36 items found.
Add to this list:
(help)       Batch import: from file / text
Sort by:
  • David Leech Anderson (2007). Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored (existential, epistemological, semantic, and ontological) and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Frederick Anderson (1942). The Relational Theory of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 39 (May):253-260.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • David Barnett, On the Simplicity of Mental Beings.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Gustav Bergmann (1945). A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness. Mind 54 (July):193-226.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org mind.oxfordjournals.org   | Scholar | More..
  • David J. Chalmers (2003). Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: consc.net u.arizona.edu   | Scholar | More..
  • Barry F. Dainton (2002). The Gaze of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (2):31-48.
    According to one influential view, consciousness has an awareness– content structure: any experience consists of the awareness of some content. I focus on one version of this dualism, and argue that it should be rejected. My principal argument is directed at the status of the supposed contents of aware- ness; I argue that neither of the principal options is tenable, albeit for different reasons. Although the doctrine in question may seem to be supported by the find- ings of researchers in (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Owen J. Flanagan (2003). The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. Basic Books.
    Traditional ideas about the basic nature of humanity are under attack as never before. The very attributes that make us human--free will, the permanence of personal identity, the existence of the soul--are being undermined and threatened by the current revolution in the science of the mind. If the mind is the brain, and therefore a physical object subject to deterministic laws, how can we have free will? If most of our thoughts and impulses are unconscious, how can we be morally (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this book  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: books.google.com   | Scholar | More..
  • A. Campbell Garnett (1948). A Naturalistic Interpretation of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 45 (October):589-602.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2002). Sensations and Grain Processes. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Hans-Ulrich Hoche (2007). Reflexive Monism Versus Complementarism: An Analysis and Criticism of the Conceptual Groundwork of Max Velmans's Reflexive Model of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).
    From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: cogprints.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Michael Jacovides, Experiences as Complex Events.
    Experiences stretch out over time. Your experience of reading this paper, for example, might last about twenty minutes. Experiences are never wholly present to the mind, except insofar as we remember them, not unless the experience is very brief. You only get to read a little bit of this paper at a time, however much you might want to get it all in an instant. Long experiences unfold; they occur over stages. I conclude, with Charles Siewert (11) and Brian O.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2006). (Proto-) Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining Systems. Mind and Matter 4 (1):45-68.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been introduced as a speci?c kind of emergence in which some, but not all of the conditions for a higher-level phenomenon exist at a lower level. Further conditions exist in contingent contexts that provide stability conditions at the lower level, which in turn accord the emergence of novelty at the higher level. The purpose of the present paper is to propose that (proto-) consciousness is a contextually emergent property of self-sustaining systems. The core assumption (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • C. Lloyd Morgan (1917). Enjoyment and Awareness. Mind 26 (101):1-11.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Riccardo Manzotti (2006). Consciousness and Existence as a Process. Mind and Matter 4 (1):7-43.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: consciousness.it   | Scholar | More..
  • Joseph Margolis (1974). Reductionism and Ontological Aspects of Consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 4 (April):3-16.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: interscience.wiley.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Colin McGinn, Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Mary Midgley (1996). One World, but a Big One. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):500-514.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • William P. Montague (1908). Consciousness and Relativity - a Reply to Professor Bode. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (8):209-212.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • William P. Montague (1905). The Relational Theory of Consciousness and its Realistic Implications. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (12):309-316.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Hans Moravec, Dualism Through Reductionism.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: kluweronline.com springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Roger W. Sperry (1993). A Mentalist View of Consciousness. Social Neuroscience Bulletin 6 (2):15-19.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Roger W. Sperry (1992). Turnabout on Consciousness: A Mentalist View. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):259-80.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Roger W. Sperry (1980). Mind-Brain Interaction: Mentalism Yes, Dualism No. Neuroscience 5 (2):195-206.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: ncbi.nlm.nih.gov   | Scholar | More..
  • Roger W. Sperry (1970). An Objective Approach to Subjective Experience: Further Explanation of a Hypothesis. Psychological Review 77 (6).
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Roger W. Sperry (1969). A Modified Concept of Consciousness. Psychological Review 76:532-36.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • Hiram M. Stanley (1892). On Primitive Consciousness. Philosophical Review 1 (4):433-442.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Alan Thomas (2003). An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.
    This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. Adverbialism is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, an identity thesis in which conscious mental states are those that the mental subject self-knows immediately that he or she is "in". The paper develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. Following O'Shaughnessy, person level consciousness is explained as a feature of (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: logical-operator.com springerlink.com kluweronline.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Nick Treanor, The Ontology of Experience.
    Most philosophers share a conception of consciousness according to which conscious experiences are had _throughout_ periods of time. If this conception is correct, then conscious experiences are not instantiated in the same way that physical processes are. This is an ontic difference, and it rules out the possibility of psychophysical identities between experiences and processes. The upshot is that physicalists face a choice: we can either (i) preserve the common conception of conscious experience and take the arguments to provide constructive (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: petemandik.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Michael Tye (1996). Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):679-685.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Max Velmans (2007). Psychophysical Nature. In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Springer.
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: cogprints.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Max Velmans, How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism.
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: cogprints.org springerlink.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • Max Velmans (1990). Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.
    Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a (...)
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: cogprints.org cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk cogprints.soton.ac.uk citebase.eprints.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Donald C. Williams (1934). Truth, Error, and the Location of the Datum. Journal of Philosophy 31 (16):428-438.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..
  • Frederick J. E. Woodbridge (1909). Consciousness, the Sense Organs, and the Nervous System. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (17):449-455.
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More..