Online research in philosophy

Propositional Attitude Reports

1. Kent Bach, Questions and Answers.
   Jonathan is known for his answers as well as his questions. In fact, he is known for giving the same answer to different questions. This illustrates his point about convergent questions: different questions can have the same answer. Jonathan relies on this point to show that if p is the answer to a certain question, knowing the answer to that question doesn’t consist merely in knowing that p. Since p is the answer to many questions, and you can know the (...) answer to one without knowing the answer to another, knowing that p does not suffice for knowing the answer to the question in question. This argument refutes the orthodox reductive view or, as I’ll call it for short, the stupid view. Jonathan thinks that knowledge-wh relates a knower to a question as well as an answer – it’s a three-term relation. Indeed, as previous visitors to Bellingham know, Jonathan even thinks that knowledge-that is a three-term relation. His not-so-hidden agenda this time around is to parlay the shortcomings of the stupid view of knowledge- wh into new support for his contrastivist view of knowledge-that. He now thinks that even “knowledge-that includes a question” (p. 14). As for me, there’s a more sensible way to improve upon the stupid view. This sensible view is reductive insofar as it holds that knowledge-wh reduces to knowledgethat, with knowledge-that understood as a two-term relation. And it’s reductive in a different way: it’s not expansive like Jonathan’s view, which incorporates both questions and answers into knowledge-wh ascriptions. The sensible view says that knowledge-wh is a two-term relation, relating knowers just to questions. Even so, as I will explain, it agrees with Jonathan that knowing-wh is knowing the answer (or at least an answer – like Jonathan, I’ll downplay the fact that some questions have more than one true answer). Best of all, the sensible view exhibits the connection between answers and questions. It shows precisely how it is that what you know when you know the answer to a question is the answer to that question.. (shrink)

   Questions in Philosophy of Language

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2. Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
   The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...) to the semantics of belief reports. But this approach must confront a puzzle of its own: it turns out that every case is a Paderewski case, at least potentially. (shrink)

   Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

   Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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3. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
   Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind

   Situation Semantics in Philosophy of Language

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4. George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
   This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...) used to defend antiexistentialism against existentialist prejudices. The paper closes with a suggestion about how this theory of content might enable us to give purely semantic (as opposed to pragmatic) solutions to the puzzles based on a novel formulation of the principle of compositionality. (shrink)

   Frege's Puzzle in Philosophy of Language

   Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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5. George Bealer (1982). Quality and Concept. Oxford University Press.
   This study provides a unified theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). Two conceptions of PRPs have emerged in the history of philosophy. The author explores both of these traditional conceptions and shows how they can be captured by a single theory.

   Propositions in Philosophy of Language

   Universals in Metaphysics

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6. John Bigelow (1980). Believing in Sentences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):11 – 18.
   Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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7. Steven E. Boër (2007). Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution. Springer.
   This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to a thought-content T just (...) in case one (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a certain sentence S of one’s language of thought that satisfies what T encodes, which in turn requires that S’s non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantical relations to items specified by T. Since these items may include other senses as well as ordinary objects, beliefs of arbitrary complexity are automatically accommodated. Within the framework of the formal ontology, a context-dependent compositional semantics is then provided for a fragment of regimented English capable of formulating ascriptions of belief—a semantics that treats substitutional opacity as a genuine semantic datum. Finally, the resulting picture of belief and its attribution is defended by showing how it solves standard puzzles, avoids objections to rival accounts, and satisfies certain adequacy conditions not fulfilled by traditional theories. Along the way, clarification and defense is offered for the ingredient conception of object-dependent senses, and it is shown how adoption of the language of thought hypothesis permits Bertrand Russell’s obscure doctrine of logical forms to be understood in a way that not only vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief but also reveals the connection between these logical forms and thought-contents. (shrink)

   Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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8. Steven E. Boër (1994). Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology. Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.
   This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.

   Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

   Propositional Attitudes, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

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9. Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan (1980). Who, Me? Philosophical Review 89 (3):427-466.
   Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

   Quotation in Philosophy of Language

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10. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Explanation. Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
    Many philosophers think that the Substitution Objection decisively refutes Russellianism. This objection claims that sentences (1) and (2) can differ in truth value. Therefore, it says, the sentences express different propositions, and so Russellianism is false.

