This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
184 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 184
  1. J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.) (2010). Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
  2. Sadiya Akram (2013). Fully Unconscious and Prone to Habit: The Characteristics of Agency in the Structure and Agency Dialectic. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43 (1):45-65.
    While the human agent must have the capacity for reflexivity, intentionality and consciousness, the same agent must also be affected by the social world in which she lives: herein lies the essence of the structure and agency dialectic. This paper argues that while some realists are in principle committed to a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, there is some dissonance between this commitment and the concepts of agency that they develop. I highlight the exclusion of the unconscious and habit (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Roman Altshuler (2009). Agency and the A-Series. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.
  4. M. Alvarez (2012). Action, Ethics, and Responsibility * Edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry S. Silverstein * Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action * Edited by Jesus H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff. [REVIEW] Analysis 72 (1):190-193.
  5. Francesco Amigoni, Viola Schiaffonati & Marco Somalvico (2000). A Multilevel Architecture of Creative Dynamic Agency. Foundations of Science 5 (2):157-184.
    There are two classical and opposite positions about scientific discovery: the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully rational and the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully irrational. In the first case, machines are regarded as able to perform the scientific discovery process whereas, in the second case, machines are considered unable to perform any part of the scientific discovery process.We adopt a third intermediate approach that envisages a new role for machines, which are conceived as descriptions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Holly Andersen (2013). The Representation of Time in Agency. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
    This paper outlines some key issues that arise when agency and temporality are considered jointly, from the perspective of psychology, cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology, and action theory. I address the difference between time simpliciter and time as represented as it figures in phenomena like intentional binding, goal-oriented action plans, emulation systems, and ‘temporal agency’. An examination of Husserl’s account of time consciousness highlights difficulties in generalizing his account to include a substantive notion of agency, a weakness inherited by explanatory projects like (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Chrisoula Andreou (2013). Agency and Awareness. Ratio 26 (2):117-133.
    I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X-ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X-ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X-ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Chrisoula Andreou (2012). Self-Defeating Self-Governance. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):20-34.
  9. Chrisoula Andreou & Mariam Thalos (2007). Sense and Sensibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):71 - 80.
  10. Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.) (2012). The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. Oup Usa.
    The essays collected in this volume explore procrastination in relation to agency, rationality, and ethics -- topics that philosophy is well-suited to address.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Yochai Ataria (2015). Sense of Ownership and Sense of Agency During Trauma. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):199-212.
    This paper seeks to describe and analyze the traumatic experience through an examination of the sense of agency—the sense of controlling one’s body, and sense of ownership—the sense that it is my body that undergoes experiences. It appears that there exist two levels of traumatic experience: on the first level one loses the sense of agency but retains the sense of ownership, whilst on the second one loses both of these, with symptoms becoming progressively more severe. A comparison of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Michelle Bastian (2009). Inventing Nature: Re-Writing Time and Agency in a More-Than-Human World. Australian Humanities Review 47:99-116.
    This paper is a response to Val Plumwoods call for writers to engage in ‘the struggle to think differently’. Specifically, she calls writers to engage in the task of opening up an experience of nature as powerful and as possessing agency. I argue that a critical component of opening up who or what can be understood as possessing agency involves challenging the conception of time as linear, externalised and absolute, particularly in as much as it has guided Western conceptions of (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Stephen Billett (2008). Learning Throughout Working Life: A Relational Interdependence Between Personal and Social Agency. British Journal of Educational Studies 56 (1):39 - 58.
    Individuals actively and continually construct the knowledge required for their working lives. Two outcomes arise from this constructive process: (i) individual change (i.e. learning) and (ii) the remaking of culturally-derived practices comprising work. These arise through a relational interdependence between the contributions and agency of the personal and the social. The relationship is interdependent because neither the social nor personal contributions alone are sufficient. The social experience is important for articulating and providing access to work performance requirements. However, personal factors (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. J. Bishop (2001). McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency. Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  16. John Bishop (forthcoming). On the Prospects for a Naturalistic Incompatibilist Metaphysics of Agency. Analysis:anv048.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. John Bishop (2014). Causal Pluralism and the Problem of Natural Agency. Res Philosophica 91 (3):527-536.
