Philosophy of Mind


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I have written a short paper on an issue that I have not come across before. In it I attempt to argue that light waves are an opaque barrier between the eye of the observer and the objective world. And, that light waves prevent direct knowledge of objects in the world. I would be grateful for criticism and responses. Bert

What kind of academic inquiry can best help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in this question?  Is it because most believe the kind of academic inquiry we have today, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knoweldge and technological know-how, is the best that we can have, judged from the perspective of helping humanity make progress towards a better world?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in arguments which seem to show decisively that inquiry restricted to the pursuit of knowledge is both profoundly irrational, and a menace?  The successful pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to trouble.  Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act - for some of us at ... (read more)
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             Alcubierre Space-Time Bubbles



How about the Alcubierre Space-Time bubble? Here we find ourselves riding a ‘shock wave’ of space-time. My research into absolute rest suggests that the interior of Alcubierre’s bubble is not immune to the effects of quantum-entropy if the quantum field geometrics theory I’ve proposed is correct. The universe, being a history of interactions, can be theoretically mapped as a series of relativistic Feynman exchanges, so if his bubble moves through space, it interacts via field geometrics. Conversely, if his bubble is stationary, it has to be asked, “Can you speed up entropy by finding absolute rest?” It poses a possible solution to the Moses on Mount Sinai/accelerated aging that was alleged to occur. *    NOTE:  “The radiant face of Moses”…  Admittedly, I’ve found no reference to this ‘advanced aging’ in the bible so it seems to be more of a Hollywood addition in the Charlton Heston classic, ‘The Ten Commandments’. Closest biblica ... (read more)

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  • Daniel Park, 2015-05-18 : QGD stand for Quantum GravitoDynamics and is a quantum gravity theory I have constructed. I will post a paper on this on... (read more)
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                        Encoding the Nonphysical in a Physical System



“Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?”

 Stephen Hawking


     The subtle link between non-physically encoded information in a physical system may be foundational. One may consider the example of neo Lamarckism, in which a generational millennia of memeplexes spurs viral informationism amongst a species. Once thought to be rubbish, this theory is making a comeback as we learn that states of consciousness can affect DNA. (Cite: Weismann Rules! OK? Epigenetics and the Lamarckian temptation, by David Haig) Take the example of a jaguar, it is bound to the same laws of physics as the quark to the extent that neither is capable of violations of such laws but when confronted with the hard question of consciousness you eventually run out options as far as irreducible complexity is con ... (read more)

If you come across this paper while researching philosophy of love, you should watch this:
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Tarski’s convention T: condition beta. South American Journal of Logic. 1, 3–32.

John Corcoran and Leonardo Weber


HISTORICAL NOTE: This paper is the culmination of a years-long joint effort by the two authors. A preliminary report appeared in 2013: Corcoran-Weber, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 19 (2013) 510–11. Their co-operative work was conducted by email dialogue in which each author’s work was developed and corrected by the other. Each section went through several iterations. The final version was the result of dozens of reciprocal exchanges; it is impossible to allocate credit. Each author learned from and taught the other. During this time they consulted several other scholars including the Tarski experts David Hitchcock, James Smith, and Albert Visser.

The senior author expresses his deep gratitude to the junior author. Moreover the senior author acknowledges publicly what he has already said privately, viz. that without the junior author’s help and mastery of ... (read more)

If you have any questions or comments on "The Zygote Argument is Invalid", I would enjoy discussing them on this thread!

Dear All


Please forgive me for any grammatical errors. I am not native English speaker.

Actually I am not professionally related to philosophy or anything near it. But I have always been attracted to the philosophy of mind and concept of "self". I have been thinking about it some times but since there is no one around that I can talk to about it, I felt I can share my thoughts in a forum to be evaluated.

What I have been thinking about is how "self" could emerge from brain activities (say material). I have reached a hypothesis but I want to know if it makes any sense to anyone else.

The scheme is roughly like this:

Let's assume that we have a network which can "categorize" inputs and also is able to operate in form of "p => q" logic. This network is not self aware. Actually it has no "self".

Let's assume that premise has been defined in this network which implies: "for every object which is categorized as A (= thought) then it must have been initiated by an object which is categor ... (read more)

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This seems a simple mistake, and it should consequently be simple to rectify it. 

In particular, since the bulk of the translation was done by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, and the front page of the fourth edition states "The German text, with an English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte", Anscombe should be appropriately credited. 

The ideas of Zero and One are abstract concepts. They only exist in the mind by assumption. Mathematically, both words are called numerals by definition. When Zero is represented with the symbol 0 and One with 1, technically the words become numbers by association. Numbers are the assumed physical representations of the abstract numerals. By symbolic representation, both digits now exist outside the mind - the physical world - the world outside of ourselves - the inherent world that exists long time independently before the mind. 

However, although 0&1 are created by definition, association, representation and assumption, can we say that these numbers are solid objects or physical materials? If I write 0 and 1 on a paper, are they materially or physically real? Can we consider the written numbers proof of their existence? Can the numbers be proven as solid evidence prescribed by the scientific method to be real? How can we validate the paper evidence to be true, false, valid, or real ... (read more)
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I wonder if anyone could help me out?
I vaguely recall that Kim somewhere expresses reservations about metaphysical supervenience in the context of the mind-body relation - that supervenience in question might be only nomologically and not metaphysically necessary. Or something like that.

