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Action Theory, Miscellaneous

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  1. Jesús H. Aguilar, Agency and Control.
    The main objective of this thesis is to defend an account of the control that agents possess over their actions from the perspective of the causal theory of action, that is, a theory that sees actions as events caused by internal states of their agents. The explanatory strategy that is employed for this purpose consists in addressing three interdependent and fundamental problems concerning the possibility of this type of control. The first problem arises from the possibility of controlling an action (...)
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  2. Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the (...)
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  3. Bruce Aune (1990). Action, Inference, Belief, and Intention. Philosophical Perspectives 4:247-271.
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). “Tätigsein Und Die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the First-Person Perspective). In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag.
    It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there are different kinds (...)
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1981). Why Computers Can't Act. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163.
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  6. Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327–335.
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  7. Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
    I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...)
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  8. Gerard Casey (1987). A Problem of Unity in St. Thomas’s Account of Human Action. The New Scholasticism 61 (2):146-161.
    In his many and varied writings, St Thomas presents us with both a sophisticated account of human action and a complicated moral theory. In this article, I shall be considering the question of whether St Thomas’s theory of action and his moral theory are mutually consistent. My claim shall be that St Thomas can preserve the ontological unity of human action—but only at the cost of rendering it extremely difficult to evaluate in a manner consistent with his moral theory, or, (...)
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  9. Vere Chappell, Self-Determination.
    1. For many thinkers in the seventeenth century, self-determination is the mark of free agency: a free agent is one who determines himself, and conversely. To determine oneself, in this context, is to be the cause of one’s own actions, and that in two ways. A self-determiner brings it about, first, that he does something, as opposed to not acting at all. And second, he brings it about that the action he performs is of some specific kind, as opposed to (...)
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  10. Roderick M. Chisholm (1983). Two Dimensions of Rational Action. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):223-229.
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  11. John Churchill, Reasons Explanation and Agent Control: In Search of an Integrated Account.
    Perhaps the central challenge for indeterministic (“libertarian”) accounts of human freedom is one of integration: squaring one’s understanding of an agent’s control over his own free action with a plausible account of how such actions are properly explained by the reasons the agent had for so acting. Two types of account predominate.1 One is centered on the notion of agent causation. The other holds that a free action is the (event) causal, but nondeterministic outcome of antecedent factors including the states (...)
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  12. Arthur B. Cody (1998). The Onslaught of Mental States. Inquiry 41 (1):89 – 97.
    The causal theory of action had suffered from inattention or linguistically motivated rejection until it was revived in 1963 by Donald Davidson. Since then the causal theory has had a continuing acceptance without having had an inspection of its assumptions. There are reasons to suspect that the theory is as unfounded as it is undoubted. Those reasons are reviewed here which have to do with the definitive moment when states such as beliefs and desires must change character to become causal (...)
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  13. Arthur B. Cody (1971). Is 'Human Action' A Category? Inquiry 14 (1-4):386-419.
    It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human (...)
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  14. John M. Connolly (1991). Whither Action Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.
    The problem of ‘wayward causal chains’ threatens any causal analysis of the concept of intentional human action. For such chains show that the mere causation of an action by the right sort of belief and/or desire does not make the action intentional, i.e. one done in order to attain the object of desire. Now if the ‘because’ in ‘wayward’ action-explanations is straightforwardly causal, that might be argued to indicate by contrast that the different ‘because’ of reasons-explanations (which both explain and (...)
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  15. Charles B. Cross (1986). 'Can' and the Logic of Ability. Philosophical Studies 50 (1):53-64.
    A selection function based semantics is offered for the 'can' of ability based on the idea that 'John can run a four minute mile' is true iff John would do so under the right conditions, meaning that he would do so under at least one appropriately chosen test condition. Completeness is proved for an axiom system and semantics based on this idea, and the logic turns out to be interestingly different from any standard system of modal logic.
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  16. Alan Donagan (1994). The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan. University of Chicago Press.
