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2012-02-13

Philosophy of MindNetwork for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness: Question 5

Kevin Connolly

University of Toronto

This is an excerpt from a report on The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011, written by Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray, and Adrienne Prettyman, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Network_for_Sensory_Research.html

5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?

In the conference's final panel discussion, Casey O'Callaghan outlined one major idea motivating the traditional approach to studying experience. According to proponents of the traditional approach, we can tell a story about vision (in a bottom-up way) which does not appeal to processes in any other sensory modality (see, for example, work by David Marr). According to this view, we can give an account of vision by paying attention to what happens when you stimulate the eyes. The visual system, on this account, is informationally encapsulated with respect to the other sensory systems, and the same can be said for each ... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6618 Reply

2012-02-13

Philosophy of MindNetwork for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness: Question 4

Kevin Connolly

University of Toronto

4. Is the Mechanism of Sensory Integration Spatio-Temporal?

So far, we have discussed various ways to model the unity of consciousness, but what about ways to model sensory integration? Consider a case of sensory integration in a single modality like vision. When presented with a visual array containing a red circle and a green square, one popular view is that the visual system binds the feature red to the circle (and not the square) in part because that feature and that shape are located in the same space at the same time. Likewise, co-location in space or time may explain how we integrate features into the same object or event across modalities. Space and time could potentially p ... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6617 Reply

2012-02-13

Philosophy of MindNetwork for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness: Question 3

Kevin Connolly

University of Toronto

3. How Should We Model the Unity of Consciousness?

Once we determine the building blocks of consciousness, we still need to determine how they are assembled. Most philosophers think that, at least in normal cases, the experiences of a single subject at a single time are phenomenally unified. As a first pass, two experiences of a subject are phenomenally unified just in case there is something it is like for that subject to experience them together. Much of the discussion at the conference centered on how to understand this relation.

On Tim Bayne's view, as noted above, phenomenal unity is understood in terms of subsumption: two experiences are phenomenally unified just in case they ... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6616 Reply

2012-02-13

Philosophy of MindNetwork for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness: Question 2

Kevin Connolly

University of Toronto

2. Are Some of the Basic Units of Consciousness Multimodal?

In the McGurk effect, a subject views a video of a person saying one set of syllables (e.g. ga-ga), while the audio has been redubbed to a second set of syllables (e.g., ba-ba). The subject experiences yet a third set of syllables, distinct from the first two sets (e.g., da-da) (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976, p. 747).

In his talk on how to model the unity of consciousness, Tim Bayne proposed two different interpretations of crossmodal cases such as the McGurk effect. On a strictly causal interpretation, seeing the person mouth ga-ga causes you to hear da-da instead of ba-ba. According to this interpretation, integration occur ... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6615 Reply

2012-02-13

Philosophy of MindNetwork for Sensory Research/Brown University Workshop on Unity of Consciousness: Question 1

Kevin Connolly

University of Toronto

1. What Is the Relationship Between the Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration?

As you pick up your mug and drink from it, you perceive both visual and tactile features of the mug. You see the mug, and many of its visible features, such as its white color, its movement through space as you bring it towards your mouth, and so on. You also feel the smooth texture of the mug's surface as you grasp its handle, and as its rim makes contact with your lips. Your experience is multimodal in at least two respects. First, it has a multimodal phenomenological character--a proper description of what it is like for you to undergo the experience has to make reference to its visual an ... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6614 Reply

2012-02-05

Normative EthicsDemonstrating Equality

Gerald (Jerry) Hull

State University of New York at Binghamton

Most moral views assume some kind of equality. However, usually this assumption is foundational, i.e. no further grounds are provided apart from its evident reasonableness. E.g., utilitarians accept the Benthamite requirement that every person counts as one and no one as more than one, but typically no justification is given beyond its apparent fairness.

I believe that that equality can be demonstrated, at least in the specific case of the equality of person's interests.

