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  1. C. Bhattacharya (1982). Can an Empiricist Talk About The World? Indian Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265.
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  2. Yvon Gauthier (1995). La Philosophie des Sciences Une Introduction Critique.
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  3. Hannah Gay (1995). "Empiricism and Darwin's Science", by Fred Wilson. [REVIEW] Dialogue 34:176.
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  4. Michel Ghins (1997). Bas van Fraassen. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 95 (4):737-754.
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  5. M. J. S. Hodge (1993). Empiricism and Darwin's Science. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 26 (1):104-105.
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  6. Joseph Margolis (2002). On the Robust Possibilities of a Constructive Realism. Idealistic Studies 32 (1):37-51.
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  7. Mark Mercer (1990). Constructive Philosophy. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):130-131.
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  8. Sajahan Miah (1997). Constructionism: Russell's Resolution of Realism-Empiricism Dilemma. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 24 (4):481-496.
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  9. Eleonora Montuschi (1989). Scientific Metaphor and Theoretical Explanation: An Inquiry Into the Constructive Language of Postulation (PhD Thesis). Oxford University.
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  10. Charles W. Morris (1941). Scientific Empiricism. Philosophical Review 50:436.
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  11. Jacob Needleman (1993). Inner Empiricism as a Way to a Science of Consciousness. Noetic Sciences Review.
  12. George Edward Novack (1971). Empiricism and its Evolution a Marxist View. Pathfinder Press.
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  13. Yukinori Onishi (2011). Analyzing the Scientific Realism Debate From the Contextualist's Point of View. Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (2):2_65-2_81.
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  14. Paolo Parrini (2007). Episystemological Conventionalism in Geochronometic Problems. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 62 (4):711-741.
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  15. Lorenzo Peña (1990). Enlightened Empiricism. Theoria 5 (1-2):300-302.
  16. Piergiorgio Quadranti (2007). La Raison Constructrice: Essai de Réalisme Constructiviste Pour Une Ontologie Quantique. Peter Lang.
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  17. Randy Ramal (2008). Realism Without Empiricism: Wittgenstein and Whitehead. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7.
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  18. Stefan Sencerz (1993). Empiricism in Science and Ethics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):449-470.
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  19. James Seth (1893). The Truth of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 2 (5):544-556.
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  20. Daniel Fm Strauss (2005). A Transcendental-Empirical Interpretation of the “Verfremdung”-Procedure in Constructive Realism. In Friedrich Wallner, Martin J. Jandl & Kurt Greiner (eds.), Science, Medicine, and Culture: Festschrift for Fritz G. Wallner. Peter Lang.
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  21. Paul Studtmann (2010). Empiricism and the Problem of Metaphysics. Lexington Books.
    Empiricism and the Problem of Metaphysics develops and defends an empiricist solution to the problem of metaphysics, then examines the implications of such a solution for skeptical arguments and the is-ought gap. At the heart of the solution is an empirically verifiable empiricist view of the a priori.
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  22. Milos Taliga (2012). Realism and the Principle of Empiricism. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):273-290.
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  23. Cor van Dijkum (2005). Constructive Realism: Looking Back and Forward. In Friedrich Wallner, Martin J. Jandl & Kurt Greiner (eds.), Science, Medicine, and Culture: Festschrift for Fritz G. Wallner. Peter Lang.
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  24. Bas C. Van Fraassen & Jill Sigman (1993). Art as Representation. In George Levine (ed.), Realism and Representation. University of Wisconsin Press.
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  25. Donald Cary Williams (1966). Principles of Empirical Realism. Charles C. Thomas.
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Constructive Empiricism
  1. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2012). Constructive Empiricism Revisited. Metascience 21 (1):187-191.
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  2. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2006). Constructive Empiricism and Epistemic Modesty: Response to van Fraassen and Monton. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 64 (3):371-379.
