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2016-11-27
Before the fact, we know based on what has been written, an example might be knowledge of the law and does not commit crimes because of conceptual knowledge. There it is based on experience already przeżytym but on the intellect, namely on this, what not to do in order not to be convicted of a misdemeanor or felony. Rights can learn to read codes that have warned us about what not to do this in ten same way, we can learn a vocabulary of language, call the prior knowledge, knowledge BEFORE the fact. Hindsight is based on our own experience and others. Drawing on the knowledge of this is written, we draw knowledge from others who have already experienced something, it is passed. Hindsight, IS OUR personal knowledge without relying on prior experience. Knowledge Based on previous experience we can verify and, if I upgrade, so how do scientists when previous experience does not agree with the observations, then seek an explanation and often expand or narrow theories. The prior knowledge IS ... (read more)

2016-11-23
Editors of The Acorn request addition of an area under the Philosophical Traditions cluster. The area would be named "Peace and Nonviolence."

Such an area would facilitate adding figures such as Gandhi, King, Chavez, and Jane Addams, who currently have no listings in the PhilPapers categorization. There are also important peace theorists such as Galtung and Gene Sharp whose work would be suitably included in this area.

Philosophical reflections on such figures make up a large and growing body of study, involving conceptual terms such as nonviolence, positive peace, or satyagraha -- terms which are not yet listed as PhilPapers categories.

Nonviolence currently has no taxonomy. Peace is listed, but only under Kant.

A few related terms do appear already:

-Pacifism appears under War;
-Civil Disobedience appears under Social and Political, States and Nations.
-Race and Civil Rights appears under Gender, Race, and Sexuality.

These categories could appear as cross-classified hyperlinks under &q ... (read more)

2016-11-21
The psychule is a proposed model for a fundamental type of event related to mind/sentience/consciousness. The term "psychule" is meant to be analogous to the term "molecule" as the fundamental unit of a substance, except that a psychule is not a substance but an event.  I would like to say the proposed model describes the fundamental unit of consciousness (as in the subject line), but for many philosophers the term "consciousness" brings along certain expectations which tend to be missing from the simplest requirements of the model.  Similarly with the term "sentience".  Therefore I have coined (I think) a new term to describe the fundamental unit.  I will then claim that any sentient or conscious event is a psychule, and leave it to future generations to decide whether the definitions of consciousness and sentience should be extended to include each and every psychule.

As mentioned, a psychule is an event.  More specifically, a psychule is a pattern recognition type of event. I use th ... (read more)

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2016-11-02
Hello! I'm a naive novice but interested in doing Philosophy for my masterate. Since education is my field of work, I would like to explore philosophy in education.

So, here is my point of departure, I really intrigued in reading Giacomo Esposito post on The Guardian; Why I teach philosophy in Primary School. I agree with him that the teaching is now relevant as the radicals entering into the minds of the youngsters. Teaching philosophers will helps them develop good dicernment.

Lets develop this together. Please share your thoughts.

Sharing is caring.


2016-10-21
What you can think about comes from what you have observed.
You think about angels. What are angels?

An angel can be that sweet person, something that makes you happy, etc. It's an adjective. 

If you think of something which you think doesn't exist in the physical world or have not yet observed, the fact that you can think about it, shows that it is a assembly of selected parts of what has already been observed and exists.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/22438 Reply

2016-10-20
Is awareness specific to specific parts of an experience?
When we are aware of seeing an apple, are we aware of all other sounds, shapes, tastes, etc which occur simultaneously?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/22242 Reply

2016-10-18
Since 1998 I carry out independent research on the logic operators and in particular of "if then" and "if and only if then". Given my difficulty when a student, and the difficulties of my students to understand mainly the operator "if then" and the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition in it implicit, and given my passion for logic, neuroscience and psychology, I spent over 20 years researching how these concepts arise in reality, and how our minds create their abstract models.
The study of the 4 cards test of Peter Wason (1966), is an excellent didactic example to explain the logical infrastructure of sufficient condition, and always use with my students. But in spite of literary research, not having met a specimen, equally excellent in explaining the necessary condition, I started a thorough study on the issue that has led me not only to devise a new specific test for the necessary condition, but also to find out what I think is a millenary gap in on the o ... (read more)
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2016-10-18
I agree with you to use similarity or distance to define Truthlikeness function.
Yet I use some different method.
For exampe, a hypothesis hj="His age is about 20 years old".We can use T(hj|E)=exp[-(E-20)2/8] as truth function or  Truthlikeness function..
If we wish that  Truthlikeness can tell precision and give tautology lower Truthlikeness,  we may use 
T(hj|E)/T(hj)  or I=log[T(hj|E)/T(hj)] as Truthlikeness, where T(hj)=sum i P(ei)T(hj|ei) is the average of T(hj|E), and may be call logical probability of hj.

For more details, see my paper: 
Semantic Information Measure with Two Types of Probability for Falsification and Confirmation

2016-10-11
This did not appear in the Journal of Symbolic Logic.