But I can't now find a good reference...  I wonder if my memory is failing me here...

(I found a brief remark in p. 49 of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough; but I thought there were better, more explicit passages.) 

I would be very grateful for good references.

All the Best

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Dear All, can anyone let me know of attempts to apply transcendental arguments to issues such as physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I would also be grateful of any comments on my attempt 'Emergence from What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness' published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies this year, issue 5-6.Thank you
Kim DaviesDavies 2014

I would be grateful for any feedback on the following unpublished note.

Zombies are inconceivable for the following reason.

In order to think that a is a zombie you have to think both that:

  1. a is exactly like a human from a third-person perspective;

  2. a has no qualia.

The problem lies in thinking (2). To see this, note that it is not enough to not think a has qualia. That is easy. You can do that just by imagining (1) and forgetting about (2). In other words, you just imagine all the required third-person facts about a—essentially what makes him indistinguishable from a human being—but don't bother to think about whether he has qualia or not. But clearly not thinking that a has some property is logically distinct form thinking that a does not have that property. To suppose otherwise would be to make an elementary scoping error. But if this right, then it is impossible in the deepest sense to think that a has no qualia. Therefore, zombies are inconceivable.

In case there is any doubt about this ... (read more)

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Dear all, I would be grateful for any comments on my paper 'Emergence from What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness' (Journal of Consciousness Studies Vol 21 Issue 5-6, June 2014) and any directions to other attempts to use transcendental arguments in the philosophy of mind.Thanks
Kim Davies

I have a question about individuation of perceptual content. I am writing about individual perceptual experience and joint perceptual experience, under the light of Fregean or NeoFregean frame. I do not believe that objects of perception are sufficient to individuate perceptual content; we need something more: a mode of presentation. So, my question is how the mode of presentations of perceptual states is individuated? Gareth Evans had an intuitive criterion of difference for thoughts or beliefs, but I do not know of a similar criterion for perceptions.  

Two beliefs have different content, if it is possible for a subject take different attitudes to both and even still being rational. Is it possible to build a similar criterion for perceptions? Maybe, two perceptions have different content, if it is possible for a subject to be disposed to do different things (e.g. actions, routines, activities, judgments, and the like) and even still being actively fluent in the environment?

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What do people think of Qualia Logic? One keeps track of both 3rd-person and 1st-person information in the truth-value of a proposition.
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Philosophy of Mind is a topic fraught with ambiguity. People use terms such as "mind," "consciousness," "awareness," "experience" and so forth as if everyone knows what they mean.  But they can mean very different things to different people, and too often we end up with ambiguity, equivocation and misunderstanding.    

Herein I propose some definitions of salient terms.  I do not claim that these are the only correct definitions.  I merely claim that if we all agree to use words the same way we'll have a productive conversation rather than talking past each other. Your comments are welcome, as I would like to hone these recommendations to be as clear as possible.

Proposed Definitions

Of all the concepts relating to mind, I propose that we use experience as the most inclusive.  It means the subjective aspect of a person's taking into account his or her world.  By subjective I mean detectable or observable in principle by only one person, the one who is taking his or her world into account. This is ... (read more)
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Recently I had an awareness that understanding is deeper than knowledge. Then I thought about it for a while. I realized that knowledge involves explanations, while understanding does not necessarily require explanations. for, we understand many things without being able to explain them. This made me very anxious about this problem because it concerns with the way human mind works. How is it possible to understand something without being able to explain it? The traditional notion of 'Intuition' or immediate and direct awareness is not satisfactory enough to clarify this problem. What concerns me is that human mind seems to me to be much more than what we have so far known through or traditional logic or even scientific parameters. By saying that understanding is deeper than knowledge, i mean that understanding is an aspect of Consciousness that seems to be distinct from what we call Mind, though both are connected. Although we are conscious of ourselves we do not need to talk t ... (read more)
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This is a rehash of an old post. I'm hoping someone can settle my confusion, xor, confirm my brilliant insight.

Let's suppose that zombies are conceivable. Many argue against this, but let's suppose. What I want to call into question is that an entire zombie world is conceivable. There is just one problem with this allegedly conceivable world: the person doing the conceiving. That's you. You, if you are truly conceiving of anything at all, are not a zombie.

I am of course assuming that "having a conception" implies "having consciousness." But this seems very fair to me. I am also assuming that "you" can be a disembodied consciousness. But 2-d semantics seems unable to deny the conceivability of such a thing.

1. Having a conception of a complete zombie world implies having a conception. (assumption)
2. Having a conception implies having (some) consciousness. (assumption)
3. Having (some) consciousness implies that there is consciousness. (assumption)
c4. Having a conception of a complet ... (read more)
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(From Author) Sadly enough, this article has badly edited parts. Although I asked Editor to correct them many times, it seems that he did not have enough time to do that. I would like to apologize to readers for that.Editor, who sent me a letter afterwards, said as follows:

September 10, 2012


This is to apologize for the typographical errors in the article published by Yusuke Kaneko in our journal, 
the International Journal of Arts and Sciences.
The mistakes were few but they were committed at the printing phase and should not be held against Dr. Kaneko.
We profusely apologize to Dr. Kaneko about the above.


Mark Bridge
Conferences Department
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