This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
49 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson (1985). On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
    This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, of one of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   296 citations  
  2. Krzysztof R. Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.) (2008). New Perspectives on Games and Interactions. Amsterdam University Press.
    This volume is a collection of papers presented at the colloquium, and it testifies to the growing importance of game theory as a tool that can capture concepts ...
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press
    The theory of belief revision deals with (rational) changes in beliefs in response to new information. In the literature a distinction has been drawn between belief revision and belief update (see [6]). The former deals with situations where the objective facts describing the world do not change (so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time), while the letter allows for situations where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent change over time. We focus on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott (2012). Guest Editors' Introduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
    The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Yves Bouchard (ed.) (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
  6. Leandra Bucher & Paul D. Thorn (2014). Minimality Criteria in Spatial Belief Revision. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society 1952-8.
    Agents typically revise their beliefs when confronted with evidence that contradicts those beliefs, selecting from a number of possible revisions sufficient to reestablish consistency. In cases where an individual’s beliefs concern spatial relations, belief revision has been fruitfully treated as a decision about which features of an initially constructed spatial mental model to modify. A normative claim about belief revision maintains that agents should prefer minimal belief revisions. Yet recent studies have rebutted the preceding claim, where minimality is understood to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Eugenio Bulygin (2008). What Can One Expect From Logic in the Law? (Not Everything, but More Than Something: A Reply to Susan Haack). Ratio Juris 21 (1):150-156.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results. Mind.
    In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of ‘Preservation’ for conditionals, which guarantees that one’s prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in one’s non-conditional beliefs. -/- We first note that Bradley’s original discussions of these results—in which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of ‘Commutativity’, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of Modus Ponens—are problematic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Jake Chandler (2013). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Charles B. Cross (1990). Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer 223--244.
    Peter Gärdenfors has proved (Philosophical Review, 1986) that the Ramsey rule and the methodologically conservative Preservation principle are incompatible given innocuous-looking background assumptions about belief revision. Gärdenfors gives up the Ramsey rule; I argue for preserving the Ramsey rule and interpret Gärdenfors's theorem as showing that no rational belief-reviser can avoid reasoning nonmonotonically. I argue against the Preservation principle and show that counterexamples to it always involve nonmonotonic reasoning. I then construct a new formal model of belief revision that does (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Simon D'Alfonso (2011). Supplementing Belief Revision for The Aim of Truthlikeness. The Reasoner 5 (9):143-144.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Lee Elkin (2015). An Epistemically Modest Response to Disagreement, AGM-Ified. The Reasoner 9 (9):76-77.
    In this short paper, I show that AGM belief contraction is appropriate for modeling an epistemically modest response to a disagreement with an epistemic peer.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Eduardo L. Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson (1999). Selective Revision. Studia Logica 63 (3):331-342.
    We introduce a constructive model of selective belief revision in which it is possible to accept only a part of the input information. A selective revision operator ο is defined by the equality K ο α = K * f(α), where * is an AGM revision operator and f a function, typically with the property ⊢ α → f(α). Axiomatic characterizations are provided for three variants of selective revision.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  14. André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.) (1991). The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
    The book presents the results of the joint annual conference of the four Operations Research Societies DGOR, GM\OR, \GOR and SVOR, held in Vienna in 1990.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer
    The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the context of some other (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Emmanuel J. Genot (2011). The Best of All Possible Worlds. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer
    Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective. In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set K and an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A, i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.) (1990). Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer.
  18. Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Franz Huber (2013). Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
    Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM theory of belief revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated belief revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas of future research.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. Theo Kuipers (2011). Basic and Refined Nomic Truth Approximation by Evidence-Guided Belief Revision in AGM-Terms. Erkenntnis 75 (2):223-236.
    Straightforward theory revision, taking into account as effectively as possible the established nomic possibilities and, on their basis induced empirical laws, is conducive for (unstratified) nomic truth approximation. The question this paper asks is: is it possible to reconstruct the relevant theory revision steps, on the basis of incoming evidence, in AGM-terms? A positive answer will be given in two rounds, first for the case in which the initial theory is compatible with the established empirical laws, then for the case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  21. Jelica Nejasmic, Leandra Bucher, Paul D. Thorn & Markus Knauff (2014). Construction and Revision of Spatial Mental Models Under High Task Demand. In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society 1066-72.
    Individuals often revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. Belief revision in the spatial domain can be regarded as variation of initially constructed spatial mental models. Construction and revision usually follow distinct cognitive principles. The present study examines whether principles of revisions which follow constructions under high task demands differ from principles applied after less demanding constructions. We manipulated the task demands for model constructions by means of the continuity with which a spatial model was constructed. We administered tasks (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Andrés Páez (2006). Explanations in K: An Analysis of Explanation as a Belief Revision Operation. Athena Verlag.
