All Philosophy


Order

Search forums
Subscribe to this forum      feed for this page

 1 - 20 / 314 
2014-07-20
Are there contemporary philosophers who argue that logic is concrete and particular? (More precisely I think the view would have to be that logics are concrete particulars.)

I'm toying with the idea of advancing that thesis, and I'm sure I'm not the first or only person to think this. But I don't know much about the field and in particular don't know what the relevant names would be.
Any help here would be appreciated.

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8519 Reply

2014-06-26
Any disagreement, agreement, argument or any evaluation would do. Need a help from you all to write a critical review for this article.

2014-06-26
From september onwards I'll be teaching a course on epistemology at secondary school level. The approach to epistemology that I have to take (because of curricular demands) is mostly historical, starting with some Ancient philosophers (Plato, Aristotle), skipping the Middle Ages, and ending with Modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant.

I tend to think that the importance of the views espoused by all these historical thinkers lies not in the veracity of their theories, for clearly some things said by Plato or Locke are most likely false. Furthermore the questions they tend to concern themselves with appear in part to have moved over from philosophy to psychology which give them the appearance of unfounded armchair speculation. Rather in my opinion it is only against the background of the broader scientific developments during the time of these philosophers that we can begin to appreciate their significance. However I feel ill-equiped to talk about this background, because I simply don ... (read more)

2014-06-13
Recently I had an awareness that understanding is deeper than knowledge. Then I thought about it for a while. I realized that knowledge involves explanations, while understanding does not necessarily require explanations. for, we understand many things without being able to explain them. This made me very anxious about this problem because it concerns with the way human mind works. How is it possible to understand something without being able to explain it? The traditional notion of 'Intuition' or immediate and direct awareness is not satisfactory enough to clarify this problem. What concerns me is that human mind seems to me to be much more than what we have so far known through or traditional logic or even scientific parameters. By saying that understanding is deeper than knowledge, i mean that understanding is an aspect of Consciousness that seems to be distinct from what we call Mind, though both are connected. Although we are conscious of ourselves we do not need to talk t ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8211 Reply

2014-06-13
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you

2014-05-30

It has recently occurred to me that the advocate of the Kantian Wille may, in significant measure, be victim of a kind of phenomenological illusion.  

We imagine the Kantian going serially down her list of desires -- "passive" matters of fact about what her experiences and behavior reveal to be her preferences -- and saying of each, "I could forebear that, if necessary.  So none of them, not one, is really me.  Me, my autonomous Wille, is distinct from every one of those desires."  A similar mistake led Newton to the postulation of Absolute Space; viz., relative effects are hypostatized into an independent existence.  What enables one to deny identity with any particular desire X is one's background awareness of all the other desires that are not X, whose cumulative preponderance overwhelms any particular desire.

Of course, the "background" cumulative awareness of all of one's desires is indeed separate from any particular desire, so in that sense there is indeed a Wille.  But it is not ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8180 Reply

2014-05-29
I am bothered with the pressures of objectivity or lack there of as it relates to knowledge, truth and perfection. I ended up re-reading this paper and realized that the primary means of achieving knowledge, truth and perfection would be for there to be a state of absoluteness; which I believe is impossible and completely inapplicable. I am now wondering what are other opinions on the relationship that exist between absolutism and objectivity and there relationship to knowledge, truth and perfection.

2014-06-07
Hello,
This is a rehash of an old post. I'm hoping someone can settle my confusion, xor, confirm my brilliant insight.

Let's suppose that zombies are conceivable. Many argue against this, but let's suppose. What I want to call into question is that an entire zombie world is conceivable. There is just one problem with this allegedly conceivable world: the person doing the conceiving. That's you. You, if you are truly conceiving of anything at all, are not a zombie.

I am of course assuming that "having a conception" implies "having consciousness." But this seems very fair to me. I am also assuming that "you" can be a disembodied consciousness. But 2-d semantics seems unable to deny the conceivability of such a thing.

1. Having a conception of a complete zombie world implies having a conception. (assumption)
2. Having a conception implies having (some) consciousness. (assumption)
3. Having (some) consciousness implies that there is consciousness. (assumption)
c4. Having a conception of a complet ... (read more)
Latest replies:
  • Derek Allan, today : Greg RE: "we are in fact each other." Sartre said that Hell is other people. If he's right, and you're... (read more)
  • Derek Allan, today : RE: [ME] > It's saying to me in effect: "Imagine a thing which you can't imagine....& [YOU] Good. ... (read more)
  • Derek Allan, today : Hi Bill RE:. ..  If one could imagine a zombie (in the philosophical sense), it would indicate that consciousness i... (read more)
  • Derek Allan, today : Hi Bill RE: “Please tell me again why you keep calling consciousness an unknown when you yourself know what it is.” As y... (read more)
  • Derek Allan, today : P I just had an interesting and slightly amusing thought which I felt I should share. If as Bill, Chalmers and many othe... (read more)
  • 323 more ..
Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8170 Reply

2014-05-18
(1) That sentient life will one day come to an end is no solace for those sentients existing and suffering today.