  18. Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this *doxastic single end condition* captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. John F. Boler (1968). Agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (2):165-181.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Pascal Boyer (2006). Prosocial Aspects of Afterlife Beliefs: Maybe Another by-Product. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):466-466.
    Bering argues that belief in posthumous intentional agency may confer added fitness via the inhibition of opportunistic behavior. This is true only if these agents are interested parties in our moral choices, a feature which does not result from Bering's imaginative constraint hypothesis and extends to supernatural agents other than dead people's souls. A by-product model might handle this better.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Michael Bratman (1987). Intention and Evaluation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):185-189.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oup Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Michael E. Bratman (2006). "Thinking How to Live" and the Restriction Problem. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):707 - 713.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Bodily Action and Distal Attribution in Sensory Substitution. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Proceedings of the British Academy.
    According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423 - 460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Fernando Broncano (2006). Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del “sentido de agencia”. Epistemological Requirements of the Sense of Agency. Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 39:7-27.
    We discuss the conditions that the knowledge of an action must meet to reach the status of agency or complete intentional action. A first problem is to account how the subject appears in the action. We consider the model of a "sense of agency" and we oppose a theory of action control that does not take in charge the epistemological problems associated to the sense of agency model. Our claim is that epistemological requirements are intrinsic components of the agency, and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Andrei Buckareff (2001). Can the Agency Theory Be Salvaged? Philosophia Christi 3 (1):217-224.
    Some of the most salient features of Randolph Clarke's causal agent-causal theory of free action are explicated and his theory critiqued. It is shown that invoking agent-causation is unnecessary and makes his theory cumbersome. For insofar as Clarke seeks to render the agency theory more intelligible by appealing to event-causation as contributing to the generation of basic actions, his theory gravitates closer to a causal indeterminist theory of free action.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Andrei A. Buckareff (2014). Deciding to Believe Redux. In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Epistemic Norms and Social Contexts. Oxford University Press. 33-50.
    The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency. Theoria 77 (4):312-332.
    In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). How Does Agent-­‐Causal Power Work? Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):105-121.
    Research on the nature of dispositionality or causal power has flourished in recent years in metaphysics. This trend has slowly begun to influence debates in the philosophy of agency, especially in the literature on free will. Both sophisticated versions of agent-­‐causalism and the new varieties of dispositionalist compatibilism exploit recently developed accounts of dispositionality in their defense. In this paper, I examine recent work on agent-­‐causal power, focusing primarily on the account of agent-­‐causalism developed and defended by Timothy O’Connor’s in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Tyler Burge (2009). Primitive Agency and Natural Norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):251-278.
  34. David Carr (2010). On the Moral Value of Physical Activity: Body and Soul in Plato's Account of Virtue. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 4 (1):3 – 15.
    It is arguable that some of the most profound and perennial issues and problems of philosophy concerning the nature of human agency, the role of reason and knowledge in such agency and the moral status and place of responsibility in human action and conduct receive their sharpest definition in Plato's specific discussion in the Republic of the human value of physical activities. From this viewpoint alone, Plato's exploration of this issue might be considered a locus classicus in the philosophy of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Bob Carter & Nickie Charles (2013). Animals, Agency and Resistance. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43 (3):322-340.
    In this paper we develop a relational approach to the question of animal agency. We distinguish between agency and action and, using three examples of non-human animal behaviour, explore how human-other animal interactions might be understood in terms of action, agency and resistance. In order to do this we draw on the distinction between primary and corporate agency found in the work of Margaret Archer, arguing that, while non-human animals are able to act and to exercise primary agency, they are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Taylor Charles (1999). Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers 1.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. James Allan Cheyne, Jonathan S. A. Carriere & Daniel Smilek (2009). Absent Minds and Absent Agents: Attention-Lapse Induced Alienation of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):481-493.
    We report a novel task designed to elicit transient attention-lapse induced alienation of agency experiences in normal participants. When attention-related action slips occur during the task, participants reported substantially decreased self control as well as a high degree of perceived agency attributed to the errant hand. In addition, participants reported being surprised by, and annoyed with, the actions of the errant hand. We argue that ALIA experiences occur because of constraints imposed by the close and precise temporal relations between intention (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Ann Chinnery (2003). Aesthetics of Surrender: Levinas and the Disruption of Agency in Moral Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 22 (1):5-17.
    Education has long been charged with the taskof forming and shaping subjectivity andidentity. However, the prevailing view ofeducation as a project of producing rationalautonomous subjects has been challenged bypostmodern and poststructuralist critiques ofsubstantial subjectivity. In a similar vein,Emmanuel Levinas inverts the traditionalconception of subjectivity, claiming that weare constituted as subjects only in respondingto the other. In other words, subjectivity isderivative of an existentially priorresponsibility to and for the other. Hisconception of ethical responsibility is thusalso a radical departure from the prevailingview (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Roderick M. Chisholm (1971). Reflections on Human Agency. Idealistic Studies 1 (1):33-46.
  40. J. Ci (2011). Evaluating Agency: A Fundamental Question for Social and Political Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):261-281.
    Many of the things we do in social and political philosophy, whether normative or critical, presuppose some understanding and evaluation of agency. To have a clear idea of our normative or critical enterprise, the underlying account of agency needs spelling out. This article begins with a descriptive account: human agency consists in power (or causal efficacy) organized as subjectivity (or selfhood), and such organization takes place through attributions of power informed by values. Some such descriptive account is useful for understanding (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Sean Clancy (2013). A Strong Compatibilist Account of Settling. Inquiry 56 (6):653-665.
  42. Randolph Clarke (2014). Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Aaron D. Cobb (2010). Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid's Account of Natural Philosophy. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):101-114.
    Thomas Reid thinks of natural philosophy as a purely nomothetic enterprise but he maintains that it is proper for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology in formulating their explanatory claims. In this paper, I analyze this puzzle in light of Reid's distinction between efficient and physical causation – a distinction he grounds in his strict understanding of active powers. I consider several possible reasons that Reid may have for maintaining that natural philosophers ought to employ causal terminology and suggest that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Ryan Cox (2012). Book Note: 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action', Edited by Jes's H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff, and Keith Frankish. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):411-411.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1, Ahead of Print.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Satyanarayana Dasa & Jonathan B. Edelmann (2014). Agency in the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Tradition. In Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 279.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Donald Davidson (1971). Agent, Action, and Reason. In Robert Binkley, Richard Bronaugh & Ausonio Marras (eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason. University of Toronto Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. John Deigh (1996). The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this collection are concerned with the psychology of moral agency. They focus on moral feelings and moral motivation, and seek to understand the operations and origins of these phenomena as rooted in the natural desires and emotions of human beings. An important feature of the essays, and one that distinguishes the book from most philosophical work in moral psychology, is the attention to the writings of Freud. Many of the essays draw on Freud's ideas about conscience and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. David DeMoss (2003). Connectionist Agency. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):9-15.
    Any mind-brain theory eventually will have to deal with agency. I do not claim that no other theory could do this successfully. I do claim that connectionism is able to handle some key features of agency. First, I will offer a brief account of connectionism and the advantages of using it to account for human agency, comparing and contrasting connectionism with two other mind-brain accounts in cognitive science, symbolicism and dynamicism. Then, since a connectionist account of agency depends on a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Ezio Di Nucci (2014). Avoiding and Alternate Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):1001-1007.
    Greg Janzen has recently criticised my defence of Frankfurt’s counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by arguing that Jones avoids killing Smith in the counterfactual scenario. Janzen’s argument consists in introducing a new thought-experiment which is supposed to be analogous to Frankfurt’s and where the agent is supposed to avoid A-ing. Here I argue that Janzen’s argument fails on two counts, because his new scenario is not analogous to Frankfurt’s and because the agent in his new scenario does not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Susan Dimock (2012). Intoxication and the Act/Control/Agency Requirement. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):341-362.
    Doug Husak has argued, persuasively I think, that there is no literal ‘act requirement’ in Anglo-American law. I begin by reviewing Husak’s reasons for rejecting the act requirement, and provide additional reasons to think he is right to do so. But Husak’s alternative, the ‘control condition’, I argue, is inadequate. The control requirement is falsified by the widespread practice of holding extremely intoxicated offenders liable for criminal conduct they engage in even if they lack control over their conduct at the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 184