    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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11. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Prediction. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
    Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. (...) They conclude that Russellianism isfalse. I defend Russellianism from this objection. I present severalanalyses of ``sentence S can be used to predict event E''. I arguethat, on each of these analyses, attitude ascriptions can be used topredict behavior, even if Russellianism is true. Furthermore, if myarguments are incorrect, and attitude ascriptions cannot be used topredict behavior under Russellianism, then Russellians can explainaway the intuition that they can be so used. (shrink)

    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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12. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.

    Explanatory Role of Content in Philosophy of Mind

    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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13. David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
    In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that (...) all utterances of (1) and.. (shrink)

    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Substitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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14. David M. Braun (1991). Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Frege's Puzzle in Philosophy of Language

    Names in Philosophy of Language

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15. Berit Brogaard (2009). What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439-467.
    Reductionists about knowledge- wh hold that " s knows- wh " (e.g. "John knows who stole his car") is reducible to "there is a proposition p such that s knows that p , and p answers the indirect question of the wh -clause." Anti-reductionists hold that " s knows- wh " is reducible to " s knows that p , as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh -clause." I argue that both of these positions are defective. (...) I then offer a new analysis of knowledge- wh as a special kind of de re knowledge. (shrink)

    Knowledge-Wh in Epistemology

    Questions in Philosophy of Language

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16. Berit Brogaard (2008). Knowledge-the and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.
    Determiner phrases embedded under a propositional attitude verb have traditionally been taken to denote answers to implicit questions. For example, 'the capital of Vermont' as it occurs in 'John knows the capital of Vermont' has been thought to denote the proposition which answers the implicit question 'what is the capital of Vermont?' Thus, where 'know' is treated as a propositional attitude verb rather than an acquaintance verb, 'John knows the capital of Vermont' is true iff John knows that Montpelier is (...) the capital of Vermont. The traditional view lost its popularity long ago, because it was thought to rest on the controversial assumption that determiner phases embedded under a propositional attitude verb function semantically in the same way as the corresponding wh -clauses. Here we defend the traditional assumption against objections. We then argue that wh -clauses are not to be given a uniform treatment as indirect questions. When occurring under a propositional attitude verb, wh -clauses are better treated as having a predicate-type semantic value. We conclude by considering some possible objections to the predicate view. (shrink)

    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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17. Berit Brogaard (2007). Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap? Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
    Attitude reports are reports about people’s states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude reports are successful. Some (...) hold that it is specification of the precise content of a mental state; others hold that it is specification of the content of a mental state only relative to a mode of presentation; yet others hold that it is merely a description or characterization of the content of a mental state. After providing a brief introduction to the traditional debate on attitude reports, this entry argues that for certain kinds of knowledge reports and for so-called de re attitude reports, descriptive theories emerge as the most plausible. The entry concludes with a discussion of how the characterizing relation between attitude reports and mental states might be construed. (shrink)

    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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18. Tyler Burge (1977). Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief. Philosophical Studies 31 (3):197 - 203.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    W. V. O. Quine in 20th Century Philosophy

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19. David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?

    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Propositions, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Two-Dimensional Semantics in Philosophy of Language

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20. Roderick Chisholm (1976). Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'de Re'. Philosophical Studies 29 (1):1 - 20.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Roderick Chisholm in 20th Century Philosophy

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21. Lenny Clapp (2002). Davidson's Program and Interpreted Logical Forms. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):261-297.
    Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind

    Truth-Conditional Theories in Philosophy of Language

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22. Leonard Clapp (1995). How to Be Direct and Innocent: A Criticism of Crimmins and Perry's Theory of Attitude Ascriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (5):529 - 565.
    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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23. Mark Crimmins (2002). Talk About Beliefs. MIT Press.
    Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...

    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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24. Mark Crimmins (1995). Contextuality, Reflexivity, Iteration, Logic. Philosophical Perspectives 9:381-399.
    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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25. Mark Crimmins (1993). So-Labeled Neo-Fregeanism. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279.
    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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26. Mark Crimmins (1992). Context in the Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (2):185 - 198.
    Philosophy of Linguistics in Philosophy of Language

    Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind

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27. Mark Crimmins & John Perry (1989). The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 - 711.
    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief in Philosophy of Language

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28. Donald Davidson (1968). On Saying That. Synthese 19 (1-2):130--46.
    Donald Davidson in 20th Century Philosophy

    Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind

    Truth-Conditional Theories in Philosophy of Language

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29. Donald Davidson (1967). Truth and Meaning. Synthese 17 (1):304--23.
    Donald Davidson in 20th Century Philosophy

    Tarskian Theories of Truth in Philosophy of Language

    Truth-Conditional Theories in Philosophy of Language

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30. Michael Dummett (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Duckworth.
    This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...

