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2014-08-31
Hi! I'm traying to translate a sentence from GA 28 (untranslated) and I need to contrast my interpretation with somebody elses.

The sentence goes like this:

Während aber die Art des Wissens nur ist, was sie sein kann, auf dem Grunde des eigenen Selbst, was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß, wozu eine Offenbarkeit freilich gehört, die aber nur aus der spezifischen Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden kann.

My version of this monstruosity would be the following (please note that the sentence is incomplete as there is no main clause, and that it has been copied literally from the book).

But while the kind of knowing only is what it can be on the ground of the own self, this itself, that is the own self, must be determined as Being, to which certainly a manifestness belongs, which it self can be understood however only from the specific mode of being of Dasein.

My biggest headache is "was selbst als das Sein bestimmt werden muß"

Is Heidegger saying

i. that the own self must be determined ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/8792 Reply

2013-08-09

Methodologically speaking, I wonder why Matilal and S's article has not been enough for  further studies of this sort to be the rule on Mind (and other philosophical journals). Does this failure depend on their style? (Or should we just start working as a task-force and submit many articles of this kind?)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7866 Reply

2013-08-09

Can there be linguistics without ontology?

The context principle and some Indian controversies over Meaning is a milestone in Indian studies, and in the history of their interaction with mainstream (i.e. Western) philosophy. Since it was published in 1988 on Mind (one of the top-5 journals in Philosophy, inaccessible for most authors), virtually everyone (in Indian philosophy) has read it.

Have you also re-read it?

I re-read it after some years this Summer and I have to admit that it was again a surprise. The article starts with a discussion of the Context principle in Frege and Quine (does the principle mean that words HAVE no meaning outside a sentence, or that their meaning can only be UNDERSTOOD within a sentence?). In this connection, Matilal and Sen discuss a strong and a weak interpretation of the Context principle (according to whether it should answer the first or the second question). They end up saying that the strong interpretation clashes with Frege's later work (see belo ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7865 Reply

2013-05-25

Heritage of the Yoga Philosophy and Transcendental Phenomenology:

 The Interlocution of  Knowledge and Wisdom across Two Traditions of Philosophy

 

Koshy Tharakan

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy

 Goa University

koshy@unigoa.ac.in

 

Abstract  Comparative philosophy has been subjected to much criticism in the latter half of the last century, though some of these criticisms were appropriate and justified. However, in our present cultural milieu, where traditions and culture transcend their geographical boundaries, seeping through the global network of views and ideas, it seems to be a legitimate enterprise to understand one’s own traditions and culture through the critical lens of the ‘other culture’. It is such cross-cultural understanding that paved the way towards legitimizing “human rights” as a universal discourse. So also, the discourse on “environmental ethics” has gained acceptance in a similar manner across cultures and traditions.  The paper attempts at an understan ... (read more)

Latest replies:
  • Joseph Alia, 2013-06-11 : I find this article refreshing and appreciate this kind of work as enabling development of more and better ways of think... (read more)
Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7806 Reply

2012-11-20
I am a reader of Asian Philosophy, and also involved in research and study of 'Asian Philosophy', the ' Vedic Philosophy. In this course, what surprises me is the 'term used 'Indian Philosophy'. Vedic Philsophy is neither an Indian Philosophy nor Nepali Philosophy, nor Bengali. In South Asia, there are otther countries with traditions based on Vedas, Nepal is one of them. In Bangladesh, there are Hindus who believe in this tradition. There are people following traditions in Burma, Thailand, Malayasia, Indonesia, Sri-Lanka and also Tibet, and most recently in many countirs. Ancient South Asia was a nation called India. India is known to be so called after East India Company occupation. In South Asia, there were nations like 'Beidhe' where King Janak ruled.

I therefore express my reservation on word called 'Indian' philosophy. Something, which is recently developed may called Indian philosophy. Mahatma Gandhi's ahimsa theory can be Indian Philosophy. But How people can put Bu ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7448 Reply

2012-11-12
Hi everyone,

Can anyone please explain to me in simple terms what Derrida understand by the concept of "Scene" and what is it its realtion to the concept of authorship.

I'm truly sorry for not adding any further background to my quarry but I'm totally and completelly lost.

