I am posting an explanation of this on my blog. It's drawn from my eprint

The Many Computations Interpretation (MCI) of Quantum Mechanics
http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0544

but I expect to make a shorter paper just on this more limited topic.

My question is: is the explanation I give and purpose of what I am doing clear? Comments on the validity of the ideas are also welcome. Thanks.

So far I have the following posts on it (and see the main blog for more context related to QM):

Basic idea of an implementation
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/basic-idea-of-implementation.html

The Putnam-Searle-Chalmers Theorem
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/putnam-searle-chalmers-theorem.html

Restrictions on mappings 1: Independence and Inheritance
http://onqm.blogspot.com/2011/10/restrictions-on-mappings-1-independence.html

Dear all,

Lately I was wondering if there is any check on quality of review in e.g. Foundation of Physics.

A paper can be rejected on  

1. Stated dislike of the philosophy by the reviewer.
2. Claim that a proof is 'not convincing' while giving no further spoecification at all.

Does this kind of reviewing practices sound familiar to any of you?



Yours
Han Geurdes

I ask this question from a position of profound ignorance of physics.

I would have answered the question in the title with a reflexive "of course not" until just a few minutes ago when something occured to me.

As far as I know, it's entirely possible that it was [i]physically possible[/i] for all the constants of nature could have turned out to be different. This, in turn, would have made for worlds in which the laws of physics would have appeared quite different to creatures inhabiting those worlds than ours appear to us, up until those creatures had succeeded in completing a full and correct theory of everything.

So what constraints are there on these basic constants? Are there any but mathematical constraints? If not, isn't this tantamount to saying there are none but logical constraints? If that's so, then, doesn't this imply that the physical possibilities are exactly the same as the logical possibilities?

Another way to put it: If a multiverse theory turns out to be correct in physic ... (read more)