Truth; semantic and assertion
Redundancy theory of truth has been regarded one (may the most) powerful objection to Realism, new truth theorist, articulating rather different notion of truth claim that the semantic thesis of Realism must be rejected - and hence the whole project of realism - i think there is something wrong with - for example - Gary Kemps article and reasoning for redundancy theory of truth. there could two problems be differed 1) the redundancy argument for redundancy of SEMANTIC content of truth; 2) the redundancy argument for redundancy of ASSERTION that notion; arguments - as far as i have seen - are related to the second but not the first ( see for example Ramsey truism and Strawson's "Truth" and Gary Kemp's article "Meaning and truth conditions"). that seems to be about the redundancy argument for ASSERTION of truth predicate, but the reasoning does not entail that "truth" does not have any genuine semantic content. i think the very problem could be found in Tarski's "Semantic Conception of truth". the language/ Metalanguage distinction at best leads to the conclusion that truth can be ASSERTED in meta-language but i'm at a loss of getting the relevance with "Semantic content of truth predicate". Gary Kemp's article has been attached. the reasoning is very clear and that is:
1- Con <p> = that p. (Con <p> = the content of p)
2- Con <p> = TC of p. (TC = truth condition of p)
3- Df: <p> is true iff f<p>. (f = the predicate truth)
4- The TC of <p> = That f<p>.
6- That p = That f<p>. from (5) and (1)
7- Con <f <p>> = that f<p>. instance of (1)
8- Con <f <p>> = Con <p>. from (5) and (7)
and from 8 and enduring the circle we have
(a) Con <p> = con <f<f<f…<p>…>>> (hence the redundancy for "truth").
the (a) conclusion shows the error. the argument shows the redundancy theory of truth ASSERTION but not SEMANTIC redundancy.