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  1. George Allan (1997). Ferré, Frederick. Being and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 50 (3):656-658.
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  2. Jamin Asay & S. Seth Bordner (2015). A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism. Synthese 192 (1):147-161.
    As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its observable respects. For manifestationalists, science aims only at providing theories that are true to the observed (...)
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  3. Daniel Attala Pochon (1997). Dos escepticismos y desafío escéptico en The Advancement of Science, de Philip Kitcher (Two Skepticism and Skeptic Challenge in Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science). Theoria 12 (2):317-335.
    En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el escepticismo (...)
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  4. Babette E. Babich, Debra B. Bergoffen & Simon Glynn (eds.) (1995). Continental and Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science. Avebury.
  5. A. Bain (1889). The Empiricist Position. Mind 14 (55):369-392.
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  6. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan Jr & Ken A. Aho (forthcoming). Empiricism and/or Instrumentalism? Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Elliott Sober is both an empiricist and an instrumentalist. His empiricism rests on a principle called actualism, whereas his instrumentalism violates this. This violation generates a tension in his work. We argue that Sober is committed to a conflicting methodological imperative because of this tension. Our argument illuminates the contemporary debate between realism and empiricism which is increasingly focused on the application of scientific inference to testing scientific theories. Sober’s position illustrates how the principle of actualism drives a wedge between (...)
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  7. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2011). An Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):95-108.
    The meaning of scientific propositions is not always expressible in terms of observable phenomena. Such propositions involve generalizations, and also terms that are theoretical constructs. I study here how to assess the meaning of scientific propositions, that is, the specific import of theoretical terms. Empiricists have expressed a concern that scientific propositions, and theoretical terms, should always be, to some degree, related to observable consequences. We can see that the former empiricist criterion of meaning only implies for theoretical terms not (...)
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  8. Ruben Berrios, Anti-Realism and Aesthetic Cognition.
    Ruben Berrios Queen’s University Belfast Anti-realism and Aesthetic Cognition Abstract At the core of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the relation between scientific theory and the world. The realist possesses a mimetic conception of the relation between theory and reality. For the realist, scientific theories represent reality. The anti-realist, in contrast, seeks to understand the relations between theory and world in non-mimetic terms. We will examine Cartwright’s simulacrum account of explanation in order to illuminate (...)
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  9. Sandy C. Boucher (2014). What is a Philosophical Stance? Paradigms, Policies and Perspectives. Synthese 191 (10):2315-2332.
    Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In (...)
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  10. Matthew J. Brown (2009). Models and Perspectives on Stage: Remarks on Giere's Scientific Perspectivism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):213-220.
    Ron Giere's recent book Scientific Perspectivism sets out an account of science that attempts to forge a via media between two popular extremes: absolutist, objectivist realism on the one hand, and social constructivism or skeptical anti-realism on the other. The key for Giere is to treat both scientific observation and scientific theories as perspectives, which are limited, partial, contingent, context-, agent- and purpose-dependent, and pluralism-friendly, while nonetheless world-oriented and modestly realist. Giere's perspectivism bears significant similarly to early writings by Paul (...)
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  11. Jordi Cat (2012). Essay Review:Scientific Pluralism* Stephen H. Kellert , Helen E. Longino , and C. Kenneth Waters , Eds., Scientific Pluralism . Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 19. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (2006), Xxix+248 Pp., $50.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 79 (2):317-325.
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  12. Anjan Chakravartty (2004). Stance Relativism: Empiricism Versus Metaphysics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):173-184.
    In The empirical stance, Bas van Fraassen argues for a reconceptualization of empiricism, and a rejection of its traditional rival, speculative metaphysics, as part of a larger and provocative study in epistemology. Central to his account is the notion of voluntarism in epistemology, and a concomitant understanding of the nature of rationality. In this paper I give a critical assessment of these ideas, with the ultimate goal of clarifying the nature of debate between metaphysicians and empiricists, and more specifically, between (...)
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  13. Steve Clarke & Tymothy D. Lyons (eds.) (2002). Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Springer.
  14. Gabriele Contessa (2010). Empiricist Structuralism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Bridging Problem. Analysis 70 (3):514-524.
    [This paper is part of a book symposium on Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (OUP, 2010)].
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  15. Gabriele Contessa (2009). Review of Bas C. Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
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  16. Sharon L. Crasnow (2000). How Natural Can Ontology Be? Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
    Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of "natural" in NOA is "nonphilosophical," but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical (...)
