This is my critical review of Hans Joas' book on Pragmatism and social theory which concerns, in part the early 20th-century German reception of American philosophy and the relationship of this to contemporary German thought.

Hans Joas has called the German reception of pragmatism “a history of misunderstandings.” This is certainly true of the Frankfurt School’s reception of John Dewey’s work. Even as early as Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness, which exercised such an influence on the western Marxism of the Frankfurt School, pragmatism is taken as a willful abandonment of reason’s highest purpose. Pragmatism is equated with relativism and is only able to conceive of freedom within the gaps of a reified society (1971: 194– (...) 195). Adorno, seemingly the most receptive to Dewey’s thought, believed pragmatism to be the a priori exclusion of metaphysics (1973: 373). Marcuse, the subject of this introduction, reviewed Dewey’s Theory of .. (shrink)

This article presents and discusses Axel Honneth's theory of recognition as a specific constellation, i.e. as a theoretical endeavour spanning over and interrelating positions in the fields of anthropology, social theory, and politics. As essential components in this constellation I discern an anthropology of recognition, a social philosophy of different forms of recognition, a morality of recognition, a theory of democratic ethical life as a social ideal, and a notion of political democracy as an ambitious reflexive form of social cooperation. (...) A tentative attempt is also made to elucidate the motivational history that underlies and animates Honneth's theoretical endeavour and accounts for its specific 'spirit'. (shrink)

A basic thesis of Neokantian epistemology and philosophy of science contends that the knowing subject and the object to be known are only abstractions. What really exists, is the relation between both. For the elucidation of this “knowledge relation ("Erkenntnisrelation") the Neokantians of the Marburg school used a variety of mathematical metaphors. In this con-tribution I reconsider some of these metaphors proposed by Paul Natorp, who was one of the leading members of the Marburg school. It is shown that Natorp's (...) metaphors are not unrelated to those used in some currents of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

A volume dealing seriously with the influence of the major schools of Neo-Kantian thought on contemporary philosophy has been needed sorely for some time. But this volume of essays aims higher: it ‘is published in the hopes that it will secure Neo-Kantianism a significant place in contemporary philosophical discussions’ (‘Introduction’, 1). The aim of the book, then, is partly to provide a history of major Neo-Kantian thinkers and their influence, and partly to argue for their importance in contemporary (continental) philosophy.