    Frege's Puzzle in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Sense in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Gottlob Frege in 20th Century Philosophy

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31. Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects thirteen papers by one of the leading philosophers of his generation, who died prematurely in 1980.

    Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

    Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind

    Molyneux's Problem in Philosophy of Mind

    Object-Dependent Contents in Philosophy of Mind

    Philosophy of Language, General Works in Philosophy of Language

    Reference in Philosophy of Language

    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

    Vague Identity in Metaphysics

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32. G. W. Fitch (1984). Two Aspects of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):87-101.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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33. Graeme Forbes (2002). Intensionality: Graeme Forbes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):75–99.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes (2000b). In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an (...) immortal gorgon', are invalid. Since 'a gorgon' and 'a mortal gorgon or an immortal gorgon' are extensionally and intensionally the same quantifier, it is not completely trivial to arrange the semantics of intensional transitives so that this classification of the inferences is obtained. (This paper is an abridged version of Forbes (2001a); the latter will be incorporated into a forthcoming monograph, Attitude Problems.) /// [Jennifer Saul] This paper discusses the question of which verbs are intensional transitives. In particular, I ask which verbs Forbes should take to be intensional transitives. I argue that it is very difficult to arrive at a clear and plausible understanding of what an intensional transitive is-making it difficult to answer these questions. I end by briefly raising some questions about the usefulness of the category of intensional transitives. (shrink)

    No categories

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34. Graeme Forbes (2000). Objectual Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.
    Intensional Transitive Verbs in Philosophy of Language

    Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind

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35. Graeme Forbes (1996). Substitutivity and the Coherence of Quantifying In. Philosophical Review 105 (3):337-372.
    Substitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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36. Graeme Forbes (1993). Reply to Marks. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):281 - 295.
    No categories

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37. Graeme Forbes (1990). The Indispensability of Sinn. Philosophical Review 99 (4):535-563.
    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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38. Gottlob Frege (1956). The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. Mind 65 (259):289-311.
    Frege's Puzzle in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Sense in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Gottlob Frege in 20th Century Philosophy

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39. Gottlob Frege (1948). Sense and Reference. Philosophical Review 57 (3):209-230.
    Frege's Puzzle in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Sense in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Gottlob Frege in 20th Century Philosophy

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40. Richard Heck (2002). Do Demonstratives Have Senses? Philosophers' Imprint 2 (2):1-33.
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...) in an appropriate way. This fact makes it difficult to reconcile the view that referring expressions are "directly referential" with any view that seeks (as Grice's does) to ground meaning in facts about communication. (shrink)

    Demonstratives, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Direct Reference Theories of Indexicals in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Sense in Philosophy of Language

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41. Richard Holton (1994). Attitude Ascriptions and Intermediate Scope. Mind 103 (410):123-130.
    Quantification into a belief ascription has often been taken to indicate that the believer knows who (or what) their belief is about. Here it is shown, by means of some iterated ascriptions, that this cannot be the correct interpretation of such quantification. In conclusion it is suggested that it should rather be interpreted as indicating that the belief has its source in the object denoted by the quantifier.

    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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42. Laurence R. Horn & Samuel Bayer (1984). Short-Circuited Implicature: A Negative Contribution. Linguistics and Philosophy 7 (4):397 - 414.
    Pragmatics in Philosophy of Language

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43. Henry Jackman, Prototypes, Belief Ascriptions, and Ambiguity.
    Many philosophers have suggested that belief predicates are ambiguous between a de dicto and a de re reading. However, the impression of ambiguity is a function of the narrow ranges of examples that philosophers focus on. When we consider our ascriptional practices as a whole, the suggestion that belief predicates are ambiguous is neither plausible nor needed to explain the de dicto/de re distinction. This paper will argue that understanding paradigmatic de dicto and de re ascriptions in terms of disavowals (...) from a more basic sort of ascription is preferable to positing an ambiguity in which each of the two sorts of ascription are conceptually primitive. (shrink)

