Online research in philosophy

Semantic temporalism vs. semantic eternalism

1. Mark Aronszajn (1996). A Defense of Temporalism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):71 - 95.
   Specific Expressions, Misc in Philosophy of Language

   Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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2. Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
   The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...) to the semantics of belief reports. But this approach must confront a puzzle of its own: it turns out that every case is a Paderewski case, at least potentially. (shrink)

   Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

   Hidden-Indexical Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

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3. George Bealer (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.
   Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...) to reduce propositions to extensional entities-either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns problems of fine grained content-both traditional 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles and recent variations on them which confront scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, I outline a non-reductionist approach-the algebraic approach-which avoids the problems associated with reductionism. I then go on to show how the theory can incorporate non-Platonic (as well as Platonic) modes of presentation. When these are implemented nondescriptively, they yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions which have been eluding us. The paper closes by applying the theory to a cluster of remaining puzzles, including a pair of new puzzles facing scientific essentialism. (shrink)

   Propositional Attitudes, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

   Propositions in Philosophy of Language

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4. Nuel D. Belnap (2001). Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World. OUP USA.
   In this elucidating work, the authors attempt to construct a logical analysis of human actions, focusing on those actions based on choice. Using their examination of "seeing to it that," they investigate a large number of topics, including imperatives, deontic logic, strategies, determinism, and promising assertion. One of the work's provocative conclusions is that one, actual future does not exist; instead, all possible futures are on par with one another.

   Agency in Philosophy of Action

   Alternative Possibilities in Philosophy of Action

   Libertarianism about Free Will in Philosophy of Action

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5. Nuel Belnap & Mitchell Green (1994). Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line. Philosophical Perspectives 8:365 - 388.
   B-Theories of Time in Metaphysics

   Meaning in Philosophy of Language

   Philosophy of Time, Misc in Metaphysics

   The Open Future in Metaphysics

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6. John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.
   Meaning in Philosophy of Language

   Presentism in Metaphysics

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7. Paul Boghossian (2006). What is Relativism? In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Relativism. Clarendon Press.
   Many philosophers, however, have been tempted to be relativists about specific domains of discourse, especially about those domains that have a normative character. Gilbert Harman, for example, has defended a relativistic view of morality, Richard Rorty a relativistic view of epistemic justification, and Crispin Wright a relativistic view of judgments of taste.¹ But what exactly is it to be a relativist about a given domain of discourse?

   Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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8. George Boolos (1984). To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables). Journal of Philosophy 81 (8):430-449.
   Quantifiers in Philosophy of Language

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9. David Bostock (1988). Necessary Truth and a Priori Truth. Mind 97 (387):343-379.
   No categories

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10. David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). Masters of Our Meanings. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):133-52.
    The two-dimensional framework in semantics has the most power and plausibility when combined with a kind of global semantic neo-descriptivism. If neo-descriptivism can be defended on the toughest terrain - the semantics of ordinary proper names - then the other skirmishes should be easier. This paper defends neo-descriptivism against two important objections: that the descriptions may be inaccessibly locked up in sub-personal modules, and thus not accessible a priori, and that in any case all such modules bottom out in purely (...) causal mechanisms, and that thus an externalist causal metasemantic theory will best account for them. I agree both that many descriptions are in some sense modularized, and that they bottom out in causal mechanisms. But I argue that these are not the relevant descriptions that two-dimensionalism trades in, and which make us, in an important sense, masters of our meanings. (shrink)

    Idiolects in Philosophy of Language

    Linguistic Convention in Philosophy of Language

    Public Language in Philosophy of Language

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11. Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2002). Indexicality, Binding, Anaphora and a Priori Truth. Analysis 62 (4):271-281.
    Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose meaning remain stable while their reference shifts from utterance to utterance. Paradigmatic cases in English are ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. Recently, a number of authors have argued that various constructions in our language harbor hidden indexicals. We say 'hidden' because these indexicals are unpronounced, even though they are alleged to be real linguistic components. Constructions taken by some authors to be associated, or to ‘co-habit’, with hidden indexicals include: definite descriptions and quantifiers more generally (hidden (...) indexical refers to a domain – Davies (1981), Westerstahl (1985), Soames (1986), Higginbotham (1988), Stanley and Williamson (1995)), propositional attitude verbs (hidden indexical refers to a mode of presentation – Richard (1990)), comparative adjectives (hidden indexical refers to comparison classes – Partee (1989), Kamp (1975), Ludlow (1989)). An interesting recent addition is the view that all nouns are associated with a hidden indexical referring to a domain restriction (Stanley and Szabo (2000), Stanley.. (shrink)

