Relationships between representationalism, functionalism and higher-order theories
University of Washington
What is the relationship between representationalsim, functionalism, and more specific theories, such as higher order theories of consciousness?
Is weak representationalism a base assumption of both functionalism and higher-order theories? As I understand it, representationalism is not a theory of consciousness in itself (it does not differentiate between conscious and unconscious states) but is a theory of qualitative character. It needs an add-on (perhaps functionalism) to account for consciousness. What is the relationship of strong representationalism to functionalism and higher-order theories?
What is the relationship between functionalism and higher-order theories? These are not typically mentioned in the same articles as competitors, so are they compatible, and do higher-order theories pressupose some sort of functionalism, or would they also be compatible with psychophysical identity theories?
If representationalism explains the difference between mental states, and higher-order theories explain the difference between consicous and unconsious mental states, what explanatory role does functionalism about qualia play?<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />
If the realizer of consciousness is a brain state in psychophysical identity theories, and a higher-order thought or perception in higher-order theories, what is the realzier of consciousness in functionalism?