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Since 1998 I carry out independent research on the logic operators and in particular of "if then" and "if and only if then". Given my difficulty when a student, and the difficulties of my students to understand mainly the operator "if then" and the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition in it implicit, and given my passion for logic, neuroscience and psychology, I spent over 20 years researching how these concepts arise in reality, and how our minds create their abstract models.
The study of the 4 cards test of Peter Wason (1966), is an excellent didactic example to explain the logical infrastructure of sufficient condition, and always use with my students. But in spite of literary research, not having met a specimen, equally excellent in explaining the necessary condition, I started a thorough study on the issue that has led me not only to devise a new specific test for the necessary condition, but also to find out what I think is a millenary gap in on the o ... (read more)

I agree with you to use similarity or distance to define Truthlikeness function.
Yet I use some different method.
For exampe, a hypothesis hj="His age is about 20 years old".We can use T(hj|E)=exp[-(E-20)2/8] as truth function or  Truthlikeness function..
If we wish that  Truthlikeness can tell precision and give tautology lower Truthlikeness,  we may use 
T(hj|E)/T(hj)  or I=log[T(hj|E)/T(hj)] as Truthlikeness, where T(hj)=sum i P(ei)T(hj|ei) is the average of T(hj|E), and may be call logical probability of hj.

For more details, see my paper: 
Semantic Information Measure with Two Types of Probability for Falsification and Confirmation

This did not appear in the Journal of Symbolic Logic.

Accurate reference is this:

Actes du XIeme Congres International de Philosophie, Volume XlV, Volume complementaire et communications du Colloque de Logique, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1953, and Editions E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain 1953, pp. 65-81

This is from the review of the article in the JSL.

Although there are quite a few lists of argumentation fallacies on the web I can't find much about these two:
Julian Baggini describes to argumentation fallacy "If I don’t do it somebody else will" at

I don't find it anywhere else. Does that fallacy have a special name?

2) Also I can't find the fallacy: "If you don't show me an alternative for my doing you can't criticise it."

Some words in my paper:

T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.

T(hj)--logical probability or  average thue-value of a predicate hj.

Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
 If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)]. 

The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness. 

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In foot note 3 of Daniel Dennett's  paper "What RoboMary Knows", Dennett notes:


Robinson (1993) also claims that I beg the question by not honouring a distinction he declares to exist between knowing "what one would say and how one would react" and knowing "what it is like."  If there is such a distinction, it has not yet been articulated and defended, by Robinson or anybody else, so far as I know.  If Mary knows everything about what she would say and how she would react, it is far from clear that she wouldn't know what it would be like. 


In the paper Dennett imagines RoboMary as follows:

"1.RoboMary is a standard  Mark 19 robot, except that she was brought on line without colour vision; her video cameras are black and white, but everything else in her hardware is equipped for colour vision, which is standard in the Mark 19."

Dennett then, it seems to me, considers that RoboMary would consciously experience red when in a simila ... (read more)

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Hello, I am a third-year undergrad in the States and was wondering about this forum. I am studying ecology, evolutionary, organismal biology (e.e.o.b) and possibly might double-major with molecular, cellular, and developmental biology (m.c.d.b) since there is only a small set of differing classes. Unfortunately, these are heavily experimental and lately over the years, I am become more interested in the theoretical/philosophical implications of the life sciences. So I am turning over to this forum to help get some perspectives on issues within particularly the evolutionary sciences (evolutionary population, quantitative, and molecular genetics, evolutionary ecology, paleontology, etc.).     One thing that I have been thinking about as I learn about the foundations of evolutionary theory is this notion, among many other ones, about selection. To explain further, in pop. genetics selection is represented by this coefficient, s, found commonly in places like the b ... (read more)
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Where is color?
In the observer as a feeling, the observed or in the communique between the two?
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Does the Phineas P. Gage case show that there are two types of memory?
One emotional and the other intellectual?

Electromagnetism or gravitomagnetism?
[See also
Halley's "Synopsis of the Astronomy of Comets", 1705, is an ingenious mathematical proof of the parabolic shape of a comet's path and fits those cosmic wanderers right into Newtonian Physics, but it does not explain how such paths are possible. We understand now the why of the famous "hypotheses non fingo", Newton could simply not start to imagine what such an explanation would have looked like. The only thing he could say was that his equations seemed to work. A cosmologist's nightmare.]

Ever since Faraday it has been understood that electricity and magnetism are inseparable. Electric current influences the magnetized needle of a compass, and the motion of a magnet can create an electrical current in a metal coil.
Gravity seems different not only because it always is attractive, but also because it is understood to be the reason why bodies not only move towards each other, but also orbit each other. And that i ... (read more)
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Kant believed that noumena was converted into phenomena, where the information from the senses is an object. By noumena he meant the 'communique' between the observer and the physical world which enables the sensing process. 
On the contrary I believe, there is no communique, all there is is sensation. However I believe there is phenomenon first and the product of sensing then becomes stored as memory. Memory of an object gives the object a permanent state. A known object as part of memory is shapeless, colorless, etc having only meaning and is senseless. Knowledge is a collection of 'thing-in-itself'.
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Most concepts in philosophy - like knowledge, consciousness, reality, or closing the explanatory gap and solving the hard problem - cannot properly be explained due to the fact that the foundations of these ideas are basically flawed. Even the Hard Problem isn't so hard - if and only if one will study and understand the origin, creation, and evolution of early information based on Information Materialization (I.M.). By utilizing the two most important foundations of IM - the Caveman in the Box and the Human Mental Handicap - the inherently flawed ideas in the study of the mind can be properly addressed. 

