Hello Pratik
As you compare humans to animals perhaps you are implicitly addressing an evolutionary approach to human intelligence in order to relatively position AI . This brings the focus on self-consciousness which is about representing oneself as an existing entity like conspecifics are represented. Only humans can do that. Concepts and ethics come after. Humans can manage concepts because they control their mental states and can produce  highly elaborated ones. And  ethics can be looked at as an "offspring of self-consciousness and human social behavior" as you say.
Now, regarding AI vs human intelligence, an evolutionary approach to meaning generation can make available a usable framework where ethics finds a place( see http://philpapers.org/rec/MENTTC-2 )
Hope this helps.

RE: “self-consciousness which is about representing oneself as an existing entity like conspecifics are represented.

Odd, I can never recall “representing myself as an existing entity like conspecifics are represented.” How does one do that exactly?

DA

"Representing oneself as an existing entity like conspecifics are represented" is a step of an evolutionary approach to self-consciousness.
In a few words:
Our pre-human ancestors were capable of intersubjectivity and had a very limited representation of themselves made of representations of parts of their bodies and of interactions with elements (seen feet&hands, heard shoutings, felt grabbed objects,...). Let's call it an "auto-representation" (to avoid the word "self").
Conspecifics were represented as entities existing in the environment.
Evolution of intersubjectivity toward identification with conspecifics produced a merger of the auto-representation with the representation of conspecifics.
By this merger the auto-representation acquired a characteristic of the representation of conspecifics: be a representation of an entity existing in the environment.
So the auto-representation slowly became about an entity existing in the environment like was the representation of conspecifics. Our ancestors became progressively conscious of themselves as existing entities like conspecifics were represented as existing. This was for our ancestors an elementary version of self-consciousness that can be called "ancestral self-consciousnes" 
You will find a description of that process in a paper (http://philpapers.org/rec/MENPFA-3) and in a TSC 2014 poster (http://philpapers.org/rec/MENCOO)  

“Our pre-human ancestors were capable of etc..”

And this claim is based on what evidence exactly?

As for the rest, none of it answers, or even addresses, my question.  Do you happen to know, by the way, how problematic the word “self” is in philosophy? Have a read of Hume on the self sometime.

I’ll leave aside other question-begging terms like: “intersubjectivity”, “auto-representation”, “conscious” etc. Do you have any idea how contested the idea of consciousness is in philosophy? And how far away we are from any sign of consensus? 

DA

Dear Christophe

I find no reference to “Bednarik” on the page you give me. But in any case why not explain the point in your own words rather than fall back on claims by someone else?  The very term “intersubjectivity” is question-begging.  What do you mean by it? What is your definition? Do animals have ”intersubjectivity”? Say, cockroaches? Slugs? Amoebae in a pond?  Why? Why not? As you may know, some philosophers claim that atoms, molecules and various other tiny bits and pieces are conscious. How do you feel about that? If they are conscious, perhaps they have “intersubjectivity” as well? Perhaps the universe is buzzing with your “intersubjectivity”?

And how on earth would anyone – “anthropologist” or not – know anything remotely reliable about the psychological life of our pre-human ancestors – of which all we have, and will ever have, are a few bones? For example, are you claiming (and on what basis?) that said ancestors were capable of language? If not, would this affect their ability for “intersubjectivity”? Why? Why not? The questions begged here are endless! (I assume you are aware that we have no accurate idea even of when human language and consciousness emerged?)

RE: “The idea of consciousness looks to me as more challenged than contested’”

Use whatever word you like. The simple fact is that there is no agreement – none – on what the term even means. And as I say, some leading philosophers in the area think that atoms etc are conscious - though other more sober souls think that’s just batty. You see what kinds of “challenges”, to use your term, this field of study contains? Nothing – just nothing – is agreed on, and opinions vary wildly. Yet you're happy to make confident pronouncements about the psychological life of our pre-human ancestors! (Which ones, by the way? It’s a complicated genealogy, there are big gaps, and paleoanthropologists are still not sure how it works.)

There are oceans of other questions begged by your post but, really, it’s just too much to deal with. And your statement re Hume is, I'm sorry, just bizarre.