    Bas van Fraassen claims that constructive empiricism strikes a balance between the empiricist’s commitments to epistemic modesty – that one’s opinion should extend no further beyond the deliverances of experience than is necessary – and to the rationality of science. In “Should the Empiricist be a Constructive Empiricist?” I argued that if the constructive empiricist follows through on her commitment to epistemic modesty she will find herself adopting a much more extreme position than van Fraassen suggests. Van Fraassen and Bradley (...)
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  3. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2004). Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience. [REVIEW] Synthese 140 (3):331-353.
    I. Introduction “We can and do see the truth about many things: ourselves, others, trees and animals, clouds and rivers—in the immediacy of experience.”1 Absent from Bas van Fraassen’s list of those things we see are paramecia and mitochondria. We do not see such things, van Fraassen has long maintained, because they are unobservable, that is, they are undetectable by means of the unaided senses.2 But notice that these two notions—what we can see in the “immediacy” of experience and what (...)
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  4. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2004). Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience. [REVIEW] Synthese 140 (3):331-353.
    Van Fraassen maintains that the information that we canglean from experience is limited to those entities and processes that are detectable bymeans of our unaided senses. His challenge to the realist, I suggest, is that the attemptto inferentially transcend those limits amounts to a reversion to rationalism. Under pressurefrom such examples as microscopic observation, he has recently widened the scope of thephenomena to include object-like experiences without empirical objects of experience.With this change in mind, I argue that van Fraassen needs (...)
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  5. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2003). The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322.
  6. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2001). Should the Empiricist Be a Constructive Empiricist? Philosophy of Science 68 (4):413-431.
    Van Fraassen does not argue that everyone should be a constructive empiricist. He claims only that constructive empiricism (CE) is a coherent post-positivist alternative to realism, notwithstanding the realist's charge that CE is arbitrary and irrational. He does argue, however, that the empiricist is obliged to limit belief as CE prescribes. Criticism of CE has been largely directed at van Fraassen's claim that CE is a coherent option. Far less attention has been directed at his claim that empiricists should be (...)
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  7. Jamin Asay (2009). Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth. Philosophy of Science 76 (4):423-443.
    Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth (...)
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  8. Jamin Asay (2007). Truth in Constructive Empiricism. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    Constructive empiricism, the scientific anti-realism championed by Bas van Fraassen, claims to offer an adequate reconstruction of the aim and practice of scientific inquiry without adopting the inflationary metaphysical excesses of scientific realism. In articulating the positions of the realist and the empiricist, van Fraassen freely makes use of the concept of truth. Theories of truth come in a variety of flavors, some more metaphysically stark than others. Deflationary theories of truth, for instance, boast of the ability to offer a (...)
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  9. Jamin Asay & S. Seth Bordner (2015). A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism. Synthese 192 (1):147-161.
    As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its observable respects. For manifestationalists, science aims only at providing theories that are true to the observed (...)
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  10. R. J. B. (1982). The Scientific Image. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):636-638.
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  11. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (1997). On an Inconsistency in Constructive Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):511-514.
    I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory.
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  12. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (1995). Constructive Empiricism: From a Theory of Empirical Adequacy to a Theory of Acceptance. Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    I begin chapter I by discussing two key distinctions that constitute the core of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism: a distinction between observables and unobservables and a distinction between acceptance and belief with regard to a theory. To support constructive empiricism, van Fraassen also deploys two epistemological principles: only actual observations are to be taken as evidence and possible evidence is all that can be rationally inferred from the actual evidence. I reject both principle and van Fraassen's construal of observation. As (...)
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  13. Jeffrey A. Barrett (2009). Review of Bas C. Van Fraassen: Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 106 (11).
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  14. Vadim Batitsky (1998). Empiricism and the Myth of Fundamental Measurement. Synthese 116 (1):51 - 73.