    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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44. David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Intensionality and Opacity in Philosophy of Language

    Reference in Philosophy of Language

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45. Ali Akhtar Kazmi (1987). Quantification and Opacity. Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (1):77 - 100.
    Intensionality and Opacity in Philosophy of Language

    Quantifiers in Philosophy of Language

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46. N. Kompa (2002). The Context Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):1-18.
    According to contextualist accounts, the truth value of a given knowledge ascription may vary with features of the ascriber's context. As a result, the following may be true: "X doesn't know that P but Y says something true in asserting 'X knows that P'". The contextualist must defend his theory in the light of this unpleasant but inevitable consequence. The best way of doing this is to construe the context sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions not as deriving from an alleged indexicality (...) of the word "know" nor from its vagueness or ambiguity, but rather from a distinct semantic feature of the word "know", namely its unspecificity. (shrink)

    Epistemic Contextualism in Epistemology

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47. Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel.
    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief in Philosophy of Language

    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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48. Richard K. Larson & Peter Ludlow (1993). Interpreted Logical Forms. Synthese 95 (3):305 - 355.
    Interpretation in Philosophy of Language

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49. David Lewis (1970). General Semantics. Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
    Context and Context-Dependence, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    David Lewis in 20th Century Philosophy

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50. David K. Lewis (1986/2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only ...

    David Lewis in 20th Century Philosophy

    Modal Empiricism in Metaphysics

    Modal Realism in Metaphysics

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51. Peter Ludlow (1995). Logical Form and the Hidden-Indexical Theory: A Reply to Schiffer. Journal Of Philosophy 92 (2):102-107.
    Context and Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

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52. Meghan Masto (2010). Questions, Answers, and Knowledge- Wh. Philosophical Studies 147 (3).
    Knowledge-Wh in Epistemology

    Questions in Philosophy of Language

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53. Thomas McKay, Propositional Attitude Reports. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Attitude Ascriptions, Misc in Philosophy of Language

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54. Thomas McKay (1981). On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):287-303.
    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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55. Thomas J. McKay (1991). Representingde Re Beliefs. Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (6):711 - 739.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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56. Jennifer Nagel (2008). Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
    Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called 'need-for-closure') relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy of one's cognition. (...) Given these effects, it is a mistake to assume that high- and low-stakes subjects provided with the same initial evidence are perceived to enjoy belief formation that is the same as far as truth-conducive factors are concerned. This mistaken assumption has underpinned contextualist and interest-relative invariantist treatments of cases in which contrasting knowledge ascriptions are elicited by descriptions of subjects with the same initial information and different stakes. The paper argues that intellectualist invariantism can easily accommodate such cases. (shrink)

    Epistemic Contextualism and Invariantism in Epistemology

    Evidence and Knowledge in Epistemology

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57. Michael Nelson (2005). The Problem of Puzzling Pairs. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.
    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

    Substitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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58. Michael Nelson (2002). Puzzling Pairs. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):109 - 119.
    Propositional attitude ascribing sentences seem to give rise to failures of substitution. Is this phenomena best accounted for semantically, by constructing a semantics for propositional attitude ascribing sentences that invalidates the Substitution Principle, or pragmatically? In this paper I argue against semantic accounts of such phenomena. I argue that any semantic theory that respects all our apparent substitution failure intuitions will entail that the noun-phrase position outside the scope of the attitude verb is not open to substitution salva veritate, which (...) is counter-intuitive. (shrink)

    Substitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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59. D. E. Over (1983). On Kripke's Puzzle. Mind 92 (366):253-256.
    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief in Philosophy of Language

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60. John Perry, Myself and I.
    In this essay I distinguish three kinds of self-knowledge. I call these three kinds agent-relative knowledge, self-attached knowledge and knowledge of the person one happens to be. These aspects of self-knowledge differ in how the knower or agent is represented. Most of what I say will be applicable to beliefs as well as knowledge, and to other kinds of attitudes and thoughts, such as desire, as well.

