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  1. Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  2. Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.) (2009). Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
  3. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). On Epistemic Agency. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
    Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should be identified (...)
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  4. Arif Ahmed (2010). Causation and Decision. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):111-131.
    Sophisticated ‘tickle’-style defences of Evidential Decision Theory take your motivational state to screen off your act from any state that is causally independent of it, thus ensuring that EDT and CDT converge. That leads to unacceptable instability in cases in which the correct action is obvious. We need a more liberal conception of what the agent controls. It follows that an ordinary deliberator should sometimes consider the past and not only the future to be subject to her present choice.
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  5. Abbas J. Ali, Robert C. Camp & Manton Gibbs (2005). The Concept of “Free Agency” in Monotheistic Religions: Implications for Global Business. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 60 (1):103 - 112.
    The current debate on “free agency” seems to highlight the romantic aspects of free agent and considers it a genuine response to changing economic conditions (e.g., high-unemployment rate, importance of knowledge in the labor market, the eclipse of organizational loyalty, and self pride). Little attention, if any, has been given to the religious root of the free agency concept and its persistent existence across history. In this paper, the current discourse on free agency and the conditions that have led to (...)
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  6. Maria Alvarez & John Hyman (1998). Agents and Their Actions. Philosophy 73 (2):219-245.
    In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...)
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  7. Joel Anderson (2008). Disputing Autonomy: Second-Order Desires and the Dynamics of Ascribing Autonomy. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):7-26.
    In this paper, I examine two versions of the so-called “hierarchical” approach to personal autonomy, based on the notion of “second-order desires”. My primary concern will be with the question of whether these approaches provide an adequate basis for understanding the dynamics of autonomy-ascription. I begin by distinguishing two versions of the hierarchical approach, each representing a different response to the oft-discussed “regress” objection. I then argue that both “structural hierarchicalism” (e.g., Frankfurt, Bratman) and “procedural hierarchicalism” (e.g., Dworkin, Christman, Mele) (...)
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  8. Nomy Arpaly (2004). Review: Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):744-747.
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  9. Neera K. Badhwar (1996). Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality. Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (01):1-.
    ♦1 Introduction Liberal political philosophy presupposes a moral theory according to which the ability to assess and choose conceptions of the good from a universal and impartial moral standpoint is central to the individual's moral identity. This viewpoint as standardly understood by liberals is that of a rational human (not noumenal) agent. Such an agent is able to reflect on her ends and pursuits, including those she strongly identifies with, and to understand and take into account the basic interests of (...)
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  10. Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.
    This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator (...)
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  11. Lynne Rudder Baker (1981). Why Computers Can't Act. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163.
    To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
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  12. M. M. Bakhtin (1993). Toward a Philosophy of the Act. University of Texas Press.
    Rescued in 1972 from a storeroom in which rats and seeping water had severely damaged the fifty-year-old manuscript, this text is the earliest major work (1919-1921) of the great Russian philosopher M. M. Bakhtin. Toward a Philosophy of the Act contains the first occurrences of themes that occupied Bakhtin throughout his long career. The topics of authoring, responsibility, self and other, the moral significance of "outsideness," participatory thinking, the implications for the individual subject of having "no-alibi in existence," the difference (...)
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  13. Gerald Beaulieu (2013). Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action? Metaphilosophy 44 (4):440-450.
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that (...)
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  14. Nuel D. Belnap (2001). Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World. Oxford University Press on Demand.
    Here is an important new theory of human action, a theory that assumes actions are founded on choices made by agents who face an open future.
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  15. Stefano Bertea (2013). Constitutivism and Normativity: A Qualified Defence. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):81 - 95.
    In this article, I defend a meta-normative account of constitutivism by specifically addressing what I take to be a fundamental criticism of the constitutivist stance, namely, the objection that constitutive standards have conceptual, not normative, force, and so that no practical normativity can be extracted from them as constitutive of agency. In reply to this objection, I argue that the conceptual role of the standards constitutive of agency ? their applying to us by virtue of our being the kinds of (...)
