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  1. Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri (2013). The Church–Fitch Knowability Paradox in the Light of Structural Proof Theory. Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
    Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$ , by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$ (KP). The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$ (OP). A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the Church–Fitch (...)
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2012-09-24
About modal machinery

Your work is technically very interesting neverthless I have some remarks.

1/ I don't always understand the claim that the Fitch Paradox threatens Anti-Realist philosophy.
If everybody accepts the Knowability Principle restricted to basic propositions,
it sounds more like a victory than a defeat for the knowability advocates.
It seems that what is threatened is more the capacity of modal logic to represent the knowability.

2/ In your intuitionistic frame, as you say in proposition 5.8, it is impossible to have 'A' and 'not K A' in the same world.
So the Fitch Paradox is avoided but the result is a very poor epistemic logic where you cannot express that some truths are unknown.

3/ more technically in the figure below the proposition 5.7
I don't understand what happens in the world y.
You have      y Rk y ;    y Rk z ;    y: p   z: not p
but you have not    'y: not K p' .
Does it stand that 'y: not not K p' ?
It is very counterintuitive.

Else I wrote a dissertation on these points.
I have published a - maybe insuficiently technical - abstract on this website:
http://philpapers.org/rec/MARFPS