    Context and Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

    Indexicals, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Pronouns and Anaphora in Philosophy of Language

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12. David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
    in the first instance, comes from my own case, not from any external observation . It is my first -person experience of consciousness that forces the problem ...

    Conceivability, Imagination, and Possibility in Metaphysics

    Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works in Philosophy of Mind

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13. David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999).

    Conceptual Analysis in Metaphilosophy

    Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment in Philosophy of Mind

    Semantic Theories in Philosophy of Language

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14. Stewart Cohen (1987). Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards. Synthese 73 (1):3 - 26.
    This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in (...) order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc. (shrink)

    Epistemology

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15. Eros Corazza, William Fish & Jonathan Gorvett (2002). Who Is I? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):1 - 21.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may (...) be thought to threaten this view, and his deferred utterance method of resolving this puzzle. In section 3 we introduce a novel version of the answering machine paradox which suggests that, in certain cases, Kaplan's identification of utterer, agent and referent of "I" breaks down. In the fourth section we go on to consider a recent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelli which appeals to the intentions of the utterer, before arguing that this picture is committed to unacceptable consequences and, therefore, should be avoided if possible. Finally, in section 5, we present a new revision of Kaplan's account which retains much of the spirit of his original proposal whilst offering a intuitively acceptable way to explain all of the apparently problematic data. In doing so, we also show how this picture is able to explain the scenario which motivated Predelli's account without appealing to speaker intentions. (shrink)

    Character and Content in Philosophy of Language

    First-Person Contents in Philosophy of Mind

    The First-Person Pronoun in Philosophy of Language

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16. Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
    Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base ...

    Logic and Philosophy of Logic

    Semantic Anti-Realism in Metaphysics

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17. Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...) and to identify properties with functions from world, time pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on--the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self -locating. (shrink)

    Properties, Misc in Metaphysics

    Property Nominalism in Metaphysics

    Three- and Four-Dimensionalism in Metaphysics

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18. Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects thirteen papers by one of the leading philosophers of his generation, who died prematurely in 1980.

    Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

    Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind

    Molyneux's Problem in Philosophy of Mind

    Object-Dependent Contents in Philosophy of Mind

    Philosophy of Language, General Works in Philosophy of Language

    Reference in Philosophy of Language

    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

    Vague Identity in Metaphysics

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19. Delia Graff Fara (2001). Descriptions as Predicates. Philosophical Studies 102:1--42.
    No categories

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20. G. W. Fitch (1998). Temporalism Revisited. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):251-256.
    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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21. Antony Galton, Temporal Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

    Temporal Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic

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22. Daniel Halliday (2007). Contextualism, Comparatives and Gradability. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):381 - 393.
    Contextualists about knowledge ascriptions perceive an analogy between the semantics they posit for “know(s)” and the semantics of comparative terms like “tall” and “flat”. Jason Stanley has recently raised a number of objections to this view. This paper offers a response by way of an alternative analogy with modified comparatives, which resolves most of Stanley’s objections. Rather than being ad hoc, this new analogy in fact fits better with platitudes about knowledge and facilitates a better understanding of the semantics of (...) gradability, such that an explanation of most of Stanley’s disanalogies becomes available. In addition, I argue that there are reasons to doubt Stanley’s claim that “knows(s)” cannot switch its content within a discourse, due to what may happen when we ascribe knowledge of more than one proposition. (shrink)

    Epistemic Contextualism in Epistemology

    Gradable Adjectives in Philosophy of Language

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23. John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a (...) large fortune. After providing a number of specific and general characterizations of the puzzle, Hawthorne carefully examines the competing merits of candidate solutions. In so doing, he explores a number of central questions concerning the nature and importance of knowledge, including the relationship of knowledge to assertion and practical reasoning, the status of epistemic closure principles, the merits of various brands of scepticism, the prospects for a contextualist account of knowledge, and the potential for other sorts of salience-sensitive accounts. Along the way, he offers a careful treatment of pertinent issues at the foundations of semantics. His book will be of interest to anyone working in the field of epistemology, as well as to philosophers of language. (shrink)

