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I have written a short paper on an issue that I have not come across before. In it I attempt to argue that light waves are an opaque barrier between the eye of the observer and the objective world. And, that light waves prevent direct knowledge of objects in the world. I would be grateful for criticism and responses. Bert

What kind of academic inquiry can best help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in this question?  Is it because most believe the kind of academic inquiry we have today, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knoweldge and technological know-how, is the best that we can have, judged from the perspective of helping humanity make progress towards a better world?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in arguments which seem to show decisively that inquiry restricted to the pursuit of knowledge is both profoundly irrational, and a menace?  The successful pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to trouble.  Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act - for some of us at ... (read more)
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If you come across this paper while researching philosophy of love, you should watch this:
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  • Kane Tran, 2015-07-27 : I argue that the received conception of the aim and results of Kant’s Paralogisms must be revised in light of a proper u... (read more)
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Tarski’s convention T: condition beta. South American Journal of Logic. 1, 3–32.

John Corcoran and Leonardo Weber


HISTORICAL NOTE: This paper is the culmination of a years-long joint effort by the two authors. A preliminary report appeared in 2013: Corcoran-Weber, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 19 (2013) 510–11. Their co-operative work was conducted by email dialogue in which each author’s work was developed and corrected by the other. Each section went through several iterations. The final version was the result of dozens of reciprocal exchanges; it is impossible to allocate credit. Each author learned from and taught the other. During this time they consulted several other scholars including the Tarski experts David Hitchcock, James Smith, and Albert Visser.

The senior author expresses his deep gratitude to the junior author. Moreover the senior author acknowledges publicly what he has already said privately, viz. that without the junior author’s help and mastery of ... (read more)

If you have any questions or comments on "The Zygote Argument is Invalid", I would enjoy discussing them on this thread!

REQUEST: Please send errors, omissions, and suggestions. I am especially interested in citations made in non-English publications.

I have noticed a small literature on Okin's objection to libertarianism. But I question whether this should be discussed under the heading of "Okin's objection". A very similar objection has been around for centuries by Robert Filmer, which the author briefly mentions but does not present. Filmer's objection is now discussed under the heading of the paradox of self-ownership.

It says that, given common knowledge, we cannot endorse both these propositions, which are essential to (standard?) libertarianism:
(1) Each person owns themselves.
(2) Each person owns the products of their labour.

According to Filmer, a person is the product of their parents' labour so they do not own themselves by (2).

Okin's version says that a person is the product of their mother's labour so they do not own themselves. (It seems she does not give a male parent even 0.000001% labour contribution.)

If the focus is mainly on whether a libertarian can say that individuals are self-owners, I feel it is unfair to discus ... (read more)
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Some of the entries have already been found to be flawed. For example, Tarski’s expression ‘materially adequate’ was misinterpreted in at least one article and it was misused in another where ‘materially correct’ should have been used. This “session” provides an opportunity to bring more flaws to light.


Acknowledgements: Each of these entries was presented at meetings of The Buffalo Logic Dictionary Project sponsored by The Buffalo Logic Colloquium. The members of the colloquium read drafts before the meetings and were generous with corrections, objections, and suggestions. Usually one 90-minute meeting was devoted to one entry although in some cases, for example, “axiomatic method”, took more than one meeting. Moreover, about half of the entries are rewrites of similarly named entries in the 1995 first edition.

I am trying to start a discussion for teaching INSEPARABILITY OF LOGIC AND ETHICS. A COLLEAGUE WROTE: I'm going to be teaching your "Inseparability of Logic and Ethics" in a couple weeks. I was wondering if you had any tips on doing so or thoughts about points to emphasize. I've always loved the paper and found your pedagogical techniques quite helpful.
MY ADVICE TO MY COLLEAGUE: First, before assigning the paper to be read, ask the students to look up “ethics” and “logic” in a dictionary or other reference work and then to write a paragraph on what the two have to do with each other. Second, after the students were supposed to have read the paper, ask them what they got out of it. Just let them talk and prompt them where necessary. No contentiousness. Third, read the first page aloud to them and see what happens. As you go read chunks aloud and ask questions—just like I did teaching you Tarski’s truth-definition paper. Fourth, go around the clas ... (read more)



Corcoran’s 2009 ARISTOTLE’S DEMONSTRATIVE LOGIC deals decisively with several issues that had previously been handled by vague speculation and dogmatic pontification if at all. One possible example: Corcoran [2009, p. 13] proves conclusively that the imperfect syllogisms Baroco and Bocardo—which Aristotle completed indirectly [by reductio-ad-impossible]—cannot be completed directly. More generally, Corcoran shows that no valid premise-conclusion argument, regardless of the number of premises,  having an existential negative [“particular negative” or “O-proposition”] as a premise can be completed using a direct deduction—assuming of course that no premises are redundant and that the conclusion is not among the premises. To be clear this means that for no such argument is it possible to deduce the conclusion from the premises without using reductio.

