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  1. Peter Alexander (1950). Other People's Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51:25-46.
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  2. Karl Ameriks (1973). Plantinga and Other Minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):285-91.
    Alvin plantinga has presented various counterexamples to the argument from analogy for other minds. I argue that the implausibility of the counterexample inferences plantinga offers depends not on a weakness essential to the analogical argument but rather on features peculiar to the inferences he provides. My procedure is to establish a number of necessary conditions for any acceptable analogical argument and then to show plantinga's counterexamples fail to meet these conditions. I then construct an analogical argument for other minds which (...)
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  3. Bruce Aune (1961). The Problem of Other Minds. Philosophical Review 70 (July):320-339.
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  4. Anita Avramides (2001). Other Minds. Routledge.
    How do I know whether there are any minds beside my own? This problem of other minds in philosophy raises questions which are at the heart of all philosophical investigations--how it is that we know, what is in the mind, and whether we can be certain about any of our beliefs. In this book, Anita Avramides begins with a historical overview of the problem from the Ancient Skeptics to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Wittgenstein. The second part of the (...)
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  5. Theodore Bach (2011). Structure-Mapping: Directions From Simulation to Theory. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.
    The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. I propose a “dynamic” hybrid that is informed by recent work on the nature of similarity cognition. I claim that Gentner’s model of structure-mapping allows us to understand simulation (...)
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  6. Jules Belford (1972). A Note on Hampshire's Analogy. Mind 81 (October):600.
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  7. Thomas W. Bestor (1978). Analogy and the Concept of Behaviour. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):3-20.
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  8. Theodore W. Budlong (1975). Analogy, Induction and Other Minds. Analysis 35 (January):111-112.
    Alvin plantinga and michael slote, Following ayer, Have attempted to formulate the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds as an enumerative induction. Their way of avoiding the 'generalizing from a single case' objection is shown to be fallacious.
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  9. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1962). Criteria, Analogy, and Knowledge of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 59 (September):533-546.
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  10. Herbert Feigl (1959). Other Minds and the Egocentric Predicament. Journal of Philosophy 56:980-87.
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  11. Melissa Frankel (2009). Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds. Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  12. Erik Gotlind (1954). Mr Hampshire on the Analogy of Feeling. Mind 63 (October):519-524.
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  13. Stuart N. Hampshire (1952). The Analogy of Feeling. Mind 61 (January):1-12.
    In this article the author is concerned with the justification of the knowledge of other minds by virtue of statements of other people's feelings based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. The author argues that they are not logically peculiar or invalid, When considered as inductive arguments. The author also proposes that solipsism is a linguistically absurd thesis, While at the same time stopping to (...)
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  14. C. D. Hardie (1939). Our Knowledge of Other Minds. Philosophy of Science 6 (3):309-317.
    I give some reason for accepting a form of the view that there is some logical, And not just contingent, Connection between publicly observable behavior and a person's psychological states. If my contentions are sound, They open the way to the enterprise of delineating a stratification of psychological state concepts. This involves determining which mental concepts are logically connected to observable behavior and how the other categories of mental states are specified on the basis of these.
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  15. Jane Heal (2000). Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 74 (74):1-19.
  16. Alec Hyslop (1975). A Reply to Don Locke. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-69.
  17. Alec Hyslop & Frank Jackson (1972). The Analogical Inference to Other Minds. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (June):168-76.
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  18. Don Locke (1973). Just What is Wrong with the Argument From Analogy? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (August):153-56.
    A reply to hyslop and jackson, American philosophical quarterly, April 1972: I argue that the argument form analogy begs the question, Much as does the inductive justification of induction, Of which it is a version.
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  19. J. W. Meiland (1966). Analogy, Verification, and Other Minds. Mind 75 (October):564-568.
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  20. W. W. Mellor (1956). Three Problems About Other Minds. Mind 65 (April):200-217.
  21. Anne H. Narveson (1966). Evidential Necessity and Other Minds. Mind 75 (January):114-121.
  22. María G. Navarro (2006). Analogía, Prudencia y Abducción En la Racionalidad Interpretativa. In Mauricio Beuchot (ed.), Contextos de la hermenéutica analógica. Editorial Torres Asociados.
  23. Thomas M. Olshewsky (1974). The Analogical Argument for Knowledge of Other Minds Reconsidered. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):63-69.
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  24. Alvin Plantinga (1965). Comment on Paul Ziff's The Simplicity of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 62 (October):585-586.
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  25. H. H. Price (1938). Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds. Philosophy 13 (52):425-56.
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  26. Stephen Prior & Henrik Rosenmeier (1979). Other Minds and the Argument From. Philosophical Investigations 2:12-33.
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  27. Stephen Prior & Henrik Rosenmeier (1979). Other Minds and the Arment From Analogy. Philosophical Investigations 2 (4):12-33.
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  28. C. D. Rollins (1948). Professor Ayer's Query on 'Other Minds'. Analysis 8 (June):87-92.
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  29. Bertrand Russell (2009). Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Routledge.
    First published in 1948, this provocative work contributed significantly to an explosive intellectual discourse that continues to this day.
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  30. Bertrand Russell (1948). Analogy. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Simon and Schuster.
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  31. Paul T. Sagal & Gunnar Borg (1993). The Range Principle and the Problem of Other Minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):477-91.
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  32. Charles Sayward (2003). A Defense of Mill on Other Minds. Dialectica 57 (3):315–322.
    This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
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  33. Richard I. Sikora (1977). The Argument From Analogy is Not an Argument for Other Mnds. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):137-41.
    If the argument from analogy is an argument for other minds it must rely on a single case, The correlation of your mind with your body. If instead it only attempts to show that certain sorts of experiences are associated with other bodies, It can rely on innumerable correlations of your experiences with your behavior. Having determined in this way that ostensive memories are associated with another body and that they are the kind one would expect if one mind had (...)
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  34. Karsten Stueber (2006). Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psycholgy, and the Human Sciences. MIT Press.
    I do not consider these objections to be able to dislodge my arguments for the epistemic centrality of empathy for understanding agency, since the empathy view is not in fact committed to an implausible Cartesian view of the mind. But I do ...
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  35. James F. Thomson (1951). The Argument From Analogy and the Problem of Other Minds. Mind 60:336-50.
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  36. Anik Waldow (2009). David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds. Continuum.
    Other minds and their place in the Hume-literature -- A modern approach -- Scepticism versus naturalism -- The vulgar and the philosopher -- Relative ideas -- Concepts of the real -- Intuition and common sense -- Epistemic responsibility -- Degeneration of reason -- Just philosophy -- Conceiving minds -- Abstraction -- Argument from analogy -- Sympathy -- Limitations -- Generality -- Hume's concept of mind -- The world and the other -- Habit and intersubjective responsiveness -- Belief and education -- (...)
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  37. Richard Wollheim (1952). Hampshire's Analogy. Mind 61 (October):567-573.
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