    A major voice in late twentieth-century philosophy, Alan Donagan is distinguished for his theories on the history of philosophy and the nature of morality. The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan, volumes 1 and 2, collect 28 of Donagan's most important and best-known essays on historical understanding and ethics from 1957 to 1991. Volume 2 addresses issues in the philosophy of action and moral theory. With papers on Kant, von Wright, Sellars, and Chisholm, this volume also covers a range of questions (...)
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  17. Dag Elgesem (1990). Intentions, Actions and Routines: A Problem in Krister Segerberg's Theory of Action. Synthese 85 (1):153 - 177.
    The aim of this paper is to make a critical assessment of Krister Segerberg''s theory of action. The first part gives a critical presentation of the key concepts in Segerberg''s informal theory of action. These are the ideas that motivate the formal models he develops. In the second part it is argued that if one takes all of Segerberg''s motivating ideas seriously, problems are forthcoming. The main problem is that on this theory the agents seem to be bound to realize (...)
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  18. Pascal Engel (2009). Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
    This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.
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  19. John Ferejohn (2002). Symposium on Explanations and Social Ontology 1: Rational Choice Theory and Social Explanation. Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):211-234.
    In the Common Mind, Pettit argues that rational choice theory cannot provide genuine causal accounts of action. A genuine causal explanation of intentional action must track how people actually deliberate to arrive at action. And, deliberation is necessarily enculturated or situated “. . . we take human agents to reason their way to action, using the concepts that are available to them in the currency of their culture” (p. 220). When deciding how to act, “. . . people find their (...)
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  20. Luca Ferrero, Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.
    How can we account for the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality? Some philosophers have argued that the grounds of these unconditional oughts are to be found in the nature of agency.2 In a rough outline, their basic claim is that the norms and requirements of practical rationality and morality can be derived from the constitutive features of agency. Hence, a systematic failure to be guided by these requirements amounts to a loss of agency. But there is (...)
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  21. Luca Ferrero, To Appear in Philosophers' Imprint.
    1.1 A distinctive feature of our agency is the ability to bind our future conduct by making future-directed decisions. The bond of decisions is not one of mere physical constraint. A decision is not the trigger of some mechanism that takes control of the agent at the future time f and physically forces her to φ. When the agent φ’s out of her past decision to do so, she is in rational control of her conduct at the time of action.1 (...)
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  22. John Martin Fischer (2010). The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories. Philosophical Review 119 (3):315-336.
    The Frankfurt cases have been thought by some philosophers to show that moral responsibility does not require genuine metaphysical access to alternative possibilities. But various philosophers have rejected this putative "lesson" of the cases, and they have put forward a powerful "Dilemma Defense." In the last decade or so, many philosophers have been persuaded by the Dilemma Defense that the Frankfurt cases do not show what Frankfurt (and others) thought they show. This essay presents a template for a general strategy (...)
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  23. Patrick Fleming (2006). Berkeley's Immaterialist Account of Action. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):415-429.
    : A number of critics have argued that Berkeley's metaphysics can offer no tenable account of human agency. In this paper I argue that Berkeley does have a coherent account of action. The paper addresses arguments by C.C. W. Taylor, Robert Imlay, and Jonathan Bennett. The paper attempts to show that Berkeley can offer a theory of action, maintain many of our common intuitions about action, and provide a defensible solution to the problem of evil.
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  24. Thor Grünbaum (2008). Trying and the Arguments From Total Failure. Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.
    New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are (...)
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  25. J. F. Horty & M. E. Pollack, Evaluating New Options in the Context of Existing Plans.
    This paper contributes to the foundations of a theory of rational choice for artificial agents in dynamic environments. Our work is developed within a theoretical framework, originally due to Bratman, that models resource-bounded agents as operating against the background of some current set of intentions, which helps to frame their subsequent reasoning. In contrast to the standard theory of rational choice, where options are evaluated in isolation, we therefore provide an analysis of situations in which the options presented to an (...)
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  26. Peter Hucklenbroich (1981). Action Theory as a Source for Philosophy of Medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (1):55-73.
    The article tries to demonstrate how the tools and perspectives of action theory may be used in philosophy of medicine and medical ethics. In the first part, some concepts and principles of action theory are reconstructed and used to sketch a view of medicine as a science of actions. The second part is a contribution to the discussion on medical ethics in the same issue of this journal and consists in a detailed analysis of the main arguments and critical remarks (...)
