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THINKING GENDER 2015, UCLA Center for the Study of Women
Call for presentations: Power, Contested Knowledge, and Feminist Practices

How have feminist approaches altered the existing understanding of scientific knowledge and practices? Celebrating the 25th Annual Graduate Student Research Conference at the UCLA Center for the Study of Women, Thinking Gender 2015 invites submissions for individual papers, pre-constituted panels, and posters on topics that focus on the participation and/or contribution of marginalized individuals or groups who have been historically excluded from knowledge production. We welcome papers and posters—across all disciplines and historical periods—that engage with the concept of the body as a contested site intersecting with gender, race, sexuality, and identity and how it is related to certain agencies in particular contexts. We invite scholarship engaging the following topics or others related to the conference theme of "Power, Contested Knowledge, and Fe ... (read more)

Because of Copyright, I am not yet in a position to upload this article. If you have any interest, feel free to contact me anytime.  (Author)

Dear all, can anyone suggest me source material on anti-essentialism discussed from a socialist feminist perspective. I am trying to develop a framework incorporating anti-essentialist, socialist feminist approaches.  

I wonder if anyone could help me out?
I vaguely recall that Kim somewhere expresses reservations about metaphysical supervenience in the context of the mind-body relation - that supervenience in question might be only nomologically and not metaphysically necessary. Or something like that.

But I can't now find a good reference...  I wonder if my memory is failing me here...

(I found a brief remark in p. 49 of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough; but I thought there were better, more explicit passages.) 

I would be very grateful for good references.

All the Best

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I want to draw a distinction between a "nation" (or other group) in terms of the individuals that make it up  and that "nation" (or other group) as a unified body. The former is entirely made up of reductive qualities; it has properties just in case the individuals have the property.  So the British nation loves tea, the Korean nation loves Kimchee and the German nation loves sausages etc.  The "unified body" has emergent qualities; sovereignty, a foreign policy, institutions, a seat at the United Nations etc.
It seems to me that the first "nation" can have some properties, in virtue of it's members having those properties that conflict with similar emergent properties of the second "nation".  For example Germany's actions in World War 1 were, at least thought to be, in the interest of Germany.  But that would appear to be "Germany" in the second sense of "nation". It doesn't seem to have advanced or even be aimed at advancing the individuals that made up the nation. 

That's two paragraphs ... (read more)
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Culture and Religion are not the same, though they are very close. There are various theories that suggest a model of relationship between them. One of them tries to see Religion as the soul of culture. This view doesn't consider the fact that there could also be non-religious cultures. Perhaps, one may quote the Pirahas as an example of such a culture. (Wiki) Of course, this doesn't rule out the fact that some kind of belief-system may be involved in a culture. However, perhaps, we can keep culture and religion totally separate. The cultural elements must not be confused with the religious elements. Thus, people having differing beliefs can still follow one culture and only disagree with regard to religious elements or belief-related elements (such heterogeneity is intense in metropolitan cities); however, there usually is a particular spirit of the age and world view in general. Also, certain cultural traits may be identified as grammatical directives of a particular cu ... (read more)
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I understand the philosophical and scientific conversations about space and time have shifted toward conversations about spacetime. Instead of following that model, I prefer to ask a common sense question about space that impacts directly on the more technical conversations we are likely to have theses days.

The question is: What, if not space, is between you and the other things around you right now? I'm talking about the furniture, objects, devices, flora or fauna or whatever happens to be about. Between you and those things there is also the atmosphere, the air that surrounds us. Air has oxygen, nitrogen and various other gasses and pollutants that compose it but we can also ask about what is between these molecules? Or inside them even? Without getting too technical, I think we all know enough about atoms to ask what is between, say the nucleus and their orbiting electrons? Or between the protons and neutrons in the nucleus? 

No matter "how far down" you might go into smalle ... (read more)
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Dear All, can anyone let me know of attempts to apply transcendental arguments to issues such as physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I would also be grateful of any comments on my attempt 'Emergence from What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness' published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies this year, issue 5-6.Thank you
Kim DaviesDavies 2014

I would be grateful for any feedback on the following unpublished note.

Zombies are inconceivable for the following reason.

In order to think that a is a zombie you have to think both that:

  1. a is exactly like a human from a third-person perspective;

  2. a has no qualia.

The problem lies in thinking (2). To see this, note that it is not enough to not think a has qualia. That is easy. You can do that just by imagining (1) and forgetting about (2). In other words, you just imagine all the required third-person facts about a—essentially what makes him indistinguishable from a human being—but don't bother to think about whether he has qualia or not. But clearly not thinking that a has some property is logically distinct form thinking that a does not have that property. To suppose otherwise would be to make an elementary scoping error. But if this right, then it is impossible in the deepest sense to think that a has no qualia. Therefore, zombies are inconceivable.

In case there is any doubt about this ... (read more)

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Hi! I'm traying to translate a sentence from GA 28 (untranslated) and I need to contrast my interpretation with somebody elses.

The sentence goes like this:

Während aber die Art des Wissens nur ist, was sie sein kann, auf dem Grunde des eigenen Selbst, was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß, wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört, die aber nur aus der spezifischen Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden kann.

My version of this monstruosity would be the following (please note that the sentence is incomplete as there is no main clause, and that it has been copied literally from the book).

But while the kind of knowing only is what it can be on the ground of the own self, this itself, that is the own self, must be determined as Being, to which certainly a manifestness belongs, which it self can be understood however only from the specific mode of being of Dasein.

