I guess there is at least David Deustch (in his The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform The World) having a similar idea: that programs are rather concrete; not abstract. I haven't read that (book/chapter) yet, of course; so not very sure.

It's an appealing idea, but there are a few problems. The main one is saying what logical syntax is: for example, if we think of axioms like "A entails A", or rules of inference like modus ponens (A and A -> B entail B), then the two As in the axiom, and the As and the Bs in modus ponens, should be the same letter. So you need at least a distinction between types and tokens there. And you probably want to discount purely notational differences between logics (for example, whether you write the connectives as infixes or prefixes). So, if you're distinguishing between the letter A and occurrences of A, then you are not exactly in the realm of concrete particulars. (Some people have tried to hold a purely inscriptionalist view of logic, but it's really hard to do).

However, there is something at issue here, which is whether logic is universally valid, whether there is one true logic, and whether mental entities like thoughts can be duplicated at will, and tested for equality, in the same way as tokens in a calculus can. None of these questions is obvious (though they are hard to answer). Incidentally, philosophers seem much more willing to believe in the one true logic than mathematicians do. However, even if you deny that logic is universally valid, I don't think you end up with logic as a concrete particular: you just end up, in my opinion, with more abstract objects than you would have otherwise.

Dear Kris,
Penelope Maddy's thesis that logic is empirical (in the latter part of the 2007 book Second Philosophy, her paper "The Philosophy of Logic", Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18:4 (Dec 2012), and forthcoming book Philosophy of Logic: From Bolzano to Boole) seems closest to yours. 

But I must say that your statement of the thesis left me wondering: is "concrete and particular" not a logical description? Would there then be a meta-logic that handles the "abstract and general" (and other two permutations), or would this belong to a logic-neutral metaphysics or theory of meaning? Your parenthetical remark about logics seems to leave open the possibility for a more abstract Logic to taxonomize them all and in the darkness bind them.

Hi Kris,
You could check out Cheryl Misak's new book called The American Pragmatists (2013).  She may also have some papers available on the subject.  
I found her because I've been doing some research into the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein and the approach to truth and inquiry that the American pragmatists were using at the turn of the 20th century.  Charles Peirce at Harvard developed truth tables before Wittgenstein laid them out in the Tractatus.  Peirce was also the first one to realize that we could use electricity to physically instantiate Boolean logic gates - the idea that would become the computer.

Misak shows how Peirce's pragmatic approach to inquiry can be traced through the work of C. L. Lewis, W. Quine, to Hilary Putnam who is still living.  This context may help to refine how you're looking to express concrete or particular logic. 

The pragmatists had a theory of logic and truth that was firmly embedded in our observations of the physical world.  It was very much an empiricist theory of truth and the means of arriving at truth, which include deductive logic.    

Of course their view was criticized by Russell for degenerating into relativism due to all the contingencies of figuring out the truth-value for each given proposition in question.  However, there may be reason to believe that Russell didn't properly understand pragmatism at the time he was critiquing it.    

Actually the pragmatist approach to truth and logic relies on actual practices performed within a community of believers all checking one another's truth assessments.  So we adopt things that are instrumentally true, but then we put these ideas to the test to continually refine the actual truths that we can ascertain about the world.  

Of course deductive logic is good because it is truth preserving, and it is truth preserving because the results it predicts when fed good premises are consistent with the results we observe.   

I should mention that I don't think any of these people believe that logical operators like "and" or "not" have concrete existence as such at some localized place in the universe as if they were entities floating around in space that you could bump into.     

   In addition to the distinction between reference-tokens and statement-operators with regards to syntactical identity, which professor Rhodes points out does not approach the domain or domains of concrete particulars, (but at most logic as a particular), one is permitted to entertain a notion of a concrete particular logic embedded in an implicit or incipient universal (-ly valid) logic; expressed as something like Max Scheler's idea that the empirical institution of logic under terrestrial conditions results from exaggerated frequency of neural traces along identical routes, ("inscriptionist"), while nevertheless progressively approximating an uninstantiated (real) universality, the possibility of which motivates the shareability of its claims. 

It is perhaps interesting to notice that present reflections by Girard are oriented toward this distinction between types and tokens. Ludics, a framework that he invented in 2000, is based on loci, not on formulae (see the title of his paper: "locus solum"). In this view, there are no "occurrences" of "formulae", there are simply loci, where formulae can be located. To test whether there is equality between "formulae" does not consist in simply observing that they have the same "letters", but in applying a recursive procedure, which is called "fax". In the same vein, "proofs" are geometrical devices and they are distinguished by their points. They are called "designs", and families of designs distinguished by particular properties give "behaviours", that, at the end, we can see as types or, as formulaes, since like in the proofs as programs paradigm, types = formulae.

i`m glad to exist such discussion about logic. logic posed as both tools and method, therefore in is concrete to argument.  

Logic has become formal logic, a system of (meaningless) signs manipulated by
stated rules... This was not always so: Logic was built on negation, the understanding that something is NOT SOMETHING ELSE!

So the Law of identity (that x = x) is fundamental and rests on understanding negation. 
Likewise any object x can not be BOTH x and not x so the Law of Non-contradiction follows.
Lastly any y must either be x or not an x (but not both) so the Law of excluded middle completes the laws of Classical Logic.

In this Classic View; logic rests only on understanding ...

End of this paper by Lars Hertzberg. Also, Don S. Levi. http://wittgensteinrepository.org/agora-ontos/article/view/2171/2389

Dear Drew,
Misak's book is good, thanks for the reference! One thing she seems to miss though, in accepting Peirce's verdict on James's mastery of logic, is James's combination of what he called "logical realism with an otherwise empiricist mode of thought" (Some Problems of Philosophy, 106, and see the references in Perry's note to Essays in Radical Empiricism, 16). This is a strand of James and the American Realists that differs starkly from Dewey, and explains Russell's affinity to them.

Apropos your observation that deduction "is truth-preserving because the results it predicts when fed good premises are consistent with the results we observe",  the key word in the explanans, 'consistent', is a logical term, so it is hard to accept that you have discharged deduction.

Kris,
I'd be happy to explain to you why I think that logic is empirical, which would make it as concrete and particular as any experience we might have. In brief I could argue that the structure of our experience of the world is representational in its structure as well as its content. It's structure is inherited from the structure of space, as is evidenced by the fact that we cannot even imagine an object having any more or less than 3 spatial dimensions. Language developed long after animal behaviors were enabled by the evolution of the mammalian brain, meaning that animals have the structure of space built into their brains too, enabling them to notice regularities in about how objects move around in space and figure out how to perform adaptive behaviors in response.

So logic reflects how the preexisting structure of space was built into mammalian primate brains from which human brains evolved an additional system of representation, language. The structure of how we identify and refer linguistically to objects in space in "naturalistic" sentences, is a priori (in an evolutionary sense) structured in the ways we discover through studying Euclidean geometry. Logic is a way of abstracting laws of entailment form the structures of language, which is isomorphic to the structure of space. Logical relations derive from spatial relations, which are discovered empirically.

I don't know if that suits your program but I like what appears to be the direction of your thinking.

Thanks,
DCD
 

thank you for your good comments.
i think logic is the law of their mind. when we are thinking we apply some laws of mind. We know what we express in terms of laws of mind and throw. In fact, thinking mean disciplined knowledge and find the unknowns through it.  Structures that they come within the meaning and the spatial dimensions are derived from the laws of mind. According to Kant, the categories are subjective aspects.