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  1. Sloman Aaron (1971). Tarski, Frege and the Liar Paradox. Philosophy 46 (176):133-.
  2. S. Arpaia (2006). On Magari's Concept of General Calculus: Notes on the History of Tarski's Methodology of Deductive Sciences. History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (1):9-41.
    This paper is an historical study of Tarski's methodology of deductive sciences (in which a logic S is identified with an operator Cn S , called the consequence operator, on a given set of expressions), from its appearance in 1930 to the end of the 1970s, focusing on the work done in the field by Roberto Magari, Piero Mangani and by some of their pupils between 1965 and 1974, and comparing it with the results achieved by Tarski and the Polish (...)
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  3. Jamin Asay (2013). Tarski and Primitivism About Truth. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (17):1-18.
    Tarski’s pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski’s work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski’s theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share much in common. While Tarski does not (...)
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  4. Jamin Asay (2013). The Primitivist Theory of Truth. Cambridge University Press.
    Jamin Asay's book offers a fresh and daring perspective on the age-old question 'What is truth?', with a comprehensive articulation and defence of primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental and indefinable concept. Often associated with Frege and the early Russell and Moore, primitivism has been largely absent from the larger conversation surrounding the nature of truth. Asay defends primitivism by drawing on a range of arguments from metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic, and navigates between correspondence (...)
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  5. Jody Azzouni (2005). Tarski, Quine, and the Transcendence of the Vernacular “True”. Synthese 142 (3):273 - 288.
    It is argued that the blind ascriptive role for the word true, its use, that is, in conjunction with descriptions of classes of sentences or with proper names of sentences (but not quote-names), is one which applies indiscriminately to sentences regardless of whether these are in languages we speak, can understand, or can translate into sentences that we do speak (and understand). Formal analogues of the ordinary word true as they arise in Tarskis seminal work, and in others, cannot replicate (...)
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  6. Jared Bates (1999). Etchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):47-54.
    John Etchemendy (1990) has argued that Tarski's definition of logical consequence fails as an adequate philosophical analysis. Since then, Greg Ray (1996) has defended Tarski's analysis against Etchemendy's criticisms. Here, I'll argue that--even given Ray's defense of Tarski's definition--we may nevertheless lay claim to the conditional conclusion that 'if' Tarski intended a conceptual analysis of logical consequence, 'then' it fails as such. Secondly, I'll give some reasons to think that Tarski 'did' intend a conceptual analysis of logical consequence.
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  7. Timothy Bays (2001). On Tarski on Models. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1701-1726.
    This paper concerns Tarski’s use of the term “model” in his 1936 paper “On the Concept of Logical Consequence.” Against several of Tarski’s recent defenders, I argue that Tarski employed a non-standard conception of models in that paper. Against Tarski’s detractors, I argue that this non-standard conception is more philosophically plausible than it may appear. Finally, I make a few comments concerning the traditionally puzzling case of Tarski’s ω-rule example.
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  8. Luca Bellotti (2003). Tarski on Logical Notions. Synthese 135 (3):401 - 413.
    We try to explain Tarski's conception of logical notions, as it emerges from alecture of his, delivered in 1966 and published posthumously in 1986 (Historyand Philosophy of Logic 7, 143–154), a conception based on the idea ofinvariance. The evaluation of Tarski's proposal leads us to consider an interesting(and neglected) reply to Skolem in which Tarski hints at his own point of view onthe foundations of set theory. Then, comparing the lecture of 1966 with Tarski'slast work and with an earlier paper (...)
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  9. Arianna Betti (2004). Lesniewski's Early Liar, Tarski and Natural Language. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (1-3):267-287.
    This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of Tarski’s semantic background in the light of the ideas of his master, Stanislaw Lesniewski. Although in his 1933 monograph Tarski credits Lesniewski with crucial negative results on the semantics of natural language, the conceptual relationship between the two logicians has never been investigated in a thorough manner. This paper shows that it was not Tarski, but Lesniewski who first avowed the impossibility of giving a satisfactory theory of truth for ordinary language, (...)
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  10. Daniel R. Boisvert (1999). The Trouble with Harrison's 'the Trouble with Tarski'. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):376-383.
    In ‘The Trouble with Tarski’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 1–22, Jonathan Harrison attacks ‘Tarski‐style’ truth theories for both formalized and natural languages, on the grounds that (1) truth cannot be a property of sentences; (2) if it could be, T‐sentences would have to be necessary truths, which they are not; and (3) T‐sentences are not necessarily true and can even can be false. I reply that (1) cannot be an objection to Tarskian truth theories, since these can be (...)
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  11. H. G. Callaway (2008). Sense and Mode of Presentation. In , Meaning without Analyticity.
    Theories of linguistic meaning have been a major influence in twentieth century philosophy. This is due, in part, to the assumption that meaning is the crucial and interesting thing about language. To know the meaning of an expression is to understand it, and since understanding is central to philosophy in many different ways, it should be no surprise that the notion of meaning has often taken center stage. The aim of this paper is to briefly explore some influential views concerning (...)
