Hi Tami

RE: “The universe is believed to be at least ten billion light years in diameter.”

But we all wonder - don’t we? – what is outside “the universe”. Someone says: nothing. But how much further does “nothing” stretch? And if it ends, what’s outside that? It boggles the mind – well, my mind anyway – and most of us, I think, just put it in the too-hard basket.

I’m told physicists can explain it all by notions of space-time, the "multiverse", etc. Not being a physicist, I’m unlikely to understand their explanations. And even if I did, I suspect I would still have my doubts… 

Some philosophers would probably tell me that my inability to understand is simply due to the limitations of human understanding. Perhaps. But how do they know that, since presumably they have the same limitations?

Moral: Don’t spend too spend much time gazing into the starry sky.

DA 

Hi Daniel

I wasn’t going to comment on your post at all until I read it through and found that I had received honourable mention.

I should just correct one or two points for the benefit of others on the thread. 

I don’t in fact think that “whether space or the universe is finite or infinite… should not be discussed”. There are probably very few things I think should not be discussed and this is certainly not among them. My point was simply that, as I said, the question “boggles the mind” – not an original thought by any means of course, and the great Pascal, as I'm sure you know, said it much more eloquently. My last line about not spending too much time gazing at the stars was – as I hope was obvious – meant ironically.

RE: “He is yet another proud non-philosopher who likes to tell us repeatedly that we should just shut up talking about things we can never know.”

Not quite how I see myself. I do think it is unwise to assume one knows things that one in fact doesn’t, and I suspect I annoy people at times (you among them perhaps) by pointing out that a given assertion is in reality open to doubt. But that is surely within the bounds of legitimate philosophical discussion. Socrates certainly seem to have thought so. (Though lest I be accused of hubris among my many other faults, let me hasten to add that I’m in no sense comparing myself to Socrates.) None of that is intended to suggest that people should “shut up”. Quite the reverse in fact. I enjoy honest and open discussion and always hope that my comments will help it continue.

I should perhaps add that I certainly wasn’t trying to discourage Tami from pursuing her line of thought. I was simply pointing out that the notion that the universe is a certain finite distance in diameter poses problems – which it obviously does.  

DA

Good morning Daniel

RE: It's good to know to consider this to be a topic that should be discussed, even though you think "most of us ...  just put it in the too-hard basket ". I assumed you meant to include yourself in that group but forgive me if I was wrong. 

I do include myself. Most certainly. In fact, there are lots of things I put in the too-hard basket. (I’ll spare you a list.) Which doesn’t mean that I don’t think about them from time to time or that I think they should never be discussed. It’s simply a way of saying that certain questions seem to defeat us – me anyway. How can space be infinite? we think. It must end somewhere. But how could it? What would be “outside” the end. So finally the mind (my mind anyway) turns to something else it thinks it might be able to deal with more successfully. I suspect lots of people have this experience. (And you yourself say: “I agree with you, though, that the notion of a spatially finite universe is problematic, if not mind-boggling.”)

RE: "What Maria/Tami wrote was "The universe is believed to be at least ten billion light years in diameter" [my emphasis]"

Yes, that’s what I quoted. But it was not the size of the diameter I was thinking about. It was the fact that it could have any diameter at all.

I might add that I often have a similar problem when I hear scientists talking about the “big bang”. They sometimes give the impression that once they’ve sorted that problem out completely, the whole kit and kaboodle of existence will be sorted. But what came before the big bang, we ask? There’s no “before” they will answer, because there was no time. But what does that mean? We can’t imagine – and can they? – a condition in which there was nothing and no time. So once again, the mind boggles…

RE: “I would include assuming that one knows a philosophical topic is useless or "too hard", when one doesn't, is equally misguided.”.

Not “useless”. I don’t think I used that term, did I? In fact, it may well be very useful to think about these “too-hard basket” questions now and then. Perhaps they are a reminder of the “human condition”. In fact, we would be a bit surprised – wouldn’t we? – if someone said to us that they had never thought about the (alleged) endlessness of space.

DA

Hi Maria

RE: “I believe that the "unknowable" can be known through logic (and theory, mathematics and empirical data) but perhaps I am wrong.”

