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1. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett, Multiple Realization and Methodology.
   ABSRACT: An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special science. In contrast to the claims of (...) recent critics, we show that methodological connections between the neurosciences and psychology are plausibly often the result of multiple realization. (shrink)

   Multiple Realizability in General Philosophy of Science

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2. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2009). The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences. Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
   Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account ( Shapiro, 2000 and (...) 2004 ) and use our work to rebut recent objections to the long-standing claim that psychological properties are multiply realized. For we use scientific evidence, in combination with our more precise theoretical framework, to show that we have strong reason to believe that psychological properties are indeed multiply realized both at the biochemical and neuronal levels. (shrink)

   Multiple Realizability in General Philosophy of Science

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3. Carl Gillett (2006). Samuel Alexander's Emergentism. Synthese 153 (2):261-296.
   Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, (...) misjudged by most of his contemporary critics and interpreters. Most importantly, I show that Alexander offers an ingenious, and highly original, version of physicalism at the heart of which is a strikingly different view of the nature of the microphysical properties and associated view of emergent properties. My final conclusion will be that Passmore is correct in his claims both that Alexander is significant as one of the grandfather’s of Australian philosophy and that he provides a novel physicalist position. I will also suggest that Alexander’s emergentism is important for addressing the so-called ‘problem of mental causation’ presently dogging contemporary non-reductive physicalists. (shrink)

   Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind

   Emergence in Metaphysics

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4. Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
   An electron clearly has the property of having a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs, but does it also have the property of being charged ? Philosophers have worried whether so-called ‘determinable’ predicates, such as ‘is charged’, actually refer to determinable properties in the way they are happy to say that determinate predicates, such as ‘has a charge of þ1.6 10 19 coulombs’, refer to determinate properties. The distinction between determinates and determinables is itself fairly new, dating only to its (...) definition by the Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson early in the last century.1 But despite its newly minted condition the distinction has found little currency in on-going philosophical debates. Or at least until recently. Renewed interest in realist positions about properties, and arguments that the determinable-determinate relation may hold the key to understanding mental causation, have thrust Johnson’s distinction to the fore. With this new attention has also come new ‘optimistic’ positions that endorse the existence of determinable properties. David Armstrong, Evan Fales, and Sydney Shoemaker, among others, have all defended such optimistic accounts that take determinable predicates, such as ‘is charged’, to refer to determinable properties.2 In this paper, our goal is to carefully assess optimism and to argue that a pessimistic view, which rejects the existence of determinable properties, is actually the appropriate default position. (shrink)

   Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind

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5. Carl Gillett (2003). Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
   Infinitism in Epistemology

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6. Carl Gillett (2003). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.
   Multiple Realizability in General Philosophy of Science

   Realization in Metaphysics

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7. Carl Gillett (2002). The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View. Analysis 62 (4):316-323.
   Realization in Metaphysics

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8. Carl Gillett (2002). The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):95-121.
   I outline reasons for the recent popularity, and lingering suspicion, about 'emergence' by examining three distinct concepts of property emergence, their purposes and associated obligations. In Part 1, I argue 'Strong' emergence is the grail for many emergentists (and physicalists), since it frames what is needed to block the 'Argument from Realization' (AR) which moves from the truth of physicalism to the inefficacy of special science properties. I then distinguish 'Weak' and 'Ontological' emergence, in Part 2, arguing each is a (...) way one may fail to establish the possibility of Strong emergence. But I also show Weak emergence can help the full-blown reductionist and Ontological emergence helps those opposed to physicalism. Lastly, in Part 3, I argue that the Completeness of Physics (CoP) is incompatible with Strong emergence and that rejecting CoP provides hope for the possibility of Strong emergence in a physical world. The result is a notion of Strong emergence offering much to non-reductive physicalism. My final conclusion is that concepts of emergence, when properly understood, have important contributions to make to philosophical debate. (shrink)

   Emergence in Metaphysics

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9. Carl Gillett (2001). The Methodological Role of Physicalism: A Minimal Skepticism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
   Formulating Physicalism in Philosophy of Mind

   Skepticism in Epistemology

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10. Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (2001). Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to philosophy of mind and metaphysics in recent years, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of new essays offers a series of 'state-of-the-art' perspectives on this (...) important doctrine and brings new depth and breadth to the philosophical debate. A group of distinguished philosophers, comprising both physicalists and their critics, consider a wide range of issues including the historical genesis and present justification of physicalism, its metaphysical presuppositions and methodological role, its implications for mental causation, and the account it provides of consciousness. (shrink)

    Physicalism about the Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

    Zombies and the Conceivability Argument in Philosophy of Mind

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11. Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2001). Does the Argument From Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):79-98.
    By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201).

    Nonreductive Materialism in Philosophy of Mind

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12. Carl Gillett & D. Gene Witmer (2001). A "Physical" Need: Physicalism and the Via Negativa. Analysis 61 (272):302–309.
    Formulating Physicalism in Philosophy of Mind

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