This is an excerpt from a report on The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011, written by Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray, and Adrienne Prettyman, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Network_for_Sensory_Research.html 

5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?

In the conference's final panel discussion, Casey O'Callaghan outlined one major idea motivating the traditional approach to studying experience. According to proponents of the traditional approach, we can tell a story about vision (in a bottom-up way) which does not appeal to processes in any other sensory modality (see, for example, work by David Marr). According to this view, we can give an account of vision by paying attention to what happens when you stimulate the eyes. The visual system, on this account, is informationally encapsulated with respect to the other sensory systems, and the same can be said for each ... (read more)

This is an excerpt from a report on The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011, written by Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray, and Adrienne Prettyman, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Network_for_Sensory_Research.html 

4. Is the Mechanism of Sensory Integration Spatio-Temporal?

So far, we have discussed various ways to model the unity of consciousness, but what about ways to model sensory integration? Consider a case of sensory integration in a single modality like vision. When presented with a visual array containing a red circle and a green square, one popular view is that the visual system binds the feature red to the circle (and not the square) in part because that feature and that shape are located in the same space at the same time. Likewise, co-location in space or time may explain how we integrate features into the same object or event across modalities. Space and time could potentially p ... (read more)

This is an excerpt from a report on The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011, written by Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray, and Adrienne Prettyman, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Network_for_Sensory_Research.html 

3. How Should We Model the Unity of Consciousness?

Once we determine the building blocks of consciousness, we still need to determine how they are assembled. Most philosophers think that, at least in normal cases, the experiences of a single subject at a single time are phenomenally unified. As a first pass, two experiences of a subject are phenomenally unified just in case there is something it is like for that subject to experience them together. Much of the discussion at the conference centered on how to understand this relation.

On Tim Bayne's view, as noted above, phenomenal unity is understood in terms of subsumption: two experiences are phenomenally unified just in case they ... (read more)

This is an excerpt from a report on The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011, written by Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray, and Adrienne Prettyman, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Network_for_Sensory_Research.html

2. Are Some of the Basic Units of Consciousness Multimodal?

In the McGurk effect, a subject views a video of a person saying one set of syllables (e.g. ga-ga), while the audio has been redubbed to a second set of syllables (e.g., ba-ba). The subject experiences yet a third set of syllables, distinct from the first two sets (e.g., da-da) (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976, p. 747).

In his talk on how to model the unity of consciousness, Tim Bayne proposed two different interpretations of crossmodal cases such as the McGurk effect. On a strictly causal interpretation, seeing the person mouth ga-ga causes you to hear da-da instead of ba-ba. According to this interpretation, integration occur ... (read more)

This is an excerpt from a report on The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011, written by Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray, and Adrienne Prettyman, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Network_for_Sensory_Research.html

1. What Is the Relationship Between the Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration?

As you pick up your mug and drink from it, you perceive both visual and tactile features of the mug. You see the mug, and many of its visible features, such as its white color, its movement through space as you bring it towards your mouth, and so on. You also feel the smooth texture of the mug's surface as you grasp its handle, and as its rim makes contact with your lips. Your experience is multimodal in at least two respects. First, it has a multimodal phenomenological character--a proper description of what it is like for you to undergo the experience has to make reference to its visual an ... (read more)

I uploaded a discussion under Value Theory but cannot find it.  Does it take time for discussions to show up?  Am I looking in the wrong place for it?  Has it been rejected for some reason?  An inquiring mind wants to know.  Thanks.

Most moral views assume some kind of equality.  However, usually this assumption is foundational, i.e. no further grounds are provided apart from its evident reasonableness.  E.g., utilitarians accept the Benthamite requirement that every person counts as one and no one as more than one, but typically no justification is given beyond its apparent fairness. 

I believe that that equality can be demonstrated, at least in the specific case of the equality of person's interests.

We begin with a technical restriction.  We can distinguish "other-regarding" interests as interests in someone's interests; e.g., a lover can be interested in a partner's well-being, a sympathetic nurse might be interested in reducing a patient's suffering, a sadist could be interested in causing or increasing somebody's pain, etc.  The equality to be demonstrated only concerns non-other-regarding interests, or what can be called "self-restricted" interests.  This is bec ... (read more)

notation : I use ! for 'not'

Perhaps you can avoid paradox but you have to admit this very strange proposition :
K !K x ->  !P K x
If you know that you ignore (x) it's impossible that you know (x)

I don't see how it could be compatible with the knowability principle :
x ->  P K x
else you can't have
(x) and (K !K x)

(excuse me if this message is out of place, I ignore the policy of tis forum,
excuse also my probable mistakes in english)

In this blog post, I outline a new form of Satisficing Consequentialism that meets Bradley's requirement that it "does not permit the gratuitous prevention of goodness."

For anyone interested, I've blogged a couple of criticisms of this paper, here.