    Epistemic Contextualism and Invariantism in Epistemology

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24. Thomas Hofweber (2005). A Puzzle About Ontology. Noûs 39 (2):256–283.
    Ontology is the philosophical discipline that tries to find out what there is: what entities make up reality, what is the stuff the world is made from? Thus, ontology is part of metaphysics, and in fact it seems to be about half of all of metaphysics. It tries to establish what (kinds of) things there are, the other half tries to find out what the (general) properties of these things are and what (general) relations they have to each other. Settling (...) questions in ontology would bring with it major progress in metaphysics. And it would bring with it major progress in a variety of areas in philosophy outside of metaphysics as well. Many philosophical debates outside of metaphysics are quite directly influenced by how things turn out in ontology. Whether or not there are certain entities will give rise to quite different answers in various philosophical debates. I would like to very briefly describe three debates where ontological questions play a central role. These debates are either directly from metaphysics or from other areas of philosophy and they will be of central importance throughout this paper. (shrink)

    Quantification and Ontology in Philosophy of Language

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25. Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...) of color. In this way the book not only offers a methodological program for philosophy, but also casts new light on some much-debated problems and their interrelations. (shrink)

    Conceptual Analysis in Metaphilosophy

    Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment in Philosophy of Mind

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26. Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel.
    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief in Philosophy of Language

    Russellian and Direct Reference Theories of Meaning in Philosophy of Language

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27. Peter Lasersohn (2005). Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
    This paper argues that truth values of sentences containing predicates of “personal taste” such as fun or tasty must be relativized to individuals. This relativization is of truth value only, and does not involve a relativization of semantic content: If you say roller coasters are fun, and I say they are not, I am negating the same content which you assert, and directly contradicting you. Nonetheless, both our utterances can be true (relative to their separate contexts). A formal semantic theory (...) is presented which gives this result by introducing an individual index, analogous to the world and time indices commonly used, and by treating the pragmatic context as supplying a particular value for this index. The context supplies this value in the derivation of truth values from content, not in the derivation of content from character. Predicates of personal taste therefore display a kind of contextual variation in interpretation which is unlike the familiar variation exhibited by pronouns and other indexicals. (shrink)

    Relativism about Truth in Philosophy of Language

    Taste Predicates in Philosophy of Language

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28. Peter Ludlow (1999). Semantics, Tense, and Time. MIT Press.
    In this book Ludlow uses the metaphysics of time as a case study and focuses on the dispute between A-theorists and B-theorists about the nature of time.

    A-Theories of Time in Metaphysics

    Presentism in Metaphysics

    Truth, Misc in Philosophy of Language

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29. Ned Markosian, A Defence of Presentism.
    ∗ Apologies to Mark Hinchliff for stealing the title of his dissertation. (See Hinchliff, A Defense of Presentism. As it turns out, however, the version of Presentism defended here is different from the version defended by Hinchliff. See Section 3.1 below.).

    Presentism in Metaphysics

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30. Gerald J. Massey (1969). Tense Logic! Why Bother? Noûs 3 (1):17-32.
    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

    Temporal Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic

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31. Matthew McGrath, Propositions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Philosophy of Language, General Works in Philosophy of Language

    Propositions in Philosophy of Language

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32. Trenton Merricks (2007). Truth and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.

    Truthmakers in Metaphysics

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33. Stephen Neale (1990). Descriptive Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora. Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):113-150.
    Pronouns and Anaphora in Philosophy of Language

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34. Terence Parsons, Pronouns as Paraphrases.
    Pronouns and Anaphora in Philosophy of Language

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35. John Perry (1977). Frege on Demonstratives. Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
    Demonstratives, Misc in Philosophy of Language

    Gottlob Frege in 20th Century Philosophy

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36. Stefano Predelli (1998). I Am Not Here Now. Analysis 58 (2):107–115.
    Character and Content in Philosophy of Language

    First-Person Contents in Philosophy of Mind

    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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37. Stefano Predelli (1998). Utterance, Interpretation and the Logic of Indexicals. Mind and Language 13 (3):400–414.
    Character and Content in Philosophy of Language

    Interpretation in Philosophy of Language

    The Nature of Context in Philosophy of Language

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38. Mark Richard (1981). Temporalism and Eternalism. Philosophical Studies 39 (1):1 - 13.
    Eternalism in Metaphysics

    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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39. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2002). Now the French Are Invading England! Analysis 62 (1):34–41.
    Specific Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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40. Patrick Rysiew (2001). The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Noûs 35 (4):477–514.
    Epistemic Contextualism in Epistemology

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41. Thomas Sattig (2006). The Language and Reality of Time. Oxford University Press.
    Thomas Sattig develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time, and offers an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world. He brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking our ordinary conception of time with the physicist's conception, and linking metaphysical questions about time with questions in the philosophy of language.

    Temporal Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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42. Philippe Schlenker (2003). A Plea for Monsters. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
    Kaplan claims in Demonstratives that no operator may manipulate the context of evaluation of natural language indexicals. We show that this is not so. In fact, attitude reports always manipulate a context parameter (or, rather, a context variable). This is shown by (i) the existence of De Se readings of attitude reports in English (which Kaplan has no account for), and (ii) the existence of a variety of indexicals across languages whose point of evaluation can be shifted, but only in (...) attitude reports. We develop an alternative account within an extensional framework with overt quantification over times, worlds and contexts. Various typological facts are discussed, esp. the distinction between English, Amharic and Ewe pronouns, and that between English and Russian tenses. (shrink)

    Character and Content in Philosophy of Language

    Fregean Theories of Attitude Ascriptions in Philosophy of Language

    Intensionality and Opacity in Philosophy of Language

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43. Quentin Smith (1990). Time and Propositions. Philosophia 20 (3):279-294.
    Propositions in Philosophy of Language

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44. Robert C. Stalnaker (1999). Context and Content. Oxford University Press.
    Two themes in particular run through these collected essays: the role that the context in which speech takes place plays in accounting for the way language is ...

    Context and Context-Dependence, Misc in Philosophy of Language

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45. Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Pragmatics. Synthese 22 (1-2):272--289.
    Pragmatics in Philosophy of Language

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46. Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2000). On Quantifier Domain Restriction. Mind and Language 15 (2&3):219--61.
    Context and Logical Form in Philosophy of Language

    Quantifiers in Philosophy of Language

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47. Kenneth A. Taylor (2001). Sex, Breakfast, and Descriptus Interruptus. Synthese 128 (1-2):45 - 61.
    Specific Expressions in Philosophy of Language

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48. Robert Van Rooy (2001). Exhaustivity in Dynamic Semantics; Referential and Descriptive Pronouns. Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (5):621-657.
    In this paper I argue that anaphoric pronouns should always be interpreted exhaustively. I propose that pronouns are either used referentially and refer to the speaker's referents of their antecedent indefinites, or descriptively and go proxy for the description recoverable from its antecedent clause. I show how this view can be implemented within a dynamic semantics, and how it can account for various examples that seemed to be problematic for the view that for all unbound pronouns there always should be (...) a notion of exhaustivity/uniqueness involved. The uniqueness assumption for the use of singular pronouns is also shown to be importantto explain what the discourse referents used in dynamic semantics represent. (shrink)

    Dynamic Semantics in Philosophy of Language

    Pronouns and Anaphora in Philosophy of Language

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49. Howard K. Wettstein (1979). Indexical Reference and Propositional Content. Philosophical Studies 36 (1):91 - 100.
    Indexicals, Misc in Philosophy of Language

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50. Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...) illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology and a notable contribution to the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

    Conditionalization in Philosophy of Probability

    Evidence and Knowledge in Epistemology

    Knowability in Epistemology

    Prior Probabilities in Philosophy of Probability

    Skepticism in Epistemology

    The Problem of Old Evidence in Philosophy of Probability

    The Reflection Principle in Philosophy of Probability

    Updating Principles in Philosophy of Probability

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