    Explanation and understanding are intimately connected notions, but the nature of that connection has generally not been considered a topic worthy of serious philosophical investigation. Most authors have avoided making reference to the notion of understanding in their accounts of explanation because they fear that any mention of the epistemic states of the individuals involved compromises the objectivity of explanation. Understanding is a pragmatic notion, they argue, and pragmatics should be kept at a safe distance from the universal features of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Bryan Pickel (2016). Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):559-578.
    In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of apriori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one’s core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak (2012). Probabilistic Belief Contraction. Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.
    Probabilistic belief contraction has been a much neglected topic in the field of probabilistic reasoning. This is due to the difficulty in establishing a reasonable reversal of the effect of Bayesian conditionalization on a probabilistic distribution. We show that indifferent contraction, a solution proposed by Ramer to this problem through a judicious use of the principle of maximum entropy, is a probabilistic version of a full meet contraction. We then propose variations of indifferent contraction, using both the Shannon entropy measure (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Hans Rott (2014). Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change. In Vít Punčochář Michal Dančák (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. College Publications 187-205.
    The theory of theory change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson ("AGM") has been widely known as being characterized by two sets of postulates, one being very weak and the other being very strong. Commenting on the three classic constructions of partial meet contraction, safe contraction and entrenchment-based construction, I argue that three intermediate levels can be distinguished that play decisive roles within the AGM theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Hans Rott (2014). Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (2):237-241.
    This paper gives critical comments on Wolfgang Spohn's Laws of Belief (2012). I argue, first, that it is important to account for incomparabilities in the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions, and second, that the meaning of input parameters specifying the degree to which a proposition is to be accepted should be independent of the agent's belief state.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Hans Rott (2014). Four Floors for the Theory of Theory Change: The Case of Imperfect Discrimination. In Eduardo Fermé João Leite (ed.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence: 13th European Conference (JELIA 2014). Springer 368-382.
    The classical qualitative theory of belief change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson has been widely known as being characterised by two packages of postulates. While the basic package consists of six postulates and is very weak, the full package that adds two further postulates is very strong. I revisit two classic constructions of theory contraction, viz., relational possible worlds contraction and entrenchment-based contraction and argue that four intermediate levels can be distinguished that play - or ought to play - (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29. Hans Rott (2011). Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.
    According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to endorse that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Hans Rott (2009). Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators. In David Makinson Jacek Malinowski & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Springer 269-296.
    Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Hans Rott (2009). Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 301--339.
    This paper combines various structures representing degrees of belief, degrees of disbelief, and degrees of non-belief (degrees of expectations) into a unified whole. The representation uses relations of comparative necessity and possibility, as well as non-probabilistic functions assigning numerical values of necessity and possibility. We define all-encompassing necessity structures which have weak expectations (mere hypotheses, guesses, conjectures, etc.) occupying the lowest ranks and very strong, ineradicable ('a priori') beliefs occupying the highest ranks. Structurally, there are no differences from the top (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  32. Hans Rott (2008). Information Structures in Belief Revision. In Pieter Adriaans Johan van Benthem (ed.), Philosophy of Information, Vol. 8 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Elsevier 457-482.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminary remarks on information, truth and mind - 2.1 Remarks on information and truth - 2.2 Some clues from the philosophy of mind - 2.3 Functionalism as applied to belief revision - 2.4 Filling in the parameters -- 3 Belief change = revision + reflection - 3.1 Foundationalism - 3.2 Coherentism -- 4 Inference operations for simple change operations: three examples - 4.1 Example 1: flat data bases - 4.2 Example (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Hans Rott (2004). Basic Entrenchment. Studia Logica 73 (2):257-280.
    In contrast to other prominent models of belief change, models based on epistemic entrenchment have up to now been applicable only in the context of very strong packages of requirements for belief revision. This paper decomposes the axiomatization of entrenchment into independent modules. Among other things it is shown how belief revision satisfying only the 'basic' postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson can be represented in terms of entrenchment.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. Hans Rott (2003). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence. Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.
    This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Hans Rott (2001). Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
    Change, Choice and Inference develops logical theories that are necessary both for the understanding of adaptable human reasoning and for the design of intelligent systems. The book shows that reasoning processes - the drawing on inferences and changing one's beliefs - can be viewed as belonging to the realm of practical reason by embedding logical theories into the broader context of the theory of rational choice. The book unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   46 citations  
  36. Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the Right Framework. Erkenntnis 50 (2):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies, show the problems they suffer from, and suggest that belief states should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Hans Rott & Sven Ove Hansson (2014). Safe Contraction Revisited. In Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3). Springer 35-70.
    Modern belief revision theory is based to a large extent on partial meet contraction that was introduced in the seminal article by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson that appeared in 1985. In the same year, Alchourrón and Makinson published a significantly different approach to the same problem, called safe contraction. Since then, safe contraction has received much less attention than partial meet contraction. The present paper summarizes the current state of knowledge on safe contraction, provides some new results (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Michael J. Shaffer (2011). Three Problematic Theories of Conditional Acceptance. Logos and Episteme 2 (1):117-125.