(2) Whether it is better to have been or not to have been is a Cartesian koan I can ponder concrerning myself, but not one I have a right to decide concerning another sentient that is or has been; all the less right have I to create or support the creation of another sentient, out of nothing.

(3) Pain and pleasure are incommensurable; only pain is pertinent to moral musings like these: No number of orgasms (for me) compensates for one fallen sparrow; and, again, the sparrow’s pains or solaces are not for me to weigh -- for the sparrow.

(4) Christianity is particularly self-righteous and presumptuous on such questions, always ready to sanction temporal risk and suffering for the bodies of others for the salvation of their immaterial, immortal souls, sub specie aeternitatis.


Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8166 Reply

2014-04-07

In the effort to understand the Williams-Parfit dispute regarding internal and external reasons, I have found it useful to distinguish between pre-choice and post-choice normativity.  The literature being voluminous, it is not clear to me whether this or a similar distinction has already been drawn somewhere.  I'd much appreciate any feedback in that and indeed any other regard.

Deliberation is a process culminating (in normal circumstances) in choice, e.g. to do A rather than not.  For simplicity, assume cases in which an individual is practically able, i.e. there is no slip betwixt cup and lip, in which the individual does what he/she chooses, viz. A (what Parfit calls being "fully practically rational").  So the sequence is:  deliberation, choice, action.

A "reason", it seems plausible to suppose, is something that plays some significant role in deliberation.  Insofar as we are concerned with understanding happenings in the world, we are interested in persons’ actions.  ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8140 Reply

2014-04-07
(From Author) Sadly enough, this article has badly edited parts. Although I asked Editor to correct them many times, it seems that he did not have enough time to do that. I would like to apologize to readers for that.Editor, who sent me a letter afterwards, said as follows:

September 10, 2012

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to apologize for the typographical errors in the article published by Yusuke Kaneko in our journal, 
the International Journal of Arts and Sciences.
The mistakes were few but they were committed at the printing phase and should not be held against Dr. Kaneko.
We profusely apologize to Dr. Kaneko about the above.

Sincerely,

Mark Bridge
Conferences Department

2014-03-20
Abstract:

This article points out: “The combination of men and women in families is irrational.” Men and women are two different “species.” They only require sexual activities from each other, which are considered the less time-consuming activities during their lives. Sex must be treated as an enemy of marriage, due to its inferior and treacherous nature, and should not be included in marriage. Men and women should not live together in a family, since this institution must be understood as a permanent place for all family members and is expected to have a solid structure. The traditional family model is the result of men‟s enslavement of women and the exaggeration of the role of sex. This model creates an overwhelming advantage for men in selecting partners, proposing marriage, and other family activities. This article indicates: (i) The prominent family models existing between the group-marriage period and now are sex-based family models. (ii) Technical and social conditions nowadays r ... (read more)

2014-02-23
A very popular text book, Sensation and Perception by Goldstein, states the following:
"Light reflected from objects in the environment enters the eye through the pupil and is focused by the cornea and lens to form sharp images of the objects on the retina."
This is a common view that I have found explicitly expressed in any book or article I have read on vision.
The assumption of a retinal image poses at least two problems:
1) 2D array vs 3D world. How come we see objects in 3D while the retinal image is 2D?
2) The Inverse Problem: different objects have the same projection on the retina, but still we have no difficulty distinguishing between them.
I would like to add a third one. The retinal blind spot.
The explanations I have found have me baffled. The ingenious tests by Ramachandran and others, that purport to prove the existence of the blind spot, only add to my confusion. I have tried to find an answer to a similar problem, Tunnel Vision (Retinitis Pigmentosa), but I did not get any far ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8097 Reply

2014-02-07
I have recently been discussing various interpretations of the Knobe effect with a friend of mine and we have been struck by the fact that all of the vignettes used in the empirical studies we have seen present subjects with conversations (or at least someone saying something to an audience, which may be the speaker herself, as in Knobe's terrorist case: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/ResponseCritics.pdf ).

We are trying to find empirical studies that have used vignettes that *don't* do this, but which instead simply describe the mental states and decision of an agent. Does anyone know if such studies have been carried out? I would be grateful for pointers, thanks.