Accurate reference is this:

Actes du XIeme Congres International de Philosophie, Volume XlV, Volume complementaire et communications du Colloque de Logique, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1953, and Editions E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain 1953, pp. 65-81

This is from the review of the article in the JSL.

2016-10-11
Although there are quite a few lists of argumentation fallacies on the web I can't find much about these two:
1)
Julian Baggini describes to argumentation fallacy "If I don’t do it somebody else will" at 

http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2002/if-i-dont-do-it-somebody-else-will/

I don't find it anywhere else. Does that fallacy have a special name?

2) Also I can't find the fallacy: "If you don't show me an alternative for my doing you can't criticise it."

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/21678 Reply

2016-10-05
Some words in my paper:

T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.

T(hj)--logical probability or  average thue-value of a predicate hj.

Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
 If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)]. 

The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness. 


Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/21538 Reply

2016-10-03
In foot note 3 of Daniel Dennett's  paper "What RoboMary Knows" https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm, Dennett notes:

---

Robinson (1993) also claims that I beg the question by not honouring a distinction he declares to exist between knowing "what one would say and how one would react" and knowing "what it is like."  If there is such a distinction, it has not yet been articulated and defended, by Robinson or anybody else, so far as I know.  If Mary knows everything about what she would say and how she would react, it is far from clear that she wouldn't know what it would be like. 

---

In the paper Dennett imagines RoboMary as follows:

"1.RoboMary is a standard  Mark 19 robot, except that she was brought on line without colour vision; her video cameras are black and white, but everything else in her hardware is equipped for colour vision, which is standard in the Mark 19."

Dennett then, it seems to me, considers that RoboMary would consciously experience red when in a simila ... (read more)

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2016-09-30
Hello, I am a third-year undergrad in the States and was wondering about this forum. I am studying ecology, evolutionary, organismal biology (e.e.o.b) and possibly might double-major with molecular, cellular, and developmental biology (m.c.d.b) since there is only a small set of differing classes. Unfortunately, these are heavily experimental and lately over the years, I am become more interested in the theoretical/philosophical implications of the life sciences. So I am turning over to this forum to help get some perspectives on issues within particularly the evolutionary sciences (evolutionary population, quantitative, and molecular genetics, evolutionary ecology, paleontology, etc.).     One thing that I have been thinking about as I learn about the foundations of evolutionary theory is this notion, among many other ones, about selection. To explain further, in pop. genetics selection is represented by this coefficient, s, found commonly in places like the b ... (read more)
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2016-09-27
Where is color?
In the observer as a feeling, the observed or in the communique between the two?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/20826 Reply

2016-09-20
Does the Phineas P. Gage case show that there are two types of memory?
One emotional and the other intellectual?

2016-09-19
Electromagnetism or gravitomagnetism?
[See also  http://philpapers.org/post/20174
Halley's "Synopsis of the Astronomy of Comets", 1705, is an ingenious mathematical proof of the parabolic shape of a comet's path and fits those cosmic wanderers right into Newtonian Physics, but it does not explain how such paths are possible. We understand now the why of the famous "hypotheses non fingo", Newton could simply not start to imagine what such an explanation would have looked like. The only thing he could say was that his equations seemed to work. A cosmologist's nightmare.]

Ever since Faraday it has been understood that electricity and magnetism are inseparable. Electric current influences the magnetized needle of a compass, and the motion of a magnet can create an electrical current in a metal coil.
Gravity seems different not only because it always is attractive, but also because it is understood to be the reason why bodies not only move towards each other, but also orbit each other. And that i ... (read more)
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2016-09-06
Kant believed that noumena was converted into phenomena, where the information from the senses is an object. By noumena he meant the 'communique' between the observer and the physical world which enables the sensing process. 
On the contrary I believe, there is no communique, all there is is sensation. However I believe there is phenomenon first and the product of sensing then becomes stored as memory. Memory of an object gives the object a permanent state. A known object as part of memory is shapeless, colorless, etc having only meaning and is senseless. Knowledge is a collection of 'thing-in-itself'.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/19942 Reply

2016-09-06
Most concepts in philosophy - like knowledge, consciousness, reality, or closing the explanatory gap and solving the hard problem - cannot properly be explained due to the fact that the foundations of these ideas are basically flawed. Even the Hard Problem isn't so hard - if and only if one will study and understand the origin, creation, and evolution of early information based on Information Materialization (I.M.). By utilizing the two most important foundations of IM - the Caveman in the Box and the Human Mental Handicap - the inherently flawed ideas in the study of the mind can be properly addressed. 

In his work on I.M., Lawsin coined the expression "the Human Mental Handicap" in attempt to define consciousness in its simplified form. He claimed that "No Humans can think of something without associating such something with a physical object". This simplicity of comparative association is the basic indicator that determines if one is conscious or not. If plants can hear, sm ... (read more)
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