I don't think the Will to Power can be dismissed as a footnote in Nietzsche's thought. Not unless we dismiss
Beyond Good and Evil and
Zarathustra, as well.
In
section 36 of Beyond Good and Evil (pp.70-73), Nietzsche claims that his thesis--presumably the thesis of the entire book--is that "our entire instinctive life" is "the development and ramification of one fundamental form of will--namely the Will To Power." The idea, I gather, is that passions/desires may be regarded as the only given, the only real. Appealing to Ockam's Razor, he stipulates that the world may be nothing but the expressions and ramifications of desires and passions. He is explicitly rejecting idealism, though--for he does not claim that these are peculiarly mental, as opposed to material, phenomena. He claims instead that the forces of nature are not the expressions of
human desires and passions, but rather that nature itself is a world of passions and desires--just of a more primitive sort. Ultimately, will to power is manifest in bodily interaction, and not merely the
product of human valuation--though it is that, too.
It is also worth noting that one of the main aims of
Beyond Good and Evil is to challenge the view that there is a primary "will to truth." Instead, he claims that the very notion of truth, or a drive to discover the truth, is the result of more primitive drives. The thesis, then, is that intellect and reason are wills--or drives/forces--which are but expressions of another drive/force, and that is the will to power. But that is not to say that people who want truth really just want power. It is rather to say that people can want truth, because truth is an expression of power.
Is this a metaphysical argument? Partly so, since Nietzsche is referring to "kinds of causality" and the logic of our discourse about them. However, his arguments also seem at least partly psychological; he is trying to locate the source of human values in physiology and nature. (Later in the book he says "the philosophers of the future" will be psychologists, doesn't he?) There is thus a strong connection between the notion of Will to Power and the issue of human values.
As for nihilism and the rejection of absolute perspectives and Truth: The Will to Power is tied to Nietzsche's perspectivalism, for any truth is the expression of the will to power, and not a pure, unadulterated will to truth. Yet, the Will to Power itself is the "intelligible character" of the world as seen from within, as it is in itself. So that must be an absolute Truth and perspective. Our personal or intellectual "truths" and perspectives are of another sort--ramifications of the most primitive force of nature--but nonetheless real and vital. They are who we are, and we can either embrace that or try to deny/suppress our own drives. Turning to
section 56 of the same book (pp. 100-101),
I think Nietzsche found nihilism self-refuting. I would
put it this way: if nothing matters, then it does not matter that
nothing matters. Nihilism cannot be maintained, but leads us to
discover ourselves and the world anew as active expressions of
power. It leads us--if we are willing to travel--to investigate the
sources and ramifications of our values, to find what matters in our
desires and passions. (To add my own two cents, Nihilism
can be maintained, but only as a way of avoiding inquiry. Nihilism disappears as soon as inquiry begins in earnest.)
I hope the above is of some interest. I find these ideas stimulating, though the metaphysical aspect turns me off a little. I spent a good deal of time with Nietzsche from high school to grad school, but that was a long time ago and I no longer feel any intellectual commitment to him.
Regards,
Jason
Feb. 27, 2010