2014-02-10

Philosophy of Time

The nature of time has had extensive attention in part down through the ages, such as Plato, St. Augustine, Pascal, Leonardo, Newton etc. For example, Newton considered time to flow uniformly, as if it were a separate manifold (1-surface) from the 3-surface of his mechanics described universe.

‘Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external…’  Newton’s Principia

For a 3-manifold, this would give a product space description M^3 x M^1, the simplest fiber bundle description. Hence such description would be universal; that is the same common time for throughout the universe. Subsequently, the relativistic model refers to time as the interval between events, wherein clocks are associated with respective observers. However an event such as the Big Bang, and concomitant Big Expansion of our manifold (i.e. 3-surface), does not have such a General Relativistic Theory description; nor is ‘initial’ 3-ex ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8088 Reply

2014-02-10
    The general (perhaps only the Western) view is that there is little to no contribution to ancient political thought from Asia. In recent scholarships, Indian and Chinese scholars have argued that Kautilya's Arthashastra (some include Manu’s Laws) and Confucius' Analects have much to contribute to ancient political thought and even contemporary relevance, and have reconstructed them so.

    Besides Confucianism and Hinduism, does Buddhism or the Buddha have anything to say about socio-political organization? Some have asserted that the Buddha was a political realist, i.e. even though he favored some kind of a tribal democratic republic (as shown in how the sangha is structured), a colossal socio-political transformation was taking place in Northern India during his time, where powerful monarchical systems were emerging, and the Buddha made his attempts to influence its development in a certain direction (The Pali Canon, Digha Nikaya presents some evidences to this).

     ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8087 Reply

2013-12-21
Are any of you aware of any attempt by a contemporary professional philosopher to articulate a practical and self-contained "philosophy of life", akin to those of the ancient Greek philosophical schools?  
To give you an idea of that for which I am searching, please see my own attempt at the following link:

https://docs.google.com/file/d/0Byh6JnTg3RMecHhxV0pYeklqV0U/edit?usp=sharing



In the interest of full disclosure, please note that I am self-taught in philosophy (if it is not already obvious from a cursory review of my document).

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Latest replies:
  • Kevin Harris, 2014-03-23 : Though I do not personally agree with several of your philosophical positions I am willing to accept them as premises in... (read more)
  • Philo Sofer, 2014-03-31 : Kevin, thank you for reading and comme I agree that substantial benefits may accrue from holding philosophical positions... (read more)
Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8002 Reply

2013-12-21
Essentially, we'll never truly be able to distinguish between "right" and "wrong" actions. At any given time in history, however, philosophers, theologians, and politicians will claim to have discovered the best way to evaluate human actions and establish the most righteous code of conduct. But it's never that easy. Life is far too messy and complicated for there to be anything like a universal morality or an absolutist ethics. The Golden Rule is great (the idea that you should treat others as you would like them to treat you),
For example, should the few be spared to save the many? Who has more moral worth: a human baby or a full-grown great ape? 

At best, we can only say that morality is normative, while acknowledging that our sense of right and wrong will change over time.

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7960 Reply

2013-11-19
Here is an argument against reliabilism. Grateful for comments. Also, is this argument already out there? Wouldn’t be surprised. The argument proceeds in two parts. Here’s part A, an analogy.

1. Suppose I’m imprisoned permanently in a windowless prison cell. However there is a large TV screen. My jailer tells me it shows, by cameras that focus on various events in the world outside, what is really happening.

2. As my life continues I believe that the events on the screen are accurate, but naturally I have doubts–maybe I’m being shown old reruns or computer generated confabulations or...– and I wonder if what I’m seeing is really going on. Sometimes images appear on the screen of how the system itself works–the cameras, their construction, the lens, examples of them capturing events in the world, the way the images are relayed accurately to the screen in my cell...I believe these are accurate but it’s hardly unreasonable to continue to wonder whether what I’m seeing is really going on–th ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7941 Reply

2013-11-12

I am unsure if this is the correct forum for this. Kant is famous for asking what the conditions are for the possibility of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason. I  think that his answers are more right than not.

    How can we apply this question to the phenomenology of Sartre or Heidegger? That is, what, are the conditions for knowledge, if any, for some of the claims in Being and Time and Being and Nothingness. I refer to the assertions about Being, Dasein, Nothingness, authenticity and the terminology therein. I realize that this is a huge and difficult question that is worthy of a book. My reason for asking is to challenge the entire projects of these texts. Their conclusions, after all, are not empirical and little or no evidence is given because that is not the intention, except with Husserl, arguably. Their claims are speculative and perhaps fallacious.
. Would you consider their assertions non-propositional in that no definite truth or falsity can be known? I think Ayer would a ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7933 Reply

 1 - 20 / 314