Thanks so much everyone!


Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7421 Reply

2011-05-19
I don't think Heidegger is a conceptualist.Since,Heidegger believes,Being finds itself in a "world" already interpreted in someway and its  grasp over its "world" is not something empirically given primordially Being is said to be interpretation all the way down.The modalities(What and How of the world) of our grasp over our world precedes any semantic conceptualization of such graspings.Hence
the basic or core purchase that we have of our world can not come in to total clarity with regard to their nature:whether they are conceptual or non conceptual.They,it seems,are more like practical know how(Verstehen) rather than conceptual know that.    
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/5838 Reply

2011-01-18
This is awesome. Tractatus power!

2010-08-06

I have not yet read the full version of Joseph's book, but I can tell this ties directly into my own theoretical perspectives involving assessment, learning, behavior, and consciousness. To me, as laid out in my Education PhD dissertation at Colorado State University (2005), the core essence of being (reality) is individual and collective consciousness interacting and interconnecting with consciousness at every level of existence (seen and unseen) as an ongoing here and now creative process." Thus, primary learning is intuitive and secondary learning is rational-objective.

Rational objective, is by my definition, fixtional thinking that allows one to "fix" or position relations "as if" they were separate and disconnected in a cause and effect relationship and in which they must of necessity substantiate existence "as if" it were true. It entails a sort of machine mentality of parts, in which the parts equals the whole and the whole is what the parts c ... (read more)


2010-06-23
Not withstanding their disparate temporal and socio-cultural context, both Sankara and Heidegger share a degree of commonality in thought and in their allegiance to their predecessors which is more than isomorphic in nature to escape attention.Sankara reaffirms his faith in Vedantic teachings and insists on doing philosophy in so far as it truely reflects the former's insights and intutions.Heidegger,similarly,is reputed to have traced his ontology to ancient philosophers such as
Hearclitus,Parmenides and, as some would say,even to Aristotle to find out the meaning of Being.Both are critical of any attempt to ontologise Being(Brahman, in case of Sankar)with categories and concepts derived from sources whose ontological merits are suspect.Intellect for Sankara is a rough equivalent of what Heidegger would say calculative thinking as opposed to mediative thinking.In this sense both find in logic-the rule of pure thought- a common enemy to be attacked and be rendered inadequate as it tric ... (read more)
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2010-05-27
Perhaps we could begin with Hitchcock and Husserl/Sartre?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/3968 Reply

2010-04-30
If one looks at the genesis,growth and achievements of European philosophy
one feature that stands apart is the way "enlightenment rationality" continues to
set the agenda not only for philosophy but,virtually, for every disciplines.
Thanks to Husserl et al. for exposing the limitation of such a highhanded
positivist outlook that treats life as an entity.    

2010-04-19
Gadamer was not properly understood by Habermas.To deny tradition and authority their proper place in our discursive practices is to build castles in the air of idealism and  to  overlook  our fallibility



 and  finitude  that  stand for who  we are.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/3613 Reply

2010-04-01

Dear Professor Ott. I have enjoyed your work on Malebranche and I'm now considering Berkeley's doctrine of the passivity of ideas. In Principles 25 he argues that essentially if we looks closely at our ideas (objects of sense) we'll come to see (1) they are passive, (2) a stronger stronger claim--it's impossible that they be active--thus non-minded nature must be causally inert. (2) Seems the right way to go--the argument as J Bennett (Learning from Six Philosophers) suggests is a priori; from the doctrine that to be is to be perceived it logically follows that nature is causally inert. I don't quite see the deduction--both K Winkler (Berkeley) and G Strawson (The Secret Connexion) have outlined how the argument might go, but I'm not convinced. Recently Jeff McDonough (J Phil argued that with respect to Berkeley's claim that 'against Malebranche we move our limbs ourselves,' a concurrentist account might save Berkeley from the consequent problem that ... (read more)

2010-04-02
This is a thread to get a discussion started on Ancient Indian Philosophy.

Indian Philosophy has evolved in 2. One which accept the authority of Sruthi "The vedas" the one which does not. 

Sruthi means heard, authority, etc, 

Sruthi is something believed to be permanent in this world and does not need any other source of knowledge to reveal itself, just like sun does not need a torch light's presence to announce its own presence.