    First-Person Authority and Privileged Access in Philosophy of Mind

    First-Person Contents in Philosophy of Mind

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61. John Perry (1996). Rip Van Winkle and Other Characters. European Review of Philosophy 2:13-39.
    In this essay I first review Kaplan’s theory of linguistic character, and then explain and motivate a concept of doxastic character. I then develop some concepts for dealing with the topic of belief retention and then, finally, discuss Rip Van Winkle. I come down on Kaplan’s side with respect to the Frege-inspired strategy, narrowly construed. But I advocate something like the Frege-inspired strategy, if it is construed more broadly. On my view it is remarkably easy to retain a belief, and (...) I think Evans is quite wrong about Rip and Kaplan. The central concept I develop, however, that of an information game, is in the spirit of much of Evans’ work. I also borrow some of his terminology. (shrink)

    Belief in Philosophy of Mind

    Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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62. John Perry, Self-Notions.
    ”Self-beliefs” are beliefs of the sort one ordinarily has about oneself, and expresses with the first person. These contrast with the beliefs one has in ”Casta˜neda cases,” in which one has a belief about oneself without knowing it. This paper advances an account of the nature of self-belief. According to this account, self-belief is a special case of interacting with things via notions that serve as repositories for information about objects with certain important relations to the knower, and as motivators (...) for actions the success of which is dependent on the object in that relation to the agent. Identity is such a relation, and ”self-notions” play this special role: they are the repositories for information gained in normally self-informative ways, and the motivators of types of action whose success normally depends on facts about the agent. Self-beliefs involve such self-notions, while the beliefs that one has about oneself in Casta˜neda cases do not. (shrink)

    First-Person Contents in Philosophy of Mind

    The First-Person Pronoun in Philosophy of Language

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63. John Perry (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 13 (December):3-21.
    Character and Content in Philosophy of Language

    First-Person Contents in Philosophy of Mind

    The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind

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64. John Perry (1977). Frege on Demonstratives. Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
    Demonstratives, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Gottlob Frege in 20th Century Philosophy

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65. Stefano Predelli (2004). The Price of Innocent Millianism. Erkenntnis 60 (3):335-356.
    According to the view I call `innocent Millianism', that-clauses differing only for occurrences of co-referential names provide the same contribution to the intensional profile of a belief report. It is widely believed by friends and foes of innocent Millianism alike that this approach entails either the denial of what I label a `naïve' account ofbelief reports, or a dismissive attitude towards our semantic intuitions. In this essay, I counter that the conjunction of innocent Millianism and the naïve view of belief (...) reports is compatible with our intuitions of truth-conditions. In order to defend this conclusion, I defend an independently motivated approach, in which utterances endowed of the same intension may nevertheless differ in truth-conditions. (shrink)

    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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66. W. V. Quine (1956). Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
    Intensional Transitive Verbs in Philosophy of Language

    W. V. O. Quine in 20th Century Philosophy

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67. François Recanati (2002). Unarticulated Constituents. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):299-345.
    In a recent paper (Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 4, June 2000), Jason Stanley argues that there are no `unarticulated constituents', contrary to what advocates of Truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) have claimed. All truth-conditional effects of context can be traced to logical form, he says. In this paper I maintain that there are unarticulated constituents, and I defend TCP. Stanley's argument exploits the fact that the alleged unarticulated constituents can be `bound', that is, they can be made to vary with the values (...) introduced by operators in the sentence. I show that Stanley's argument rests on a fallacy, and I provide alternative analyses of the data. (shrink)

    Context and Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

    Quantifiers in Philosophy of Language

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68. Mark Richard (2001). Seeking a Centaur, Adoring Adonis: Intensional Transitives and Empty Terms. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):103–127.
    Meaning in Philosophy of Language

    Specific Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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69. Mark Richard (1993). Attitudes in Context. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (2):123 - 148.
    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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70. Mark Richard (1993). Sense, Necessity and Belief. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):243 - 263.
    Fregean Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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71. Mark Richard (1983). Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4):425--52.
    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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72. Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues (...) in the philosophy of mind are addressed. (shrink)

    Propositional Attitudes, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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73. Ian Rumfitt (1993). Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised. Mind 102 (407):429-454.
    Propositions and That-Clauses in Philosophy of Language

