as the creation of artifacts that were not according to the goals of human subsistence and improvement became visible, movements and studies related to the social impacts of science and technology emerged. The field called science - technology - society (CTS) (Spanish acronym) arose in that context, focused on the complex interrelationships in science technology and society. This text aims to deepen the work of theoretical foundation in recognition of some ideas like: the relationship of human beings with their environments is socio-techno - cognitive, interaction knowledge - society is contradictory, and we must recognize the complexity of knowledge CTS. Finally, in the new circumstances a new proposal a more encompassing acronym than the CTS can be SOCITEI (SO: society, CI: knowledge, TE: technology, IN: innovation) (Spanish acronyms). (shrink)

The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...) the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. (shrink)

We argue that two well-known examples (strawberry distribution and Konigsberg bridges) generally considered genuine cases of distinctively _mathematical_ explanation can also be understood as cases of distinctively _generic_ explanation. The latter answer resemblance questions (e.g., why did neither person A nor B manage to cross all bridges) by appealing to ‘generic task laws’ instead of mathematical necessity (as is done in distinctively mathematical explanations). We submit that distinctively generic explanations derive their explanatory force from their role in ontological unification. Additionally, (...) we argue that distinctively generic explanations are better seen as standardly mathematical instead of distinctively mathematical. Finally, we compare and contrast our proposal with the work of Christopher Pincock on abstract explanations in science and the views of Michael Strevens on abstract causal event explanations. (shrink)

Science policy mandates across the industrialized world insinuate more active roles for publics, their earlier participation in policy decisions, and expanded notions of science and technology governance. In response to these policies, engaged scholars in science studies have sought to design and conduct exercises aimed at better attuning science to its public contexts. As demand increases for innovative and potentially democratic forms of public engagement with science and technology, so also do the prospects for insights from science studies to contribute (...) to policy agendas and institutional capabilities. This collection brings together an international set of scholars in science, technology and society who inquire into the meaning, efficacy and responsibility of engaged science studies scholarship as a public matter. (shrink)

Seeing from somewhere in particular -- Embracing binocularity -- Creativity and gratitude -- Technology as vlaue-free and as value-laden -- Nobody's against true enhancement -- Comprehending persons as subjectss and as objects -- Respecting persons as subjects and as objects.

We have argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) violates the plausible adequacy condition that an act that would harm an agent cannot leave her much better off than an alternative act that would benefit her. In a recent paper in this journal, however, Neil Feit objects that our argument presupposes questionable counterfactual backtracking. He also argues that CCA proponents can justifiably reject the condition by invoking so-called plural harm and benefit. In this reply, we argue (...) that Feit’s lines of criticism are both unsuccessful. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.

Divine command theory is experiencing something of a renaissance, inspired in large part by Robert Adams’s 1999 masterpiece Finite and Infinite Goods. I argue here that divine commands are not always necessary for actions to be morally obligatory. I make the case that the DCT-ist’s own commitments put pressure on her to concede the existence of some moral obligations that in no way depend on divine commands. Focusing on Robert Adams’s theistic framework for ethics, I argue that Adams’s views about (...) good, evil, reasons, and the nature of moral obligation suggest that there can be moral obligations that exist independently of any divine commands. My argument proceeds through the development of an example in which there is a moral obligation that is not even partially grounded in a divine command. I focus primarily on Adams’s view because, many contemporary divine command theorists work in a broadly Adams-ian framework, so the argument that I advance here poses a challenge for many contemporary versions of DCT. (shrink)

The “new natural lawyers” (NNLs) are a prolific group of philosophers, theologians, and political theorists that includes John Finnis, Robert George, Patrick Lee, Gerard Bradley, and Germain Grisez, among others. These thinkers have devoted themselves to developing and defending a traditional sexual ethic according to which homosexual sexual acts are immoral per se and marriage ought to remain an exclusively heterosexual institution. The sterility objection holds that the NNLs are guilty of making an arbitrary and irrational distinction between same-sex couples (...) and sterile heterosexual couples. The NNLs believe that it is a necessary condition for two people’s being morally and legally entitled to get married that they be able to perform sexual acts that are “suited to procreating.” But sterile heterosexual couples are incapable of performing such acts. Therefore, it should follow from the NNLs’ own premises that sterile heterosexual couples are not entitled to marry. But the NNLs do not draw this conclusion. Instead, they maintain that sterile heterosexuals can marry while denying that the same is true of same-sex couples. The sterility objection claims the NNLs are being inconsistent in treating the two kinds of couples differently. Although the sterility objection has been endorsed by recent critics, I don’t think it has yet been adequately defended. The NNLs have responded by arguing that there is a sense in which the sex acts of sterile heterosexual couples are as suited to reproduction as those of fertile heterosexuals. Thus they maintain that the distinction they draw between the two kinds of couple has a rational basis. A successful defense of the sterility objection must show that this response on the part of the NNLs fails. Such is the task I undertake in this paper. I argue that the NNLs’ response fails because acts of penile-vaginal intercourse between sterile heterosexuals lack the actual causal power to produce conception that sexual acts need to be considered truly reproductive, and because their assumption that penile-vaginal intercourse always functions reproductively is bad biology. (shrink)

In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (...) (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein’s insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert’s socio-cultural practice and the individual’s situated and lived normativity. (shrink)