And perhaps you are right. I think many scientists would share your opinion. Personally I’m rather sceptical. There are many things that seem to be beyond the grasp of science, and I wonder if, in the end, this might not be another one.  

DA 

Hi Daniel

RE: “Once life begins on a planet, it will reproduce itself in any way it can’”

This is not really a counter-argument. If God is omniscient (usually said to be one of his attributes), he would know in advance what path evolution would take. So there is no logical inconsistency here for a believer in such a God.

RE: “It [evolution] is not a hard theory to understand and it requires no theology for it to make sense.”

True, but if one assumes an omniscient God, there is no contradiction either. (One might say that he would need to be a very patient God, waiting all those billions of years for humankind (made in his image etc) to evolve. But the religious person might simply reply that to God time is as nothing etc. After all, he is said to inhabit an eternal realm).

DA

HI Daniel

RE: “I'm just saying, if you believe evolutionary theory is true you cannot also meaningfully believe in a Creator God or Intelligent Designer as the best explanation that accounts for the world that beings like us know, You have the freedom to believe it, but it would be pointless as part of the explanation provided by the way natural selection works to originate new and sustain old species…. Evolution is a sufficient explanation, in that you don't need anything else in order for it to do its explanatory work,..”

Yes, I agree that a Creator God or Intelligent Designer would add nothing to the explanation of how natural selection works. But when you say “Evolution is a sufficient explanation, in that you don't need anything else in order for it to do its explanatory work”, the question arises: what is the “explanatory work” in question, exactly? If, for example, it involved the emergence of human consciousness, one might well object, depending on one’s thinking about what human consciousness might be, that it is not a sufficient explanation. And if one were a religious person (as you know I am not) and believed in a religious conception of man (soul etc), then again one could well object that it is not a sufficient explanation.

I am not trying to be difficult here. But depending on one’s point of view about what “man” is (man in the sense of humankind rather than homo sapiens) one might well want to argue that natural selection is not (to quote you) “the best explanation that accounts for the world that beings like us know”.

DA 

RE: I was talking about the origin of species, particularly the origin of our own species,  I was not including consciousness in the conversation,…

But the question is: can one talk about homo sapiens sapiens without including consciousness? What would such a creature be? Can we even conceive of it?

DA

Hi Tami

I’m not sure I follow your train of thought entirely. But if you are saying that evolutionary theory falls a long way short of providing an adequate explanation of human behaviour, I would agree with you.  

Some people try to explain altruistic acts by claiming that this somehow assures the “overall” survival of the species. (Dawkins argues this, I think - I have never taken the trouble to read him.) Perhaps it does – who knows? – but I’m sure that would be the last thing in the mind of someone who gives up their life for another. People sacrifice their lives for love, for their comrades in battle, and perhaps for their ideals. I can’t recall any who gave up their lives for the continuation of the species.

I’m not suggesting that Darwinian theory is wrong – and I don’t think you are either. But when it comes to human motivations and human behaviour, Darwin tells us very little in my view (as perhaps he would have agreed).

DA

It all boils down to reductionism, doesn't it? LOL.

So let's talk about the parts and the wholes with which they are coincident. The part-whole relationship is not well-understood in the literature, and so the debate between reductionists and anti-reductionists (of whatever ilk you choose) is also misinformed. "Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts?" becomes the crucial question, as if it posed a true dichotomy, and not a false one, as I would argue. It's a false dichotomy because the word "sum" gets a weasel-word usage here. The sum of my 4 quarters is a whole dollar. The sum of my 16 ounces of coffee is a whole pound of coffee. No more; no less. But what makes me a whole person is not the sum of any finite number of distinct quantities that add up to me, DCD. The weight of my parts add up to the weight of my whole body, to be sure. But how heavy is my charming personality, my musical talent or my stunning good looks? Or my self-effacing sense of humor?

Addition is a precise and rigorously reliable mathematical process that sums up the quantity of things we have of a particular kind of thing (or all things). So, the sum of the parts in the whole assumes that all the parts are fully quantifiable to start with AND that, in some DIFFERENT sense, the whole is also quantifiable, such that we could compare the 2 quantities and calculate the difference or equivalence of the 2. I think it is only way in which we could ever answer the question "Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts?" OR, "Can we reduce the whole to the sum of its parts?"