We begin with a technical restriction. We can distinguish "other-regarding" interests as interests in someone's interests; e.g., a lover can be interested in a partner's well-being, a sympathetic nurse might be interested in reducing a patient's suffering, a sadist could be interested in causing or increasing somebody's pain, etc. The equality to be demonstrated only concerns non-other-regarding interests, or what can be called "self-restricted" interests. This is bec ... (read more)

Latest replies:

Gerald (Jerry) Hull, 2012-02-13 : No bites so far, eh? Perhaps a reconceptualization will help. People tend to regard moral values as the only... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6607 Reply

yesterday

Discussion of Samuel Alexander, An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradoxabout D: K(!x) -> !P(x)

Bruno Maret

Université Paris 8

notation : I use ! for 'not'

Perhaps you can avoid paradox but you have to admit this very strange proposition :
K !K x -> !P K x
If you know that you ignore (x) it's impossible that you know (x)

I don't see how it could be compatible with the knowability principle :
x -> P K x
else you can't have
(x) and (K !K x)

(excuse me if this message is out of place, I ignore the policy of tis forum,
excuse also my probable mistakes in english)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6605 Reply

2012-02-03	Discussion of Ben Bradley, Against satisficing consequentialismBlog response: Satisficing by Effort
Richard Yetter Chappell Princeton University	In this blog post, I outline a new form of Satisficing Consequentialism that meets Bradley's requirement that it "does not permit the gratuitous prevention of goodness." Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6601 Reply

2012-01-23	Discussion of Winthrop Staples & Philip Cafaro, The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration into the United StatesBlog response
Richard Yetter Chappell Princeton University	For anyone interested, I've blogged a couple of criticisms of this paper, here. Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6575 Reply

2011-12-29

Philosophy of MindWhat it is like to have been a zombie

Bill Meacham

University of Texas at Austin

Philosophical zombies (as opposed to the ones in the movies, which are slow-witted, bloody and broken people with a crazed and single-minded desire to eat normal people) are hypothetical creatures used in thought experiments to elucidate what we mean by the term "consciousness." They are supposed to act just like humans but lack internal experience. David Chalmers defines them thus: "A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience. Zombies look and behave like the conscious beings that we know and love, but 'all is dark inside.' There is nothing it is like to be a zombie." (http://consc.net/zombies.html)

Derek Allen objects to the concept, saying it makes no sense. (http://philpapers.org/post/6535) In particular he objects to the phrase "There is nothing it is like to be a zombie." I agree that the phrase "what it is like to be " is problematic, but we all know what it is trying to get at. If one has a conscious exp ... (read more)

Latest replies:

John Ivor Jones, 2012-01-23 : I cannot make headway with the idea that consciousness is not necessary for certain responses . Even if we note that the... (read more)
Bill Meacham, 2012-01-23 : Sorry, I am having a bit First of all what does "contingently necessary" mean? Perhaps I am showing my ignoran... (read more)
Ron Morstyn, 2012-02-01 : I suspect the conscious state under midazolam is not that different to being in a dream which is a state of consciousnes... (read more)
John Ivor Jones, 2012-02-01 : Yes, if I may repeat my point so I can work from it. under the principles of science consciousness is neither necessary... (read more)
Melina Costello, 2012-02-01 : On 2011-12-29, Bill Meacham wrote: I suppose to do a true experiment we would have to administer the drug -- Versed, a t... (read more)
4 more ..

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6545 Reply

2011-12-04

Philosophy of Gender, Race, and SexualityRepronormativity-

Geraldina Gonzalez de la Vega

Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

I've read recently Katherine M. Franke's paper, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism Law and Desire, in which she approaches the idea of repronormativity as a compulsory motherhood (parenthood actually, but she focuses on the feminist approach) In her paper Franke discusses how it is expected that women reproduce herselves and how this issue has been "taken for granted" in the femenist theory. She argues that not every woman actually wants to be a mother, and that this choice is actually like being heterosexual: social forces (heteronormativity) push women into motherhood.
A month ago the ECHR decided in a case S.H.&Others vs. Austria that it is not against the European Convention on Human Rights to deny the use of ova of third person in In vitro fertilisation processes, the argument is that this could disrupt the "normal" development of the child because having two mothers can be specially awkward and it would pose many problems to establish kinship and parental rights.

