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Agnosticism

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  1. Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer (2006). Is the Mind Bayesian? The Case for Agnosticism. Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.
    This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that (...)
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  2. Piers Benn (1999). Some Uncertainties About Agnosticism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 46 (3):171-188.
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  3. Susanne Bobzien (2010). Higher-Order Vagueness, Radical Unclarity, and Absolute Agnosticism. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (10):1-30.
    The paper presents a new theory of higher-order vagueness. This theory is an improvement on current theories of vagueness in that it (i) describes the kind of borderline cases relevant to the Sorites paradox, (ii) retains the ‘robustness’ of vague predicates, (iii) introduces a notion of higher-order vagueness that is compositional, but (iv) avoids the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. The theory’s central building-blocks: Borderlinehood is defined as radical unclarity. Unclarity is defined by means of competent, rational, informed speakers (‘CRISPs’) whose (...)
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  4. J. Brown (2001). Anti-Individualism and Agnosticism. Analysis 61 (3):213-24.
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  5. Jeremy Byrd (2010). Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
    Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 (...)
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  6. Sean Creaven (2001). Materialism, Agnosticism and God. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (4):419–448.
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  7. J. E. Creighton (1904). Dr. Perry's References to Ward's `Naturalism and Agnosticism'. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (10):266-269.
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  8. Sylvie Delacroix (2011). Meta-Ethical Agnosticism in Legal Theory: Mapping a Way Out. Jurisprudence 1 (2):225-240.
    In his review of Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , Hart eloquently formulated an apprehension that still haunts much of contemporary jurisprudence: if the moral 'I must' has to be 'seen as coming not from outside, but from what is most deeply inside us ? the fear is that this will not be enough'. I argue that this fear is the byproduct of the dualist outlook within which Hart—and a significant part of contemporary legal theory—is confined: because (...)
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  9. John Divers (2004). Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):660–685.
    The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality (...)
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  10. Theodore M. Drange, Atheism, Agnosticism, Noncognitivism (1998).
    Suppose you are to answer the following two questions: (1) Does the sentence "God exists" express a proposition? (2) If so, then is that proposition true or false? If you say no to the first question, then you may be classified as a noncognitivist with regard to God talk . If you say yes to it, thereby allowing that the given sentence does express a proposition, then you are a cognitivist with regard to God talk . (Let us henceforth abbreviate (...)
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  11. Robert M. Ellis (2011). The Trouble with Buddhism. Lulu.com.
    This book is a philosophical critique of the Buddhist tradition (not a scholarly work about the Buddhist tradition), applying the standards of judgement developed in 'A Theory of Moral Objectivity'. It is argued that although the Buddhist tradition provides access to the insights of the Middle Way, many other aspects of Buddhist tradition are inconsistent with this central insight. The sources of justified belief in Buddhism, karma, conditionality, concepts of reality, monasticism and Buddhist ethics are all subjected to the same (...)
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  12. Alan Hájek (1998). Agnosticism Meets Bayesianism. Analysis 58 (3):199–206.
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  13. Alan Hajek (1998). Agnosticism Meets Bayesianism. Analysis 58 (3):199-206.
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  14. Aaron Holland (2001). Consistency in Presuming Agnosticism. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):82-89.
    According to the presumption of atheism, we are to presume disbelief unless agnosticism or theism can be adequately defended. In this paper I will defend the presumption of atheism against a popular objection made by Thomas Morris and elucidate an insuperable difficulty for any attempt to argue for a presumption of agnosticism.
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  15. Tomis Kapitan (1985). Lucey's Agnosticism: The Believer's Reply. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1/2):87 - 90.
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  16. George Karnoutsos (1970). Agnosticism. Journal of Critical Analysis 2 (2):1-13.
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  17. Han-Kyul Kim (2008). Locke and the Mind-Body Problem: An Interpretation of His Agnosticism. Philosophy 83 (4):439-458.
    From the Lockean point of view, the mind-body problem is conceived as a problem created by us. It is an error to think there is a problem with mind and body, an error of confusing nominality with reality. I argue that Locke’s agnosticism should be understood as a warning not to confuse our human point of view with what really is. From this perspective, the mind-body problem is a nominal problem, not a real one. It appears to us as a (...)
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  18. Sterling P. Lamprecht (1933). Naturalism and Agnosticism in Santayana. Journal of Philosophy 30 (21):561-574.
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  19. Antonio Llano (1897). Agnosticism and Disguised Materialism. Philosophical Review 6 (2):170-175.
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  20. Alfred H. Lloyd (1908). Radical Empiricism and Agnosticism. Mind 17 (66):175-192.