What, is often left out of this attempt to debate is the fact that it isn't numerical quantities alone that determine the wholeness of a composite thing. Remember that everything, even the "fundamental" particles of the Standard Model, is a composite object. It has parts that comprise whatever it is as a whole.

But the parts are not just numbers or size. They are also shapes. Shapes don't add up numerically; they organize themselves geometrically or spatially. Thus, it isn't just the numerical value of the parts that gets summed up; the parts also align spatially, according to the laws of geometry, according to how the shapes of its different parts coincide with parts of space. Of course, it's not just shapes but, when you add in motion, you get properties like velocity and angular momentum that all have to "add up" in our predictions of how it will move and be moved.

So, it's a bad question. Better to ask is there a difference between the whole and the structure of its parts? And the answer is, No, because the whole is identical to the specific structure of its parts; not different in any way. An obvious example would be the parts of a watch, each in its own drawer on the watchmaker's bench vs. a ticking watch assembled from them. Since the weight of the configured pieces is equal to the weight of the parts separately, it promotes the label of "reductionism". But then, culturally, the literature wants to label as "reductionistic" someone who recognizes that the whole can be numerically equal to many different configurations of its separate parts.

So maybe, whatever it was about my reductionistic insolence that got your censorship-level dander up, might be reduced to this weasel-word “sum” and the ambiguity of darkness its vague meaning spread over a now-enlightened word-scape. Or maybe not. But I try. Hope those censoring moderators allow our seditious communications to pass along uninterrupted very soon.

DCD  

Hi Tami

RE:  Altruism literature relies heavily on the multiple examples in life of hero behavior, where people jump without hesitation into a raging river to save a stranger, disregarding the imminent threat to their own survival.

Yes, I forgot those examples. Like the person who races into the surf to save someone (he doesn’t know) from a shark. But even there I think it’s odd to say that the motivation is continuation of the species. To start with, both people might die, which doesn’t do a lot for the species. Second, I think that in real life the motivation has a lot more to do with a sense that to do anything else would be a kind of unforgivable cowardice (and of course there are some who don’t jump into the raging river or the surf, so not everyone is a hero).

Doubtless the Dawkinses of this world would simply reply that the impulse to jump in and try to help in such cases has been “programmed” into us by evolution which favoured altruistic conduct etc. So whatever we might think our motivation is, that’s the real one. But where does that logic stop? If we are “programmed” here, why not in everything else too? Which would, of course, mean the cowardly and wicked things we do as well as the heroic and altruistic ones. (Sade would have found that conclusion attractive!)

In short, thinking of this kind leads ultimately to a nullification of human psychology: people are essentially robots driven by forces outside their control. The “inner life” is just smoke and mirrors. A very cold, de-humanising doctrine in the end.  Applied to human experience science usually ends up there. 

DA 

Hi Daniel

RE: That's why, when we interview the heroes, they usually say they were just doing their jobs. Which they were. We are just being good citizens or parents, soldiers, etc. 

I don’t know. Lots of soldiers just do their jobs and don’t win Victoria Crosses. I don’t think we can dismiss genuinely heroism or self-sacrifice so easily.  If we can, why not dismiss craven cowardice, heartlessness or plain cruelty as people who just don’t “do their jobs”? This is a not a bad example of how science, when applied to human behaviour, tends to dehumanise it. It is inherently ill-equipped to understand human emotions and human values so it just rides roughshod over them.

RE: Darwin's point is that species are selected when the individual animal's pursuit of their own various interests ALSO does, at the same time, the work of supporting the reproduction of the species as a whole. 

The principle may be OK when applied to animals. Not so good for humans. One of the major problems facing us now is, precisely, reproduction...

DA

Hi Tami

RE: "As I told my priest, "Father, I've never actually died naturally, but been 'deaded' a lot" --  if that makes any sense at all.  "

I admit I am struggling with that idea... 

RE: "to figure out as best you can as a loving individual, what the f*** is going on."

Alas! I can report no progress on that front. I really have no idea what's going on.  