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  27. Beth Huffer (2007). Actions and Outcomes: Two Aspects of Agency. Synthese 157 (2):241 - 265.
    Agency can be construed as both the manner in which autonomous individuals embark on particular courses of action (or inaction), and the relationship between such agents and the outcomes of the courses of action on which they embark. A promising strategy for understanding both senses of agency consists in the combination of a modal logic of agency and branching time semantics. Such is the strategy behind stit theory, the theory of agentive action developed by Nuel Belnap and others. However, stit (...)
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  28. Daniel D. Hutto, Folk Psychology Without Theory or Simulation.
    Folk Psychology is dead. Long live Folk Psychology!! This could be the motto of many of the papers in this volume. I too endorse the need to reform the standard assumptions about the function, scope and basis of our capacity to understand others in terms of what might be called – accurately, if rather cumbersomely – propositionalattitude belief-desire psychology. Yet, I stop short of proposing a successor. I take it to be a datum that certain populations of psychologically normal, adult (...)
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  29. Mikael M. Karlsson (2002). Agency and Patiency: Back to Nature? Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):59 – 81.
    The distinction between acting and suffering underlies any theory of agency. Among contemporary writers, Fred Dretske is one of the few who has attempted to explicate this distinction without restricting the notion of action to intentional action alone. Aristotle also developed a global account of agency, one which is deeper and more detailed than Dretske's, and it is to Aristotle's account (with some modifications) that the bulk of this paper is devoted. Dretske's sketchier theory faces at least two ground-level problems. (...)
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  30. T. M. Knox (1968). Action. New York, Humanities P..
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  31. E. J. Lowe (2008). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford University Press.
    This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will--a "two-way" power which ...
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  32. E. J. Lowe (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
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  33. Kirk Ludwig, Trying the Impossible: Reply to Adams.
    The Simple View (so-dubbed by Michael Bratman) holds that if one A's intentionally, then one intended to A. The autonomy thesis holds that there is no belief requirement on intending, that one can intend to do something even though one believes that it is impossible.
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  34. Roopen Majithia (2007). Akara on Action and Liberation. Asian Philosophy 17 (3):231 – 249.
    In this paper I attempt to understand the implications of akara's claim that liberation is not an action. If liberation is not an action, how is it up to us and therefore our responsibility? What role do actions have in a life concerned with liberation? The key to understanding akara's view, I suggest, requires broad reflection on his claim in his commentary on Brahma Stra I.1.4 that cessation of action in accordance with Vedic prohibition is not an action. I will (...)
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  35. Roopen Majithia (2007). Śaṇkara on Action and Liberation. Asian Philosophy 17 (3):231-249.
    In this paper I attempt to understand the implications of a kara's claim that liberation is not an action. If liberation is not an action, how is it up to us and therefore our responsibility? What role do actions have in a life concerned with liberation? The key to understanding a kara's view, I suggest, requires broad reflection on his claim in his commentary on Brahma S tra I.1.4 that cessation of action in accordance with Vedic prohibition is not an (...)
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  36. Conor McHugh (forthcoming). Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action. Philosophical Studies.
    Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when (...)
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  37. A. R. Mele (2003). Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):292 – 295.
    Book Information Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. MIT Press. Cambridge MA. 2002. Pp. 381. US$45.
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  38. Thaddeus Metz (2008). The Nature of Reactive Practices:Exploring Strawson’s Expressivism. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):226-240.
    I aim to answer the questions of whether reactive practices such as gratitude and punishment are inherently expressive, and, if so, in what respect. I distinguish seven ways in which one might plausibly characterize reactive practices as essentially expressive in nature, and organise them so that they progress in a dialectical order, from weakest to strongest. I then critically discuss objections that apply to the strongest conception, questioning whether it coheres with standard retributive understandings of why, when and where the (...)
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  39. Donovan Miyasaki, (2011) Nietzsche and the Morality of Liberal Eugenics.