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  12. Andrea Cantini (1980). A Note on Three-Valued Logic and Tarski Theorem on Truth Definitions. Studia Logica 39 (4):405 - 414.
    We introduce a notion of semantical closure for theories by formalizing Nepeivoda notion of truth. [10]. Tarski theorem on truth definitions is discussed in the light of Kleene's three valued logic (here treated with a formal reinterpretation of logical constants). Connections with Definability Theory are also established.
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  13. Josep Pla I. Carrera (1989). Alfred Tarski I la Teoria de Conjunts. Theoria 4 (2):343-417.
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  14. Josep Pla I. Carrera (1989). Alfred Tarski I la Teoria de Conjunts. Theoria 4 (2):343-417.
    The work on set theory made by A. Tarski in the years 1924-1950 is very interesting, but little know.We develope partial questions in set theory in the moment that A. Tarski intervenes and his contributionsand also influences.The principals aims in this development are:1. The axiom of choice [A.C.] and his equivalents;2. the general continuum hypothesis [G.C.H.] and the A.C.;3. the dual trichotomy principle;4. the inaccessible cardinals and his relation with the A.C. and the G.C.H.;5. the notion of finite set and (...)
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  15. Juao Luis Castro & Enric Trillas (1989). Sobre Preórdenes Y Operadores de Consecuencias de Tarski. Theoria 4 (2):419-425.
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  16. Alonzo Church (1976). Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with That of Tarski. Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (4):747-760.
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  17. Alberto Coffa (1987). Carnap, Tarski and the Search for Truth. Noûs 21 (4):547-572.
  18. John Corcoran (1991). REVIEW OF Alfred Tarski, Collected Papers, Vols. 1-4 (1986) Edited by Steven Givant and Ralph McKenzie. [REVIEW] MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 91 (h):01101-4.
  19. Barbara F. Csima, Antonio Montalbán & Richard A. Shore (2006). Boolean Algebras, Tarski Invariants, and Index Sets. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (1):1-23.
    Tarski defined a way of assigning to each Boolean algebra, B, an invariant inv(B) ∈ In, where In is a set of triples from ℕ, such that two Boolean algebras have the same invariant if and only if they are elementarily equivalent. Moreover, given the invariant of a Boolean algebra, there is a computable procedure that decides its elementary theory. If we restrict our attention to dense Boolean algebras, these invariants determine the algebra up to isomorphism. In this paper we (...)
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  20. Giovanna D'Agostino & Marco Hollenberg (2000). Logical Questions Concerning the Μ-Calculus: Interpolation, Lyndon and Los-Tarski. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):310-332.
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  21. David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
    It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that (...)
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  22. John Doner & Wilfrid Hodges (1988). Alfred Tarski and Decidable Theories. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):20-35.
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  23. Jim Edwards (2003). Reduction and Tarski's Definition of Logical Consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):49-62.
    In his classic 1936 paper Tarski sought to motivate his definition of logical consequence by appeal to the inference form: P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . therefore ∀nP(n). This is prima facie puzzling because these inferences are seemingly first-order and Tarski knew that Gödel had shown first-order proof methods to be complete, and because ∀nP(n) is not a logical consequence of P(0), P(1), . . ., P(n), . . . by Taski's proposed definition. An attempt to resolve (...)
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  24. John Etchemendy (1988). Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.
  25. Solomon Feferman, Tarski's Influence on Computer Science.
    The following is the text of an invited lecture for the LICS 2005 meeting held in Chicago June 26-29, 2005.1 Except for the addition of references, footnotes, corrections of a few points and stylistic changes, the text is essentially as delivered. Subsequent to the lecture I received interesting comments from several colleagues that would have led me to expand on some of the topics as well as the list of references, had I had the time to do so.
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  26. Juliet Floyd (2001). Prose Versus Proof: Wittgenstein on Gödel, Tarski and Truth. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):280-307.
    A survey of current evidence available concerning Wittgenstein's attitude toward, and knowledge of, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, including his discussions with Turing, Watson and others in 1937–1939, and later testimony of Goodstein and Kreisel; 2) Discussion of the philosophical and historical importance of Wittgenstein's attitude toward Gödel's and other theorems in mathematical logic, contrasting this attitude with that of, e.g., Penrose; 3) Replies to an instructive criticism of my 1995 paper by Mark Steiner which assesses the importance of Tarski's semantical (...)
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  27. Chris Foster (2000). On Tarski's Theory of Logical Consequence. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):125-132.
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  28. John F. Fox (1989). What Were Tarski's Truth-Definitions For? History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (2):165-179.
    Tarski's manner of defining truth is generally considered highly significant. About why, there is less consensus. I argue first, that in his truth-definitions Tarski was trying to solve a set of philosophical problems; second, that he solved them successfully; third, that all of these that are simply problems about defining truth are as well or better solved by a simpler account of truth. But one of his crucial problems remains: to give an account of validity, one requires an account not (...)
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  29. Harvey Friedman, Interpretations, According to Tarski.