DA

Dear Derek,

Hi Christophe

Again, I don’t see the paper. But in any case I want to hear what you have to say. On a discussion thread like this, simply referring people to books, papers etc strikes me as a bit if a cop-out. If you have answers to the questions I raised – and you haven’t so far provided any – let's hear them in your own words.    

To be perfectly honest with you, I have found myself half-wondering if your comments on these issues are not perhaps a kind of spoof. You could reassure me this is not the case by addressing the questions I have asked you in lucid prose, free of undefined jargon.

DA

Hi Donald

Excuse me for intervening.

You write “These are standard concepts in philosophy,”.

Indeed, most of the words Luc listed are “standard”, even in everyday life.

What is not standard in philosophy (hence Luc’s question) is the meanings of these words. If you are at all familiar with the relevant philosophical literature, you will know that many volumes have been written on these concepts by many writers, past and present, and that opinions often differ widely. To suggest, as you seem to be doing, that there is somehow a consensus in the philosophical literature would, as I'm sure you must be aware, be simply naïve.

Luc’s questions were, in other words. perfectly reasonable. Like him, I await a response.

You also write: “Effectively, your questioning is like asking a physicist to define quark, or strong or weak force, or neutron, proton, electron, etc., or a biologist to define DNA or RNA or stem cell.:

This is a highly dubious claim. The physicist would be defining a physical object in scientific terms. Any suggestion that the self and consciousness (for example) are purely physical objects would be extremely questionable, and large numbers of philosophers would not support that view. Though perhaps you are a die-hard physicalist in this field? (Oddly, there are a few around in philosophy.)  If so, I would be interested in your defence of the view that the self and human consciousness are definable and explicable in purely physical terms. If nothing else, it should raise the level of discussion on this thread a little…

As for your remarks on the US education system, I for one couldn't possibly comment. Strangely, not everyone is educated in the US…

DA

Nice dodge, Christophe. 

Think about it:  Luc or I could refer you to any number of books or papers pointing out how much more complex the issues are than you (and others here) are implying. But we don’t do so because it would defeat the purpose of a discussion thread which, as the name suggests, is a thread for discussion.

So if you actually have an argument to put, and answers to the quite specific questions we have asked you, now might be a good time to put your head up above the “read-the-paper” parapet and show you actually have something to say. Otherwise, we can draw our own conclusions...

DA

PS  I am still not entirely convinced that you are not engaging in a spoof. Take for example your statement: "Our pre-human ancestors ... had a very limited representation of themselves made of representations of parts of their bodies and of interactions with elements (seen feet&hands, heard shoutings, felt grabbed objects,..." (This statement verges on the unintelligible. But as if there is even the slightest modicum of evidence for it!)  Or how about this one: "Evolution of intersubjectivity toward identification with conspecifics produced a merger of the auto-representation with the representation of conspecifics." Good to know. Or try this one (again barely intelligible): "Our ancestors became progressively conscious of themselves as existing entities like conspecifics were represented as existing. "

Really, the more I look at this stuff, the more I think it has got to be a a spoof!

Hi Derek,
Real sorry that you cannot access the paper (http://philpapers.org/rec/MENPFA-3) because it is precisely there that you could read what I have to say.
The post where you highlight the difficulty to define concepts on a general basis is pertinent.
Take for instance the concept of consciousness. In the paper you could read:
"Human consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people would today disagree with an evolutionary history of human mind. But human consciousness is a complex and still mysterious performance. Different perspectives have been developed to try to understand it. Among the key ones: as concepts of consciousness like phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, monitoring consciousness and self-consciousness (Block, 1995); as functions of consciousness like adaptation and learning (Baars, 1993); as levels of consciousness like core consciousness and extended consciousness (Damasio, 1999); as self-representational theory of consciousness where a mental state is phenomenally conscious iff it represents itself in the right way (Kriegel, 2012).
The choice made here is to focus on self-consciousness following an evolutionary approach. We define self-consciousness as being "the representation of oneself as an existing entity like others humans are represented as existing" (representations are here understood as being meaningful representations2). Such a definition of self-consciousness refers to the representations of conspecifics and does not use the concept of self. It is different from defining self-consciousness as "the possession of the concept of the self and the ability to use this concept in thinking about oneself" (Block, 1995). In the proposed evolutionary approach self-consciousness is the consciousness of oneself as an existing entity rather than the consciousness of a self3."
And much more could be said (other types of consciousness like pre-reflexive self-consciousness and primitive consciousness are addressed elsewhere in the paper).