    Ethical debates about liberal eugenics frequently focus on the supposed unnaturalness of its means and its supposed harm to autonomy, an emphasis that leads into irresolvable disputes about human nature, free will, and identity. In this paper I draw on Nietzsche’s work to critique eugenics’ ends rather than its means, as harm to abilities, rather than to autonomy. I first critique subjective eugenics, the selection of extrinsically valuable traits, using Nietzsche’s notion of ‘slavish’ forms of evaluation: values reducible to the (...)
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  40. Benjamin Mossel (2009). Negative Actions. Philosophia 37 (2).
    Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions. I defend the following claims: (i) Positive actions necessarily include activity or effort, negative actions may require activity or effort, but never include the activity or effort (...)
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  41. Robert D. Murray (1995). Is Davidson's Theory of Action Consistent? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):317 - 334.
    According to a familiar objection to Davidson's causal theory of action, reasons are not causes qua reasons unless explanations of actions fit reason and action into a nomic nexus. The focus of this criticism should really be redirected to the issue of whether or not Davidson's theory provides an account of the explanatory force of explanations of actions.
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  42. Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (2008). Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag.
    Autoren Johannes Brachtendorf, Professor für Philosophie am Institut für philosophische Grundfragen der Theologie an der Katholisch-Theologischen Fakultät ...
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  43. Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (2010). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The first volume to survey the entire field of philosophy of action (the central issues and processes relating to human actions) Brings together specially ...
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  44. Amy Peikoff (2003). Rational Action Entails Rational Desire: A Critical Review of Searle's Rationality in Action. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):124 – 138.
    In this paper I contest Searle's thesis that desire-independent reasons for action - 'reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set' - are inherent in the concept of rationality. Following Searle's procedure, I first address his argument that altruistic reasons for action inhere in the concept of rationality, and then examine his argument for his more general thesis. I conclude that a viable theory of rational action would be centered, not on (...)
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  45. John Pollock, The Logical Foundations of Decision-Theoretic Planning in Autonomous Agents.
    Decision-theoretic planning is normally based on the assumption that plans can be compared by comparing their expected-values, and the objective is to find an optimal plan. This is typically defended by reference to classical decision theory. However, classical decision theory is actually incompatible with this “simple plan-based decision theory”. A defense of plan-based decision theory must begin by showing that classical decision theory is incorrect insofar as the two theories conflict, so this paper begins by raising objections to classical decision (...)
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  46. Huw Price (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):187 - 203.
    In this paper we defend the view that the ordinary notions of cause and effect have a direct and essential connection with our ability to intervene in the world as agents.1 This is a well known but rather unpopular philosophical approach to causation, often called the manipulability theory. In the interests of brevity and accuracy, we prefer to call it the agency theory.2 Thus the central thesis of an agency account of causation is something like this: an event A is (...)
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  47. Joseph Raz (1999). Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford University Press.
    Joseph Raz presents a penetrating exploration of the interdependence of value, reason, and the will. The essays illuminate a wide range of questions concerning fundamental aspects of human thought and action. The book is a summation of many years of original, compelling, and influential work by a major contemporary philosopher.
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  48. David Rose, Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (forthcoming). Deep Trouble for the Deep Self. Taylor and Francis: Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-18, Ahead of Print.
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  49. Abraham Sesshu Roth (2004). Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments. Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
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  50. Mark Rowlands (2006). The Normativity of Action. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.
    The concept of action is playing an increasingly prominent role in attempts to explain how subjects can represent the world. The idea is that at least some of the role traditionally assigned to internal representations can, in fact, be played by the ability of subjects to act on the world, and the exercise of that ability on appropriate occasions. This paper argues that the appeal to action faces a serious dilemma. If the concept of action employed is a representational one, (...)
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  51. Severin Schroeder (2001). The Concept of Trying. Philosophical Investigations 24 (3):213–227.
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  52. John R. Searle (1979). The Intentionality of Intention and Action. Inquiry 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
    This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action -vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self-referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the (...)
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  53. Andrew Sneddon (2004). Action: On Cause and Constitution. Dialogue 43 (01):157-.
    This is a response to Andrei Buckareff and Jing Zhu, who in "Causalisms Reconsidered" criticize my argument in, primarily, "Considering Causalisms" and, secondarily, in "Does Philosophy of Action Rest on a Mistake?".