This result, called the EXISTENTIAL-NEGATIVE EXCLUSION [ENE], was circulated informally by Corcoran much earlier but it seem ... (read more)

This seems a simple mistake, and it should consequently be simple to rectify it. 

In particular, since the bulk of the translation was done by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, and the front page of the fourth edition states "The German text, with an English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte", Anscombe should be appropriately credited. 


JOHN CORCORAN AND HASSAN MASOUD, Three-logical-theories redux.

  The 1969 paper, “Three logical theories” [1], considers three logical systems all based on the same interpreted language and having the same semantics.

  The first, a logistic system LS, codifies tautologies (logical truths)—using tautological axioms and tautology-preserving rules that are not required to be consequence-preserving.

  The second, a consequence system CS, codifies valid premise-conclusion arguments—using tautological axioms and consequence-preserving rules that are not required to be cogency-preserving [2]. A rule is cogency-preserving if in every application the conclusion is known to follow from its premises if the premises are all known to follow from their premises.

  The third, a deductive system DS, codifies deductions, or cogent argumentations [2]—using cogency-preserving rules. The derivations in a DS represent deduction: the process by which conclusions are deduced from premises, i. e. the way knowl ... (read more)


JOHN CORCORAN, Two-method errors.

  Where there are two or more methods for the same thing, sometimes errors occur if two are mixed. Two-method errors, TMEs, occur in technical contexts but they occur more frequently in non-technical writing. Examples of both are cited.

  We can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other ways: ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws’ or ‘Abe knows whether Ben draws or not’. But a TME occurs in ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws or not’.

  We can say “Abe knows how Ben looks” using ‘Abe knows what Ben looks like’. But a TME occurs in ‘Abe knows what Ben looks’ and also in ‘Abe knows how Ben looks like’. Again, we can deny that Abe knows Ben by prefixing ‘It isn’t   that’ or by interpolating ‘doesn’t’. But a TME occurs in trying to deny that Abe knows Ben by using ‘It isn’t that Abe doesn’t know Ben’.

  There are two standard ways of defining truth for first-order languages: using finite sequences or infinite sequences. Quine’s discussion in the 1970 first ... (read more)


► JOHN CORCORAN AND WILLIAM FRANK, Cosmic Justice Hypotheses.

  This applied-logic lecture builds on [1] arguing that character traits fostered by logic serve clarity and understanding in ethics, confirming hopeful views of Alfred Tarski [2, Preface, and personal communication].

  Hypotheses in one strict usage are propositions not known to be true and not known to be false or—more loosely—propositions so considered for discussion purposes [1, p. 38].

   Logic studies hypotheses by determining their implications (propositions they imply) and their implicants (propositions that imply them). Logic also studies hypotheses by seeing how variations affect implications and implicants. People versed in logical methods are more inclined to enjoy working with hypotheses and less inclined to dismiss them or to accept them without sufficient evidence.

  Cosmic Justice Hypotheses (CJHs), such as “in the fullness of time every act will be rewarded or punished in exact proportion to its goodness or badness ... (read more)


The writing describes a new sort of individual, “a delude”. People like Hitler would well fit the description. He was mentally healthy, however overwhelmed by grossly deluded opinions.

Here is the description from the text: 

"Even when a person is born possessing a healthy mental state, the familial and environmental assault during childhood with deluded opinions and behavior can be the basis for an individual to develop into a delude, an individual in a deluded mental state. In this writing, the label fool, or imbecile, is sometimes interchangeable with the underlying primary conditions of the delude. A fool is predisposed to accept deluded opinions as true; however, he or she can have an overall good awareness of social norms and laws that he or she learned to comply with. A fool is not, because of his mental condition alone, a villain. In contrast, the delude typically develops overwhelming extreme views. These views can be held as more important than any social or legal consideration ... (read more)

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Because of Copyright, I am not yet in a position to upload this article. If you have any interest, feel free to contact me anytime.  (Author)

Any disagreement, agreement, argument or any evaluation would do. Need a help from you all to write a critical review for this article.
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I am bothered with the pressures of objectivity or lack there of as it relates to knowledge, truth and perfection. I ended up re-reading this paper and realized that the primary means of achieving knowledge, truth and perfection would be for there to be a state of absoluteness; which I believe is impossible and completely inapplicable. I am now wondering what are other opinions on the relationship that exist between absolutism and objectivity and there relationship to knowledge, truth and perfection.
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