Daniel, I fear, has concluded that I am a dyed-in-the-wool sceptic (we are old sparring partners) but I don't think I am really. I see no point in being a sceptic just for the sake of it. I think that would just be a silly intellectual pose. But alas! where “the fundamentals” (for lack of a better word) are concerned, I’ve never been able to discover "what's going on".  Of course, I know I'm not Robinson Crusoe in that respect. An author I greatly admire describes us as the first civilization that “is aware that it does not understand man’s significance”. He doesn't mean that there may not be individuals here and there who are exceptions but that, as a whole, today’s world has been obliged to fall back on agnosticism – and is aware it has done so.

 DA 

Hi Daniel

RE: “Derek is a knee-jerk skeptic, despite his denials. etc..." 

Believe it or not, Daniel, I do believe in some things. I believe in the possibility of truth – not a belief to be sneezed at in this day and age, after all, when it is almost de rigueur in many circles to “deconstruct” anything that moves.

But I also think that anything approaching truth is usually very hard won, and I guess what annoys me most about a lot of contemporary philosophy (this is not a shot at you) is that so many facile, trivial – and often downright juvenile – ideas get taken for rolled-gold verities.

My irritation gauge goes into the red zone when the subject in question is one I regard as important. Hence, for instance, my very negative reactions when the philosophy of consciousness starts taking about “zombies”, “something it is like”, "panpsychism", etc. Can there be a subject in philosophy more important to us than the nature of human consciousness? After all it’s a question about the very nature of our being – both for good and for evil: we’re talking about the same human consciousness that can perform acts of genuine self-sacrifice but also put people in extermination camps. Yet multitudes of (analytic) philosophers can manage nothing better than to frame the issue in terms of fantasy Hollywood zombies etc. I think that’s pitiful. More than that, it’s downright irresponsible because, in effect, it’s an abdication of a philosopher’s basic responsibility to deal seriously with topics of serious human concern.  

Now that's DA speaking from the heart. Does it really sound like someone who’s only “a knee-jerk skeptic”?

DA

You’re a hard man to please, Daniel!

Yes, I know you are a Nagel man but I truly wasn’t taking a shot at you in particular. There are hordes of analytic philosophers out there who are dyed-in-the-wool followers of the Nagel mantra and it was those poor benighted souls I had in mind. Besides, I think I’m right in saying you’re not a disciple of the other crack-brained ideas I mentioned. You’re not a panpsycho – I mean “ist” – for example, if my memory serves.

On the question of claims I defend, well, modesty sort of forbids, but really you only have to read the books and articles I’ve written. There’s not a word in all of that I wouldn’t defend to the death (so to speak). But alas! those topics rarely come up on Philpapers – principally, I think, because most analytic philosophers regard art and literature as topics of zero importance (they would rather talk about Hollywood “zombies” and brains in vats…). I have made two or three efforts to start relevant topics but they fizzled fairly quickly.

But in any case, one doesn’t always need to have a fully formed opinion on an issue to be able to recognise a nonsense argument when one sees it. So although I’m not able to give a satisfactory answer to the question: ‘What is the nature of human consciousness?" (and who can?), I can tell a mile off that the Nagel mantra, for example, is pure, unadorned nonsense.

DA 

RE: “I've read your arguments about art criticism before…”

With an occasional exception (eg my recent article on “Crime and Punishment”), they’re not arguments about art criticism, Daniel. They’re arguments about the general nature of art and its human importance. And, apart from my critiques of arguments I disagree with (e.g. claiming that art is about “aesthetic pleasure”, beauty, etc), I am most certainly not a “dissolver”.

But I do try to dissolve silly arguments about important subjects like human consciousness. (“zombies”, the Nagel mantra, panpsychism etc). And in case you think, I’m beating a dead horse here, a quick read around in contemporary books and articles will show you that these nonsense ideas are still treated very seriously by many philosophers. I do my best to winkle them out and encourage them to defend their positions. But alas, they seldom seem keen to enter the lists…

DA

PS What is "BS"?

Hi Daniel

Yes, the penny dropped on “BS” after I had sent the post.