Now regarding the identification with conspecifics producing a merger of representations that brought the auto-representation to become about an entity existing in the environment.
The wording of the process is not that easy indeed. If you prefer drawings to sentences you can have a look at the TSC 2014 poster which shows all that in a graphic way.(http://philpapers.org/rec/MENPOS). 
The idea about an evolution of inter-subjectivity leading to identification with conspecifics and then to an initial and limited form of self-consciousness is a new one. As far as I know it has not been addresed by other authors. And I agree that it may not be that easy to grasp.

Hi Christophe

I’m glad to hear you’re not subjecting us to a spoof.

You seem to have made some effort to clarify your thinking. But all sorts of questions are begged.

For example, you say: “Human consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people would today disagree with an evolutionary history of human mind.”

Now, in one sense this is simply a statement of the bleeding obvious. Everything that took place in the emergence of species in “a product of evolution” – fins, wings, claws, etc., etc., etc.  So in some general sense, presumably – or, rather, obviously – human consciousness must be a “product of evolution”. But that tells us precisely nothing about (a) what human consciousness is, and (b) how precisely it emerged. It is about as informative as saying “human consciousness happened”.

Moreover, you appear to be implying (are you?) that once having emerged (and who knows how?) human consciousness “evolved” in some way – i.e. continued to evolve.

Now, first, there is absolutely no paleoanthropological evidence to support a claim of this nature. (Your own statement about our “pre-human ancestors” being only capable of “very limited representation of themselves made of representations of parts of their bodies and of interactions with elements (seen feet&hands, heard shoutings, representations of parts of their bodies)” is, and can only be, mere speculation.) It is perfectly possible – though we have no way of knowing – that human consciousness as it first emerged in the homo sapiens line is the only form of human consciousness homo sapiens has ever known. If you think you have evidence – actual evidence – to demonstrate that is not the case, please feel free to tell me what it is (though please don’t just refer me to an article, or cite “Bloggs 20XX”, etc. I see those as cop-outs). 

Second, a claim of this kind implies that you not only have a satisfactory definition of human consciousness (and as far as I am aware no such definition exists – and the various definitions proposed by the different names you cite so blandly and confidently are all open to major challenge) but it also implies that you have satisfactory definitions of different prehistorical levels of human consciousness. Are you serious?  

There are many more questions begged by your post but this is getting long, and presumably gives you enough to deal with anyway. So I’ll leave it there for now.

DA

Hi Derek,

If I read you correctly you are looking for the following as related to the evolutionary scenario:

1) what is human consciousness ?
2) what could have been prehistorical levels of human consciousness ?
3) how did human consciousness precisely emerge?
4) how did human consciousness evolve after that emergence ?
5) Is human consciousness still evolving and how ?
6) what could have been a representation in the mind of our pre-human ancestors ?