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  54. Andrew Sneddon (2001). Does Philosophy of Action Rest on a Mistake? Metaphilosophy 32 (5):502-522.
    Philosophers of action tend to take for granted the concept of basic actions – actions that are done at will, or directly – as opposed to others that are performed in other ways. This concept does foundational work in action theory; many theorists, especially causalists, take part of their task to be showing that normal, complex actions necessarily stem from basic ones somehow. The case for the concept of basic actions is driven by a family of observations and a cluster (...)
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  55. Eleni Staraki & Anastasia Giannakidou, Ability, Action, and Causation: From Pure Ability to Force.
    Abstract In this paper, we show that Greek distinguishes empirically ability as a precondition for action, and ability as initiating and sustaining force for action. In this latter case, the ability verb behaves like an action verb, and the sentence has the logical form of a causative structure φ CAUSE [BECOME ψ] (Dowty 1979). The distinction between ability as potential for action and ability as action itself has a venerable tradition that goes back to Aristotle, and is recently implied in (...)
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  56. Gordon Park Stevenson (2004). Revamping Action Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):427 - 451.
    Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, action theorists propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of folk psychological action ascriptions. However, several key doctrinal and methodological features of contemporary action theory are troubling, in particular (i) the insistence that folk psychological kinds like beliefs and desires have neurophysiological correlates, (ii) the assumption that the concept of action is "classical" in structure (making it amenable to definition (...)
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  57. Frederick Stoutland (1980). Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action. Synthese 43 (3):351 - 367.
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  58. Stephan Torre (2010). Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
    I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...)
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  59. Raimo Tuomela, Corporate Intention and Corporate Action.
    Professor James Coleman's book The Foundations of Social Theory is a great achievement: It presents a general but precisely formulated social theory based partly on long-term theoretical work and in part also on empirical work. I find myself largely in agreement with what Coleman says; accordingly, most of my critical points will be "external". The chief purpose of this paper is therefore not so much to criticize as as to attempt to say something which complements Coleman's theory and also serves (...)
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  60. J. David Velleman (1997). How To Share An Intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29 - 50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...)
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  61. John B. Watson (1926). Behaviourism: A Psychology Based on Reflex-Action. Philosophy 1 (04):454-.
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  62. Thomas E. Wren (1975). Danto's Rejection of Immanent Causation. Inquiry 18 (4):463 – 469.
    Against Danto's recent argument that the causation internal to basic actions is not a special, immanent causation, it is objected that (i) he introduces a notion of truncated action that involves a fallacious use of the Equals-subtracted-from-equals axiom, (ii) his version of the Identity Thesis turns upon a misleading notion of co-referentiality, and (iii) he falls into what, by his own theory of meaning, amounts to a category mistake concerning intentions as causes within actions. Hence Danto's arguments do not warrant (...)
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Action Sentences
  1. Maria Alvarez (1999). Actions and Events: Some Semantical Considerations. Ratio 12 (3):213–239.
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  2. Lennart Åqvist (2002). Old Foundations for the Logic of Agency and Action. Studia Logica 72 (3):313-338.
    The paper presents an infinite hierarchy of sound and complete axiomatic systems for Two-Dimensional Modal Tense Logic with Historical Necessity, Agents and Acts. A main novelty of these logics is their capacity to represent formally (i) basic action-sentences asserting that such and such an act is performed/omitted by an agent, as well as (ii) causative action-sentences asserting that by performing/omitting a certain act, an agent causes that such and such a state-of-affairs is realized (e.g. comes about/ceases/remains/remains absent). We illustrate how (...)
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  3. Renée Bilodeau (1985). Attribution d'États Mentaux Et Justification de L'Action. Dialogue 24 (04):639-653.
    Plusieurs auteurs se sont inspirés des thèses du deuxième Wittgenstein pour proposer une nouvelle approche en sciences sociales qui viserait la justification plutôt que l'explication de l'action. Sur la base d'une étude de trois types d'énoncés formulés grâce au langage de l'action (factuels, normatifs et attributifs d'états mentaux), cet article évalue les difficultés et possibilités d'une telle suggestion.
