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2014-11-05
Because of Copyright, I am not yet in a position to upload this article. If you have any interest, feel free to contact me anytime.  (Author)

2013-08-09

Methodologically speaking, I wonder why Matilal and S's article has not been enough for  further studies of this sort to be the rule on Mind (and other philosophical journals). Does this failure depend on their style? (Or should we just start working as a task-force and submit many articles of this kind?)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7866 Reply

2013-08-09

Can there be linguistics without ontology?

The context principle and some Indian controversies over Meaning is a milestone in Indian studies, and in the history of their interaction with mainstream (i.e. Western) philosophy. Since it was published in 1988 on Mind (one of the top-5 journals in Philosophy, inaccessible for most authors), virtually everyone (in Indian philosophy) has read it.

Have you also re-read it?

I re-read it after some years this Summer and I have to admit that it was again a surprise. The article starts with a discussion of the Context principle in Frege and Quine (does the principle mean that words HAVE no meaning outside a sentence, or that their meaning can only be UNDERSTOOD within a sentence?). In this connection, Matilal and Sen discuss a strong and a weak interpretation of the Context principle (according to whether it should answer the first or the second question). They end up saying that the strong interpretation clashes with Frege's later work (see belo ... (read more)

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/7865 Reply

2011-01-18
This is awesome. Tractatus power!

2010-05-27
Perhaps we could begin with Hitchcock and Husserl/Sartre?
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/3968 Reply

2010-04-30
If one looks at the genesis,growth and achievements of European philosophy
one feature that stands apart is the way "enlightenment rationality" continues to
set the agenda not only for philosophy but,virtually, for every disciplines.
Thanks to Husserl et al. for exposing the limitation of such a highhanded
positivist outlook that treats life as an entity.    

2010-04-01

Dear Professor Ott. I have enjoyed your work on Malebranche and I'm now considering Berkeley's doctrine of the passivity of ideas. In Principles 25 he argues that essentially if we looks closely at our ideas (objects of sense) we'll come to see (1) they are passive, (2) a stronger stronger claim--it's impossible that they be active--thus non-minded nature must be causally inert. (2) Seems the right way to go--the argument as J Bennett (Learning from Six Philosophers) suggests is a priori; from the doctrine that to be is to be perceived it logically follows that nature is causally inert. I don't quite see the deduction--both K Winkler (Berkeley) and G Strawson (The Secret Connexion) have outlined how the argument might go, but I'm not convinced. Recently Jeff McDonough (J Phil argued that with respect to Berkeley's claim that 'against Malebranche we move our limbs ourselves,' a concurrentist account might save Berkeley from the consequent problem that ... (read more)

2010-03-28
The relationship of early Carnap to Husserl is now better known.
English readers may not know that "Überwindung der Metaphysik" is the title of a controversial Heidegger essay which appeared in the early 50's

In this thread I will look at the Joan Stambaugh translation in the light of Faye, Wolin and Rockmore on Heidegger's political thought.

Stambaugh's 1973 translation appears in Richard Wolin's (editor) 1991 collection, "The Heidegger Controversy".

note: Wilfred Sellar's short philosophical autobiography is interesting and amusing as regards the early Carnap.

2010-03-24
In "On Denoting" (1905), Russell presents a theory of denotation which relies on the notion of a variable.  Russell says very little about variables in this paper.  He says only that they are "fundamental," and that they are "essentially and wholly undetermined" constituents of propositional functions.  I think I understand the role of this notion in Russell's theory, and why Russell says what he does about it,  He appeals to non-denoting elements in propositions in order to avoid having to interpret "a=b" as "a=a."  By using variables, he can claim that no elements in a propositional function serve the role of the denoting phrase.  For example, in the fully explicit presentation of "Scott is the author of Waverley," we do not find anything for which we could substitute the phrase "the author of Waverley."  The meaning of the denoting phrase is only found when we interpret the proposition as a whole, and cannot be found in any of its parts. 

My problem is, I don't know what it means to say ... (read more)
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/3357 Reply

2010-01-18

This much seems clear. Wittgenstein held that Christians, at some level of devoutness, should believe in the alleged historical event (believe that it actually occurred – could have been photographed, etc.) but with a sort of certainty, and fervor, that is quite inappropriate in regard to historical events in general.  Something like that? I think it is clear that he did not think that they should keep the objective uncertainty of such beliefs in mind. That is to say, he was strongly opposed to what I take to be the Kierkegaardian view.

 

Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/2793 Reply

2009-08-11
That's an interesting myth-busting. However, the subject might gain from a deeper discussion. I don't really understand what Hegel's rhetoric would be in such a context: why does he even take the Timaeus' series, and why the change in it? If he's not happy with aprioristic thinking, why does he use it? Is it a form of sarcasm, or a reductio ad absurdum?

2009-03-10
Here is a bit of background: I came across Millican's 1994 paper over the weekend while I was independently researching the philosophy of P.F. Strawson online.  (My resources are quite limited, incidentally.)  I only last week learned of Strawson via the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy while I was looking for interpretations of the Liar's Paradox, and I was struck by an apparent similarity between his and my own.  My interest in Strawson was furthered when I came across the first four pages of "On Referring," in which he claims that expressions do not refer, but that people can refer using expressions.  (This is the idea Millican indicates as Strawson's distinction between sentences and statements, where the latter is determined by a sentence's usage.)  This Wittgensteinian notion had occured to me only days earlier, and is what led me to formulate my own arguments about the Liar's Paradox.  In fact, I had written virtually the exact same sentence as Strawson to express t
 he same id ... (read more)
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2009-02-24
This is a good attempt from an analytical perspective to examine an interpretation of Kant which has tended to be the preserve of Continental philosophers. However, it seems to have generated little comment that I can trace.  Imagination is the faculty of the gaps in Kant's epistemology - an uncomfortable position if Kant is to be seen as a cognitive realist.  But the transcendental component of his dualism is perhaps a matter ultimately of imagination so Gibbons' work is a useful balance to interpretations of Kant which emphasise his attempt to defeat Humean scepticism.
Latest replies: Permanent link: http://philpapers.org/post/441 Reply

2009-02-02
Dear reader,

I am looking for feedback on this paper.  I have never sent anything (except book notes) to be published because I have never felt that my work was up to standard.  I do not want to publish something that will not be read or that will not provide some inspiration and interest when read.  If you feel you can provide constructive criticism, then please do so.

All the best,

Max Bini

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