Philosophical zombies (as opposed to the ones in the movies, which are slow-witted, bloody and broken people with a crazed and single-minded desire to eat normal people) are hypothetical creatures used in thought experiments to elucidate what we mean by the term "consciousness." They are supposed to act just like humans but lack internal experience. David Chalmers defines them thus: "A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience. Zombies look and behave like the conscious beings that we know and love, but 'all is dark inside.' There is nothing it is like to be a zombie." (http://consc.net/zombies.html)

Derek Allen objects to the concept, saying it makes no sense. (http://philpapers.org/post/6535) In particular he objects to the phrase "There is nothing it is like to be a zombie." I agree that the phrase "what it is like to be " is problematic, but we all know what it is trying to get at. If one has a conscious exp ... (read more)

at http://philpapers.org/s/iris%20murdoch the page is headed 
'Works by Iris Murdoch'


but the first item is a paper by Richard Moran.

Why is this?

Confession of interest: I noticed this because a paper of mine responds to Moran on this point, and I am curious as why Moran's paper has the special prominence accorded to 'works by iris murdoch' when no other contribution in commentary is visible on that page.

it is a pleasure for me  to inform you that we have arranged a new course at distance on Quantum Cognition. Please, visit our web site www.saistmp.com  for details.
On the same site you find also details on a new at distance course on applications of Herat Rate Variability in psychophysiology. I retain it may be of interest. 
Regards. EC

I've read recently Katherine M. Franke's paper, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism Law and Desire, in which she approaches the idea of repronormativity as a compulsory motherhood (parenthood actually, but she focuses on the feminist approach) In her paper Franke discusses how it is expected that women reproduce herselves and how this issue has been "taken for granted" in the femenist theory. She argues that not every woman actually wants to be a mother, and that this choice is actually like being heterosexual: social forces (heteronormativity) push women into motherhood. 
A month ago the ECHR decided in a case S.H.&Others vs. Austria that it is not against the European Convention on Human Rights to deny the use of ova of third person in In vitro fertilisation processes, the argument is that this could disrupt the "normal" development of the child because having two mothers can be specially awkward and it would pose many problems to establish kinship and parental rights.


This makes me wonder ... (read more)

A question from a novice on the topic:

I'm suspecting that certain game-theoretic norms constitute necessary, a priori discernable norms and hence provide a robustly realist foundation for morality.  (And possibly even "non-naturalist", although I suspect that that categorization may not be meaningful or worth caring about.)  As I understand the nature of game theory, it discovers norms of procedural collective rationality.

There is of course room to debate the extent to which morality really is based on the norms of game theory.  However, my questions are slightly different: What is the ontological status of game theoretic norms?  And what are the consequences for the ontology of morality?

Reading suggestions much appreciated.

The PhilPapers team is pleased to announce the launch of PhilEvents, a comprehensive calendar of events in philosophy worldwide. Try it out! 
As always, we welcome any form of feedback. Please report any bugs and send your suggestions using our contact form on PhilEvents. 

Which is the correct forum to propose a new category?


When I was about to begin to categorize a new papers for my leaf, I could see many paper that could be in a proper category, but that categoy does not exist. And I would like to propose a new category.

Thanks!

Quine criticized the so-called two dogmas of Empiricism, and Davidson criticized the so-called third dogma of Empiricism. Then, McDowell criticized the existence of non-conceptual content of experience. we will show that their arguments are all wrong. Their arguments are some kind of proof by contradiction. If we accept some principle of Empiricism, then we have to face some problems, thus we could not accept some principle of Empiricism. We will show that these problems could be solved. In fact, Wittgenstein had solved these problems. Therefore, their arguments are all invalid. At last, we will examine proof by contradiction. What contradictions can tell us? What about ability and inability of conceptual analysis?

1. The first So-called dogmas of Empiricism

Quine criticize Frege's definition of analyticity, but it doesnot mean that there are no other definition s of analyticity. In fact, Wittgenstein had given another definition of analyticity: logically true statements are analyti ... (read more)

Thanks to all involved for a really useful service.


I am writing to recommend that an anti-discrimination policy be enforced by PhilJobs.  For example, PhilJobs could adopt the APA Statement on Non-Discrimination, and either:

• Refuse to advertise these positions (my preferred option); or
• Allow them to be filtered out in search results.

It is a disgrace that the current issue of JFP includes the following disclaimer:

Due to technical problems resulting from our recent transition to new administrative software, we are unable to assure that all of the universities listed in this issue agree to abide by the APA's nondiscrimination policy. If you have any concerns about this, please investigate the individual institutions' policy before applying for a position.

...and it would be great if PhilJobs was able to help compensate.

Redundancy theory of truth has been regarded one (may the most) powerful objection to Realism, new truth theorist, articulating rather different notion of truth claim that the semantic thesis of Realism must be rejected - and hence the whole project of realism - i think there is something wrong with - for example - Gary Kemps article and reasoning for redundancy theory of truth.
there could two problems be differed
1) the redundancy argument for redundancy of SEMANTIC content of truth;
2) the redundancy argument for redundancy of ASSERTION that notion;
arguments - as far as i have seen - are related to the second but not the first ( see for example Ramsey truism and Strawson's "Truth" and Gary Kemp's article "Meaning and truth conditions").
 that seems to be about the redundancy argument for ASSERTION of truth predicate, but the reasoning does not entail that "truth" does not have any genuine semantic content. i think the very problem could be found in Tarski's "Sem ... (read more)