  15. Peter Baumann (2011). Empiricism, Stances, and the Problem of Voluntarism. Synthese 178 (1):27-36.
    Classical empiricism leads to notorious problems having to do with the (at least prima facie) lack of an acceptable empiricist justification of empiricism itself. Bas van Fraassen claims that his idea of the “empirical stance” can deal with such problems. I argue, however, that this view entails a very problematic form of voluntarism which comes with the threat of latent irrationality and normative inadequacy. However, there is also a certain element of truth in such a voluntarism. The main difficulty consists (...)
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  16. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2011). An Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):95-108.
    The meaning of scientific propositions is not always expressible in terms of observable phenomena. Such propositions involve generalizations, and also terms that are theoretical constructs. I study here how to assess the meaning of scientific propositions, that is, the specific import of theoretical terms. Empiricists have expressed a concern that scientific propositions, and theoretical terms, should always be, to some degree, related to observable consequences. We can see that the former empiricist criterion of meaning only implies for theoretical terms not (...)
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  17. Alexander Bird (2003). Kuhn, Nominalism, and Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):690-719.
    In this paper I draw a connection between Kuhn and the empiricist legacy, specifically between his thesis of incommensurability, in particular in its later taxonomic form, and van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. I show that if it is the case the empirically equivalent but genuinely distinct theories do exist, then we can expect such theories to be taxonomically incommensurable. I link this to Hacking's claim that Kuhn was a nominalist. I also argue that Kuhn and van Fraassen do not differ as (...)
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  18. Sandy C. Boucher (2014). What is a Philosophical Stance? Paradigms, Policies and Perspectives. Synthese 191 (10):2315-2332.
    Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In (...)
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  19. Warren Bourgeois (1987). On Rejecting Foss's Image of Van Fraassen. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):303-308.
    Foss's critique of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is shown to be completely wide of the mark (Foss 1984, van Fraassen 1980). Foss misunderstands van Fraassen's use of the terms 'observable', 'phenomena', 'empirical adequacy', and 'epistemic community'. He misconstrues constructive empiricism as making knowledge, and perhaps existence, dependent on the observer. On the basis of this error, he attempts to reduce constructive empiricism to skepticism. None of his criticisms are to the point.
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  20. Richard N. Boyd (1985). Lex Orandi Ast Lex Credendi. In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. University of Chicago Press.
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  21. Bryson Brown (2004). The Pragmatics of Empirical Adequacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):242 – 264.
    Empirical adequacy is a central notion in van Fraassen's empiricist view of science. I argue that van Fraassen's account of empirical adequacy in terms of a partial isomorphism between certain structures in some model(s) of the theory and certain actual structures (the observables) in the world, is untenable. The empirical adequacy of a theory can only be tested in the context of an accepted practice of observation. But because the theory itself does not determine the correct practice of observation, its (...)
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  22. F. A. I. Buekens & F. A. Muller (2012). Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism. Erkenntnis 76 (1):91-100.
    By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.
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  23. Otávio Bueno (2008). Scientific Representation and Nominalism: An Empiricist View. Principia 12 (2):177-192.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p177 Can a constructive empiricist make sense of scientific representation? Usually, a scientific model is an abstract entity (e.g., formulated in set theory), and scientific representation is conceptualized as an intentional relation between scientific models and certain aspects of the world. On this conception, since both the models and the representation relation are abstract, a constructive empiricist, who is not committed to the existence of abstract entities, would be unable to invoke these notions to make sense of scientific representation. In (...)
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  24. Otávio Bueno (1999). What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting. Erkenntnis 50 (1):55-81.
    In this paper a constructive empiricist account of scientific change is put forward. Based on da Costa's and French's partial structures approach, two notions of empirical adequacy are initially advanced (with particular emphasis on the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy). Using these notions, it is shown how both the informativeness and the empirical adequacy requirements of an empiricist theory of scientific change can then be met. Finally, some philosophical consequences with regard to the role of structures in this context (...)
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  25. Nancy Cartwright (2007). Why Be Hanged for Even a Lamb? In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
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