Epistemology


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2016-11-27
Before the fact, we know based on what has been written, an example might be knowledge of the law and does not commit crimes because of conceptual knowledge. There it is based on experience already przeżytym but on the intellect, namely on this, what not to do in order not to be convicted of a misdemeanor or felony. Rights can learn to read codes that have warned us about what not to do this in ten same way, we can learn a vocabulary of language, call the prior knowledge, knowledge BEFORE the fact. Hindsight is based on our own experience and others. Drawing on the knowledge of this is written, we draw knowledge from others who have already experienced something, it is passed. Hindsight, IS OUR personal knowledge without relying on prior experience. Knowledge Based on previous experience we can verify and, if I upgrade, so how do scientists when previous experience does not agree with the observations, then seek an explanation and often expand or narrow theories. The prior knowledge IS ... (read more)

2016-10-20
Is awareness specific to specific parts of an experience?
When we are aware of seeing an apple, are we aware of all other sounds, shapes, tastes, etc which occur simultaneously?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/22242 Reply

2016-10-05
Some words in my paper:

T(hj|ei)--fuzzy truth function of a predicate hj.

T(hj)--logical probability or  average thue-value of a predicate hj.

Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since Logical Probability and Statistical Probability are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The author suggests defining log [1/T(hj)] as testing severity, and T(hj|ei)/T(hj) as verisimilitude. In terms of Likelihood method, P(ei| hi is true)/P(ei) =T(hj|ei)/T(hj) is also called standard likelihood. So, we may say Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) = log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation
 If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also define verisimilitude by log [T(hj|ei)/T(hj)]. 

The figure 8 in the paper shows how positive and negative degrees of believe affect thruthlikeness. 


Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/21538 Reply

2016-09-27
Where is color?
In the observer as a feeling, the observed or in the communique between the two?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/20826 Reply

2016-09-20
Does the Phineas P. Gage case show that there are two types of memory?
One emotional and the other intellectual?

2016-09-06
Kant believed that noumena was converted into phenomena, where the information from the senses is an object. By noumena he meant the 'communique' between the observer and the physical world which enables the sensing process. 
On the contrary I believe, there is no communique, all there is is sensation. However I believe there is phenomenon first and the product of sensing then becomes stored as memory. Memory of an object gives the object a permanent state. A known object as part of memory is shapeless, colorless, etc having only meaning and is senseless. Knowledge is a collection of 'thing-in-itself'.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/19942 Reply

2016-07-07
The real materialism states that "all scientific laws are inherent to the matter itself".
It is these laws that, for billions of years (at least 13) determine the causal evolution of the atomOs (atomOs of Democritos&alii), and thus determines the causal evolution of photons, so the agglomerated material, so the causal evolution of living matter and therefore the causal evolution of human society.
So we can say that the laws of biology are inherent in the laws of physics. They are only summaries of these basic laws.
As a result, physics and biology have a common body of scientific laws - they are what we will call "philosophical laws."
These laws obviously add to the laws of knowledge (epistemological laws)
So we will call "materiological laws" these laws that will add to the "epistemological laws" to form the set of "philosophical laws."
The first materiological laws - so a law common to physics and biology - is the law of transformation quantity quality  law.-(LTQQ)
It was discovered by Hegel ... (read more)
Latest replies:
  • Boris Itkin, 2016-11-07 : I agree with you that all three dialectic laws of Hegel-Engels conserves their validity in both physics and biolgy, but... (read more)
Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/17514 Reply

2016-06-07
Is anyone aware of any philosophical discussions of the following kind of question?
Can you rationally (or justifiably, or without irrationality, or the like) believe that p while also believing that you do not know that p?

Also, what do you think the answer is?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/16126 Reply

2016-03-29
My alarm bells went off seeing mention of Al Qaeda and 9/11 in an abstract from 1999. Turns out the DOI and abstract here are not for Keeley's 1999 paper, but for an SSRN working paper by Sunstein and Vermeule from 2008 (which doesn't seem to have a separate philpapers entry). I can delete the abstract from this entry, but I can't find a way to edit the DOI.

What's the best thing for a user like me to do? I could create another entry with the correct DOI (which is 10.2307/2564659)&copy over the information from this one, then edit this one to describe the Sunstein and Vermeule paper, but I feel like there's got to be a better way--especially since that would distort the download stats for the two papers.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/14402 Reply

2016-03-07
For your review, discussion, and to provide feedback on this paper I have submitted. Thank you. Tim

2016-01-05
In epistemology, very little has been said of what can be perceived through the objective world to its objects. This short paper argues that light is a barrier to that world and that direct knowledge of it is not possible.
This is based on general readings only. I don't know if this aspect of epistemology has been discussed already. However, and irrespective of that, it is interesting and does add another dimension to the study of perception.

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/11786 Reply

2015-10-05
I have written a short paper on an issue that I have not come across before. In it I attempt to argue that light waves are an opaque barrier between the eye of the observer and the objective world. And, that light waves prevent direct knowledge of objects in the world. I would be grateful for criticism and responses. Bert

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10568 Reply

2015-09-04
What kind of academic inquiry can best help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in this question?  Is it because most believe the kind of academic inquiry we have today, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knoweldge and technological know-how, is the best that we can have, judged from the perspective of helping humanity make progress towards a better world?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in arguments which seem to show decisively that inquiry restricted to the pursuit of knowledge is both profoundly irrational, and a menace?  The successful pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to trouble.  Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act - for some of us at ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10477 Reply

2015-04-18
If you come across this paper while researching philosophy of love, you should watch this: https://youtu.be/ykxNI137sPk
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9876 Reply

2014-12-19

JOHN CORCORAN AND HASSAN MASOUD, Three-logical-theories redux.

  The 1969 paper, “Three logical theories” [1], considers three logical systems all based on the same interpreted language and having the same semantics.

  The first, a logistic system LS, codifies tautologies (logical truths)—using tautological axioms and tautology-preserving rules that are not required to be consequence-preserving.

  The second, a consequence system CS, codifies valid premise-conclusion arguments—using tautological axioms and consequence-preserving rules that are not required to be cogency-preserving [2]. A rule is cogency-preserving if in every application the conclusion is known to follow from its premises if the premises are all known to follow from their premises.

  The third, a deductive system DS, codifies deductions, or cogent argumentations [2]—using cogency-preserving rules. The derivations in a DS represent deduction: the process by which conclusions are deduced from premises, i. e. the way knowl ... (read more)


2014-12-16

The writing describes a new sort of individual, “a delude”. People like Hitler would well fit the description. He was mentally healthy, however overwhelmed by grossly deluded opinions.

Here is the description from the text: 

"Even when a person is born possessing a healthy mental state, the familial and environmental assault during childhood with deluded opinions and behavior can be the basis for an individual to develop into a delude, an individual in a deluded mental state. In this writing, the label fool, or imbecile, is sometimes interchangeable with the underlying primary conditions of the delude. A fool is predisposed to accept deluded opinions as true; however, he or she can have an overall good awareness of social norms and laws that he or she learned to comply with. A fool is not, because of his mental condition alone, a villain. In contrast, the delude typically develops overwhelming extreme views. These views can be held as more important than any social or legal consideration ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9450 Reply

2013-11-19
Here is an argument against reliabilism. Grateful for comments. Also, is this argument already out there? Wouldn’t be surprised. The argument proceeds in two parts. Here’s part A, an analogy.

1. Suppose I’m imprisoned permanently in a windowless prison cell. However there is a large TV screen. My jailer tells me it shows, by cameras that focus on various events in the world outside, what is really happening.

2. As my life continues I believe that the events on the screen are accurate, but naturally I have doubts–maybe I’m being shown old reruns or computer generated confabulations or...– and I wonder if what I’m seeing is really going on. Sometimes images appear on the screen of how the system itself works–the cameras, their construction, the lens, examples of them capturing events in the world, the way the images are relayed accurately to the screen in my cell...I believe these are accurate but it’s hardly unreasonable to continue to wonder whether what I’m seeing is really going on–th ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7941 Reply

2013-11-12

I am unsure if this is the correct forum for this. Kant is famous for asking what the conditions are for the possibility of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason. I  think that his answers are more right than not.

    How can we apply this question to the phenomenology of Sartre or Heidegger? That is, what, are the conditions for knowledge, if any, for some of the claims in Being and Time and Being and Nothingness. I refer to the assertions about Being, Dasein, Nothingness, authenticity and the terminology therein. I realize that this is a huge and difficult question that is worthy of a book. My reason for asking is to challenge the entire projects of these texts. Their conclusions, after all, are not empirical and little or no evidence is given because that is not the intention, except with Husserl, arguably. Their claims are speculative and perhaps fallacious.
. Would you consider their assertions non-propositional in that no definite truth or falsity can be known? I think Ayer would a ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7933 Reply

2013-09-12
Hi Jack,

Nice paper!. However, if I may, I wasn't convinced by your response to objection five. The objection, I take it, is that the intuitions you are marshaling about incoherence derive from a non-moral standpoint, that is, they are intuitions that arise when one is doing metaethics and not when one is actually moralizing.  And it seems undeniable that Moore paradoxical sentences are straightforwardly bizarre when uttered by persons in the context of actual moralizing (just imagine actually having the relevant conversation). At the outset of your paper, you correctly note that expressivism is a theory about actual moralizing, so it seems like this is one objection to which you should be very sensitive.  You respond:

This is not really a rejection of C3, but a rejection of C1, since it admits that it is not always the case that affective or conative attitudes are expressed by moral assertions. If non-cognitive mental states are only sometimes expressed by moral assertions, then the clai ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7909 Reply

2013-07-11
Your article is very interesting.

In the same spirit I propose a more modal formalism to speak about "true announcements" and "learning" : http://philpapers.org/rec/MARFPS

This representation allow to make the difference between a world before and after the learning act. Then it becomes easier to deal with expression about knowledge and learning.




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