In his work on I.M., Lawsin coined the expression "the Human Mental Handicap" in attempt to define consciousness in its simplified form. He claimed that "No Humans can think of something without associating such something with a physical object". This simplicity of comparative association is the basic indicator that determines if one is conscious or not. If plants can hear, sm ... (read more)
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(1) all atoms in a form that does consciously experience, would behave the same if individually they had the same surroundings in a form which does not. 


(2) The reasons for the behaviour would be the same in both cases. 


(3) What the form was consciously experiencing is not a reason for any atomic behaviour. 

because given (2) the reasons for each atom's behaviour are the same reasons as when in a form that is not consciously experiencing. 
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We all know Mother Nature’s gradualist ways and have coined phrases for them: “Rome was not built in a day”; “a journey of a thousand miles starts with a step”, “little drops of water make a mighty ocean”, etc. Unfortunately, some cosmologists would prefer that the universe become wealthy overnight. The universe is now 1052kg rich (i.e. about 1069J) and they want to force this wealth, our current mass estimate into the very beginning (time zero), the Planck epoch and the other early times.  Of course, Mother Nature has resisted this get-rich-quick attitude and has inflicted such versions of our Big bang model with riddles, like the flatness and singularity problems for example.

In this post, I quote from Steven Weinberg’s popular book, The First Three Minutes,

 “As the explosion continued the temperature dropped …but the temperature continued to drop, finally reaching one thousand million degrees (109K) at the end of the first three minutes. It was then cool enough for the protons and neu ... (read more)

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In two recent papers (Journal of Modern Physics (open access), I have shown that a fundamentally irreversible world (deduced from a dynamic interpretation of the principle of least action) not only eliminates paradoxes in quantum physics and cosmology, but also leads to maximum entropy production (within the constraints of the systems involved) in self-organized systems. Under such conditions also information systems can self-organize to develop consciousness and mind. Mind can thus be materialistically explained as a higher (self-organized) hierarchy compared to mere computation. 
In the second paper I have given three conditions for falsification of this theory. If, on the other hand, they cannot be demonstrated the presently established scientific concept of a fundamentally time invertible, reversible world is shown to be incorrect. This has dramatic consequences for understanding o ... (read more)
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Hi everyone.

I have recently come across a novel argument that may undermine all forms of consequentialism, and accordingly wrote a paper elaborating on that argument. I now wish to get it peer-reviewed by the experts in this area. Kindly guide on the best course of action I should follow. Thanks!
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  • Ian Stuart, 2016-10-03 : Submit it for publication to a peer reviewed journal.   The journal will peer review it - and if they like it will... (read more)
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Hi,I'm looking for a good book/article that analyzes the concept of continuum (not just in space and time but on the general level, including properties, numbers etc.) and surveys its definitions.
I'll be grateful for your references.
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The title of this piece is "Problems of Conflict," not "Problems of Conduct," and it occupies pp. 892-893, not just p. 892. (It is a letter to the editor responding to an essay by Evelyn Underhill; it discusses pacificism in the context of World War I.)

The author was a Quaker, pacifist, and educator (part of the National Adult Schools Movement in the United Kingdom). She was also one of Gilbert Ryle's older siblings.

After the publication of this paper, I enjoyed personal communication with Aloysius Martinich and discovered that I misused if and only if in several places of this paper. The corrections are below:

The formula indicates the following:
1. A is relatively identical to the value, but A is not absolutely identical to the value.
2. B is relatively identical to the value, but B is not absolutely identical to the value.
3. The value of A is absolutely identical to the value of B.
4. A is not identical to B.
(page 135)

1. The expression 1 + 3 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 1 + 3 is not absolutely identical to 4.

2. The expression 2 + 2 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 2 + 2 is not absolutely identical to 4.
3. The value of 1 + 3 is absolutely identical to the value of 2 + 2.
4. The expression 1 + 3 is not identical to the expression 2 + 2.
(page 135)

1. The triumvir was relatively identical to Lepidus, but the triumvir was not absolutely identical to Lepidus.
2. The pontifex maximus ... (read more)

I describe a novel textual structure which gave rise to the so-called analytic/continental divide, and which describes the origin and nature of divides in general.
The source of the analytic-continental divide is organizational and not conceptual, the divide arising as a consequence of the structure of the University "text". This structure I refer to as the "integral text". It is a tangible, self-referring structure through which the University stores knowledge and retains influence. (Those who wish to grasp the main conjecture quickly can move straight to the description of the integral text, about half-way through this essay.)

I develop the model of the integral text to describe both the structure through which an interpretive community fixes knowledge within its institutional repository and the way in which this structure restricts and promotes communication and academic influence.The integral text is not itself a body of knowledge, but a single, indivisible structur ... (read more)
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