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  16. Robert Williams Binkley, Richard N. Bronaugh & Ausonio Marras (eds.) (1971). Agent, Action, and Reason. [Toronto]University of Toronto Press.
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  17. John Bishop (1990). Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge University Press.
    From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that (...)
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  18. John Bishop (1990). Searle on Natural Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):282 – 300.
  19. John Bishop (1987). Sensitive and Insensitive Responses to Deviant Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):452 – 469.
  20. Roland Bleiker (2003). Discourse and Human Agency. Contemporary Political Theory 2 (1):25-47.
    The conceptualization of human agency is one of the oldest and most debated challenges in political theory. This essay defends the continuous relevance of this endeavour against a proliferating theoretical pessimism. Instead of engaging the much rehearsed structure-agency debate, the author conceptualizes agency in relation to discourses. However, such an approach inevitably elicits suspicion. Is discourse not merely a faddish term, destined to wax and wane with fleeting intellectual trends of the postmodern and poststructural kind? Does the concept of discourse, (...)
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  21. Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Agency, Life Extension, and the Meaning of Life. The Monist 93 (1):38-56.
    Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that life extension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains constrained, and many (...)
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  22. Lisa Bortolotti (2010). Agency, Life Extension, and the Meaning of Life. The Monist 93 (1):38-56.
    Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists argue that life extension is bad for the individual. According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the meaningfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains constrained, and many (...)
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  23. Raymond Bradley (2002). Love and Power, and the Development of the Brain, Mind, and Agency. World Futures 58 (2 & 3):175 – 211.
    In drawing on my own research and collaborative work with Karl Pribram, I show that love (affective attachment) and power (social control) play a central role in psychosocial evolution. When these relations are coupled in a self-regulating system of cooperative interactions, brain growth is stimulated, mind and agency develop, and stable forms of collective social organization are generated. Focusing on the endogenous dynamics of social collectives, the article is organized in four parts. (A "social collective" is defined as a (...)
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  24. Raymond Trevor Bradley (2000). Agency and the Theory of Quantum Vacuum Interaction. World Futures 55 (3):227-275.
  25. Myles Brand (1987). Interpersonal Practical Reasoning. Grazer Philosophische Studien 30:77-95.
    According to one version of the Causal Theory, an action is a mental or bodily event caused by an intention to act. Deliberate action requires prior planning. The practical syllogism is interpreted as a summary description of the planning process, where the conclusion reports the agent's intention. Social action differs from individual action in that only the former requires coordination of one's action with members of a group. This difference is reflected in the intention with which we act, labeled 'we-intention' (...)
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  26. Michael Bratman (forthcoming). Reflections on the Philosophy of Action. In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
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  27. Michael Bratman (2009). Shared Agency. In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. 41--59.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways. Forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal, both intrinsically – think of friendship and love, singing duets, and the joys of conversation -- and instrumentally – think of how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals. My focus will be on activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups. My approach begins with an underlying model of individual planning agency, and (...)
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  28. Michael Bratman (2007). Structures of Agency: Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics and metaphysics.
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  29. Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...)
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  30. Michael E. Bratman (1996). Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18.
    I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such phenomena — (...)
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  31. Michael Brownstein (2014). Rationalizing Flow: Agency in Skilled Unreflective Action. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.
    In recent work, Peter Railton, Julia Annas, and David Velleman aim to reconcile the phenomenon of “flow”—broadly understood as describing the “unreflective” aspect of skilled action—with one or another familiar conception of agency. While there are important differences between their arguments, Railton, Annas, and Velleman all make, or are committed to, at least one similar pivotal claim. Each argues, directly or indirectly, that agents who perform skilled unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately answer “Anscombean” questions—”what” and “why” questions— about what (...)
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  32. A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.) (2010). New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  33. Andrei A. Buckareff (2005). How (Not) to Think About Mental Action. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.
    I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.
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  34. Andrei A. Buckareff (1999). Can Agent-Causation Be Rendered Intelligible?: An Essay on the Etiology of Free Action. Dissertation, Texas A&M University
    The doctrine of agent-causation has been suggested by many interested in defending libertarian theories of free action to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary to make the notion of incompatibility freedom intelligible. In the present essay the conceptual viability of the doctrine of agent-causation will be assessed. It will be argued that agent-causation is, insofar as it is irreducible to event-causation, mysterious at best, totally unintelligible at worst. First, the arguments for agent-causation made by such eighteenth-century luminaries as Samuel Clarke and (...)
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  35. Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell & Susan Sherwin (eds.) (2009). Embodiment and Agency. Pennsylvania State University Press.
  36. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  37. Thomas L. Carson (1994). Corporate Moral Agency: A Case From Literature. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 13 (2):155 - 156.
    I analyze a well-known and moving passage from John Steinbeck''s novelThe Grapes of Wrath. This passage provides an excellent illustration of one of the central questions about corporate moral agency: Is corporate moral agency anything over and above the agency of individual human beings? The passage in question is a debate about whether or not the actions of a particular company are anything over and above the actions of individual human beings.
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  38. Stephanie Clare (2009). Agency, Signification, and Temporality. Hypatia 24 (4):50 - 62.
    This paper examines the temporality of agency in Judith Butler's and Saba Mahmood's writing. I argue that Mahmood moves away from a performative understanding of agency, which focuses on relations of signification, to a corporeal understanding, which focuses on desire and sensation. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze's reading of Henri Bergson, I show how this move involves a changed model of becoming: whereas Butler imagines movement as a series of discontinuous beings, in Mahmood's case, we get an understanding of becoming.
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  39. Randolph Clarke (2013). Understanding Human Agency, by Erasmus Mayr. Mind 122 (486):fzt045.
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  40. Randolph Clarke (2012). What is an Omission? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.
    This paper examines three views of what an omission or an instance of refraining is. The view advanced is that in many cases, an omission is simply an absence of an action of some type. However, generally one’s not doing a certain thing counts as an omission only if there is some norm, standard, or ideal that calls for one’s doing that thing.
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  41. Randolph Clarke (2010). Intentional Omissions. Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
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  42. Randolph Clarke (2010). Opposing Powers. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.
    A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.
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  43. Randolph Clarke (2001). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Alfred R. Mele. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (439):792-796.
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  44. Randolph Clarke (1995). Recent Work on Freedom and Determinism. Philosophical Books 36 (1):9-18.
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  45. Fiery Cushman (2008). Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment. Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
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  46. Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). In Defence of the Agent-Centred Perspective. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):652-667.
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  47. Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
  48. Maximilian De Gaynesford (ed.) (2011). Agents and Their Actions. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface.1. Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning (Maria Alvarez).2. Ambivalence and Authentic Agency (Laura W. Ekstrom).3. The Road to Larissa (John Hyman).4. What is the Content of an Intention in Action? (John McDowell).5. Joseph Raz Being in the World (Joseph Raz).6. Moral Scepticism and Agency (Kant and Korsgaard Robert Stern).7. Speech, Action and Uptake (Maximilian de Gaynesford).Index.
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  49. Marcia-Anne Dobres & John E. Robb (eds.) (2000). Agency in Archaeology. Routledge.
    Agency in Archaeology is the first critical volume to scrutinize the concept of agency and to examine in-depth its potential to inform our understanding of the past. Theories of agency recognize that human beings make choices, hold intentions and take action. This offers archaeologists scope to move beyond looking at the broad structural or environmental change and instead to consider the individual and the group. The book brings together nineteen internationally renowned scholars who have very different, and often conflicting, stances (...)
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  50. Zoe Drayson & Andy Clark (2007). Augmentation, Agency, and the Spreading of the Mental State. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):3 - 11.
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