    Quotation in Philosophy of Language

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74. Bertrand Russell (2005). On Denoting. Mind 114 (456):479-493.
    By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish (...) three cases: (1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., `the present King of France'. (2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g., `the present King of England' denotes a certain man. (3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g. `a man' denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man. The interpretation of such phrases is a matter of considerably difficulty; indeed, it is very hard to frame any theory not susceptible of formal refutation. All the difficulties with which I am acquainted are met, so far as I can discover, by the theory which I am about to explain. (shrink)

    Bertrand Russell in 20th Century Philosophy

    Descriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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75. Bertrand Russell (1912/2004). The Problems of Philosophy. Barnes & Noble Books.
    Immensely intelligible, thought-provoking guide by Nobel prize-winner considers such topics as the distinction between appearance and reality, the existence and nature of matter, idealism, inductive logic, intuitive knowledge, many other subjects. For students and general readers, there is no finer introduction to philosophy than this informative, affordable and highly readable edition that is "concise, free from technical terms, and perfectly clear to the general reader with no prior knowledge of the subject."—The Booklist of the American Library Association.

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76. Bertrand Russell (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
    Bertrand Russell in 20th Century Philosophy

    Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind

    Knowledge by Acquaintance in Epistemology

    Perception in Philosophy of Mind

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77. Bertrand Russell (1903). Principles of Mathematics. Routledge.
    In addition to these, mathematics uses a notion which is not a constituent of the propositions which it considers, namely the notion of truth. 2. ...

    Bertrand Russell in 20th Century Philosophy

    History: Philosophy of Mathematics in Philosophy of Mathematics

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78. Nathan Salmon (1995). Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt. Noûs 29 (1):1-20.
    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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79. Nathan Salmon (1992). Reflections on Reflexivity. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (1):53 - 63.
    Meaning in Philosophy of Language

    Specific Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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80. Nathan Salmon (1989). Illogical Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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81. Jennifer M. Saul (1999). The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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82. Jennifer M. Saul (1998). The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):363-389.
    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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83. Jennifer M. Saul (1997). Substitution and Simple Sentences. Analysis 57 (2):102–108.
    Substitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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84. Jennifer M. Saul (1993). Still an Attitude Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.
    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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85. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions. Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.
    Knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. One natural explanation for this is that the knowledge relation is contrastive ( s knows that p rather than q ). But can the binary view of knowledge ( s knows that p ) explain contrast-sensitivity? I review some of the linguistic data supporting contrast-sensitivity, and critique the three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity. I conclude that the contrast-sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions shows that knowledge is a contrastive relation.

    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Epistemic Contrastivism in Epistemology

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86. Stephen Schiffer (1996). The Hidden-Indexical Theory's Logical-Form Problem: A Rejoinder. Analysis 56 (2):92–97.
    Context and Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

    Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

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87. Stephen Schiffer (1992). Belief Ascription. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.
    Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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88. Stephen R. Schiffer (1994). A Paradox of Meaning. Noûs 28 (3):279-324.
    Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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89. Scott Soames (2002). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
    In this fascinating work, Scott Soames offers a new conception of the relationship between linguistic meaning and assertions made by utterances. He gives meanings of proper names and natural kind predicates and explains their use in attitude ascriptions. He also demonstrates the irrelevance of rigid designation in understanding why theoretical identities containing such predicates are necessary, if true.

    Aspects of Reference, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Essentialism in Metaphysics

    Essentialism and De Re Modality, Misc in Metaphysics

    Logical Necessity in Metaphysics

    Metaphysical Necessity in Metaphysics

    Names in Philosophy of Language

    Natural Kinds in Metaphysics

    Origins Essentialism in Metaphysics

    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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90. Scott Soames (1992). Truth, Meaning, and Understanding. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):17--35.
    Knowledge of Language in Philosophy of Language

    Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Truth-Conditional Theories in Philosophy of Language

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91. Scott Soames (1989). Semantics and Semantic Competence. Philosophical Perspectives 3:575-596.
    Knowledge of Language in Philosophy of Language

    Semantic Theories, Misc in Philosophy of Language

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92. Scott Soames (1985). Lost Innocence. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):59--71.
    Philosophy of Linguistics in Philosophy of Language

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93. David Sosa (1996). The Import of the Puzzle About Belief. Philosophical Review 105 (3):373-402.
    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief in Philosophy of Language

    Millian Theories of Names in Philosophy of Language

    Russellian Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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94. Ernest Sosa (1970). Propositional Attitudes de Dictu and de Re. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):883-896.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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95. Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). Indexical Belief. Synthese 49 (1):129-151.
    Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