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  4. E. J. Borowski (1974). Adverbials in Action Sentences. Synthese 28 (3-4):483 - 512.
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  5. Roderick M. Chisholm (1964). The Descriptive Element in the Concept of Action. Journal of Philosophy 61 (20):613-625.
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  6. Arthur B. Cody (1967). Can a Single Action Have Many Different Descriptions? Inquiry 10 (1-4):164 – 180.
    To say that a single human action can be given different descriptions is to imply that the contrast between action and description is intelligible. There are several ways in which such a contrast is easily understood, but those ways do not meet philosophers? needs. They have said that the descriptions are all true, thereby excluding that interpretation in which no more than one description could be true. They have emphasized the word ?different?, therefore that interpretation in which the descriptions are (...)
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  7. Linda B. Cornett (1975). A Problem in the Logic of Action Sentences. The New Scholasticism 49 (4):467-472.
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  8. Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
  9. Jennifer Hornsby (1980). Actions. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  10. John Hyman (2001). -Ings and -Ers. Ratio 14 (4):298–317.
    This paper is about the semantic structure of verbal and deverbal noun phrases. The focus is on noun phrases which describe actions, perceptions, sensations and beliefs. It is commonly thought that actions are movements of parts of the agent’s body which we typically describe in terms of their effects, and that perceptions are slices of sensible experience which we typically describe in terms of their causes. And many philosophers hold that sensations and beliefs are states of the central nervous system (...)
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  11. Carl Erik Kühl (2008). Kinesis and Energeia—and What Follows. Outline of a Typology of Human Actions. Axiomathes 18 (3).
    This paper presents a typology of human actions, based on Aristotle’s kinesis–energeia dichotomy and on a formal elaboration (with some refinement) of the Vendler–Kenny classificatory schemes for action types (or action verbs). The types introduced are defined throughout by inferential criteria, in terms of what here are referred to as “modal-temporal expressions” (‘MT-terms’). Examples of familiar categories analysed in this way are production and maintenance, but the procedure is meant to offer a basis for defining various other commonsense categories. Among (...)
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  12. Michael Perloff (1991). Stit and the Language of Agency. Synthese 86 (3):379 - 408.
    Stit, a sentence form first introduced in Belnap and Perloff (1988), encourages a modal approach to agency. Von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, and Castañeda have all attempted modal treatments of agency, while Davidson has rejected such treatments. After a brief explanation of the syntax and semantics of stit and a restatement of several of the important claims of the earlier paper, I discuss the virtues of stit against the background of proposals made by these philososphers.
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  13. Paul M. Pietroski (1998). Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency. Mind 107 (425):73-111.
    The event analysis of action sentences seems to be at odds with plausible (Davidsonian) views about how to count actions. If Booth pulled a certain trigger, and thereby shot Lincoln, there is good reason for identifying Booths' action of pulling the trigger with his action of shooting Lincoln; but given truth conditions of certain sentences involving adjuncts, the event analysis requires that the pulling and the shooting be distinct events. So I propose that event sortals like 'shooting' and 'pulling' are (...)
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  14. Helen Steward (2006). 'Could Have Done Otherwise', Action Sentences and Anaphora. Analysis 66 (290):95–101.
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  15. Richmond H. Thomason, Defeasibly Successful Action.
    “Philosophy of action” is a recognized specialty in contemporary philosophy, and the literature on action is fairly extensive: see, for instance, (Care & Landesman 1968; Goldman 1970; Hornsby 1980). The relation of actions to their effects is formulated most clearly in the more specialized literature on the logic of action; see (Belnap & Perloff 1988; Chellas 1992; Czelakowski 1996; Segerberg 1982).
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  16. Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (1985). Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.
    This collection brings together previously unpublished works by well-known philosophers on the philosophy of action, the metaphysics of causality, and the philosophy of psychology. Nine of the essays directly discuss Donald Davidson's work on these topics, while three others challenge a Davidsonian approach through discussion of independent but related issues. These essays are followed by replies from Davidson, including a previously unpublished essay, "Adverbs of Action.".
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  17. David Widerker (1988). Action Sentences. Erkenntnis 28 (2):269 - 291.
