While many take Newton's argument for absolute space to be an inference to the best explanation, some argue that Newton is primarily concerned with the proper definition of true motion, rather than with independent existence of spatial points. To an extent the latter interpretation is correct. However, all prior interpretations are mistaken in thinking that 'absolute motion' is defined as motion with respect to absolute space. Newton is also using this notion to refer to the quantity of motion (momentum). This (...) reading reveals a misunderstood argument for absolute space, according to which absolute space is necessary for a workable definition of momentum. (shrink)

In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects. A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad sense of nomic possibility.

Although Trautman (1966) appears to give a unified‐field treatment of electrodynamics in Newtonian spacetime, there are difficulties in cogently interpreting it as such in relation to the facts of electromagnetic and magneto‐electric induction. Presented here is a covariant, nonunified field treatment of the Maxwell‐Lorentz theory with absolute space. This dispels a worry in Earman (1989) as to whether there are any historically realistic examples in which absolute space plays an indispensable role. It also shows how Trautman's formulation can be rendered (...) coherent, albeit at the cost of deunification, by reinterpreting the Maxwell tensor as a composite object involving, in part, elements from Newtonian spacetime. (shrink)

Although Trautman (1966) appears to give a unified-field treatment of electrodynamics in Newtonian spacetime, there are difficulties in cogently interpreting it as such in relation to the facts of electromagnetic and magneto-electric induction. Presented here is a covariant, non-unified field treatment of the Maxwell-Lorentz theory with absolute space. This dispels a worry in Earman (1989) as to whether there are any historically realistic examples in which absolute space plays an indispenable role. It also shows how Trautman`s formulation can be rendered (...) coherent, albeit at the cost of de-unification, by reinterpreting the Maxwell tensor as a composite object involving, in part, elements from Newtonian spacetime. (shrink)

I explain why the New Theory of Reference of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others does not entail absolute time and space, contrary to what Quentin Smith has recently claimed.

The New Theory of Reference (NTR) of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others is a theory in the philosophy of language and there has been much debate about whether it entails the metaphysical theory of essentialism. But there has been no discussion about whether the NTR entails another metaphysical theory, the absolutist theory of time and space. It is argued in this paper that the NTR carries this entailment; the theory of time is the main focus of the paper and (...) it is argued that the NTR entails the absolutist theory that times are event-independent moments. (shrink)

Whereas one can conceive of a relational classical mechanics in which absolute space and time do not play a fundamental role, quantum mechanics does not readily admit any such relational formulation.