    Indexicals, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Temporal Experience in Philosophy of Mind

    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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96. Jason Stanley (2002). Making It Articulated. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):149–168.
    Context and Context-Dependence in Philosophy of Language

    Relevance Theory in Philosophy of Language

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97. Jason Stanley (2000). Context and Logical Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4):391--434.
    In this paper, I defend the thesis that alleffects of extra-linguistic context on thetruth-conditions of an assertion are traceable toelements in the actual syntactic structure of thesentence uttered. In the first section, I develop thethesis in detail, and discuss its implications for therelation between semantics and pragmatics. The nexttwo sections are devoted to apparent counterexamples.In the second section, I argue that there are noconvincing examples of true non-sentential assertions.In the third section, I argue that there are noconvincing examples of what (...) John Perry has called`unarticulated constituents''. I conclude by drawingsome consequences of my arguments for appeals tocontext-dependence in the resolution of problems inepistemology and philosophical logic. (shrink)

    Context and Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

    Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

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98. William Taschek (1988). Would a Fregean Be Puzzled by Pierre? Mind 97 (385):99-104.
    Fregean Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief in Philosophy of Language

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99. William W. Taschek (1998). On Ascribing Beliefs: Content in Context. Journal of Philosophy 95 (7):323-353.
    Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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100. William W. Taschek (1995). Belief, Substitution, and Logical Structure. Noûs 29 (1):71-95.
     Substitutivity in Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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101. William W. Taschek (1992). Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and Information Content. Mind 101 (404):767-791.
     Frege's Puzzle in Philosophy of Language

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102. Kenneth A. Taylor (2003). Singular Beliefs and Their Ascriptions. In Reference and the Rational Mind. Csli Publications.
     This essay defends three interlocking claims about singular beliefs and their ascriptions. The first is a claim about the nature of such beliefs; the second is a claim about the semantic contents of ascriptions of such beliefs; the third is a claim about the pragmatic significance of such ascriptions. With respect to the nature of singular belief, I claim that the contents of our singular beliefs are a joint product of mind and world, with neither mind nor world enjoying any (...) peculiar priority over the other in the constitution of content. This view amounts to a rejection of the priority of so-called narrow or notional content over wide or referential content for singular beliefs. About the semantics of ascriptions of singular belief, I claim that such ascriptions ascribe what I call predicative doxastic commitments and nothing more. In particular, I will argue that to ascribe a predicative commitment is merely to say what property is being predicated by she who undertakes the relevant commitment to what object. My view has the consequence that ascriptions of singular beliefs typically do not either semantically specify or pragmatically implicate the modes of presentations, notions, or conceptions via which the ascribee cognizes the objects and properties relative to which she undertakes predicative commitments. To be sure, many maintain that at least one class of belief ascriptions -- so called de dicto ascriptions. (shrink)

     Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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103. Michael Thau (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
     This book maintains that our conception of consciousness and cognition begins with and depends upon a few fundamental errors. Thau elucidates these errors by discussing three important philosophical puzzles - Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White Mary - each of which concerns some aspect of either consciousness or cognition. He argues that it has gone unnoticed that each of these puzzles presents the very same problem and, in bringing this commonality to light, the errors in our natural conception of consciousness (...) and cognition are also reviewed. (shrink)

     Consciousness and Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

     The Inverted Spectrum in Philosophy of Mind

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104. Michael Tye (1978). The Puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):219 – 224.
     Frege's Puzzle in Philosophy of Language

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105. Edward N. Zalta (2001). Fregean Senses, Modes of Presentation, and Concepts. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):335-359.
     of my axiomatic theory of abstract objects.¹ The theory asserts the ex- istence not only of ordinary properties, relations, and propositions, but also of abstract individuals and abstract properties and relations. The.

     Concepts in Philosophy of Mind

     Fregean Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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106. Edward N. Zalta (1983). Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. D. Reidel.
     . THEORY, DATA, AND EXPLANATION In this book, we shall produce a research program in metaphysics. Following Lakatos, a research program in metaphysics ...

     Abstract Objects in Metaphysics

     Knowability in Epistemology

     Mathematical Neo-Fregeanism in Philosophy of Mathematics

     Mathematical Platonism in Philosophy of Mathematics

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