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  21. P. D. Magnus (2005). Peirce: Underdetermination, Agnosticism, and Related Mistakes. Inquiry 48 (1):26 – 37.
    There are two ways that we might respond to the underdetermination of theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response, is to suspend judgment: "Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we should believe nothing". Another response, which we can call the fideist response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: "If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science ever contradicting us". C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested evading (...)
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  22. Roberta L. Millstein, Is the Evolutionary Process Deterministic or Indeterministic? An Argument for Agnosticism.
    Recently, philosophers of biology have debated the status of the evolutionary process: is it deterministic or indeterministic? I argue that there is insufficient reason to favor one side of the debate over the other, and that a more philosophically defensible position argues neither for the determinacy nor for the indeterminacy of the evolutionary process. In other words, I maintain that the appropriate stand to take towards the question of the determinism of the evolutionary process is agnosticism. I then suggest that (...)
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  23. Bradley Monton (1998). Bayesian Agnosticism and Constructive Empiricism. Analysis 58 (3):207–212.
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  24. James Noxon (1976). In Defence of "Hume's Agnosticism". Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (4).
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  25. James Noxon (1964). Hume's Agnosticism. Philosophical Review 73 (2):248-261.
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  26. Graham Oppy (1994). Weak Agnosticism Defended. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (3):147 - 167.
    Agnosticism has had some bad press in recent years. Nonetheless, I hope to show that agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism. This is not a mere philosophical exercise; for, as it happens, the formulated position is--I think--the one to which I subscribe. I include a qualification here since it may be that the position to which I subscribe is better characterised as fallibilist atheism--but more of that anon.
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  27. Gerald B. Phelan (1929). Beyond Agnosticism. The New Scholasticism 3 (4):478-479.
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  28. Douglas V. Porpora (2006). Methodological Atheism, Methodological Agnosticism and Religious Experience. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (1):57–75.
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  29. Thomas McHugh Reed (2002). Christianity and Agnosticism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (2):81-95.
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  30. Sven Rosenkranz (2007). Agnosticism as a Third Stance. Mind 116 (461):55-104.
    Within certain philosophical debates, most notably those concerning the limits of our knowledge, agnosticism seems a plausible, and potentially the right, stance to take. Yet, in order to qualify as a proper stance, and not just the refusal to adopt any, agnosticism must be shown to be in opposition to both endorsement and denial and to be answerable to future evidence. This paper explicates and defends the thesis that agnosticism may indeed define such a third stance that is weaker than (...)
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  31. Sven Rosenkranz (2006). Metaethics, Agnosticism, and Logic. Dialectica 60 (1):47–61.
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  32. Sven Rosenkranz (2003). Wright on Vagueness and Agnosticism. Mind 112 (447):449-464.
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  33. Josiah Royce (1890). Dr. Abbot's "Way Out of Agnosticism":The "Way Out of Agnosticism; or, the Philosophy of Free Religion,". Francis Ellingwood Abbot. Ethics 1 (1):98-.
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  34. J. G. Schurman (1895). Agnosticism. Philosophical Review 4 (3):241-263.
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  35. Roy Sorensen (2009). Meta-Agnosticism: Higher Order Epistemic Possibility. Mind 118 (471):777-784.
    In ‘Epistemic Modals’ (2007), Seth Yalcin proposes Stalnaker-style semantics for epistemic possibility. He is inspired by John MacFarlane’s ingenious defence of relativism, in which claims of epistemic possibility are made rigidly from the perspective of the assessor’s actual stock of information (rather than from the speaker’s knowledge base or that of his audience or community). The innovations of MacFarlane and Yalcin independently reinforce the modal collapse espoused by Jaakko Hintikka in his 1962 epistemic logic (which relied on the implausible KK (...)
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  36. Roy Sorensen (2004). Agnosticism and Tolerance: A Reply to Mills. Philosophical Books 45 (1):12-16.
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  37. Lawrence Torcello (2011). Sophism and Moral Agnosticism, or, How to Tell a Relativist From a Pluralist. The Pluralist 6 (1).
    Is it possible to recognize the limits of rationality, and thus to embrace moral pluralism, without embracing moral relativism? My answer is yes; nevertheless, certain anti-foundational positions, both recent and ancient, take a cynical stance toward the possibility of any critical moral judgment, and as such, must be regarded as relativistic.1 It is such cynicism, I argue, whether openly announced or unknowingly implied, that marks the distinction between relativism and pluralism.2 The danger of this cynicism is not so much that (...)
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  38. James Ward (1915/1971). Naturalism and Agnosticism. New York,Kraus Reprint Co..
    This book contains Volumes 1 and 2 of the original works.
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