Metaphysics and Epistemology


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2016-05-24
In https://arcturantimes.wordpress.com/2016/04/16/consciousness-from-the-bottom-up-speculation-on-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-and-qualia-2-leaning-on-the-premise/, I try out a speculative way through the hard problem of consciousness and dealing with qualia. It's very incomplete and tentative, but I'd appreciate any feedback or criticisms.
Basically, I take Chalmers's idea of consciousness as a fundamental property, but instead of seeing it as a high-level, emergent property arising from complex information processing, I consider that it might be a low-level input into the full, constructed mind. Specifically, I suggest the qualia might be the direct (not mediated) experience of individual, or small groups of, cells.

Of course, this would push the qualia/consciousness mystery down to the cellular level, but at least it could help explain what is happening in the brain at higher levels of organization!

2016-04-24
I told this philosophy joke to some friends, and they think I should tell it to philosophers, but I wonder whether it is already known. Just in case not:

How many homunculi does it take to change a lightbulb?
An infinite number, getting smaller and smaller.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/15030 Reply

2016-04-12
If you have any thoughts, comments or questions about this paper, let me know!

2016-04-12
If you have any thoughts, comments or questions about this paper, let me know!

2016-04-12
If you have any thoughts, comments or questions about this paper, let me know!
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/14842 Reply

Note: Because you do not have pro status, this post needs to be accepted by an editor before appearing on regular forum pages. It will be deleted if rejected, so you should make a copy.
2016-04-06
I recently had a paper on a novel approach to the hard problem rejected after getting to the minor revision stage at a Leiter-ranked journal (disagreement with the referee on a single issue).

I accomplished this with no formal training in philosophy (although I am highly educated in other fields). I understand that making it to the minor revision stage (much less getting published) at a respected journal with no formal training in the field is so rare as to effectively be unheard of. 

Since I am not in academia, the only feedback I have received on the paper are the referee reports. I have resubmitted to another journal but I would greatly value feedback from a prof/postdoc. In that respect, if anyone is interested, please let me know and I will send you a link to the paper. Given the unique circumstances, I would prefer not to post a link to/discuss the paper here so as not to prejudice the ongoing/any future reviews. I would offer to credit any feedback/suggestions that are incorporated ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/14594 Reply

2016-03-29
My alarm bells went off seeing mention of Al Qaeda and 9/11 in an abstract from 1999. Turns out the DOI and abstract here are not for Keeley's 1999 paper, but for an SSRN working paper by Sunstein and Vermeule from 2008 (which doesn't seem to have a separate philpapers entry). I can delete the abstract from this entry, but I can't find a way to edit the DOI.

What's the best thing for a user like me to do? I could create another entry with the correct DOI (which is 10.2307/2564659)&copy over the information from this one, then edit this one to describe the Sunstein and Vermeule paper, but I feel like there's got to be a better way--especially since that would distort the download stats for the two papers.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/14402 Reply

2016-03-22
Concerning his recent paper I agree almost 100% but I am more receptive to IIT than Curello. I am arguing in a new paper that it addresses some aspects of consciousness, but not all.
The main problem that Tononi and Koch seem entirely unaware of is that a theory of consciousness that does not address intelligence cannot be a theory of consciousness at all.

Regards,

Eray Ozkural, PhD
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/14266 Reply

2016-03-07
For your review, discussion, and to provide feedback on this paper I have submitted. Thank you. Tim

2016-01-22


Some people are dualists and some are materialists, but for some reason they can't convince each other, they always seem to be talking past each other, so what is going on?

Here is what is going on: The only information that our brains (we) receive from outside are electrical pulses from our sensory nerves, these pulses are not random, they carry very complicated mathematical patterns, you would expect that we would be completely overwhelmed if we tried to find and track these patterns, but fortunately we have customized - less conscious - brain features that help us and this results in new sensations that we can understand, like pictures and sounds and our sense of space and time in general, but this sub conscious help comes at a price, because we forget that they are just mathematical patterns and we start making stupid assumptions e.g. a force field is more mysterious then a rock i.e. a rock is a "thing" and a magnetic field is not, or that rel ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/12690 Reply

2016-01-22

Hi everybody, Hi philosophy of mind lovers!

