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  1. David Leech Anderson (2007). Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored (existential, epistemological, semantic, and ontological) and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful (...)
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  2. Frederick Anderson (1942). The Relational Theory of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 39 (May):253-260.
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  3. Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false.
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  4. Hiranmoy Banerjee (2003). Introspectible Consciousness: What Philosophers Can Do About It. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
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  5. David Barnett, On the Simplicity of Mental Beings.
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  6. Gustav Bergmann (1945). A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness. Mind 54 (July):193-226.
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  7. Peter Bieri (1982). Nominalism and Inner Experience. The Monist 65 (January):68-87.
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  8. David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  9. C. R. Bukala (1991). Consciousness: Creative and Self-Creating. Philosophy Today 14 (1):14-25.
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  10. Tom R. Burns (1998). The Social Construction of Consciousness, Part 2: Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):166-184.
  11. David J. Chalmers (2003). Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 102--142.
    Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature. In twentieth-century philosophy, this dilemma is (...)
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  12. D. (2000). Mind-Body Unity, Dual Aspect, and the Emergence of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):393-403.
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  13. Barry F. Dainton (2002). The Gaze of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2):31-48.
    According to one influential view, consciousness has an awareness– content structure: any experience consists of the awareness of some content. I focus on one version of this dualism, and argue that it should be rejected. My principal argument is directed at the status of the supposed contents of aware- ness; I argue that neither of the principal options is tenable, albeit for different reasons. Although the doctrine in question may seem to be supported by the find- ings of researchers in (...)
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  14. Christian de Quincey (2000). Conceiving the 'Inconceivable'? Fishing for Consciousness with a Net of Miracles. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):67-81.
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  15. Todd E. Feinberg (1997). The Irreducible Perspectives of Consciousness. Seminars in Neurology 17:85-93.
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  16. Owen J. Flanagan (2003). The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. Basic Books.
    Traditional ideas about the basic nature of humanity are under attack as never before. The very attributes that make us human--free will, the permanence of personal identity, the existence of the soul--are being undermined and threatened by the current revolution in the science of the mind. If the mind is the brain, and therefore a physical object subject to deterministic laws, how can we have free will? If most of our thoughts and impulses are unconscious, how can we be morally (...)
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  17. A. Campbell Garnett (1948). A Naturalistic Interpretation of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 45 (October):589-602.
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  18. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2002). Sensations and Grain Processes. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    This paper celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's “Is consciousness a brain process?†appeared in the British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's “Sensations and brain processes†appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review (Place 1962/1956, Smart 1962/1959).  These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. They defined its central preoccupation (the ontology of consciousness), introduced (...)
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  19. Hans-Ulrich Hoche (2007). Reflexive Monism Versus Complementarism: An Analysis and Criticism of the Conceptual Groundwork of Max Velmans's Reflexive Model of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):389-409.
    From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.
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  20. D. J. Howard (1986). The New Mentalism. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (December):353-7.
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  21. Michael Jacovides (2010). Experiences as Complex Events. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are (or underlie) its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience (...)
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  22. J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2006). (Proto-) Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining Systems. Mind and Matter 4 (1):45-68.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been introduced as a speci?c kind of emergence in which some, but not all of the conditions for a higher-level phenomenon exist at a lower level. Further conditions exist in contingent contexts that provide stability conditions at the lower level, which in turn accord the emergence of novelty at the higher level. The purpose of the present paper is to propose that (proto-) consciousness is a contextually emergent property of self-sustaining systems. The core assumption (...)
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  23. Otis T. Kent (1984). Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness. Man and World 17 (1):19-52.
    What is consciousness? brentano suggests that consciousness is a simple binary relation between a self and an object. in this paper, i offer a textual clarification and a qualified philosophical defense of brentano's suggestion. in part i, i indicate the ordinary facts of subjective experience that any adequate theory of consciousness must account for. in part ii, i argue on textual grounds that brentano's theory has been misunderstood by chisholm. in part iii, i argue that brentano's theory meets the conditions (...)
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  24. C. Lloyd Morgan (1917). Enjoyment and Awareness. Mind 26 (101):1-11.