1) what is human consciousness ?
Using the N. Block definitions, the focus of the evolutionary scenario is on self-consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is to be taken into account after, linked to self-consciousness as subject (see poster http://philpapers.org/rec/MENCOO). But, as already said, such definition of self-consciousness applies to us humans with our full fledged self-consciousness. It includes performances that our pre-human ancestors did not carry. The evolutionary approach brings the need to introduce intermediate steps with corresponding definitions.
2) what could have been prehistorical levels of human consciousness ?
As said, a first step could have been an ancestral self-consciousness defined as a limited representation of oneself as an entity existing in the environment, like conspecifics were represented as existing. Other intermediate steps have probably existed before reaching our today level of human self-consciousness. This is to be investigated based on the evolutionary engine (see paper http://philpapers.org/rec/MENPFA-3).
3) how did human consciousness precisely emerge?
As already said, the evolutionary scenario uses an identification with conspecifics resulting from an evolution of pre-human primate intersubjectivity. It produced a merger of representations that brought the auto-representation to become about an entity existing in the environment. (see previous post).
4) how did human consciousness evolve after that emergence ?
A hypothesis of the evolutionary scenario is that identification with conspecifics was also about identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics which produced a huge anxiety increase. To limit that anxiety our ancestors have developed behaviors and mental performances like caring, scenarios simulation, communication, imitation, ... which brought obvious evolutionary advantages. But they also generated new anxieties that had in turn to be limited (exclusion from group,...). Overall, an evolutionary engine based on anxiety management was built up in the minds of our ancestors. That engine has driven ancestral self-consciousness to our today self-consciousness. The evolution from ancestral self-consciousness to our today human self-consciousness has not really been analyzed in the scenario. Only some key points have been introduced (see paper). More work is needed on that subject.
5) Is human consciousness still evolving and how ?
The evolution of human consciousness is only a very short segment in the billions of years of life evolution which has no reason to stop. So it looks reasonable to consider that human consciousness is to evolve beyond its today status. The evolutionary engine should also be active in that future process. This domain (psychology ? anthropology ?) deserves more work with a focus on anxiety management processes in humans, spreading from life drive to death drive. Good and evil then being looked at as different aspects of a "Pascalian entertainment". Such a perspective will somehow introduce an anxiety limitation drive coming in addition to the Freudian life and death ones. Again, more work is needed in these areas.
6) what could have been a representation in the mind of our pre-human ancestors ?
In the evolutionary scenario all representations are meaningful as being networks of meanings. Meaningful information has been formalized by the modeling of a Meaning Generator System (http://philpapers.org/rec/MENIAM-2). A system submitted to an internal constraint (ex: stay alive for animals) generates a meaning when receiving information that has a connection with the constraint. The generated meaning is precisely that connection. The meaning is to be used for the implemention of an action that will satisfy the constraint.
Meaningful representations are constraint satisfaction driven. (more on this in  http://philpapers.org/rec/MENCOI ) 
Our pre-human ancestors were submitted to animal type constraints (stay alive, live group life) and also to new constraints coming from the need to limit the anxiety increase. 
The anxiety limitation constraint has been (and still is) powering the evolutionay engine. Anxiety limitation as a new constraint has been feeding many MGSs and by this generating a huge quantity of new anxious meanings since the dawn of humanity. The evolutionary scenario shows that self-consciousnes is interwoven with anxiety. As many of today mental disorders are related to anxiety problems, formalizing an evolutionary link between self consciousness and anxiety may bring new perspectives on that subject. More work is needed here also

Hi Christophe

Just when I thought you were showing signs of coming out from behind the underbrush, you’ve gone back to hiding behind “authorities” and undefined jargon. Your post reminds me of someone reciting a catechism.

I’m not going to go through your whole post. It really would be too much of a chore. But here are a few rather random comments:

RE: “Using the N. Block definitions..” So why is Block the law and the prophets? There are hundreds of versions of consciousness and evolution out there, all different in some way or another, often radically. (Personally, I think Block's account of consciousness is feeble.)

RE: “As said, a first step could have been an ancestral self-consciousness defined as a limited representation of oneself as an entity existing in the environments etc..” Actually that’s not what you said. You claimed to know what our “pre-human ancestors” were capable of. Guesses about what “could have been” are a dime a dozen in this area. Perhaps they “could have” spent their time chanting primitive versions of the Iliad. Or having counselling sessions about problems with their “conspecifics” in the next tree.

Your response to my question “how precisely did consciousness emerge?” is just a welter of undefined jargon. And you have clearly missed the point I was making.

RE: A hypothesis of the evolutionary scenario is that identification with conspecifics was also about identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics which produced a huge anxiety increase. To limit that anxiety our ancestors have developed behaviors and mental performances like caring, scenarios simulation, communication, imitation, ... which brought obvious evolutionary advantages.”

So (a) it is all just a “hypothesis” and (b) it all comes down to “huge anxiety”! Seriously? (Perhaps counselling sessions were held after all!) And then, as a result, we became all caring and sharing? (The extermination camps must be a myth then?) This is simply wild speculation. Show me one shred of convincing evidence.

