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  1. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how the introspection (...)
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  2. Murat Aydede (forthcoming). A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure. In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. Oxford University Press.
    [This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of an experiential-desire account.
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  3. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  4. G. Berger (1987). On the Structure of Visual Sentience. Synthese 71 (June):355-70.
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  5. Thomas W. Bestor (1979). Gilbert Ryle and the Adverbial Theory of Mind. Personalist 60 (July):233-242.
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  6. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  7. Harold I. Brown (1987). Observation And Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    This book develops an explanation for the roles of observation and theory in scientific endeavor that occupies the middle ground between empiricism and rationalism, and captures the strengths of both approaches. Brown argues that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories and constructs an epistemological theory that provides an account of the role that theory and instruments play in scientific observation. His theory of perception yields a new analysis of objectivity that combines the traditional view of observation (...)
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  8. Panayot K. Butchvarov (1980). Adverbial Theories of Consciousness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (3):261-80.
  9. Gregg Caruso (1999). A Defence of the Adverbial Theory. Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.
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  10. Albert Casullo (1983). Adverbial Theories of Sensing and the Many-Property Problem. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):143-160.
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  11. R. Clark (1981). Sensing, Perceiving, Thinking. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:273-95.
    This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.
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  12. Romane L. Clark (1987). Objects of Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 1:481-500.
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  13. Romane L. Clark (1979). Sensing, Perceiving, Thinking. Grazer Philosophische Studien/ 8:273-295.
    This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.
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  14. M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that (...)
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  15. C. J. Ducasse (1942). Moore's Refutation of Idealism. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court. 232-3.
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  16. Reinaldo Elugardo (1982). Cornman, Adverbial Materialism, and Phenomenal Properties. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):33-50.
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  17. Richard A. Fumerton (2000). Relational, Non-Relational, and Mixed Theories of Experience. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center. 21-28.
    In this paper I argue that there are excellent reasons to embrace nonrelational (adverbial) analyses of sensations and intentional states. I shall further argue, however, that the epistemology of experience requires that we recognize at least one conscious state that is genuinely relational—awareness or acquaintance. It is through the relational state of being acquainted with non-relational mental states that one can end a regress of justification.
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  18. Richard A. Fumerton (2000). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.
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  19. Laurence Goldstein (1983). The Adverbial Theory of Conceptual Thought. The Monist 65 (July):379-392.
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  20. A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.) (1992). A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    A memorial collection of essays by leading Western philosophers, with a postumous essay by Ayer himself.
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  21. Gary C. Hatfield (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited (...)
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  22. Ted Honderich (1992). Seeing Qualia and Positing the World. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press. 129-152.
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  23. Frank Jackson (1975). On the Adverbial Analysis of Visual Experience. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):127-135.
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  24. James W. Kalat (2002). Identism Without Objective Qualia: Commentary on Crooks. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):233-238.
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  25. Ran Lahav (1990). An Alternative to the Adverbial Theory: Dis-Phenomenalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):553-568.
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  26. Harold Langsam (2000). Experiences, Thoughts, and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.
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  27. Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Sensory Experience and Intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
    Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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  28. Brian Loar (2003). Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  29. Michael C. Loui (1994). Against Qualia: Our Direct Perception of Physical Reality. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
  30. Michael C. Loui (1994). European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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  31. William G. Lycan (1987). Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.
  32. Barry Maund (2003). Perception. Acumen.
    Barry Maund's account of the major issues in the philosophy of perception highlights the importance of a good theory of perception in a range of philosophical fields - including epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind - while ...
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  33. Alan Millar (1991). Reasons and Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the (...)
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  34. Walter Ott (2014). Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
    Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...)
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  35. Desiree Park (1992). Ayerian 'Qualia' and the Empiricist Heritage. In The Philosophy of a Jayer. Peru: Open Court.
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  36. Desiree Park (1992). Ayerian 'Qualia' and the Empiricist Heritage. In Lewis E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of A.J. Ayer.
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  37. Kenneth L. Pearce, Arnauld's Verbal Distinction Between Ideas and Perceptions.
    In his dispute with Malebranche about the nature of ideas, Arnauld endorses a form of direct realism. This appears to conflict with views put forward by Arnauld and his collaborators in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic where the distinction between verbs and nouns is based on a distinction between mental acts and their (internal, mind-dependent) objects. I show that, although Arnauld identifi es perceptions with ideas, he recognizes a distinction in meaning between the words `perception' and `idea,' and this distinction (...)
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  38. William J. Rapaport (1979). An Adverbial Meinongian Theory. Analysis 39 (March):75-81.
    A fundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's 1904 Theory of Objects is the act-content-object analysis of psychological experiences. I suggest that Meinong's theory need not be based on this analysis, but that an adverbial theory might suffice. I then defend the adverbial alternative against an objection raised by Roderick Chisholm, and conclude by presenting an apparently more serious objection based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark.
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  39. Paul Arthur Schilpp (1952). The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York, Tudor Pub. Co..
    --Moore's autobiography.--Descriptive and critical essays on the philosophy of G. E. Moore.--The philosopher replies.--Bibliography of the writings of G. E. Moore (to July, 1952) compiled by Emerson Buchanan and G. E. Moore (p. [689]-699).
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  40. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1975). The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Sensation. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):144-160.
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  41. Michael Tye (1984). The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience. Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.
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  42. Michael Tye (1975). The Adverbial Theory: A Defence of Sellars Against Jackson. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):136-143.
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  43. E. W. van Steenburgh (1987). Adverbial Sensing. Mind 76 (July):376-380.
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  44. Thomas C. Vinci (1981). Sellars and the Adverbial Theory of Sensation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (June):199-217.
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  45. Edmond L. Wright (1990). Two More Proofs of Present Qualia. Theoria 56 (1-2):3-22.
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