Samkhya, Vaiseshika, Mimamsa, Vedanta, Nyaya, Yoga, forms the schools which accept the authority of vedas.

Jainism, Buddhism, and Materialism or Carvaka Philosophy constitute the class of schools which do not accept the authority of vedas.


Tantra forms another greater development of philosophy. This is said to be evolved as a distinct branch independent of vedas but later accepted the authority of vedas and got merged with it. Tantra stands independent and many of its ideas are unique. 

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/3416 Reply

2010-03-28
Today I am comparing my old, defective, James S. Churchill translation of "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" with an edition published in 1934 by Verlag Gerhard Shulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt am Main.
What struck me was how the 1962 Indiana U. Press translation had largely stayed with the German footnotes of this 1934 edition: footnotes vary across the langauges as "WW (Cass.)" versus "Works (Cass.)".  The 1962 replicates the German in one place introducing the full surname (Cassirer) in an early footnote, but nowhere "Ernst Cassirer".

But does this demolition of Kant not arise out of the lectures at Davos? The 1934 edition has an untitled "preface" saying "und bei den Davoser Hochschulkursen im Maerz d.J.) ", i.e., in spring 1929 with Ernst Cassirer - but with no mention of Cassirer.

In the Richard Taft translation, a note indicates only that Heidegger's footnotes are to the Cassirer edition.

Cassirer did not live to return to reclaim his teaching position in Germany.  He began his caree ... (read more)
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2010-03-28
The relationship of early Carnap to Husserl is now better known.
English readers may not know that "Überwindung der Metaphysik" is the title of a controversial Heidegger essay which appeared in the early 50's

In this thread I will look at the Joan Stambaugh translation in the light of Faye, Wolin and Rockmore on Heidegger's political thought.

Stambaugh's 1973 translation appears in Richard Wolin's (editor) 1991 collection, "The Heidegger Controversy".

note: Wilfred Sellar's short philosophical autobiography is interesting and amusing as regards the early Carnap.

2010-03-24
In "On Denoting" (1905), Russell presents a theory of denotation which relies on the notion of a variable.  Russell says very little about variables in this paper.  He says only that they are "fundamental," and that they are "essentially and wholly undetermined" constituents of propositional functions.  I think I understand the role of this notion in Russell's theory, and why Russell says what he does about it,  He appeals to non-denoting elements in propositions in order to avoid having to interpret "a=b" as "a=a."  By using variables, he can claim that no elements in a propositional function serve the role of the denoting phrase.  For example, in the fully explicit presentation of "Scott is the author of Waverley," we do not find anything for which we could substitute the phrase "the author of Waverley."  The meaning of the denoting phrase is only found when we interpret the proposition as a whole, and cannot be found in any of its parts. 

My problem is, I don't know what it means to say ... (read more)
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2010-01-18

This much seems clear. Wittgenstein held that Christians, at some level of devoutness, should believe in the alleged historical event (believe that it actually occurred – could have been photographed, etc.) but with a sort of certainty, and fervor, that is quite inappropriate in regard to historical events in general.  Something like that? I think it is clear that he did not think that they should keep the objective uncertainty of such beliefs in mind. That is to say, he was strongly opposed to what I take to be the Kierkegaardian view.

 

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/2793 Reply

2010-01-10
What is Anglophone philosophy?

The question is simple enough, but I do now know if there is consensus on the answer.

Three possible answers come to mind:
  1. Philosophy produced in an English-speaking community.
  2. Philosophy produced in English.
  3. Philosophy that is primarily of interest to English-speaking philosophers.
I do not know what has been written on this subject, though the question was raised for me recently when I read (and responded to) Brian Leiter's "The Most Cited Books in Post-WWII Angolphone Philosophy."

In what follows, I consider Leiter's account of Anglophone philosophy, because his is the only treatment I've come across.  While Leiter may not be the foremost authority on this issue, I do not know who is.

Number 4 on Leiter's list is Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which was not written in English, but which was first published in English translation, thanks to G. E. M. Anscombe.  Of course, Wittgenstein was a pivotal figure at Oxford.  Yet, I presume that ... (read more)
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