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  17. Richard Creath (1985). Taking Theories Seriously. Synthese 62 (3):317 - 345.
    This paper defends scientific realism, the doctrine that we should interpret theories as being just as ontologically committing as beliefs at the observational level. I examine the character of observation to show that the difference in interpretation suggested by anti-realists is unwarranted. Second, I discuss Wilfrid Sellars'' approach to the issue. Finally, I provide a detailed study of recent work by Bas van Fraassen. While van Fraassen''s work is the focus of the paper, the conclusions are far broader: That a (...)
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  18. Richard De Brasi & Joseph R. Laracy (2013). An Empirical Critique of Empiricism. Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 16 (4):124-163.
    [A] thorough definition of empiricism is no simple task. In this article, we will instead attempt an overarching exposition of two overlapping but divergent paradigms of empiricism: (a) strict empiricism, representing most of the British empiricists and ancient skeptics and (b) mitigated, or metaphysical,1 empiricism represented by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Sense experience is the unifying departure point for both, but while (b) says that human knowledge begins with sense experience, (a) tends to ultimately reduce knowledge to sense experience. (...)
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  19. Herman C. D. G. De Regt (2006). To Believe in Belief. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):21-39.
    Take the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did not believe (...)
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  20. C. F. Delaney (1978). Basic Propositions, Empiricism and Science. In Joseph Pitt (ed.), The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions. D. Reidel. 41--55.
    In this paper I would like to explore Sellars' answers to these general epistemological questions in order to get clear about the sense in which he can be said to be in the empiricist tradition broadly construed and to ascertain what resources he has available to demarcate science from other (rationally acceptable or unacceptable) forms of inquiry. My contention will be that to the degree that one moves away from the notion of basic empirical proposition in the strong sense it (...)
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  21. Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (1954). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
    This classic work in the philosophy of physical science is an incisive and readable account of the scientific method. Pierre Duhem was one of the great figures in French science, a devoted teacher, and a distinguished scholar of the history and philosophy of science. This book represents his most mature thought on a wide range of topics.
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  22. Catherine Z. Elgin (2010). Keeping Things in Perspective. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 150 (3):439 - 447.
    Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective. They describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen argues otherwise. If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be grounded in evidence. Since evidence is perspectivai, science cannot vindicate its claims using only utterly objective representations. For science to do its epistemic job, it must involve perspectivai representations. I explicate this argument and show its power.
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  23. Patrick Enfield (2008). P. Kyle Stanford Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):881-895.
  24. Herbert Feigl (1958). Critique of Intuition According to Scientific Empiricism. Philosophy East and West 8 (1/2):1-16.
  25. Paul Feyerabend (1981). Realism, Rationalism, and Scientific Method. Cambridge University Press.
    Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influentical approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume (...)
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  26. Curtis Forbes (2009). REVIEW: Bas van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW] Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):236-238.
  27. Greg Frost-Arnold (2011). Putting the 'Empiricism' in 'Logical Empiricism': The Director's Cut. [REVIEW] Metascience 20 (2):373-376.
    Putting the ‘empiricism’ in ‘logical empiricism’: the director’s cut Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9444-x Authors Greg Frost-Arnold, Department of Philosophy, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY 14456, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  28. Carlo Gabbani & Marc Lange (2011). Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation. Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 2 (3):245-256.
  29. Carlo Gabbani & Marc Lange (2009). Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective di Bas van Fraassen. [REVIEW] Iride 22 (3):707-720.
  30. Lucia Galovičová (2011). Fraassen, B. C. van: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW] Filozofia 66:386-390.
  31. Michel Ghins (2015). Representing and Measuring: Discussing van Fraassen’s Views. Metascience 24 (1):31-35.
    Representation and models have been the focus of considerable interest in philosophy of science for several decades. But the publication in 2008 of Bas van Fraassen’s important book Scientific representation: Paradoxes of perspective gave a novel and strong impetus to the study of their role in the dynamic of scientific knowledge, as attested by the growing quantity of papers and conferences related to representation. In science, knowing necessarily involves representing—phenomena at least and perhaps more for the scientific realist—by means of (...)
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  32. Michel Ghins (2011). Models, Truth and Realism: Assessing Bas van Fraassen's Views on Scientific Representation. Manuscrito 34 (1):207-232.
    This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen’s views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic” construal of theories does not give proper due to the (...)
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  33. Ronald Giere (2006). Perspectival Pluralism. In ¸ Itekellersetal:Sp. 26--41.