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  25. Joseph Margolis (1974). Reductionism and Ontological Aspects of Consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 4 (April):3-16.
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  26. Wallace I. Matson (1976). Sentience. University of California Press.
    1 Strange words to come from the father of materialism, a philosophy that might be self-evidently true if only there were no people. ...
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  27. Colin McGinn, Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks.
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  28. T. McMullen (1997). Sperry on Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent. Australian Journal of Psychology 49:152-155.
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  29. Mary Midgley (1996). One World, but a Big One. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):500-514.
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  30. William P. Montague (1908). Consciousness and Relativity - a Reply to Professor Bode. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (8):209-212.
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  31. William P. Montague (1905). The Relational Theory of Consciousness and its Realistic Implications. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (12):309-316.
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  32. Hans Moravec, Dualism Through Reductionism.
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  33. Robert Rentoul (1992). Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World: A Reply to Velmans. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):163-166.
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  34. Charles Ripley (1984). Sperry's Concept of Consciousness. Inquiry 27 (December):399-423.
    This paper explores R. W. Sperry's view that consciousness is ?causally? effective in directing voluntary human behaviour. This view, formulated in the course of his split brain research, presupposes an earlier theory that motor behaviour is the sole output of the brain and that mental phenomena were developed for regulation of overt response. His view of the ?causal? effectiveness of consciousness is shown to be based on a theory of emergent properties like that of Bunge. It is also shown that (...)
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  35. Gregg H. Rosenberg, Consciousness as a Physical Property and its Implications for a Science of Mind.
    As the view that the mind has a physical cause becomes increasingly more difficult to refute, both philosophy and science must face the fact that having experiences, qualia, consciousness in short, is simply not deducible from within our physical theories. Indeed, all the power physics shows for qualitative explanation is adduced from outside the actual formality of its theories. Our physical theories describe vibrations and stochastic correlates of motion, and there is no principled way to explain awareness or the existence (...)
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  36. Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
    Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted (...)
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  37. K. J. Schuhmann (1990). Contents of Consciousness and States of Affairs. In Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  38. William Seager (2006). The Emergence of Consciousness. Philosophic Exchange 36:5-23.
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  39. Dennis M. Senchuk (1991). Consciousness Naturalized: Supervenience Without Physical Determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (January):37-47.
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  40. Roger W. Sperry (1993). A Mentalist View of Consciousness. Social Neuroscience Bulletin 6 (2):15-19.
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  41. Roger W. Sperry (1992). Turnabout on Consciousness: A Mentalist View. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):259-80.
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  42. Roger W. Sperry (1980). Mind-Brain Interaction: Mentalism Yes, Dualism No. Neuroscience 5 (2):195-206.
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  43. Roger W. Sperry (1970). An Objective Approach to Subjective Experience: Further Explanation of a Hypothesis. Psychological Review 77 (6).
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  44. Roger W. Sperry (1969). A Modified Concept of Consciousness. Psychological Review 76:532-36.
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  45. Hiram M. Stanley (1892). On Primitive Consciousness. Philosophical Review 1 (4):433-442.
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  46. Alan Thomas (2003). An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.
    This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. Adverbialism is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, an identity thesis in which conscious mental states are those that the mental subject self-knows immediately that he or she is "in". The paper develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. Following O'Shaughnessy, person level consciousness is explained as a feature of (...)
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  47. Michael Tye (1996). Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):679-685.
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  48. Undo Uus (1994). Blindness of Modern Science. Estonia: APT Ltd.
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  49. Max Velmans (2007). Dualism, Reductionism, and Reflexive Monism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  50. Max Velmans (2007). How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
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  51. Max Velmans (2007). Psychophysical Nature. In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Springer.
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...)
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  52. Max Velmans (1992). Reply to Gillett's Consciousness, Intentionality and Internalism. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):181-182.
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  53. Max Velmans (1990). Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.
    Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a (...)
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  54. Donald C. Williams (1934). Truth, Error, and the Location of the Datum. Journal of Philosophy 31 (16):428-438.
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  55. Frederick J. E. Woodbridge (1909). Consciousness, the Sense Organs, and the Nervous System. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (17):449-455.
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