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2016-06-20
I have listening to all these economic warnings against Brexit, but they leave me with a couple of worries. And I don't have the expertise to assess them properly:

(a) The arguments for very negative economic effects from Brexit seem to assume that Brexit will leave the EU perfectly intact. It can then punish us with its economic power! But the assumption is very heavy. At least 4 EU member states fear that Brexit will lead to referendums in their own countries: France, Austria, Netherlands and Denmark.


(b) David Cameron repeatedly tells us that according to 9 out of 10 economists, Brexit would be bad for the UK. But the principle “Just go with the vast majority of economic experts on what the economic consequences are” is questionable. What about the 1 out of 10? Who are they? Today I found a professor at Cardiff Business School, a professor of economics at Durham University, and a professor of pensions at Cass Business School. Also Joseph Stiglitz, one of the greatest living ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/16874 Reply

2016-04-19
Freedom of Speech and the Right to Insult

Turkish President Erdogan has filed a complaint against a German comedian who read a poem depicting him committing  sexual acts with animals. A vast majority of the German population consider this as an inalienable right to free-speech. Me? I am certainly not a fan of Erdogan, but I agree with him in this special case. The "comedian" should be legally prosecuted. I must add that I find that journalists detained in Turkish prisons should simply be freed. Criticism is certainly a democratic right. So, what is the difference between the German "perpetrator", and the Turkish victims?
Thousands of people, if not millions, throughout history, have given their lives for the freedom to speak freely. And to this day, hundreds are still dying every day for that same right. What I find absolutely disgusting are parasites who abuse this right and not only seek but also get protection from the Law. And then I wonder. Did all those people in the past die for th ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/14930 Reply

2016-04-12
If you have any thoughts, comments or questions about this paper, let me know!

2016-04-12
If you have any thoughts, comments or questions about this paper, let me know!

2016-04-12
If you have any thoughts, comments or questions about this paper, let me know!
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/14842 Reply

2015-12-11
In Mark Cherry’s article “Non-consensual Treatment is (nearly always) Morally Adherent” he takes a Socratic approach to the issue of involuntary hospitalization and forced treatment of psychiatric patients. Cherry believes that non-consensual treatment does not reserve the patient’s best interest, fails to respect autonomy, and uses the idea of the mentally ill being a threat to others to violate their human rights. I will challenge these ideas by exploring the “thank you theory” as it is related to a wide range of mental illnesses and respect to patient best interest, pondering how the informed consent process can ever be seen as valid with a patient having no true sense of reality, and how never considering someone a threat until they already show violent behavior can result in tragedies occurring that could have been easily prevented.

Though it is true that non-consensual treatment of the mentally ill usually does not result in a “thank you” from the patients, addicts seem to be the ... (read more)


2015-09-04
What kind of academic inquiry can best help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in this question?  Is it because most believe the kind of academic inquiry we have today, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knoweldge and technological know-how, is the best that we can have, judged from the perspective of helping humanity make progress towards a better world?  Why are philosophers apparently so uninterested in arguments which seem to show decisively that inquiry restricted to the pursuit of knowledge is both profoundly irrational, and a menace?  The successful pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to trouble.  Scientific knowledge and technological know-how enormously increase our power to act - for some of us at ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10477 Reply

2015-06-23

Normative antirealism supposes that the only normative reasons are empirical, viz. those constituted by the actual attitudes of individuals and what follows from them.  However, the empirical normative attitudes of some individuals (e.g. normative realists) posit attitude-independent standards of normative judgement:  for example, rational measures of correctness (e.g. right and wrong) that are independent of the attitudes individuals actually have.  Since it follows from the actual attitudes of realists that there are independent normative standards, at least for them antirealism entails realism.  The antirealists respond that they have proven such independent standards to be fatally compromised:  when properly scrutinized they fail to follow even from the attitudes of realists.  But that's not an empirical claim!  The antirealist is replacing the question "What attitudes do persons actually have?" with the question "What personal attitudes stand up to scrutiny?", so withstanding scrutiny be ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/10194 Reply

2015-05-14
Discussion on one of the other threads (“Toward a Uniform Vocabulary for Discussing Subjectivity”) has lately turned to neuro-aesthetics where it is only marginally relevant. So I wondered if perhaps the topic might deserve its own thread, especially given that aesthetics in all its forms is such a poor relation in analytic philosophy and generally gets so little attention.