This makes me wonder ... (read more)

Latest replies:

Jim Stone, 2011-12-06 : My understanding is that there are about 40 families waiting to adoptThere are enough minority families to adopt minorit... (read more)
Scott Forschler, 2011-12-12 : Jim, frankly your message here is a reflection of the kind of blind paranoia that arises from the stubborn refusal to ac... (read more)
Jim Stone, 2011-12-12 : You missed my point. What I said was compatible with the view that fetus's do not have a moral right to life. I was... (read more)
Scott Forschler, 2011-12-12 : Jim, I agree that what you said is *logically compatible* with abortion rights and fetal non-personhood. I never s... (read more)
Scott Forschler, 2011-12-12 : And I didn't "miss your point." You made several points. I didn't comment on those which m... (read more)
1 more ..

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6484 Reply

2011-11-19

Meta-EthicsGame theory, its ontology, and morality

Jay Quigley

Florida State University

A question from a novice on the topic:

I'm suspecting that certain game-theoretic norms constitute necessary, a priori discernable norms and hence provide a robustly realist foundation for morality. (And possibly even "non-naturalist", although I suspect that that categorization may not be meaningful or worth caring about.) As I understand the nature of game theory, it discovers norms of procedural collective rationality.

There is of course room to debate the extent to which morality really is based on the norms of game theory. However, my questions are slightly different: What is the ontological status of game theoretic norms? And what are the consequences for the ontology of morality?

Reading suggestions much appreciated.

Latest replies:

John Ivor Jones, 2012-01-04 : I assume by a priori you mean identifying or manifesting conditions, and not the parts so identified or manifested. Unfo... (read more)
Boram Lee, 2012-01-04 : What do you have in mind? Could you give me an example of a game-theoretic norm? (Perhaps the Nash Equilibri... (read more)
Joseph Wagner, 2012-01-23 : I view ontology as an ancient, antiquated, obsolete and wholly useless line of inquiry, which no longer has relevance to... (read more)
Sj Chapman, 2012-02-01 : Loving this discussion, just FYI. I came across something that reminded me of this forum today when reading about... (read more)
John Ivor Jones, 2012-02-01 : Responding to Joseph Wagner, and straying a little from the topic of game theory (though there are some relevant points... (read more)
10 more ..

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6439 Reply

2011-11-11

EpistemologyOn So-called Dogmas of Empiricism

Chaohui Zhuang

Xiamen University

Quine criticized the so-called two dogmas of Empiricism, and Davidson criticized the so-called third dogma of Empiricism. Then, McDowell criticized the existence of non-conceptual content of experience. we will show that their arguments are all wrong. Their arguments are some kind of proof by contradiction. If we accept some principle of Empiricism, then we have to face some problems, thus we could not accept some principle of Empiricism. We will show that these problems could be solved. In fact, Wittgenstein had solved these problems. Therefore, their arguments are all invalid. At last, we will examine proof by contradiction. What contradictions can tell us? What about ability and inability of conceptual analysis?

1. The first So-called dogmas of Empiricism

Quine criticize Frege's definition of analyticity, but it doesnot mean that there are no other definition s of analyticity. In fact, Wittgenstein had given another definition of analyticity: logically true statements are analyti ... (read more)

Latest replies:

Steve Wallis, 2011-11-15 : Regarding Wittgenstein, you might look at the work of John Shotter who has continued some of Wittgenstein's argument... (read more)
Chaohui Zhuang, 2011-11-19 : Thanks for your comments and recommendations. For understanding “there is a beautiful flower”, we need logic reasoning a... (read more)
Steve Wallis, 2011-11-22 : I am sorry but I don't see an important difference between experienced and conceived - as all my experiences must be... (read more)
Chaohui Zhuang, 2011-12-04 : R We both agree that ordinary experience includes conceptual content. We have different opinion toward the problem wheth... (read more)
Vincent Mennella, 2011-12-27 : Hello, I hope you guys don't mind if I chime in here. I find this material really interesting, and I'm cur... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6402 Reply