RE: “You tend to deem something to be silly or nonsense, offer some biting ridicule but no alternative views and walk away feeling yourself the victor.”

Not at all. I have often set out my arguments against the Nagel nonsense, “zombies” etc in some detail. Problem is getting anyone to read them attentively and argue the issue through to its conclusion. I came close to that with one contributor on another list a while back but then he inexplicably dropped out.

But you’re right. I do indulge in the odd bit of ridicule now and then. It’s hard to resist: the Nagel mantra, “zombies” etc lend themselves to it so easily.  And then I sometimes hope that a mild dose of ridicule might spur some advocate of these silly – yet widely held – ideas to leap to their defence. 

RE: “So what is art and what is its importance to humanity?”

Excellent question but not one I’m going to try to answer in a few words on Philpapers. It’s all there on my website, but, as you know, I don’t believe in referring Philpapers readers to external sources – I like to keep discussions to arguments outlined on the list – so I’m not expecting you to read my books and articles. Suffice it to say that, contrary to what you suggest, these are arguments I would defend tooth and nail.

DA

Hi DCD

RE: “Your arguments in the consciousness debate are nothing but wry jabs and insults.”

Not so. Just as one example have a look at my comments on the Nagel nonsense of 2016-05-10 on the thread Human consciousness and evolution. The discussion went on a bit further as you’ll see but my interlocutor dropped out unfortunately, just as we were getting to the crux of the matter.

This was detailed philosophical argumentation and I have sometimes found to my surprise that philosophers get uncomfortable when obliged to follow the consequences of an argument through to its full conclusions. I found the same thing when trying to get people to think through the “zombie” argument. It’s as if some philosophers would do anything rather than let go of pet ideas.

I think it was Albert Camus who said (something like): "It’s not hard to be logical, but it can be hard to be logical to the bitter end."  But, after all, if philosophers can’t do that, who can?  That's what they're supposed to be good at. 

DA

Hi Daniel

RE: I looked at your post. Oh God does that bring back bad memories! You said exactly the same things to poor Anton, over and over again, that made me stop talking to you.

Actually no. I only had this one conversation with him on this issue, as I recall. He in fact came the closest of anyone to addressing the issues I had carefully explained. I honestly thought he was going to follow them through to the conclusion. But then he dropped out. Pity. (I seem to recall by the way that "poor Anton" as you call him had very little time for your arguments.)

RE: “Anton gets it. I get it. Nagel and many non-analytic philosophers get it…”

I won’t ask you what it is you “get”. Actually I’ve been told that kind of thing a number of times by disciples of the Nagel mantra who seem unwilling or unable to examine the proposition carefully, as a conscientious philosopher should. One just has to “get it”. What admirable philosophical method! Let’s forget about careful analysis. Let’s just kind of emote and “intuit” until we all “get it”. And to think this is happening with so-called “analytic” philosophy! It's a joke.

DA

Hi Daniel

RE: “I have shown any reasonable person what is meant by the phrase "what is it like to be X", in a non-comparative sense.”

You have “shown” nothing. You simply told me I needed to “get” it. Others, you said, had "got" it. So I should "get" it too?

But your comment here is interesting. You apparently agree that “like” in the Nagel mantra is not being used comparatively. (Which is just as well (a) because it would make a nonsense of the proposition and (b) Nagel himself ruled it out.)

Now the only other possible meaning of the English word “like” in the context is the meaning it has in phrases such as “I feel like a cup of tea”. Is that what you think “like” means here? (Warning: this is a trap question. This meaning of like also makes a nonsense of the Nagel proposition. And as I say there is no other possible meaning in the context. Game over.)

Elementary reasoning really, isn’t it? Well within the reach of any analytic philosopher worth his salt. Peter Hacker made pretty much the same argument quite a while ago. But analytic philosophers in general continue to cling on the Nagel mantra like Linus with his blanket. They rely on it again and again in their arguments about consciousness not only as if it made sense, but as if said something of fundamental importance about the nature of human consciousness! As I say, a joke. 

DA

RE: I qualified my assertion by saying any "reasonable" person would admit to understanding my illustration of how to use that phrase in a meaningful way. I still can't imagine what it would be like to be so thick or even to act that way. But I know for sure, it must be like something. 

