Here's an argument that you can't suppose the Liar, where the Liar is, basically, "this very sentence is false."
If you can't suppose the liar, then one common way of setting forth the argument leading to paradox won't work--since it requires you to suppose the liar.
(It's more common, probably, for it to require you to suppose the liar is true. Whether the below argument successfully extends to that supposition isn't something I've thought through yet.)
What do you think of the argument?
I worry about line 4. What do we know (or what do different people think they know) about how to individuate thoughts?
Should I be worrying about any of the other three premises?
Thanks for any comments. It's outside my field (as you can probably tell!) and doesn't really engage directly, as far as I can see, with any of the technical material people usually (need to) discuss when dealing with the liar paradox--which is probably a bad thing I'm afraid.
1. A =def A is false. (definition)<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />
2. For all X, in order to suppose X, I must entertain the thought that whatever X says is the case. (Premise)
3. For all X, in order to suppose X is false, I must entertain the thought that whatever X says is not the case. (Premise)
4. For all X, to suppose X is to entertain a single thought. (Premise)
5. To suppose A is not to entertain a conjunction. (Premise)
6. In order to suppose A, I must entertain the thought that whatever A says is the case. (From 2)
7. In order to suppose A, I must suppose A is false. (From 1)
8. In order to suppose A is false, I must entertain the thought that whatever A says is not the case. (From 3 and 7)
9. In order to suppose A, I must both entertain the thought that whatever A says is the case, and the thought that whatever A says is not the case. (From 7 and 8)
10. Therefore: It is impossible to suppose A. (From 4, 5 and 9)