I should explain my own position. I think neuro-aesthetics is bunkum. I won’t go into why for the moment – that will doubtless emerge as time goes on. I’m happy to suggest it as a topic, however, because (a) I’m aware it has many enthusiasts, (b) who knows? I may be wrong, (c) I think it warrants closer scrutiny than it usually seems to get, and (d) as I say, aesthetics in all its form gets very little attention anyway.

To encourage contributions, I should mention that I have an Achilles heel: I have read very little of the work by “leading” neuro-aestheticians. Some intellectual movements, I feel, have folly writte ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9967 Reply

2015-04-18
If you come across this paper while researching philosophy of love, you should watch this: https://youtu.be/ykxNI137sPk
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9876 Reply

2015-03-27
In The Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel advocates substituting reasons for the role in human motivation traditionally played by desires.  He sees the need because what people desire is an empirical matter revealed in behavior, and varies too greatly to provide the kind of inescapability he thinks morality requires:  reasons can be "agent-neutral", whereas desires must always be "agent-relative" (to use terms later introduced by Parfit).  But Nagel specifically rejects the possibility that this approach conflates causal explanation with normative justification:  "a close connection between the two is already embodied in the ordinary concept of a reason" (15).  

He proposes to dethrone desires by drawing attention to a particular problem regarding the role of "future desires" in practical reasoning.  For example, suppose I now purchase a bottle of water for quenching the thirst I anticipate I will experience later in my drive home.  How do we explain this purchase?&nbs ... (read more)
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2015-03-23

THINKING GENDER 2015
The 25th edition of CSW’s Annual Graduate Research Conference will take place over two days, April 23&24, and will feature a keynote address, reception, networking luncheon, workshops, and a poster session.

THINKING GENDER 2015, CSW’s 25th Annual Graduate Student Research Conference, promises to strengthen scholarly networks and inspire lively conversation. To help make this landmark anniversary a memorable success, we have expanded the conference to a two-day schedule at UCLA’s Covel Commons and added a keynote address, poster exhibition, awards for papers and posters, student travel grants, workshops, and more.

We will open the conference with a keynote address, “Body Modifications: Violence, Labor, and the Subject of Feminism,” by Rebecca M. Herzig, the Christian A. Johnson Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies and Chair of the Program in Women and Gender Studies at Bates College (http://
www.bates.edu/gender/faculty/rebecca-m-herzig/), from 2 to 3:15 pm. The keyno ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9735 Reply

2015-03-04
I have been rereading The Possibility of Altruism, and have been struck by (pace Nagel) the essential incoherence of cognitive judgment internalism, at least on a rationalist construal of cognitivism (e.g. as opposed to naturalism).

On such a cognitive view, the truth of a moral judgment -- e.g. that act A is right -- is determinable by some rational assessment, regardless of one's involvement in A.  That is, whether or not one is in a position to do A, it's rightness is something anyone can determine, analogous to the way one can determine that "5 + 7 = 12" or "P&Q --> P" are true.  It is a rational truth.

But in determining the truth of a moral judgment I have not thereby decided to do anything, even in cases where I am involved.  In this case (shame on me) I may not yet have decided to do what is right.  The argument will be that, insofar I have not decided to do A, I have failed to fully appreciate the rightness of A.  But we have seen that the determination of the right ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9672 Reply

2015-03-09
Can anyone suggest a good source/reference about the discussion of Edith Stein's conception of soul and women, probably a critique or commentary about her existent essays?
Latest replies:
  • Cora Cruz, 2015-03-22 : I recently read a good paper by Kris McDaniel of Syracuse University, entitled Edith Stein: On the Problem of Empathy, d... (read more)
Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/9671 Reply

2015-02-19
If you have any questions or comments on "The Zygote Argument is Invalid", I would enjoy discussing them on this thread!


2015-02-01
I have noticed a small literature on Okin's objection to libertarianism. But I question whether this should be discussed under the heading of "Okin's objection". A very similar objection has been around for centuries by Robert Filmer, which the author briefly mentions but does not present. Filmer's objection is now discussed under the heading of the paradox of self-ownership.

It says that, given common knowledge, we cannot endorse both these propositions, which are essential to (standard?) libertarianism:
(1) Each person owns themselves.
(2) Each person owns the products of their labour.

According to Filmer, a person is the product of their parents' labour so they do not own themselves by (2).

Okin's version says that a person is the product of their mother's labour so they do not own themselves. (It seems she does not give a male parent even 0.000001% labour contribution.)

If the focus is mainly on whether a libertarian can say that individuals are self-owners, I feel it is unfair to discus ... (read more)
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