I think I see where your problem is, DCD, and it’s quite a reasonable one to have, you’ll be glad to know. You’re saying to yourself: The Nagel mantra seems to make sense, why is Allan saying it’s vacuous? (You’re not putting it quite so politely but I’m happy to overlook that.)

I asked myself the very same question when I first analysed it. The answer, I realised, is this: The feeling that it makes sense is a consequence of the peculiar syntax. Remember, it reads like this: “There is something it is like to be conscious.” (That’s the standard, accepted formulation – which, by the way, clearly puts a lot of weight on the word “like”.)

Now, if you rephrase that, and put it into more natural English, you get (using both possible meanings of like, even though Nagel ruled the first one out):

(a)   “Being conscious is like something.”

 OR

(b)   “Being conscious is feeling like doing (having, etc ) something.

(Remember: these are the only two possible meanings of the English word “like” in the context. You have not disagreed with that, and I really don’t see how anyone could.)

Now, once we’ve done that, we see straight off that the proposition is nonsensical. In the first case, one immediately wants to ask: “Really? So, what is it like?” To which, of course, there is no sensible answer. (What could one say? It’s like swimming? Eating? Jumping?)

And in the second, similarly, one wants to ask: “Really? What does it feel like doing?” To which, again, there is no sensible answer. (It feels like wanting a holiday? It feels like needing a cup of tea?)

But when the proposition is phrased in the usual, unnatural way (“There is something it is like to be conscious”) the effect is to make the meaning of “like” ambiguous by encompassing both meanings, without the reader necessarily being aware of it. One is not therefore prompted to ask the perfectly reasonable questions (those above) one want to ask when it’s expressed in normal English. Thus, many people – yourself included, apparently – have allowed themselves to be confused and have concluded that the proposition is saying something deep and meaningful about the nature of consciousness, when in fact it is just a nonsense.

I don’t claim, by the way, that this analysis is especially demanding. It just calls for a bit of concentration and a normal level of sensitivity to the meaning of English words. Which is why I’m often so puzzled that so many philosophers who calls themselves “analytic” haven’t been able to do it long ago. It's the kind of thing that should be bread and butter to them.

(I suspect, though, that because so many of them have invested a lot of philosophical capital in the Nagel mantra, they would be very reluctant to abandon it anyway...)

DA

Hi DCD 

RE: “I don't disagree that the syntax of “Being conscious is like something.” is troubling and peculiar. “

But it’s not even that (which, by the way, would bring the comparison idea directly into play – which Nagel ruled out). The hallowed formula, used standardly by all philosophers in the field, is “There is something it is like to be conscious”. It’s derived from the Nagel article wording (and he’s the “authority” in this context, regularly quoted as such).

So, yes, the syntax is very odd, but it is precisely because of that that the word “like” takes on the deceptive ambiguity I described.   

RE:  I say it is like something to be the animal that is conscious.”

But this is the like of comparison - which Nagel ruled out. But let’s assume we ignore Nagel and rule it in, what then? If someone says what does an X (mango etc) taste like, we might answer, well, it’s like a blend of Y and Z. But what is it like to be (the animal that is) conscious? What can we compare it to?  There is no Y and Z this time – no phenomenon or experience “like” consciousness. Everything we know, feel etc is through consciousness, so there is nothing outside it we could refer to.  So the like of comparison just doesn’t work here. 

Re: “But it's not a syntax problem, for sure. Indeed, if it were simply a linguistic problem, it would be one more of semantics than syntax, wouldn't you say? “

I’m not suggesting it’s a problem of syntax. I’m saying that the odd syntax is responsible for the treacherous ambiguity of the term “like” in this context – an ambiguity that sets the trap into which so many philosophers have obligingly fallen. (I am not the first to notice this by the way. I seem to recall Hacker drew attention to it. Someone I read did anyway.)

DA

RE: “he has accomplished his usual feat, which is to kill off any meaningful dialogue that was trying to occur prior to his intervention.”

You’re free to carry on any dialogue you like, Daniel.  I can hardly prevent it even if I wanted to – which of course I don’t.

DA