2011-11-11

Philosophy of LanguageTruth; semantic and assertion

Maarefi Mohammad

Redundancy theory of truth has been regarded one (may the most) powerful objection to Realism, new truth theorist, articulating rather different notion of truth claim that the semantic thesis of Realism must be rejected - and hence the whole project of realism - i think there is something wrong with - for example - Gary Kemps article and reasoning for redundancy theory of truth.
there could two problems be differed
1) the redundancy argument for redundancy of SEMANTIC content of truth;
2) the redundancy argument for redundancy of ASSERTION that notion;
arguments - as far as i have seen - are related to the second but not the first ( see for example Ramsey truism and Strawson's "Truth" and Gary Kemp's article "Meaning and truth conditions").
that seems to be about the redundancy argument for ASSERTION of truth predicate, but the reasoning does not entail that "truth" does not have any genuine semantic content. i think the very problem could be found in Tarski's "Sem ... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6369 Reply

2011-10-18

Philosophy of MindHas Dennett discovered a new form of dualism - Dennettian Dualism?

JWK Matthewson Matthewson

In Consciousness Explained p407-408. Dennett considers the experiences of someone looking at the world, and describes his idea of the relationship between conscious experience, mind and representation:

"It seemed to him, according to the text, as if his mind - his visual field - were filled with intricate details of gold-green buds and wiggling branches, but although this is how it seemed this was an illusion. No such "plenum" ever came into his mind; the plenum remained out in the world where it didn't have to be represented, but could just be. When we marvel, in those moments of heightened self-consciousness, at the glorious richness of our conscious experience, the richness we marvel at is actually the richness of the world outside, in all its ravishing detail. It does not "enter" our conscious minds, but is simply available"

Here Dennett explicitly describes a "view", events arranged in a plenum but seen from one side and from a viewing point. Given that this is the ... (read more)

Latest replies:

JWK Matthewson Matthewson, 2011-10-18 : Note: Dennett actually describes this problem of the viewing point: "My point of view had lagged... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6349 Reply

2011-10-09

Philosophy, MiscellaneousFrom Knowledge to Wisdom

Nicholas Maxwell

University College London

Since 1976, a growing body of work has argued that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge - wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides. What we have at present, academic inquiry devoted, in the first instance, to the pursuit of knowledge is, it is argued, profoundly and damagingly irrational. The generation of our current global problems, and our current incapacity to tackle them intelligently, effectively and humanely, is in part due to the long-standing structural irrationality of our institutions of learning.

The revolution we require would change every branch and aspect of academic inquiry. A basic intellectual task of academic inquiry would be to articulate our problems of living (personal, social and global) and propose and critically assess possible so ... (read more)

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6337 Reply

2011-10-06

Philosophy of Physical ScienceExplaining implementation of computations

Jacques Mallah

I am posting an explanation of this on my blog. It's drawn from my eprint

The Many Computations Interpretation (MCI) of Quantum Mechanics
http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0544

but I expect to make a shorter paper just on this more limited topic.

My question is: is the explanation I give and purpose of what I am doing clear? Comments on the validity of the ideas are also welcome. Thanks.

So far I have the following posts on it (and see the main blog for more context related to QM):

Basic idea of an implementation
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/basic-idea-of-implementation.html

The Putnam-Searle-Chalmers Theorem
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/putnam-searle-chalmers-theorem.html

Restrictions on mappings 1: Independence and Inheritance
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/restrictions-on-mappings-1-independence.html

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6315 Reply

2011-10-06

Philosophy of MindDo zombies have intentional states about qualia?

Ramiro Frick

Instituto de Filosofía y Ciencias de la Complejidad

Hey guys,

1. As far as I understand, philosophical zombies are physically and behaviorally identical to normal beings, they have all the intentional mental states of normal beings, but they have no qualia. The lack of qualia is the only difference.

2. There is a certain kind of intentional mental states: intentional states about qualia.I have the belief that I'm seeing red, I have the desire to have an orgasm, I have the fear of experiencing pain. Much of the intentional mental states are about phenomenal properties of experience.

3. So my question is: Do zombies have intentional states about qualia?

I'm not sure about exactly what is the relevance of this question, but I have a hunch that there is something here...

