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I really cannot see how it is possible to carry on a philosophical discussion about zombies. David Chalmers writes that “A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience.” 

Now unless we know what “conscious experience” is – and so far there's a conspicuous absence of agreement on this – the idea of a zombie is null and void isn’t it?  One cannot subtract an unknown.

DA

Hi Cecilea

Thank you for your reply.

I certainly recognise that, as you say, discussions about zombies do occur. But discussions occur about all manner of things real and unreal, so that in itself can’t be a reason why it is philosophically sensible to carry on philosophical discussions about zombies. Frankly, philosophers talking about zombies strikes me as the equivalent of the characters in the Big Bang Theory arguing about what superman could or couldn’t do. In both cases Hollywood fantasies are being taken seriously. Though at least Sheldon and his crew have the excuse of being Hollywood fantasies themselves.

I’m not quite sure what you mean by “your interpretation of Chalmers' reliance on zombies”. I wasn’t interpreting Chalmers. That was a direct quote.  I think you are right in saying that “zombies are thought experiments that are supposed to incite our intuitions regarding what consciousness is.” But there are two problems here:

First, the term “experiment” is misleading. How does one “experiment” with a Hollywood fantasy?

Second, as I indicated, the idea of a zombie – such as it is – is defined as a human being minus consciousness.  If the idea of consciousness is necessary to define a zombie, how could we use the idea of a zombie to help us define consciousness?

I don’t know whether the story about medieval philosophers debating how many angels could pass through the eye of a needle is apocryphal or not. But philosophical speculation about zombies strikes me as the modern-day equivalent. (Though the Middle Ages could perhaps be excused. They really did believe in angels...)

DA  

Hi Cecilea

Well, it is possible to have a discussion about anything – even, say, whether the moon is made of green cheese. 

So when I said “I cannot see how it is possible to carry on a philosophical discussion about zombies” I meant a philosophically sensible discussion – a discussion that is likely to be of some intellectual use.

I do not think philosophical discussion of zombies can be of any conceivable intellectual use – unless perhaps one happens to be talking about the nature of fantasy (and there are probably richer examples of fantasy than zombies).

But more to the point, how does one get around the basic problem that since a zombie is defined as a human being lacking consciousness, one needs to know what one means by consciousness to start with?  How, as I said, does one subtract an unknown?

DA

Hi Jim

Re zombies you say: “…zombies, as defined in philosophy,…”

I was wondering what you had in mind. David Chalmers, who I gather is one of the main proponents, writes: “…A zombie is physically identical to a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience. Zombies look and behave like the conscious beings that we know and love, but "all is dark inside." There is nothing it is like to be a zombie.”

There seem to be three elements here:

(1)   Zombies are physically the same as a human being but lack consciousness. This is clearly of no use to us unless we know what “consciousness” signifies. (As I’ve said one can’t subtract an unknown.)

(2)   “All is dark inside”. I pointed out to David that this is just a vague metaphor, to which he replied “’All is dark inside’ is indeed just a vague metaphor.  It doesn't play any role in the arguments.” So I take it we can forget this bit.

(3)   “There is nothing it is like to be a zombie”. I assume this is an appeal to the Nagel argument (on which Fiona also seems to rely). I would have thought Nagel has worn pretty thin now, especially since the demolition job Hacker did on him (somewhat belatedly, I think – he was a sitting duck.)

So this doesn’t seem to leave us with anything at all. What did you yourself have in mind for “zombies, as defined in philosophy”?

DA

The term “phenomenal” gets used a lot in the philosophy of consciousness but always very questionably. Clear definitions are extremely rare and one often has the uneasy feeling that the term is being used simply to avoid using the word “conscious” – to dance around the issue, as it were. (A fairly common feature of the philosophy of consciousness in general is heavy reliance on ill-defined jargon. Terms like “functional states”, “qualia”, “perceptual experience”, etc abound, and, again, clear definitions are rare.)

Anyway, I notice Fiona defines “phenomenal” as follows: “‘phenomenal character’ refers to that aspect of mental states, paradigmatically had by perceptual experiences, sensations, moods and emotions, which is to be identified with “what it is like” to be in such states, to use Nagel’s (1974) well-worn phrase.”

Phrases like “perceptual experiences, sensations, moods and emotions” are obviously highly question-begging in any discussion of consciousness. Can one even have “perceptual experiences” etc without being conscious in the first place? Vicious circle. So that part of the definition doesn’t help us at all.

That just leaves us with the Nagel thing – a very slender thread indeed to hang a definition on. Fiona says the Nagel phrase is “well-worn”. I would say: well and truly “worn out”.  Personally, I find it hard to understand how the Nagel formula has been accepted for so long by a school of philosophy that prides itself on its ability to analyse the meanings of words and statements. Hacker has highlighted the weaknesses in Nagel very effectively but, really, that analysis should have been done a long time ago.

Now, of course, the philosophy of consciousness has simply painted itself into a corner. Nagel has been relied on for so long that it’s no longer possible to repudiate him. He has effectively become holy writ, and any rejection now would be tantamount to heresy…

DA

At the risk of aborting an interesting discussion, I have to say that I agree with you.  I have never liked the phrase because it requires something for comparison.  And with what can one compare being conscious?  We each have only one data point.  If I need to refer to someone's private experience or some aspect of it, I say "How it is to be ...."  

I have a waggish friend who likes to ask people "So, what's it like being you?"  Best answers:

*  "I have no basis for comparison" (government prof)
*  "Better than being you" (grad student, now director of corporate strategy, Bell Canada)
*  "Fun" (five year-old boy)
*  "Much like being you, I suppose, but how would either of us really know?" (me)

Hi Bill

Nice to encounter someone who agrees with me on the point. The only other person I am aware of who does is Peter Hacker – who doubtless has never heard of me.

I never cease to be amazed by the unwillingness of philosophers of consciousness to subject the “something it is like” proposition to careful analysis. It’s like a kind of credo or ritual incantation one recites as proof of one’s orthodoxy – but never questions.

And to make matters worse, it’s everywhere!  Philosophers great and small in every corner of the globe invoke constantly it as if it were the law and the prophets. I switched on the radio last night and what do I hear? Some Australian philosopher pontificating on the subject of consciousness and relying constantly on the idea of “feeling like” as if it were self-evident Truth. Hacker would have had a fit. Last year, I outlined my objections to the idea on the “Consciousness Online” conference (which I hope to do this year too if I get the chance) and the replies I got were exactly what I have now come to expect – a refusal to engage with detailed analysis, and vague comments about “missing the point” etc. (I am happy to entertain the possibility that I am missing the point, but that would have to be demonstrated to me by clear philosophical argument, not just asserted.)

Such is life. Thank God the philosophy of consciousness is not my main interest! I would find it soooo frustrating dealing with this kind of thing. Consciousness is far too important a subject to be sidetracked by such nonsense.

DA