RE: “Good and evil then being looked at as different aspects of a "Pascalian entertainment"

Pascal would simply turn in his grave at this!

Enough! I can’t bear any more…

DA

Hi Derek,
It is becoming a bit difficult to discuss these new ideas with you. So I'll stop here about the proposed evolutionary approach to self-consciousness.
Also, as I like Malraux as you do, I was looking at addressing with you some elements of his metamorphosis of art with anxiety limitation as a human constraint in the background. But your comments on self-consciousness bring me to feel that it may not be a good thing to do.
Sorry about that.
Regarding Pascal, please read 136 (139) of the Pensees.
Christophe

“New ideas” Christophe? Speculation about human consciousness “evolving” has been a la mode for quite a while now.  What it always lacks, however – as your claims do – is the slightest shred of evidence.  I’m not at all surprised that although I invited you to provide some, nothing has eventuated. All you’ve done is retreated from “were capable of” to “could have been”. I seem to recall Von Daniken was very good at “could have beens”…

My invitation to provide some evidence – even the tiniest modicum – remains open however. (And of course this applies to anyone on the thread.)

I don’t think I introduced Malraux into the discussion, did I? I would of course be very happy to discuss his fascinating concept of metamorphosis but it relates primarily to art, which makes it rather off-topic here. And I can assure you it has nothing whatsoever to do with “anxiety limitation”.

Re Pascal, I am quite familiar with the Pensées and the notion of divertissement. Your proposition, however, that “good and evil” could be “looked at as different aspects of a ‘Pascalian entertainment’” strikes me as about as far from the spirit of the Pensées as one could get. Hence my “turning in his grave” remark.

DA

Hi Luc,
Using your numbering: 

1. Self- consciousness is not for me an object. It is a high level performance of a living entity (self-consciousness as object is understood as being the consciousness of onself as an object, not about positioning self-consciousness as an object).  

A mental performance can be analyzed, thought about, without being experienced in real time.
As a high level performance of a living entity, self-consciousnes can be described by simpler (better understandable) performances like meaningful representations. But intersubjectivity (key also in the evolutionary scenario) is not a simple performance we can just rely on and use as is. We cannot model it as we do for meaning generation. A lot is still to be done to understand intersubjectivity. Mirror neurons may be a  good entry point.  
So the starting point is analysis and usage of the perfromances of life. And the result could be self-consciousness. 

2. The proposed scenario is about self-consciousness resulting from an evolution of life, not of matter. The "matter-mind problem" is a tricky wording as it mplicitly adds a layer of complexity by bringing in the "matter-life problem". We do not know the nature of life. Adding an mysterious component makes the story more complicated.
The proposed scenario on self-consciousness addresses the "life-mind problem" (focusing on self-consciousness). Life is the starting point, not matter. A possible evolutionary scenario about a nature of life taking matter as a sartring point is another story. 

3.The proposed scenario is not about consciousness emerging so anxiety could be mastered.
Let me try to word it again (more details in http://philpapers.org/rec/MENPFA-3)  
The first step in the emergence of self- consciousness came from identification with conspecifics which also produced an increase in anxiety resulting from identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics. To limit that anxiety our ancetors have developed performances like imitation, caring, simulation,  communication, .... In addition to anxiety lilmitation, these performances have procured evolutionary advantages that have accelerated the evolutionary process. But these performances have also generated new anxieties that had to be limited, like anxiety of rejection from group. So overall an "evolutionary engine" was created which tightly interwoved  the evolutionary nature of self-consciousness with anxiety management. (Joseph Ledoux has been informed  of that approach). 

For me anxiety, pain, pleasure and emotions are indeed intimately connected with lived conscious experiences (phenomenal consciousness)
My focus is on self-consciousness. A lot has been written about the relations between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. I would like not to get too much in theses complex discussions as they do not interfere with the proposed evolutionary approach. 

Christophe

Hi Luc,
With your numbering:

1. Perhaps a problem from an ucorrect usage of words on my side.
What I mean is that self-consciousness is a performance of life. It is not an object like a stone or a computer.But self-consciousness can be thought about, can be investigated (it s coming up in evolution can be modeled) like a computer can be thought about and modeled.
Calling it an "object of investigation" has been a wrong usage of the word "object" from my side.

2. You address three items.
They are taken into account as follows in the scenario on self-consciousness:
a) Performance:  Self-consciousness is a performance that came up in the evolution of life, like vision or the capability to identify predators. That performance came in with significant evolutionary advantages (see previous posts)
b) Self: You have noted in the paper (http://philpapers.org/rec/MENPFA-3) that the concept of self is explicitly avoided at the beginning of the scenario. The evolutionary scenario begins at pre-human level where the concept of human self cannot apply. This is why I have introduced an "auto-representation" at pre-human level in order to avoid using "self-representation" which could have been misleading.
But of course the scenario is to address ultimately the build up of our human self. This will be part of a continuation (see 5) in paper).
c) Representation: Such concept is complex and difficult to define at human level. The proposed approach is an evolutionary one where a representation for an anilmal is basicaly meaningful relatively to "stay alive" constraints.  (the representation of a cat for a mouse carries the meaning "danger").
Meaningful representations as networks of meanings are introduced and defined in a book chapter (http://philpapers.org/rec/MENCOI).
Meaningful representations are difficult to characterize for humans because we lack a clear understanding about the constraints to which humans are submitted.
The evolutionary scenario introduces anxiety management related constraints which have driven and still drive the build up of meaningful representations in human minds. Anxiety management as a permanent constraint brought in a permanent generation of anxiety related meanings in the minds of our ancestors. All these anxiety related meanings have been driving forces in human evolution, marking profoundly the nature of human mind with its potential psychological sufferings.

3. It can look a bit suprizing to focus on self-consciusness without considering phenomenal consciousness (PC). But this is a deliberate choice in order to keep the scenario as simple as possible.
PC is part of animal life and is not a human specificity (animals have experiences and feelings). As my focus is on self-consciousness as a human specificity, PC can be put aside for a while in order to keep the scenario simple.
You are right to highlight that anxiety management (key part of the scenario) calls for "what it is like". But it is not mandatory to take it into account explicitly at that level. PC is to be addressed later through the connections it has with human self-consciousnes, like pre-reflexive self-consciousness (see 4.2 in paper).
Now, regarding the relations between PC and access consciousness, the evolutionary scenario is on self-consciousness and does need to take them into account.
I agree that this can be looked at as a flaw when using the Block concepts of consciousness. But I'm confident that more brilliant minds will solution these problems.
I'm an enginreer. Nobody is perfect  :)

4. Emergence is for me about the whole being more than the sum of the parts. Self-consciousnes is an emergence of life as life is an emergence of matter and as matter is an emergence of the big bang (the next step may be a bit more complex...).
I have not read the Galen Strawson's chapter you talked about.
Regarding an epiphenomenal status of self-consciousness, for me life has produced self-consciousness and self-consciousness can affect life and matter (taking free will as a mysterious reality). So with that wording self-consciousness is not for me an epiphenomena. 

Hi Tim

Thank you for your post and your cheering comments. My apologies for the delay in replying. I’ve been away for a while with limited access to the internet.

I’ve had a quick look at your paper and will have a closer read as soon as I get the chance. I’m not sure I’ll be able to do it justice because it’s outside my normal beat, so to speak, but I’ll see what eventuates. You’re quite right to suggest that I’m an outsider in this area. I’ve read various well-known things but I’m by no means a specialist. On the other hand, I wonder (as you also seem to suggest) if the views of outsiders might not sometimes be salutary in this area. I often feel that the philosophy of consciousness has become rather inward-looking and that it has locked itself rather prematurely into certain rather doctrinaire positions that are holding it back rather than helping it progress. The “something it is like” mantra (as I rather unflatteringly call it) is an example. An outsider can sometimes be useful in such cases – to argue that the emperor actually has no clothes. Though I must admit my attempts to point this out seem to have been singularly  unsuccessful; the consensus view among specialists on this question seems be that the emperor is fully and amply clothed.