My biggest headache is "was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß"

Is Heidegger saying

i. that the own self must be determined ... (read more)

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Dear all, I would be grateful for any comments on my paper 'Emergence from What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness' (Journal of Consciousness Studies Vol 21 Issue 5-6, June 2014) and any directions to other attempts to use transcendental arguments in the philosophy of mind.Thanks
Kim Davies

I have a question about individuation of perceptual content. I am writing about individual perceptual experience and joint perceptual experience, under the light of Fregean or NeoFregean frame. I do not believe that objects of perception are sufficient to individuate perceptual content; we need something more: a mode of presentation. So, my question is how the mode of presentations of perceptual states is individuated? Gareth Evans had an intuitive criterion of difference for thoughts or beliefs, but I do not know of a similar criterion for perceptions.  

Two beliefs have different content, if it is possible for a subject take different attitudes to both and even still being rational. Is it possible to build a similar criterion for perceptions? Maybe, two perceptions have different content, if it is possible for a subject to be disposed to do different things (e.g. actions, routines, activities, judgments, and the like) and even still being actively fluent in the environment?

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What do people think of Qualia Logic? One keeps track of both 3rd-person and 1st-person information in the truth-value of a proposition.
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So I'm currently writing my thesis, which Andy Clark is supervising, and all seems to be going well, but I was just wondering if people had any critical thoughts on the topic. My current abstract is below:

In The Extended Mind (1998, p18), Clark and Chalmers wrote that ‘‘As with any reconception of ourselves, [the extended mind] will have significant consequences. There are obvious consequences for philosophical views of the mind and for the methodology of research in cognitive science, but there will also be effects in the moral and social domains. It may be, for example, that interfering with someone’s environment will have the same moral significance as interfering with their person.’ (my italics). Little has been done to explore the consequences in these so-called moral and social domains. Problematically, the Extended Mind literature tends to focus on the role of the immediate environment on cognition, typically demonstrating the crucial role ... (read more)

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Philosophy of Mind is a topic fraught with ambiguity. People use terms such as "mind," "consciousness," "awareness," "experience" and so forth as if everyone knows what they mean.  But they can mean very different things to different people, and too often we end up with ambiguity, equivocation and misunderstanding.    

Herein I propose some definitions of salient terms.  I do not claim that these are the only correct definitions.  I merely claim that if we all agree to use words the same way we'll have a productive conversation rather than talking past each other. Your comments are welcome, as I would like to hone these recommendations to be as clear as possible.

Proposed Definitions

Of all the concepts relating to mind, I propose that we use experience as the most inclusive.  It means the subjective aspect of a person's taking into account his or her world.  By subjective I mean detectable or observable in principle by only one person, the one who is taking his or her world into account. This is ... (read more)
Latest replies:
  • Bill Meacham, today : Greg - > anyone who imagines that consciousness (or awareness or just raw experience) could simply evolve, accidental... (read more)
  • Bill Meacham, today : Derek - > I'm suggesting that the emergence of human consciousness as we know it may have been an accident that... (read more)
  • Derek Allan, today : RE: "an accidental origin of the ability to be conscious seems plausible.  On what grounds do you think it que... (read more)
  • Gregory Nixon, today : Bill, anyone who imagines that consciousness (or awareness or just raw experience) could simply evolve, accidentally or... (read more)
  • Bill Meacham, today : Derek - > do most philosophers think that some accident occurred in the hominid gene pool that resulted, via selectio... (read more)
  • 240 more ..
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TL;DR: Does anyone know of a resource where I can gain an understanding of what the current debates in the philosophy of social science are?


I am a soon-to-be PhD student at Notre Dame in Western Australia.
My intended area of research is Marx's dialectical method. I am very interested in what has been described as Marx's critique of 'immediacy' in mainstream social science. Immediacy is when a particular study or social scientific theory takes empirical data at face value, and does not investigate whether or not that data has been distorted by previously-constructed systems of reasoning and thought. Perhaps even more simply, ideology (here meant in its technical Marxian sense) distorts the interpretation of empirical data.

I was wondering whether anyone knew of a resource where I might be able to find out what the current debates or issues in the philosophy of social science are, so I might be able to link this interest with a current debate that is going on, so my early syno ... (read more)
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Are there contemporary philosophers who argue that logic is concrete and particular? (More precisely I think the view would have to be that logics are concrete particulars.)

I'm toying with the idea of advancing that thesis, and I'm sure I'm not the first or only person to think this. But I don't know much about the field and in particular don't know what the relevant names would be.
Any help here would be appreciated.

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Any disagreement, agreement, argument or any evaluation would do. Need a help from you all to write a critical review for this article.

From september onwards I'll be teaching a course on epistemology at secondary school level. The approach to epistemology that I have to take (because of curricular demands) is mostly historical, starting with some Ancient philosophers (Plato, Aristotle), skipping the Middle Ages, and ending with Modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant.

I tend to think that the importance of the views espoused by all these historical thinkers lies not in the veracity of their theories, for clearly some things said by Plato or Locke are most likely false. Furthermore the questions they tend to concern themselves with appear in part to have moved over from philosophy to psychology which give them the appearance of unfounded armchair speculation. Rather in my opinion it is only against the background of the broader scientific developments during the time of these philosophers that we can begin to appreciate their significance. However I feel ill-equiped to talk about this background, because I simply don ... (read more)

Recently I had an awareness that understanding is deeper than knowledge. Then I thought about it for a while. I realized that knowledge involves explanations, while understanding does not necessarily require explanations. for, we understand many things without being able to explain them. This made me very anxious about this problem because it concerns with the way human mind works. How is it possible to understand something without being able to explain it? The traditional notion of 'Intuition' or immediate and direct awareness is not satisfactory enough to clarify this problem. What concerns me is that human mind seems to me to be much more than what we have so far known through or traditional logic or even scientific parameters. By saying that understanding is deeper than knowledge, i mean that understanding is an aspect of Consciousness that seems to be distinct from what we call Mind, though both are connected. Although we are conscious of ourselves we do not need to talk t ... (read more)
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