In the beginning, I am very grateful for reading this new thread. The question is as follows,but I suppose before that, I give a brief explanation of my background. I entered to the realm of western philosophy especially with concentration on mind issues around 2 years before.
In fact, my main background in philosophy comes from an eastern philosophy (especially Sufism). That`s why most of articles I submit to the conferences and journal about mind based on eastern philosophy are rejected in the west !!! (No problem! This is life!) 
In any case, I passed a cumbersome path to reach in a level of analytical philosophy that I understand somehow what is going on here. So, for me, it is the time to choose a topic for my thesis in philosophy of mind. My professors have proposed me some topics, but I ask you here based on your strong background in philosophy of mind: which topic do you recommend to me to start? Which topic is the most challenging iss ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/12662 Reply

2016-01-05
In epistemology, very little has been said of what can be perceived through the objective world to its objects. This short paper argues that light is a barrier to that world and that direct knowledge of it is not possible.
This is based on general readings only. I don't know if this aspect of epistemology has been discussed already. However, and irrespective of that, it is interesting and does add another dimension to the study of perception.

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/11786 Reply

2016-01-04
Via the internet, I’ve recently been watching an excellent series of televised lectures by a leading researcher in palaeoanthropology at the Collège de France. I am by no means a specialist in this field and a lot of what he has to say is too technical for me and goes over my head. But I understand enough to feel reassured in a conclusion I had already reached, namely that philosophical attempts to explain human consciousness in evolutionary terms are, and probably always will be, doomed to failure, as are attempts in the philosophy of art to explain art in evolutionary terms. (I should add that the lectures in question don’t address either question specifically; they’re about human evolution generally.)

I’ve read very little of the relevant philosophical literature (and most of what I have read relates to art) because I tend to avoid topics that strike me as a waste of time. But I’m aware that there are some who would disagree with me and who believe that philosophy has important thing ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/11770 Reply

2016-01-05
What are good journals to publish stuff in meta-philosophy, besides _Metaphilosophy_?

2015-12-21
Hello there,
Do you have any recommendations to submit a philosophy of mind paper that argues strongly against dualism? I am looking for a respectable journal about philosophy of mind that is open to philosophical, lengthy, inquiring articles that are written from a strictly scientific and logical point of view. Basically, I regard dualism as an anti-scientific attitude, and I would like to be able to liberally criticize a philosophical position that I view as intellectually lazy and harmful.

Kind Regards,

Eray Ozkural, PhD.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/11454 Reply

2015-12-07
I would like to ask: how many of you think that the task of philosophy is to make our concepts clearer? I would also like to add, that do you think that philosophy is a completly different doctring from science?
My answer to the first one is yes, but I am still a little bit uncertain about the second question. However, it might be the case, that from giving to the first question an answer "Yes" it follows that one must also answer "Yes" to the second question.

What is your opinion about this?

Also: if you have a view about philosophy, which you think is not so common view, I would also like to read and discuss about it.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10962 Reply

2015-10-05
I have written a short paper on an issue that I have not come across before. In it I attempt to argue that light waves are an opaque barrier between the eye of the observer and the objective world. And, that light waves prevent direct knowledge of objects in the world. I would be grateful for criticism and responses. Bert

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10568 Reply

2015-09-04
What kind of academic inquiry can best help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in this question?  Is it because most believe the kind of academic inquiry we have today, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knoweldge and technological know-how, is the best that we can have, judged from the perspective of helping humanity make progress towards a better world?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in arguments which seem to show decisively that inquiry restricted to the pursuit of knowledge is both profoundly irrational, and a menace?  The successful pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to trouble.  Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act - for some of us at ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10477 Reply

2015-06-30
I have a following trouble.

If I want to defining some word, and I want that my definition will be correct in the meaning of Semantical Conception of Truth or Classical, I have to know something about object, attribute or relation that I want to define. In other words: If I wand define "wisdom" I have to know what the wisdom is. If I don't know what the wisdom is, my definition will be arbitrary and could be incorrect (not in logical meaning but in ontological meaning), it would be fake definition.

The question is: How would I know about the subject, object, relation, attribute to give its proper definition ?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10224 Reply

2015-06-17
I am currently studying objections to modal realism for a section of something I'm writing, and am wondering if people can help me with questions about two related objections which seem important to me. My questions are: are there existing sources for these objections, and if so, what are they?

Reality as a whole could have been different

One objection I would like to find more sources for is the idea that reality as a whole (in the most unrestricted sense) could have been different. Lewis's modal realism leads to the conclusion that the whole system of worlds is the way it is necessarily, but intuitively reality as a whole could have been different, so this is a mark against the theory.

I have found one source for this objection - Williamson's 'Necessary Existents', where he says:

'Even if there are mutually disconnected spatiotemporal systems such as Lewis postulates, they are not the distinctive subject matter of modal discourse. They are simply more of what there is, about which we ... (read more)
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