    In this paper I explore the extent to which a perspectival understanding of scientific knowledge supports forms of “scientific pluralism.” I will not initially attempt to formulate a general characterization of either perspectivism or scientific pluralism. I assume only that both are opposed to two extreme views. The one extreme is a (monistic) metaphysical realism according to which there is in principle one true and complete theory of everything. The other extreme is a constructivist relativism according to which scientific claims (...)
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  34. Ronald N. Giere (2009). Bas C. Van Fraassen: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective,. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 76 (1).
  35. Ronald N. Giere (2006). Scientific Perspectivism. University of Chicago Press.
    Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn (...)
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  36. Clark Noren Glymour (1969). Theories: An Examination of the Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science. Dissertation, Indiana University
  37. Fred Ivan Goldberg (1969). Empiricism and Necessary Truth. Dissertation, Brandeis University
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  38. Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb (ed.) (2008). Reduction and elimination in philosophy and the sciences : papers of the 31th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  39. Patrick A. Heelan (1982). Hermeneutical Realism and Scientific Observation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:77 - 87.
    Using the methods of hermeneutic phenomenology, and against the background of the principle that the real is what is or can be given in a public way in perception as a state of the World, and of the thesis established elsewhere that acts of perception are always epistemic, contextual, and hermeneutical, the writer proposes that objects of scientific observation are perceptual objects, states of the World described by theoretical scientific terms and, therefore, real. This thesis of Hermeneutical Realism is proved (...)
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  40. Anja Jauernig (2007). Must Empiricism Be a Stance, and Could It Be One? How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
    In his recent book, The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen forcefully raises the question of what a philosophical position can or should be. He mainly discusses this question with regard to empiricism but his discussion makes it clear that he takes his proposed answer to be generalizable: not only empiricism but philosophical positions in general should be understood as stances rather than dogmata. The first part of this essay is devoted to an examination of van Fraassen’s critique of ‘naïve’ or (...)
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  41. Kareem Khalifa (2011). Understanding, Knowledge, and Scientific Antirealism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):93-112.
    Epistemologists have recently debated whether understanding is a species of knowledge. However, because they have offered little in the way of a detailed analysis of understanding, they lack the resources to resolve this issue. In this paper, I propose that S understands why p if and only if S has the non-Gettierised true belief that p, and for some proposition q, S has the non-Gettierised true belief that q is the best available explanation of p, S can correctly explain p (...)
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  42. A. Kukla (2010). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, by P. Kyle Stanford. Mind 119 (473):243-246.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  43. James Ladyman, Otávio Bueno, Mauricio Suárez & Bas van Fraassen (2011). Scientific Representation: A Long Journey From Pragmatics to Pragmatics. [REVIEW] Metascience 20 (3):417-442.
    Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Journal Metascience Online (...)
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  44. Larry Laudan (1990). Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. The University of Chicago Press.
    Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science Larry Laudan. the mouths of my realist, relativist, and positivist. (By contrast, there is at least one person who hews to the line I have my prag- matist defending.) But I have gone to some  ...
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  45. Jean Leroux (1987). The Structuralist View of Theories and Empiricism. Dialectica 41 (4):321-326.
  46. Dachun Liu & Yongmou Liu (2009). A Reflection on the Alternative Philosophy of Science. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):576-588.
    A prominent phenomenon in contemporary philosophy of science has been the unexpected rise of alternative philosophers of science. This article analyses in depth such alternative philosophers of science as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Michel Foucault, summarizing the similarities and differences between alternative philosophies of science and traditional philosophy of science so as to unveil the trends in contemporary philosophy of science. With its different principles and foundation, alternative philosophy of science has made breakthroughs in terms of its field of (...)
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  47. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part Three: Einstein, Aim-Oriented Empiricism and the Discovery of Special and General Relativity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):275-305.
    In this paper I show that Einstein made essential use of aim-oriented empiricism in scientific practice in developing special and general relativity. I conclude by considering to what extent Einstein came explicitly to advocate aim-oriented empiricism in his later years.
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  48. Sam Mitchell (2010). Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. By Bas C. Van Fraassen. Metaphilosophy 41 (5):717-722.
  49. Moti Mizrahi (2013). The Argument From Underconsideration and Relative Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.
    In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories (...)
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  50. Bradley Monton (2010). Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective - Bastiaan C. Van Fraassen. [REVIEW] Humana.Mente 13.
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