Thanks in advance!

Ramiro Frick.

Instituto de Filosofía y Ciencias de la Complejidad,
Santiago de Chile.

Latest replies:

Derek Allan, 2011-12-28 : The term “phenomenal” gets used a lot in the philosophy of consciousness but always very questionably. Clear definitions... (read more)
Bill Meacham, 2011-12-29 : Perhaps I can throw some light on the question, for I have been a zombie. I have started a new thread on the topic... (read more)
Derek Allan, 2011-12-30 : Hi Bill This is a reponse to part of your comment on the new thread you started. I give it here because it also se... (read more)
Bill Meacham, 2012-01-02 : At the risk of aborting an interesting discussion, I have to say that I agree with you. I have never liked the phr... (read more)
Derek Allan, 2012-01-03 : Hi Bill Nice to encounter someone who agrees with me on the point. The only other person I am aware of who does is Peter... (read more)
11 more ..

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6314 Reply

2011-09-22

EpistemologyIs the World In your Head, or your Head in the World?

Steven Lehar

Boston University

Is the world that we experience around us, the real world itself, experienced out there where it lies? Or is our experience of the world a "picture" generated by our brain inside our head?

I posed this question in Lehar( 2003 ) and Lehar( 2003 }, and I have posted an informal cartoon outlining the issue here:

A Cartoon Epistemology
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist.html

What is the current state of consensus in the community on this subject? Are there more naive realists out there, or is representationalism the dominant paradigm yet?

And why is this most central and foundational issue not discussed more widely? Surely just about everything else in philosophy and psychology depends critically on getting this profound epistemological issue right. The issue is by no means irrelevant or insignificant. What is your view on this?

Steve Lehar

Latest replies:

Aleksandar Sasa, 2011-12-04 : SL: "How our brain paints the picture of reality that is our experience?& Your putting this question perhaps&n... (read more)
Steven Lehar, 2011-12-04 : Just rejecting self-contradictory proposals? Thats funny, that is exactly what I have beed doing! Its just that evidentl... (read more)
Jonathan C.W. Edwards, 2011-12-27 : Point 1. As I have tried to emphasise at least somewhere in these threads, direct perception is a non-starter. All biolo... (read more)
Steven Lehar, 2011-12-27 : >&WHAT PIGMENT DEPICTS THE OUTSIDE(NESS)? I'm not at all sure how you mean that question, but I'll take a sta... (read more)
Greg P. Hodes, 2011-12-27 : .
24 more ..

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6262 Reply

2011-09-15

Discussion of Joachim L. Dagg, Exploring mouse trap historyRambling scamper - don't get lost

Joachim L. Dagg

Ok, I collected all the historical evidence I could find that Michael Behe should have considered before making his claims about mousetraps and irreducible complexity.

Some of you may get lost because of technicalities concerning traps or my rambling style. But the main result is that taking a closer look at mousetrap history reveals similar patterns as taking a closer look at some organism's natural history. In the face of this evidence ID proponents can only revert to the same old strategies of emphasising gaps in the record etc. as we are used from their dealing with biological systems. In my opinion, nothing of the suggestive power of Behe's mousetrap analogy remains, if the real historical record is brought into consideration.

In fact, Hooker's patent of 1894 alone suffices to destroy Behe's mousetrap case for irreducible complexity. For a short and simple blog entry concerning Behe's mousetrap nemesis see: <http://historiesofecology.blogspot.com/2011/08/michael-beh ... (read more)

Latest replies:

Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/6247 Reply

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Online research in philosophy

All Philosophy

Basic idea of an implementationhttp://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/basic-idea-of-implementation.html

The Putnam-Searle-Chalmers Theoremhttp://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/putnam-searle-chalmers-theorem.html

Restrictions on mappings 1: Independence and Inheritancehttp://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/restrictions-on-mappings-1-independence.html

Basic idea of an implementation
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/basic-idea-of-implementation.html

The Putnam-Searle-Chalmers Theorem
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/putnam-searle-chalmers-theorem.html

Restrictions on mappings 1: Independence and Inheritance
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/restrictions-on-mappings-1-independence.html