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  18. Edward Wierenga (1980). Fodor on Davidson on Action Sentences. Synthese 44 (3):347 - 359.
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  19. John W. Yolton (1957). Ascriptions, Descriptions, and Action Sentences. Ethics 67 (4):307-310.
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Knowledge of Action
  1. G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  2. Michael E. Bratman (1991). Cognitivism About Practical Reason (Review of Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman). Ethics 102 (1):117-.
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  3. Frederick Broadie (1967). Knowing That I Am Doing. Philosophical Quarterly 17 (67):137-149.
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  4. Jan M. Broersen (2011). Making a Start with the Stit Logic Analysis of Intentional Action. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):499-530.
    This paper studies intentional action in stit logic. The formal logic study of intentional action appears to be new, since most logical studies of intention concern intention as a static mental state. In the formalization we distinguish three modes of acting: the objective level concerning the choices an agent objectively exercises, the subjective level concerning the choices an agent knows or believes to be exercising, and finally, the intentional level concerning the choices an agent intentionally exercises. Several axioms constraining the (...)
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  5. Peter Carruthers (2011). Action-Awareness and the Active Mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):133-156.
    In a pair of recent papers and his new book, Christopher Peacocke (2007, 2008a, 2008b) takes up and defends the claim that our awareness of our own actions is immediate and not perceptually based, and extends it into the domain of mental action.1 He aims to provide an account of action-awareness that will generalize to explain how we have immediate awareness of our own judgments, decisions, imaginings, and so forth. These claims form an important component in a much larger philosophical (...)
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  6. David Cunning (1999). Agency and Consciousness. Synthese 120 (2):271-294.
    In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing is always a component of one'€™s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle'€™s view to establish that there are actions in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility.
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  7. Arthur Danto (1963). What We Can Do. Journal of Philosophy 60 (15):435-445.
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  8. Arthur Coleman Danto (1973). Analytical Philosophy of Action. Cambridge, [Eng.]University Press.
    He is always prepared to venture novel ideas to stimulate further debate and research and the book as a whole is presented as an original contribution to a ...
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  9. Govert den Hartogh (2004). The Authority of Intention. Ethics 115 (1):6-34.
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  10. Keith S. Donnellan (1963). Knowing What I Am Doing. Journal of Philosophy 60 (14):401-409.
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  11. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot (...)
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  12. Robert Dunn (1998). Knowing What I'm About to Do Without Evidence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):231 – 252.
    J. David Velleman casts foreknowledge of one's own next move as psychologically active. As agents, we form prior intentions about what we will do next. Such prior intentions are licensed self-fulfilling beliefs or directive cognitions. These cognitions differ from ordinary predictions in their psychological relation to the evidence, in that they precede that crucial part of the evidence which consists in the fact that they have been formed. However, once formed, these cognitions are epistemologically unremarkable: they are directly justified by (...)
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  13. Kevin Falvey (2000). Knowledge in Intention. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.
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  14. C. Farrer, N. Franck, J. Paillard & M. Jeannerod (2003). The Role of Proprioception in Action Recognition. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):609-619.
    This study aimed at evaluating the role of proprioception in the process of matching the final position of one's limbs with an intentional movement. Two experiments were realised with the same paradigm of conscious recognition of one's own limb position from a distorted position. In the first experiment, 22 healthy subjects performed the task in an active and in a passive condition. In the latter condition, proprioception was the only available information since the central signals related to the motor command (...)
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  15. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (2011). Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  16. Chris Frith (2005). The Self in Action: Lessons From Delusions of Control. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770.
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  17. John Gibbons (2010). Seeing What You're Doing. In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Do we have privileged access to what we’re intentionally doing? Well, that probably depends on what privileged access is. One way to think about privileged access is to try to identify a true formal principle. One thing you’ll need to do when identifying the formal principle is to specify the relevant range of propositions to which you have privileged access. These ranges are usually specified by subject matter: propositions about your own current, conscious propositional attitudes, propositions about your own sensations, (...)
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  18. John Gibbons (2001). Knowledge in Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
    This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent's beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe (...)
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  19. Thor Grünbaum (2011). Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
    I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her (...)
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