Hi Derek,
Thanks for your posting. I have defined what I mean by a HOT in the essay posted at the top of this thread in connection with Las Meninas.
Generally, higher-order representation (HOR) theories of consciousness maintain that a mental state M is conscious by virtue of the fact that it is the target of another mental state M*. Higher-order thought (HOT) theories represent M* as an actual, occurent thought. Different versions of HOR theory arise because there are varying disagreements not only over the contents of M* but also concerning the relationship between M and M*. Higher-order perception (HOP) theories maintain that M* should be construed as a kind of perception linked to sensations. There are theories that depict M and M* as less distinct, making them intrinsic to larger mental contexts. This may be seen with the wider intrinsicality view (WIV) and in higher-order global states (HOGS). Thus, in the literature concerning HOR theory, there are various metaphors and images referencing spatial categories and structures that are used to clarify the relations and boundaries between these mental states. The essay I refer to above is an attempt to provide a theoretical construct—the frame-in-a-frame—which allows us to rethink this fundamental intrinsicality/extrinsicality dualism by appealing to conceptions of space and representation found in art.
A framed picture contains within it a framed picture. The internal frame is both internal in relation to the outer frame and external in the sense that it, too, has contents. This more flexible and multivalent concept of space allows us to appreciate that some objects possess properties that appear to contradict each other. The picture-in-a-picture is both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, both nested and nesting. Significantly, this superpositionality makes it possible to understand what it is like to be ‘in’ or outside a mental state. There are various theories in the philosophy of mind that try to explain whether having a thought about being in a mental state actually involves having two mental states: being in a lower-order thought and knowing you are in a higher-order thought, which is ‘about’ the lower order thought. These are intrinsicality or extrinsicality arguments; the former attempts to show that higher-order thought is part of the lower order thought it makes conscious (part of a broader mental event), while the latter argues that these are distinct mental states that accompany each other in order to produce aspects of consciousness.
In Velazquez's famous painting Las Meninas, we see a number of framed areas, including a mirror and a doorway which 'interrupt' our flow of perceptions and make us conscious of our own looking, a lot of this 'stepping outside' of the narrative flow, which I would associate with lower order perceptions ('it's a door, a man, a mirror etc'). We become aware of how the painting is constructed as we might become aware of another person's thoughts or our own thoughts, this kind of awareness is what I would associate with having a number of higher order thoughts. We are engaged in many kinds of HOTs or sometimes we swtch to lower order thoughts while visually examining the painting, and while one would could argue that Velasquez's HOTs were responsiblie for the complex visual composition which allows us to weave in and out of these thoughts, one would not exactly say thatthe HOTs are IN the painting, would we? And yet, they are visual notations which allow us to become aware of our looking and our perceptions of things in the same way that words on a page can make us think about what we are reading.
There are lots of framing devices in Buddhist art and I have analysed a prominent example in my 'Framing Consciousness in Art: Transcultural Perspectives' (New York and Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, 2009), where I also look at framing devices in South Pacific art, Yoruban art, Islamic art, Japanese art, film, and sculpture. I didn't manage to do prehistoric art, I'm afraid, and I understand what you are getting at. I don't know whether our ancestors had HOTs (thoughts about thoughts, or concepts about how perceptions work); they probably did. Whether they were able to engage them while painting on walls is an interesting question. They probably did, but used a series of different visual structures (obviously not frames in frames) but it is interesting to see how they used the stone 'background' as a part of the representation. The animal or human depicted as an outline is a kind of frame in which one can 'see' the object depicted AND the stone 'inside' the outline (the binocular rivalry between seeing in/seeing as may also be charactherised as hovering betweeh lower order and higher order thought). I hope this answers some of your questions. And thank you again for taking an interest.
Greg