    In this paper it is argued that three of the most prominent theories of conditional acceptance face very serious problems. David Lewis' concept of imaging, the Ramsey test and Jonathan Bennett's recent hybrid view all face viscious regresses, or they either employ unanalyzed components or depend upon an implausibly strong version of doxastic voluntarism.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Michael J. Shaffer (2008). Idealization, Counterfactuals and the Correspondence Principle. In Jerzy Brzezinski, Andrzej Klawiter, Theo A. F. Kuipers, Krzysztof Lastowski, Katarzyna Paprzycka & Piotr Przybysz (eds.), The Courage of Doing Philosophy: Essays Presented to Leszek Nowak. Rodopi
    In a recent revision (chapter 4 of Nowakowa and Nowak 2000) of an older article Leszek Nowak (1992) has attempted to rebut Niiniluoto’s 1990 critical suggestion that proponents of the Poznań idealizational approach to the sciences have committed a rather elementary logical error in the formal machinery that they advocate for use in the analysis of scientific methodology. In this paper I criticize Nowak’s responses to Niiniluoto’s suggestion, and, subsequently, work out some of the consequences of that criticism for understanding (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Michael J. Shaffer (2002). Coherence, Justification, and the AGM Theory of Belief Revision. In Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe 139--160.
    In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson) theory of belief revision can be given an epistemic basis by interpreting the revision postulates of that theory in terms of a version of the coherence theory of justification. To accomplish this goal Gärdenfors suggests that the AGM revision postulates concerning the conservative nature of belief revision can be interpreted in terms of a concept of epistemic entrenchment and that there are good empirical reasons (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  41. Wolfgang Spohn, Ranking Functions, AGM Style. Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors.
    First, ranking functions are argued to be superior to AGM belief revision theory in two crucial respects. Second, it is shown how ranking functions are uniquely reflected in iterated belief change. More precisely, conditions on threefold contractions are specified which suffice for representing contractions by a ranking function uniquely up to multiplication by a positive integer. Thus, an important advantage AGM theory seemed to have over ranking functions proves to be spurious.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Michael Starks, Do Our Automated Unconscious Behaviors Reveal Our Real Selves and Hidden Truths About the Universe? -- A Review of David Hawkins ‘Power Vs Force-the Hidden Determinants of Human Behavior –Author’s Official Authoritative Edition’ 412p(2012)(Original Edition 1995).
    I am very used to strange books and special people but Hawkins stands out due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.) (2010). EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Allard Tamminga (2004). Expansion and Contraction of Finite States. Studia Logica 76 (3):427-442.
    We present a theory that copes with the dynamics of inconsistent information. A method is set forth to represent possibly inconsistent information by a finite state. Next, finite operations for expansion and contraction of finite states are given. No extra-logical element — a choice function or an ordering over (sets of) sentences — is presupposed in the definition of contraction. Moreover, expansion and contraction are each other's duals. AGM-style characterizations of these operations follow.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  45. Allard Tamminga (2003). A Critical Exposition of Isaac Levi's Epistemology. Logique Et Analyse 183:447-478.
    The branch of philosophical logic which has become known as “belief change” has, in the course of its development, become alienated from its epistemological origins. However, as formal criteria do not suffice to defend a principled choice between competing systems for belief change, we do need to take their epistemological embedding into account. Here, on the basis of a detailed examination of Isaac Levi's epistemology, we argue for a new direction of belief change research and propose to construct systems for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Allard Tamminga (2002). Isaac Levi's kenleer: een kritische beschouwing. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 94 (2):124-145.
    Levi, setting out to formalize Peirce's and Dewey's *belief-doubt-belief*-model, took the lead in defining the field of philosophical logic that has become known as *belief change*. First, Levi's theory of knowledge is placed within the context of American pragmatism. A discussion follows of Levi's criteria under which a change of belief must be judged an improvement. In the final section, a critical evaluation of Levi's logical epistemology opens new venues for logical and epistemological inquiry.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh (2013). Katz's Revisability Paradox Dissolved. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.
    Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Márcio M. Ribeiro (2015). Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator. CLE E-Prints 15 (8):01-11.
    In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Gregory Wheeler, AGM Belief Revision in Monotone Modal Logics. LPAR 2010 Short Paper Proceedings.
    Classical modal logics, based on the neighborhood semantics of Scott and Montague, provide a generalization of the familiar normal systems based on Kripke semantics. This paper defines AGM revision operators on several first-order monotonic modal correspondents, where each first-order correspondence language is defined by Marc Pauly’s version of the van Benthem characterization theorem for monotone modal logic. A revision problem expressed in a monotone modal system is translated into first-order logic, the revision is performed, and the new belief set is (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation