This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
29 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Carla Bagnoli (2013). Counting Without Numbers: A Non‐Aggregative Account of the Puzzle of Altruism. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):124-126.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ben Bramble (2014). Whole-Life Welfarism. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Erik Carlson (2000). Aggregating Harms - Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches? Theoria 66 (3):246-255.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Richard Yetter Chappell (2013). Value Receptacles. Noûs 47 (3).
    Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Dale Dorsey (2009). Headaches, Lives and Value. Utilitas 21 (01):36-.
    University of Alberta Forthcoming in Utilias Consider Lives for Headaches: there is some number of headaches such that the relief of those headaches is sufficient to outweigh the good life of an innocent person. Lives for Headaches is unintuitive, but difficult to deny. The argument leading to Lives for Headaches is valid, and appears to be constructed out of firmly entrenched premises. In this paper, I advocate one way to reject Lives for Headaches; I defend a form of lexical superiority (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Johan E. Gustafsson (forthcoming). Sequential Dominance and the Anti-Aggregation Principle. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    According to the widely held anti-aggregation principle, it is wrong to save a larger number of people from minor harms rather than a smaller number from much more serious harms. This principle is a central part of many influential and anti-utilitarian ethical theories. According to the sequential-dominance principle, one does something wrong if one knowingly performs a sequence of acts whose outcome would be worse for everyone than the outcome of an alternative sequence of acts. The intuitive appeal of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Iwao Hirose (2013). Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 25 (2):182-205.
    Many critics of utilitarianism claim that we should reject interpersonal aggregation because aggregative principles do not take the separateness of persons seriously. In this article, I will reject this claim. I will first elucidate the theoretical structure of aggregation. I will then consider various interpretations of the notion of the separateness of persons and clarify what exactly those critics are trying to reject by appealing to the notion of the separateness of persons. I will argue that none of these interpretations (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Iwao Hirose, Equality, Priority, and Aggregation.
    In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the weight (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Adam Hosein, Numbers, Fairness and Charity.
    This paper discusses the "numbers problem," the problem of explaining why you should save more people rather than fewer when forced to choose. Existing non-consequentialist approaches to the problem appeal to fairness to explain why. I argue that this is a mistake and that we can give a more satisfying answer by appealing to requirements of charity or beneficence.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. F. M. Kamm (2005). Aggregation and Two Moral Methods. Utilitas 17 (1):1-23.
    I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various types of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Alastair Norcross (2009). Two Dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation, Rights, and the Separateness of Persons. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):76-95.
    One of the currently popular dogmata of anti-consequentialism is that consequentialism doesn't respect, recognize, or in some important way account for what is referred to as the The charge is often made, but rarely explained in any detail, much less argued for. In this paper I explain what I take to be the most plausible interpretation of the separateness of persons charge. I argue that the charge itself can be deconstructed into at least two further objections to consequentialist theories. These (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Alastair Norcross (2006). Aggregation, Rights, and the Separateness of Persons. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):1-15.
  13. Alastair Norcross (1998). Great Harms From Small Benefits Grow: How Death Can Be Outweighed by Headaches. Analysis 58 (2):152–158.
    Suppose that a very large number of people, say one billion, will suffer a moderately severe headache for the next twenty-four hours. For these billion people, the next twenty-four hours will be fairly unpleasant, though by no means unbearable. However, there will be no side-effects from these headaches; no drop in productivity in the work-place, no lapses in concentration leading to accidents, no unkind words spoken to loved ones that will later fester. Nonetheless, it is clearly desirable that these billion (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Alastair Norcross (1998). Speed Limits, Human Lives, and Convenience: A Reply to Ridge. Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1):59–64.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Alastair Norcross (1997). Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (2):135–167.
  16. Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2006). On the Repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. Theoria 72 (2):126-137.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss the plausibility of a certain position in the philosophical literature within which the Repugnant Conclusion is treated, not as repugnant, but as an acceptable implication of the total welfare principle. I will confine myself to focus primarily on Törbjörn Tännsjö’s presentation. First, I reconstruct Tännsjö’s view concerning the repugnance of the RC in two arguments. The first argument is criticized for (a) addressing the wrong comparison, (b) relying on the controversial claim that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Theron Pummer, The Priority Monster.
    The Priority View implies that we sometimes have nontrivially stronger reason to benefit a person, the worse off in absolute terms this person would be if she did not receive the benefit in question. This view seems plausible. Nonetheless I will argue that it is inconsistent with the conjunction of a number of independently intuitively plausible claims. One such claim is that we should spare a very badly off person from many years of intense pain rather than spare someone else (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Theron Pummer (2013). Intuitions About Large Number Cases. Analysis 73 (1):37-46.
    Is there some large number of very mild hangnail pains, each experienced by a separate person, which would be worse than two years of excruciating torture, experienced by a single person? Many people have the intuition that the answer to this question is No. However, a host of philosophers have argued that, because we have no intuitive grasp of very large numbers, we should not trust such intuitions. I argue that there is decent intuitive support for the No answer, which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Re'em Segev (2010). Hierarchical Consequentialism. Utilitas 22 (3):309-330.
    The paper considers a hierarchical theory that combines concern for two values: individual well-being – as a fundamental, first-order value – and (distributive) fairness – as a high-order value that its exclusive function is to complete the value of individual well-being by resolving internal clashes within it that occur in interpersonal conflicts. The argument for this unique conception of high-order fairness is that fairness is morally significant in itself only regarding what matters – individual well-being – and when it matters (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Kieran Setiya (2014). Love and the Value of a Life. Philosophical Review 123 (3):251-280.
    Argues that there is no one it is irrational to love, that it is rational to act with partiality to those we love, and that the rationality of doing so is not conditional on love. It follows that Anscombe and Taurek are right: you are not required to save three instead of one, even when those you could save are perfect strangers.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. David Sosa (2009). What is It Like to Be a Group? Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):212-226.
    Consequentialist and Kantian theories differ over the ethical relevance of consequences of actions. I investigate how they might differ too over the relevance of what actions are consequence of. Focusing on the case of group action and collective responsibility, I argue that there's a kind of analog to the problem of aggregating the value of consequencesthat Kantian theories will not confront and consequentialist theories will. The issue provides a useful way to characterize a deep difference between Kantian and consequentialist theories (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Larry S. Temkin (2011). Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
    Temkin's book is a very original and deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Larry S. Temkin (2009). Aggregation Within Lives. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):1-29.
    Many philosophers have discussed problems of additive aggregation across lives. In this article, I suggest that anti-additive aggregationist principles sometimes apply within lives, as well as between lives, and hence that we should reject a widely accepted conception of individual self-interest. The article has eight sections. Section I is introductory. Section II offers a general account of aggregation. Section III presents two examples of problems of additive aggregation across lives: Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion, and my Lollipops for Life Case Section (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Larry S. Temkin (2005). A "New" Principle of Aggregation. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):218–234.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle: A Response. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777-784.
    In "Intrzmsitivity and thc Person-Affecting Principlc,"‘ (IPAP) Alastair Norcross attacks several key claims of my "Intransitivity and thc Merc Addition Paradox" (IMAP).2 This article suggests that N0rcross’s arguments despite: their appca1——lcavc IMAP’s claims mostly intact. Bcforc assessing N0rcross’s arguments, lct mc characterize two key notions distinguished in IMAP: an essentially comparative view of moral ideals and an intrinsic aspect view. On an essentially comparative view (ECU, different factors might bc relevant for comparing diffcrcnt alternatives regarding a given idcal. On such (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Larry S. Temkin (1999). Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):777 - 784.
  27. Larry S. Temkin (1996). A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (3):175–210.
  28. Alex Voorhoeve (forthcoming). How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? Ethics.
    Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call “Aggregate Relevant Claims” satisfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and defend it against objections.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Alex Voorhoeve (forthcoming). Why Sore Throats Don't Aggregate, but Arms Do. Journal of Medical Ethics.
    When do claims to be saved of a small or moderate harm aggregate against a competing claim to be saved from an early death? In this short response to Kamm's Bioethical Prescriptions, I argue for the following answer: aggregation of weaker claims against a life is permitted just in case, in a one-to-one contest, a person with a weaker claim would have a personal prerogative to prioritize her claim over a stranger’s competing claim to life.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation