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  1. Stuart S. Glennan (1995). Computationalism and the Problem of Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):375-88.
    In this paper I discuss Searle's claim that the computational properties of a system could never cause a system to be conscious. In the first section of the paper I argue that Searle is correct that, even if a system both behaves in a way that is characteristic of conscious agents (like ourselves) and has a computational structure similar to those agents, one cannot be certain that that system is conscious. On the other hand, I suggest that Searle's intuition that (...)
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  2. Anil Gomes (2015). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  3. William Hasker (1971). Theories, Analogies, and Criteria. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):242-256.
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  4. Alec Hyslop (1976). Other Minds as Theoretical Entities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (August):158-61.
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  5. Alec Hyslop (1975). A Reply to Don Locke. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-69.
  6. William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Seeing What You Want. Consciousness and Cognition.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
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  7. William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Seeing What You Want. Consciousness and Cognition.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
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  8. William E. S. McNeill (2015). Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others’ Minds. Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
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  9. Andrew Melnyk (1996). Review of Alex Hyslop's "Other Minds". [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):383-384.
  10. Andrew Melnyk (1994). Inference to the Best Explanation and Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):482-91.
    Robert Pargetter has argued that we know other minds through an inference to the best explanation. My aim is to show, by criticising Pargetter's account, that this approach to the problem of other minds cannot, as it stands, deliver the goods; it might be part of the right response to the problem, but it cannot be the whole story. More precisely, I will claim that Pargetter does not successfully reconstruct how ordinary people in everyday life come reasonably to believe in (...)
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  11. Anne H. Narveson (1966). Evidential Necessity and Other Minds. Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  12. P. A. Ostein (1974). God, Other Minds, and the Inference to the Best Explanation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:149-62.
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  13. Robert Pargetter (1984). The Scientific Inference to Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (June):158-63.
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  14. Hilary Putnam (1979). Empirical Realism and Other Minds. Philosophical Investigations 2:71-72.
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  15. Johannes Roessler (2005). Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...)
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  16. Nathan Stemmer (1987). The Hypothesis of Other Minds: Is It the Best Explanation? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 51 (January):109-121.
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