    The notion of interpretation is absolutely fundamental to mathematical logic and the foundations of mathematics. It is also crucial for the foundations and philosophy of science - although here some crucial conditions generally need to be imposed; e.g., “the interpretation leaves the mathematical concepts unchanged”.
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  30. Greg Frost-Arnold (2004). Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism? History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
    Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Hartry Field, claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism—the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not reveal Tarski to be inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that Tarski's only published remarks that speak approvingly (...)
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  31. Steven Givant (1986). Bibliography of Alfred Tarski. Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (4):913-941.
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  32. Mario Gómez-torrente (2009). Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):249-297.
    I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarskis views on the logical correctness of certain omega-arguments, on the Tarskian proof that Etchemendy took to be modal and fallacious, and on Tarskicommon concept of consequence”.
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  33. Mario Gómez-Torrente, Alfred Tarski. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  34. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1998). On a Fallacy Attributed to Tarski. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (4):227-234.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski?s paper ?On the concept of logical consequence? and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. Some (...)
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  35. Mario Gómez-Torrente (1996). Tarski on Logical Consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (1):125-151.
    This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the -rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, (...)
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  36. Nicholas Griffin (1978). Supervaluations and Tarski. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (2):297-298.
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  37. Rafał Gruszczyński & Andrzej Pietruszczak (2008). Full Development of Tarski's Geometry of Solids. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):481-540.
    In this paper we give probably an exhaustive analysis of the geometry of solids which was sketched by Tarski in his short paper [20, 21]. We show that in order to prove theorems stated in [20, 21] one must enrich Tarski's theory with a new postulate asserting that the universe of discourse of the geometry of solids coincides with arbitrary mereological sums of balls, i.e., with solids. We show that once having adopted such a solution Tarski's Postulate 4 can be (...)
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  38. Susan Haack (1976). Is It True What They Say About Tarski? Philosophy 51 (197):323 - 336.
    Popper welcomes Tarski's theory of truth as a vindication of the ‘objective or absolute or correspondence theory of truth’: -/- Tarski's greatest achievement, and the real significance of his theory for the philosophy of the empirical sciences, is that he rehabilitated the correspondence theory of absolute or objective truth … He vindicated the free use of the intuitive idea of truth as correspondence to the facts ….
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  39. Volker Halbach (1995). Tarski Hierarchies. Erkenntnis 43 (3):339 - 367.
    The general notions of object- and metalanguage are discussed and as a special case of this relation an arbitrary first order language with an infinite model is expanded by a predicate symbol T0 which is interpreted as truth predicate for . Then the expanded language is again augmented by a new truth predicate T1 for the whole language plus T0. This process is iterated into the transfinite to obtain the Tarskian hierarchy of languages. It is shown that there are natural (...)
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  40. William H. Hanson (1999). Ray on Tarski on Logical Consequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.
    In "Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski" (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617-677), Greg Ray defends Tarski's account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray's defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence and should be replaced by a stronger (...)
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  41. Jonathan Harrison (1998). The Trouble with Tarski. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):1-22.
    As a result of thinking (pace Tarski, wrongly) that it is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false, it has been supposed (also wrongly) that propositions such as that ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white are necessarily true. But changing the rules for the use of the words in a sentence has no effect on the truth of the proposition, only on what proposition it formulates. Many similar statements, e.g., that ‘plus’ does not (...)
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  42. Richard Heck (1997). Tarski, Truth, and Semantics. Philosophical Review 106 (4):533-554.
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
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  43. Jaakko Hintikka (1975). A Counterexample to Tarski-Type Truth-Definitions as Applied to Natural Languages. Philosophia 5 (3):207-212.
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  44. Wilfrid Hodges (1986). Alfred Tarski. Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (4):866-868.
  45. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1980). Tarski and Proper Classes. Analysis 40 (4):6-11.
    In this paper the authors argue that if Tarski’s definition of truth for the calculus of classes is correct, then set theories which assert the existence of proper classes (classes which are not the member of anything) are incorrect.
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  46. Dale Jacquette (2010). Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326.
    Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to particular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata themselves involve general truth functions, and in particular (...)
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  47. Richard C. Jennings (1987). Tarski - a Dilemma. Inquiry 30 (1 & 2):155 – 172.
    Tarski's correspondence theory of truth (which he spells out in his semantic conception of truth) is open to two interpretations. This ambiguity in the theory has led philosophers to find support in it for metaphysical realism. In fact, Tarski's theory turns out to support a form of ontological relativism. In different passages Tarski himself gives support to each of these interpretations. The first interpretation leads to ontological relativism, while the second sacrifices the connection between language and the world. I clarify (...)
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  48. Richard C. Jennings (1987). Is It True What Haack Says About Tarski? Philosophy 62 (240):237 - 243.
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  49. Bjarni Jónsson (1986). The Contributions of Alfred Tarski to General Algebra. Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (4):883-889.
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  50. S. Körner (1955). Undecidable Theories. By Alfred Tarski in Collaboration with Andrzej Mostowski and Raphael M. Robinson. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. 1953. Pp. 98. Price 18s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 30 (114):278-.
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