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2016-08-22
Hi,I'm looking for a good book/article that analyzes the concept of continuum (not just in space and time but on the general level, including properties, numbers etc.) and surveys its definitions.
I'll be grateful for your references.
Thanks,
Benny

2016-08-08
After the publication of this paper, I enjoyed personal communication with Aloysius Martinich and discovered that I misused if and only if in several places of this paper. The corrections are below:

The formula indicates the following:
1. A is relatively identical to the value, but A is not absolutely identical to the value.
2. B is relatively identical to the value, but B is not absolutely identical to the value.
3. The value of A is absolutely identical to the value of B.
4. A is not identical to B.
(page 135)

1. The expression 1 + 3 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 1 + 3 is not absolutely identical to 4.

2. The expression 2 + 2 is relatively identical to the value 4, but 2 + 2 is not absolutely identical to 4.
3. The value of 1 + 3 is absolutely identical to the value of 2 + 2.
4. The expression 1 + 3 is not identical to the expression 2 + 2.
(page 135)

1. The triumvir was relatively identical to Lepidus, but the triumvir was not absolutely identical to Lepidus.
2. The pontifex maximus ... (read more)


2016-07-20
It seems to me that this work is very much unavailable to students and professionals. Have not found it online in any form, save for a few hardcover editions for more than $500. Crazy.

2015-06-17
I am currently studying objections to modal realism for a section of something I'm writing, and am wondering if people can help me with questions about two related objections which seem important to me. My questions are: are there existing sources for these objections, and if so, what are they?

Reality as a whole could have been different

One objection I would like to find more sources for is the idea that reality as a whole (in the most unrestricted sense) could have been different. Lewis's modal realism leads to the conclusion that the whole system of worlds is the way it is necessarily, but intuitively reality as a whole could have been different, so this is a mark against the theory.

I have found one source for this objection - Williamson's 'Necessary Existents', where he says:

'Even if there are mutually disconnected spatiotemporal systems such as Lewis postulates, they are not the distinctive subject matter of modal discourse. They are simply more of what there is, about which we ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10158 Reply

2015-02-19
If you have any questions or comments on "The Zygote Argument is Invalid", I would enjoy discussing them on this thread!


2015-02-07
I would like to know where I can find arguments in favor of the assertion: that there are no first causes, and that there are no things that do not change. Maybe some work of Dr McZed, or if you want to contribute some ideas in favour or against the mentioned assertion, it would be great.  
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9590 Reply

2014-12-01
I was often  thinking about the thread title question while I worked on the ontology of artworks such as a piece of drama or music. Some philosophers show a positive response to the type view of artworks according to which an artwork is a type and its performances are the tokens. (By the word of "type", here I mean an entity that can have its example(s) like universal.)

What about fictional characters then?

I, at first thought, tended to support the particular view of characters. 

Yet the type view may be a more plausible position for some reasons.
One of them can be understood easily when you look at the case that many actors have ever played the role of Hamlet in their own ways. It may be natural that their performances are considered as tokens of the Hamlet-type. 

Besides, trademark protection for fictional characters like Disney's may imply the idea that they are types.  They seem to think the characters have their tokens, and then to prevent a third party from producing some token ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9365 Reply

2013-09-12
Hi Jack,

Nice paper!. However, if I may, I wasn't convinced by your response to objection five. The objection, I take it, is that the intuitions you are marshaling about incoherence derive from a non-moral standpoint, that is, they are intuitions that arise when one is doing metaethics and not when one is actually moralizing.  And it seems undeniable that Moore paradoxical sentences are straightforwardly bizarre when uttered by persons in the context of actual moralizing (just imagine actually having the relevant conversation). At the outset of your paper, you correctly note that expressivism is a theory about actual moralizing, so it seems like this is one objection to which you should be very sensitive.  You respond:

This is not really a rejection of C3, but a rejection of C1, since it admits that it is not always the case that affective or conative attitudes are expressed by moral assertions. If non-cognitive mental states are only sometimes expressed by moral assertions, then the clai ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7909 Reply

2013-08-23
Hallo

I am interested in further arguments pro  and in objections contra my distinction between world and culture.

Sincerely Erwin Sonderegger

2013-07-25
All comments are welcome!
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7858 Reply

2013-06-14
Here's the place to be critical!  Anything that can help me develop this argument is much appreciated.  This is something I develop a bit in my dissertation and the hope is to develop it more here and eventually have something worthy of publication.
Latest replies:
  • Jim Stone, 2013-06-23 : Here are some comments. Thanks for t 1. It will help your reader to say early on what nonreductive physicalism is, and w... (read more)
  • John Altmann, 2013-06-24 : I just wanted to say first and foremost before I go any further that I am not a Professor of Philosophy nor have I ever... (read more)
  • Andrew Russo, 2013-06-24 : First of all, thanks for taking the time to read my paper and provide me with comments.  This is what I hoped would... (read more)
  • Andrew Russo, 2013-06-24 : Thank you for reading my paper and commenting on it.  Whatever comments you give, whether or not they are from some... (read more)
  • Jim Stone, 2013-06-24 : Thanks for answering. The dialectic between us is for me now a little complicated. I follow this protocol in commenting... (read more)
Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7816 Reply

2013-06-11
Hi Professor Demetriou,

I've just read the draft of your paper, and I really enjoyed it, especially the bits where you complicate the somewhat simplistic just-so cultural-evolutionary story provided by Ross and Nisbett.  One rarely sees such deep engagement with actual anthropological data in moral-philosophical papers about disagreement, and I think your reflections here are a valuable contribution to this literature.

However, I have a question about the "pluralism" that is on offer, which is "a view urging the moral correctness of  multiple and mutually irreducible comprehensive ethical  outlooks , each suited to  its own dimension  of social life ."  A familiar worry emerges here, which is that you are covertly drawing on a kind of monism which serves to make each of the competing moral systems appear attractive.  The trouble begins with the word "suited": what does it mean to say that a moral outlook is "suited" t ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7811 Reply

2012-11-12
I am delighted that someone of Kitcher's ability has tackled the meta-ethical implications of understanding morality as an evolutionary adaptation. Further, Christine Clavien has advanced that good cause by providing an inspiringly insightful and clear review of important implications of his work. 

However, the science of the matter actually supports a much stronger hypothesis than Kitcher's "morality evolved to overcome altruism failures".That stronger hypothesis may have different meta-ethical implications.

Relevant criteria for scientific truth regarding morality as an evolutionary adaptation Include explanatory power for descriptive facts and puzzles, no contradiction with known facts, simplicity, and integration with the rest of science. By these criteria, a superior hypothesis can be stated as "morality overcomes a universal cooperation-exploitation dilemma by motivating or advocating altruistic cooperation strategies". That is, morality is composed of assemblies of biolog ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7433 Reply

2012-08-08
Excellent paper first and foremost Mr. MacLeod! As I was reading your thoughts on plurality and the nature of the individual conscious, it made me think of the ideal of Solipsism. For those who don't know, Solipsism is defined as: The view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist. Would you say that your case for a plurality of consciousness "immediately present." defeats the ideal of a Solipsistic Philosophy? 
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7182 Reply

2011-09-10
I couldn't find Tim's email so am instead posting here a link to my critical discussion of his paper (which may also be of interest to other readers):
Moral Judgments, 2Dism, and Attitudinal Commitments.


Cheers,
Richard

2011-04-18
Recently I started reading Ronald Giere's Scientific perspectivism but it turned out to be a demanding task: I became bogged in Chapter 2 and havent been able to go much farther. In a philosophy book one expects down to earth examples to bring some clarity about but here, rather the obverse, they turn out to be the problem.

Chapter 2 is entirely devoted to Color vision, which is presented in the first sentence (p.17) as "the best exemplar I know for the kind of perspectivism that characterizes modern science." And on the next page (18) we are told: "The fact that hues have a circular rather than linear structure means that there is no simple linear relationship between wavelength and color".

As I get it "circular structure" means that we percieve colors in a limited range and anything beyond is black.But should we say that  a sound dissolving in low frequency rumble is at the same time an inaudible piercing screech? Our field of vision is also limited, so  it might be ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/5719 Reply

2011-02-27
There is a curious statement made by Philonous to Hylas in George Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in the third dialogue.

Here is what Philonous says: "The question between the materialists and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds."

I think we can modify this quote a little to say: The question between a materialist and an idealist is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that human being, but whether have an existence outside of a mind.

The quote itself grants that there is a world exterior to the human mind that is either perceiving it, and this over looks the problem of an external world. However, why do we hold that there is a world that exists independent of a nonhuman mind?

Why should we believe that there is a world that exists independent of a mind instead of the world t ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/5447 Reply

2010-08-06

I have not yet read the full version of Joseph's book, but I can tell this ties directly into my own theoretical perspectives involving assessment, learning, behavior, and consciousness. To me, as laid out in my Education PhD dissertation at Colorado State University (2005), the core essence of being (reality) is individual and collective consciousness interacting and interconnecting with consciousness at every level of existence (seen and unseen) as an ongoing here and now creative process." Thus, primary learning is intuitive and secondary learning is rational-objective.

Rational objective, is by my definition, fixtional thinking that allows one to "fix" or position relations "as if" they were separate and disconnected in a cause and effect relationship and in which they must of necessity substantiate existence "as if" it were true. It entails a sort of machine mentality of parts, in which the parts equals the whole and the whole is what the parts c ... (read more)


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