I sympathize with your situation re criticism. As you say “Criticism is fine.  Silence from everyone is not.” Moreover, criticism can often help refine one’s own thinking or lead one to find better ways of expressing them. Silence is just frustrating. That’s one of the reasons I continue contributing to these threads. The criticisms are not always to the point of course, but c’est la vie.

 DA

Hi Bill

RE: “What leads you to believe that chimps and bonobos lack the ability to be conscious of themselves? Both pass the mirror test for self-recognition…”

But this simply begs the question of what the term “self” means and in what way, if at all, it might operate in the case of chimps and bonobos. We simply have no idea of what is happening in the brain (I won’t say “mind”) of a chimp or bonobo when it “passes” this “test”. We interpret the situation in human terms (though, as I say, the very notion “self” is far from clear to us anyway.) What entitles us to do that?

The remainder of your post is also, in my view, heavily dependent on highly questionable, anthropocentric assumptions.

DA

RE: “around six million years ago, our pre-human ancestors might have had such capacities that broadly resembled those of some modern apes" (Bednarik, 2003).

Seriously, Christophe, what is the use of a comment such as this? Which pre-human ancestors? We’re talking about an as yet undetermined number of pre-hominid lines developing over millions of years – for which much of the evidence is often fragmentary at best.  And “”might have had such capacities”. Might have?  If we're merely conjecturing, "might not have had" would be just as appropriate, don't you think? And then: “that broadly resembled those of some modern apes” Which apes?  In what respect? etc, etc.etc. .

And then to solemnly add “(Bednarik, 2003)” as if you were quoting some clear, reliable piece of evidence is, if you'll forgive me, just silly.

DA

Hi Tim

Very encouraging to hear from someone who shares some of my concerns about current discussions of consciousness.  Regrettably, I’m somewhat hampered in this field by not having read enough of the literature - partly because it’s not my main area of interest and partly because, quite honestly, much of what I’ve read strikes me as question-begging and superficial. On the other hand, the topic itself is, in my view, of huge importance because it seems to relate so closely to the question: “What is it to be human?’’  I think it’s the contrast between the importance of that question and the triviality (as I see it) of so many of the current “explanations” of consciousness that I find so disappointing – and often irritating.

The claim that consciousness “evolved”, for example, seems to me to border on the vacuous. First, our conceptions of what human consciousness is are foggy at best; second, what characteristic of homo sapiens is not the result of evolution?

But I’d go even further. If we assume that evolutionary developments usually promote the survival and flourishing of a species, does human consciousness really fit this mould?  The usual answer is: “Yes, of course it does! It helped homo sapiens hunt, cooperate, etc. And look how successful we became! We rule the planet!” etc. etc.

But questions are begged. Were homo sapiens’ precursors such bad hunters? Homo erectus seems to have been no slouch judging by the fossil record. And can we legitimately connect the distant consequences that led to our “mastery of the planet” (science etc) with the normal evolutionary process? Moreover, one might well argue that many of the consequences of human consciousness have been very destructive, and far from ensuring our survival, may eventually wipe us out.

I even think it is perfectly possible (this is rank heresy!) that human consciousness was a sheer accident – that it was made possible by previous evolutionary changes in the brain of our hominid line but that the thing itself (whatever that thing is) was a perfectly spontaneous, “gratuitous” development, quite unconnected with evolutionary processes - with consequences as indefinite and unforeseeable then as they are now.

This of course is all speculation. But so, to my mind, is a very large amount of what is currently being written on this topic.

Sorry to be so long-winded. I’ll stop there.

 DA

Hi Mark

I read a little Teilhard  a long time ago – so long he’s only a dim memory.

In principle, I’m not opposed to the introduction of a “poetic” element into accounts of the emergence of human consciousness. Indeed, one of the (many) criticisms I would have of accounts by “analytic” philosophers is that, whether “physicalists” or not, they constantly seek to reduce this mysterious, perhaps even semi-miraculous, event to just another evolutionary change and try to explain it through dry-as-dust arguments and simplistic formulae (e.g. the infamous “something it is like”).

Nevertheless, judging by this extract, I think I would have a few problems with Teilhard’s approach. I suspect poetry may be playing too large a role here. Maybe I'm wrong.

DA